PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

BOOK I. AND BOOK II. CC. I.—X.

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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

THE PROEM

TO THE

IDEAL COMMONWEALTH OF PLATO

[AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LANGUAGE AND METHOD OF THE 'SOCRATIC' DIALOGUES]

WITH INTRODUCTION
AND CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

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PREFACE.

THE construction of the ideal commonwealth in the *Republic* does not begin till the eleventh chapter of the second book. The composition of the work as a whole is discussed in the following Introduction §§ 57 sqq., and it is there sufficiently shewn that we may either detach the first book as an independent dialogue, or divide from the remainder, as the 'Proem,' all the matter which leads up to the words *γίγνεται τοίνυν πόλις* (Steph. p. 369 B). For the purposes of a modern educational book the latter division is preferable, inasmuch as the first ten chapters of Book II., intended by Plato to link his 'Socratic' discussion *περὶ δικαίου* to his more advanced Platonic philosophy of the state, are only an elaboration of arguments more briefly urged in Book I., and are still concerned purely with the subject of Justice. The *μακρολογία* of the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus is useful also as a lesson in Platonic style, of which the dialectic *βραχυλογία* of the first book affords but a partial notion. Whether for instruction in Greek or in Plato it is manifestly profitable for both portions to be studied together.

The present edition of what I have called the 'Proem' is primarily intended for the use of classical students in the Universities and the higher forms of schools.

For their purposes the analysis of the matter and the comments thereupon—which are, it is hoped, strictly relevant to the text—have been designed to serve as an introduction to the study of the 'Socratic' dialogues in general. The notes have also been written with the same intention in regard to Platonic Greek. Apart from their intrinsic value as classic monuments of thought and style, the books of Plato, as of other Greek writers, are read, and will continue to be read, for the study of Greek philology, and an editor of an educational volume can only use his best judgment in determining how far he may seasonably consult the interests of that study. It cannot be held that the last word has been said upon the niceties of either Greek in general or Platonic Greek in particular, nor, to judge from prevailing texts, are certain well authenticated points of grammar, form and usage so generally recognised as they should be. The notes, therefore, while dealing with exegesis in its various departments, do not neglect the discussion of such forms and uses as seem to be involved in the establishment of the exact text and the determination of Greek as Plato wrote it.

Meanwhile the contributions to textual criticism are addressed partly to the University student (who may be assumed to neglect no department of philological study), and partly to the consideration of more advanced scholars. The critical footnotes do not represent a full *apparatus criticus*, but only a selection of such matter as appears helpful to the critic of the special text or instructive to the general student of philology.

In the preparation of this book I have derived the usual help from Bekker's variorum edition of Plato and from Stallbaum. I have also had before me the recent suggestive work of Jowett and Campbell, and have found

the essays of Professor Campbell of much assistance. M. Lutoslawski's new *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* has aided in establishing views at which I had already arrived concerning the date of the first book. No one who has studied the work of Grote and Zeller can very well say how much he owes to them; nor, in the region of the text, is it easy to assess one's debt to Schanz. It would be ungrateful not to mention also the indirect help derived from a previous use of Mr Adam's scholarly editions of separate dialogues. His critical text of the *Republic* has come to hand only after the completion of my own work and in time to permit of no more than a brief mention at one or two points in the critical notes. I find that I differ from Mr Adam in respect of sundry forms adopted in the text, and that fact serves as a justification after the event for certain notes which might possibly have been thought superfluous.

I am much indebted to Dr Leeper, Warden of Trinity College in this University, for rigorously examining the proofs of the entire work and affording me the ready help of his ripe learning and taste. More than ordinary thanks are also due to the reader at the Cambridge Press, whose conscientious watchfulness has prevented no few inaccuracies, sometimes more than typographical, from appearing in the book.

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INTRODUCTION.

I. THE FIRST BOOK OF THE REPUBLIC AND ITS CONTENTS.

1. The **Republic** is a narration by Socrates himself of a certain dialogue in which he bore the chief share.

a. The Platonic dialogues are variously introduced. The author was naturally as desirous of avoiding a uniform machinery as of avoiding a monotonous style.

Methods of introducing the Platonic dialogues.

(i) For the most part they are immediately, and without preface, dialogues, Socrates being merely one of the *personae*, who are distinguished for the reader just as they are in a drama, or in Landor's Imaginary Conversations, by prefixing the name of the speaker in each instance. This is the case with the **Laches**, **Euthyphro**, **Crito**, **Meno**, **Gorgias**, **Phaedrus**, **Timaeus**, **Philebus**, **&c**., and is therefore in itself no mark of either earlier or later production.

(ii) The **Republic**, like the **Lysis** and **Charmides**, begins as a narrative told by Socrates. This device necessitates the frequent and rather embarrassing use of 'said I,' 'said he'; but, on the other hand, it allows of picturesque touches of personal description, and makes it possible to impart a background.

(iii) In the **Parmenides** the device is varied. It is not Socrates who reports the dialogue, but a certain Cephalus, who repeats what was narrated to him by Antiphon. So in the **Symposium** Apollodorus relates how he told to a companion a Socratic dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus.

(iv) In the **Protagoras** and the **Euthydemus** methods (i) and (ii) are combined. Each piece opens as a conversation between Socrates and a friend, but continues as a narrative, in which Socrates rehearses the discussion to his companion and enlivens it with dramatic touches.

(v) It is also possible to combine devices (i) and (iii). Thus the **Phaedo** begins as a conversation between Phaedo and Echecrates, which leads to the relation by Phaedo of a Socratic dialogue on the immortality of the soul. In the **Theaetetus** Euclid and Terpsion are conversing at Megara: Theaetetus is mentioned; and this recalls a dialogue which Theaetetus had once enjoyed with Socrates and had reported to Euclid, who wrote it out. Euclid does not, however, repeat the dialogue from memory, but has it read by a slave.

b. It may be added that in the first class, the dialogues pure and simple, there is a noticeable distinction between the regular custom of the earlier pieces (e.g. the **Laches** or **Crito**), in which the preliminary conversation is made to lead up to the discussion proper, and the abruptness of the later productions (e.g. the **Philebus** or even the **Meno**), in which the pretence of an excuse for the disputation is abandoned and the discussion opened without prelude of any kind.

2. The dialogue is reported to an audience of four persons—Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates and another unnamed—on the day after its alleged occurrence.

Circumstances of the narration of the Republic.

a. The former fact does not appear in the **Republic** itself, but is proved by the opening of the **Timaeus**, where the same persons (except the nameless fourth) meet, on the morrow of this narration, to carry on the dialogue of the **Timaeus**. There Socrates exclaims *εἷς, δύο, τρεῖς. ὁ δὲ δὴ τέταρτος ἡμῖν, ὦ φίλε Τίμαιε, ποῦ, τῶν χθὲς μὲν δαιτυμόνων, τὰ νῦν δ' ἑστιατόρων;* That the 'feast' was the **Republic** is stated in the words (Tim. 17 B, C) *χθές που τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ῥηθέντων λόγων περὶ πολιτείας ἦν τὸ κεφάλαιον, οἵα τε καὶ ἐξ οἵων ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστη κατεφαίνετ' ἂν μοι γενέσθαι.*

The gathering at the Peiraeus.

3. **Socrates** and **Glaucon** had been down to the Peiraeus to the first festival of Bendis. Well pleased, they were starting cityward, when **Polemarchus**, son of Cephalus, caught sight of them and

sent a slave to stop them. **Polemarchus, Adeimantus,** Niceratus and some others soon came up. After a playful threat of compulsion, followed by temptation in the shape of a reminder that there is to be a *παννυχίς* and an opportunity of good talk with the young men, Polemarchus induces Socrates to accompany him home, where they find Lysias and Euthydemus (brothers of Polemarchus), **Thrasymachus** of Chalcedon, Charmantides, **Cleitophon**, and the aged **Cephalus.** The last named has just been sacrificing in the court, where he is now comfortably seated amid a ring of chairs. [**327 A—328 C**]

'Mimic' character of the earlier dialogues.

A. *a.* The notion of the dialogue as the suitable form for philosophic writings (employed, we are told, by the Eleatic Zeno before it was used by Plato) arose from familiarity with the drama and with its development, the mime. Of the latter, which is drama (or dramatic sketches) in prose and dealing with ordinary life and character, Sophron of Syracuse (circ. 450 B.C.) and his son Xenarchus were famous composers, and with these Plato is known to have made himself specially familiar. In the same city the comic poet Epicharmus had previously made a great step towards familiarising the reading world with philosophy in the form of dramatic dialogue, and the legend goes that Plato slept with the works of Epicharmus under his pillow. His own earlier compositions have much of the 'mimic' character. The words of Aristotle (Poet. I. 7), rightly understood, imply his recognition of a decided similarity between *τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους.*

A little social scene, with the picturesque accessories and accidents of real conversation, passes before the reader's eye. The figures of the dialogue are plainly visible, moving against a certain background and in a certain environment. Their various characters are sketched with that subtle economy of strokes which is part of the 'mimic' genius, whether in the material of language or of form and colour, a genius of *ἠθοποιία* in which Plato is inferior to none.

The opening of the **Republic** affords one example out of many of the 'mimic' element in Plato. The closest analogies from a formal point of view are in the **Charmides** ('I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas &c.') and the **Lysis** ('I was going

from the Academy straight to the Lyceum...and when I came to the postern-gate &c.'). Here the narrator gives us the picture, as Phaedo does in the dialogue of that name, or as Socrates himself again does in the **Euthydemus.** At other times the easy skill of Plato makes the components of the sketch come out incidentally in the conversation, as in the **Laches** or the **Gorgias.** The dramatic attitude of the parties, when it is not described in narrative, is sometimes indicated by the interlocutor. For instance, instead of 'Polus was reluctant to reply' we have Socrates saying 'why don't you answer?' (Gorg. 468 C, D.)

For the perfection to which Plato could carry the art when he chose we must look to the **Protagoras** and the **Symposium,** with their exquisitely humorous touches and inimitable suggestions of the life-like. If the wedding of philosophy to the mime is anywhere complete, it is undoubtedly in these two dialogues.

Air of historical reality in the dialogues.

b. In his later years the more dogmatic Plato comes to abandon the dramatic setting, and leaves us without any *mise-en-scène* or any opportunity of visualising the dialogue. In his earlier work he would generally delude us into believing that the conversation was actually held. 'The place is there to this day to prove it.' The persons who take part are living flesh and blood, so real and recognisable that the dialogue (it appears) must also have been real. Moreover the talk comes about so naturally, that it seemingly *must* have come about just in that way. This delusion Plato seeks to impart with his chance meetings 'in the palaestra of Taureas,' or 'in the new palaestra near the postern' (**Lysis**), or 'in the house of Callias, son of Hipponicus' (**Protagoras**), or 'in the dressing-room of the Lyceum' (**Euthydemus**), or 'in the porch of the King Archon' (**Euthyphro**), or in the prison of Socrates (**Crito** and **Phaedo**), or under the plane-tree by the Ilissus (**Phaedrus**). Sometimes, it is true, the place does not appear, as in the **Laches** or **Meno**; but these cases are exceptional.

Plato no doubt also appreciated the livelier interest which naturally attaches to the real, particularly in a small community like Athens, where the personality of every prominent man was familiar to the reader, or where, at least, the recollection of him was current. Talk, even fictitious, by well-known characters possessed an attraction which could

not in all cases belong to an undisguised essay. The method of Socrates was invariably conversational, the method of dialectics. This was universally known, and in his Socratic period Plato had no choice but to adopt the form of dialogue. And if the dialogues were to be put in the mouth of Socrates, a historical personage, the other *personae* also should be historical. The question would then arise 'Where and when was this conversation held?,' and it is by the touches above described that Plato imparts the required air of verisimilitude as well as the charm of vivacity.

Reality and dramatic date of the dialogue of the Republic discussed.

B. *a.* It is, of course, hardly more necessary to believe that any such dialogue as the **Republic** actually did take place than it is in the case of an Imaginary Conversation of Berkeley or Landor. It is therefore futile to attempt to fix a date for its occurrence. Socrates, indeed, employed his dialectic upon so many occasions of which Plato may be supposed to have taken notes[1], that the early, or 'Socratic,' dialogues may be largely based in point of substance upon what Socrates really did at some time say, or, more probably, was in the habit of saying. Plato would certainly recall in fairly exact outline the Socratic arguments concerning justice, temperance, courage, friendship, piety and other ethical subjects. He would also naturally recall the humours and ironical forms of expression and the dialectical tricks habitual to Socrates, together with certain incidents which had occurred during his disputations with well-known sophists and others. It may even be the case that Plato had knowledge how on some occasion at the Peiraeus Socrates did discourse on the subject of justice, or even of an ideal *πολιτεία*. This we may grant as possible, without admitting it to be in the least necessary. We can hardly go further. The art and style of Plato are his own, whatever Socrates may have suggested. If Socrates supplied the basis, the superstructure is Plato's.

Plato not concerned at anachronisms in his dialogues.

b. In the elaboration of his work Plato exercises the usual artistic disregard of mere literal facts of chronology and environment. In this he resembles the dramatist, whose imaginative creation is *φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ἱστορίας* (Arist. Poet. IX. 8). To a certain

[1] Compare the manner in which Theaetetus reports a dialogue to Euclid, while Euclid writes it out, fills it in, and obtains corrections from Socrates.

extent the artist in his μίμησις must necessarily conceive of time and place, a *dramatic* date and scene; but he is not fastidious about maintaining every circumstance in strict accord with historical fact. A gathering of the characters precisely as described at the opening of the **Republic** can, perhaps, hardly have occurred. There is no information obtainable as to the year of the first recognition of Bendis-worship, but, as regards the presence of the parties concerned, Boeckh (Kleine Schriften IV. 437 sqq.) fixes upon B.C. 411 as the date at which their meeting is most conceivable. Against this we have, indeed, the doubtful authority of pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. Orat. III. p. 835) for the statement that Cephalus was already dead by B.C. 443. Whether this be true or not[1] is of little importance, for, even if Plato did conceive of a date as definite as B.C. 411 (which is highly unlikely), he certainly did not think it of any consequence whether Cephalus was alive or not in that year, and whether the speakers could or could not have made at that time certain references which they do make in the dialogue. In B.C. 411 Socrates was in his fifty-eighth year—an age which the Greeks called old. Yet his remarks to Cephalus imply that he is still sufficiently remote from old age. On the other hand, in B.C. 411 Polydamas had not made the name (Rep. 338 C) which he won in the year 408; and it was not till B.C. 393 (six years after the death of Socrates) that Ismenias the Theban (Rep. 336 A) became πλούσιος and developed power. Obviously there will exist anachronisms in the case of any year upon which we choose to settle.

Nor are such anachronisms found only in the **Republic.** In the **Laches** Socrates is young as compared with Nicias and Laches. But the dialogue takes place after the battle of Delium (B.C. 424), when Socrates must have been forty-six, and Nicias can hardly have been much, if any, older. In the **Euthydemus** the grandson of Alcibiades τοῦ παλαιοῦ takes part in the dialogue. But Alcibiades died, at the age of forty-six, only five years before Socrates himself. In the **Gorgias**, of which the dramatic date is B.C. 405 (since the affair of Arginusae happened 'last year'), Nicias is spoken of as still alive, though he died in B.C. 413. Pericles also is 'lately dead.' In the **Symposium**, of which the dramatic date is B.C. 416, reference is made to the way in which Mantinea was treated by the Lacedaemonians thirty-one years

[1] It almost certainly is not. See the remarks on Cephalus below (C).

later (B.C. 385). In the **Menexenus** Socrates, who died in B.C. 399, alludes to the peace of Antalcidas, which belongs to the year 387. The chronological difficulties of the **Protagoras** are pointed out in Athenaeus v. 218 B sqq. History is manifestly viewed from the later standpoint of the writer Plato, and not from the contemporary standpoint of the *dialogi personae*.

C. It remains to speak of the several persons present in the company.

The characters in the **Republic.**

CEPHALUS was a wealthy Syracusan, of whom his son Lysias, the orator, says (c. Eratosth. 120) that 'he was persuaded by Pericles to come to Athens, and there he dwelt for thirty years, without any litigation on the part of himself or any of the family, either as plaintiff or defendant.' Considering the litigiousness of the Athenians, this remark indicates that he was indeed *εὔκολος* (Rep. 329 D, 330 A). As the career of Pericles did not even begin till about the year 470 B.C., and as he would hardly be in a position to invite Cephalus till some years later, it is very improbable that the date assigned to the death of Cephalus by the pseudo-Plutarch (viz. before B.C. 443) can be correct. Moreover it is inconceivable that Plato should not have had some personal knowledge of the man; and yet Plato was not born till about B.C. 428.

The family were, of course, *μέτοικοι*. Cephalus was in all probability a manufacturing merchant, since Lysias and Polemarchus are afterwards proprietors of a shield-factory.

The name was not uncommon, and the Cephalus who narrates the dialogue of the **Parmenides** was from Clazomenae. There is unhappily a tendency to confuse persons of the same name and of approximately the same date.

POLEMARCHUS, the son of Cephalus and master of the house in this dialogue, is mentioned in the **Phaedrus** (257 B) as a votary of philosophy, in the words *Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα αἰτιώμενος παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον*. From that place and his familiar behaviour here it is tolerably clear that he belonged to the coterie of Socrates. Lysias (c. Eratosth. l.c.) describes how an attack was made under the tyranny of the Thirty (B.C. 404) upon disaffected metics, among whom his brother Polemarchus was condemned to drink hemlock. The

same fact is reported by Plutarch (De Esu Carn. II. 4), by whom he is called Πολέμαρχος ὁ φιλόσοφος.

It is not easy to see why Jowett ascribes to him 'the frankness and impetuousness of youth.' He is evidently a man of mature standing, inasmuch as he is not only the householder, but also speaks (328 A) of going out 'to talk with the young men.' That the aged father should nevertheless speak of his sons as *νεανίαι* or even *νεανίσκοι* (328 D) is an eminently natural touch. They are his 'lads.'

LYSIAS (who takes no part in the dialogue) is the well-known orator of that name (458—378 B.C.). In the **Phaedrus** (228 A) he is called *δεινότατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν*, and a speech in his style, dramatically attributed to him, is given and adversely criticised (235 A sqq.). From the views which Plato held concerning the vices of rhetoric it is natural that he should entertain none too favourable an opinion of Lysias.

EUTHYDEMUS, the third son of Cephalus, is otherwise unknown. The sophist Euthydemus (brother of Dionysodorus), in the dialogue with that title, is a different person, a Chian.

CHARMANTIDES 'of Paiania' does not appear to be mentioned elsewhere. His position in the text would suggest that he was an adherent of Thrasymachus.

CLEITOPHON, 'son of Aristonymus,' interposes (in Rep. 340 A, B) in such a manner as to indicate that he is a partisan of Thrasymachus. That the latter should have his supporters in the company is in the manner of Plato, and is dramatically desirable.

Cleitophon lends his name to one of those dialogues of uncertain authorship which have been attributed to Plato. This brief piece begins in an un-Platonic style with the words 'somebody told us lately that Cleitophon, son of Aristonymus, in conversation with Lysias, found fault with the Socratic discussions and could say nothing too good of talk with Thrasymachus,' and continues with references to the **Republic** and its argument concerning Justice. Finally (410 C) Cleitophon complains that Socrates is not positive enough for him and that therefore *πρὸς Θρασύμαχον, οἶμαι, πορεύσομαι καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι δύναμαι, ἀπορῶν.*

GLAUCON, son of Ariston, is the brother of Plato and Adeimantus. His generosity with money (Rep. 337 D), his courage both moral (357 A) and physical (368 A), and his

talent (367 E), are illustrated in the present portion of the **Republic**, but in 548 E his character is more deliberately stated, under a pretext which shews that Plato was bent on complimenting a brother whom he admired. Plutarch (On Brotherly Love 484 E) remarks on Plato's desire to render his brothers famous by bringing their names into his finest works, 'as Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic.' In the passage mentioned Glaucon is contentious (*φιλόνικος*), but not stubbornly self-assertive (*αὐθάδης*). He is cultured and a good speaker. Elsewhere we learn that he is a sportsman, fond of dogs and game-birds (459 A), and that he makes love (474 D). He is, in fact, a type of the *καλὸς κἀγαθός* according to the Greek conception, an Alcibiades qualified by philosophy. His name occurs again in the **Parmenides** (126 A) and in Xen. Mem. III. 6.

ADEIMANTUS is appealed to in the **Apology** to say if any harm has been done to his brother Plato by associating with Socrates. The context implies that he is an elder brother, and in the **Republic** the same suggestion arises from his greater composure of tone. He is mentioned with Glaucon in the **Parmenides** (init.).

NICERATUS, son of Nicias, who takes no part in the dialogue, is mentioned by his father in the **Laches** (200 D). He was put to death by the Thirty at the same time with Polemarchus. (Xen. Hell. II. 3. 39, Lys. 18. 602.)

THRASYMACHUS of Chalcedon, the vulgar and blustering sophist of the **Republic**, was a personage of much higher repute than his treatment might lead us to suppose, and there can be little doubt that, through some special dislike, Plato has done him a certain injury. In the **Phaedrus** (261 C) he is mentioned with Gorgias and Theodorus as an authority on rhetoric, and Socrates styles him (267 C), in reference to his rhetorical commonplaces on pathetic subjects (the Ἔλεοι ascribed to him by Aristotle Rhet. III. 1), *τὸ τοῦ Καλχηδονίου σθένος*, 'the mighty man of Chalcedon.' It is, perhaps, not without significance for the opening scene of the **Republic** that he is coupled with Lysias in Phaedr. 269 D, and the appearance of the two at the house of Polemarchus may have been suggested by their common tastes, Lysias being an orator who practised the vices taught in the theory of Thrasymachus. To Plutarch (Symp. 616 D) he was known as the writer of a treatise on 'Eminent men' (Ὑπερβάλλοντες),

to Cicero (Brut. § 39, de Or. III. §§ 59 and 128) as one of the old masters of theoretical eloquence, like Gorgias, Prodicus, Protagoras and Isocrates. Cicero also speaks of him (de Or. III. § 128) as a writer *de natura rerum*. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (de Isaeo 20) praises his skill, subtlety and smoothness. According to Aristotle (Rhet. III. 8. 4) and Quintilian (IX. 4. 87) he improved prose rhythm by making particular use of the 'paean' (e.g. ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – or – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑).

Athenaeus (x. 454 F) quotes the curious inscription on the tomb of 'Thrasymachus the sophist' at Chalcedon:

τοὔνομα θῆτα ῥῶ ἄλφα σὰν ὖ μῦ ἄλφα χεῖ οὖ σάν·
πατρὶς Καλχηδών, ἡ δὲ τέχνη σοφίη.

It was unfortunate for Thrasymachus and 'poetry' of this kind that his name was one of those which *versu dicere non est*, and that, therefore, it had to be spelled.

That his character corresponded to his name appears from Aristot. Rhet. II. 23. 29, where Herodicus is quoted for the poor *mot αἰεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ.*

D. The characters thus collected represent, according to Plato's custom, various types of mind. Socrates, of course, is unique in his way of regarding ethical questions, in the knowledge of his own ignorance, and in the desire to bring truth to birth by means of dialectics. Thrasymachus represents the shallow and aggressive certitude of sophistry, which deals in rhetoric. The orator Lysias and Cleitophon are presumably anti-Socratic. If so, their presence prevents Thrasymachus from standing unfairly alone in hostile company. Glaucon, Adeimantus and Polemarchus may be regarded as a set-off on the Socratic side. Polemarchus is the representative of traditional morality with (as we know from elsewhere) leanings to philosophy and an obvious liking for Socrates (327 B—328 B), although he is no master of the Socratic dialectics. Glaucon and Adeimantus are younger men of the Socratic coterie, sound in their instincts and ardent to be taught. The brief stay of Cephalus gives us a passing glimpse of a type of good old unquestioning probity. The *ἄλλοι τινές* make up 'a full house.'

Variety of the characters.

4. Cephalus welcomes Socrates, who should come oftener and make himself at home. Cephalus himself is too old to go to town. For his own part he finds that intellectual pleasure

increases as physical pleasures wane, and Socrates' talk will also be good for the 'lads.' [**328 C, D**]

Socrates replies that he is fond of talking to the very aged. They can tell what it is like to be 'upon the threshold of eld.' How does Cephalus find it? [**328 D, E**]

Preliminary conversation with Cephalus on old age.

Cephalus will be candid. Old men, like 'birds of a feather,' often flock together to lament that their pleasures are over, or that their relatives slight them. The complaint is perverse. Many old men—Sophocles, for instance—rejoice to escape the tyranny of appetite. The real cause of the trouble lies in the character of the individual. [**329 A—D**]

5. 'But,' says Socrates, 'you are rich, and that may make the difference.' Cephalus retorts after the manner of Themistocles to the Seriphian. True, a man of character (*ἐπιεικής*) cannot bear a poor old age; equally, a man without character cannot bear a rich old age. [**329 E—330 A**]

Lightened by riches.

a. Most of the matter here is borrowed, though without mention of Plato, in the De Senectute of Cicero. His translation is tolerably close, and the continuity only slightly broken up, so that he makes no attempt to conceal his original. The words of the **Republic** 328 E *δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι...ἐξαγγέλλεις*; are abbreviated (De Senect. § 6) into *volumus sane, nisi molestum est, Cato, tamquam longam aliquam viam confeceris, quam nobis quoque ingrediundum sit, istuc, quo pervenisti, videre quale sit.* From 329 A *πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθα κ.τ.λ.* to 329 B *οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ ἄλλοις* is translated with some adaptation (§ 7). The anecdote about Sophocles is then deferred to § 47. The next words (329 C) *εὖ οὖν μοι...ἀπηλλάχθαι* are not rendered. Cicero resumes (§ 7) the translation of Rep. 329 D *ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων κ.τ.λ.*, and continues (§ 8), after a slight and necessary omission, with Rep. 329 E—330 A (fin.).

Again in De Senect. § 46 we meet with an imitation of Rep. 328 D in the shape *habeo senectuti magnam gratiam, quae mihi sermonis aviditatem auxit, potionis et cibi sustulit*, a sentence much stiffened from the original. It may be worth while in

passing to note Cicero's rendering of εὔκολοι as *nec difficiles nec inhumani*, and of the difficult ἐπιεικής by the flat *sapiens*.

6. 'But did you make your money or inherit it?'

'Something of both.' [**330 B**]

Socrates has asked the question because Cephalus is not in love with his money, whereas self-made men are as fond of it as poets of their own poems or parents of their own children. [**330 C**]

Chief blessing of riches is to aid just conduct.

'What is the greatest blessing that Cephalus owes to wealth?' [**330 D**]

'One which might not seem the most likely. It is that wealth precludes the danger of committing injustices, and, as a guilty conscience torments with the fear of retribution in another world, so the consciousness of truth and fair dealing and of being out of debt to God and man is the greatest of boons.' [**330 D—331 B**]

7. Socrates catches at the mention of justice and the conception of it implied in the words of Cephalus.

'BUT WHAT IS JUSTICE?'

a. The subject of the **Republic** is introduced at this point in an apparently casual manner, although, perhaps, the precise form of words with which Socrates turns the conversation into a discussion is marked by somewhat less ease than in some other dialogues. The conversational 'on-glide,' so to speak, is not quite so smooth as a captious reader might desire. Cephalus has not used the word δικαιοσύνη. That, indeed, would be of little importance if a word cognate to δικαιοσύνη had occurred at the end of his speech. As it is, we are obliged to look back to 330 D, E, for ἀδικήσαντα, ἠδίκηκεν, ἀδικήματα, assisted by the words δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως in 331 A. Nevertheless the speech as a whole is concerned with the clear conscience which comes of 'having done no injustice' by 'lying or cheating' or 'leaving debts unpaid.' This is enough to justify Socrates in asking 'But this "Justice" of which you speak—does it consist in the absence of lying and of unpaid debts?'

Casual introduction of the subject of the dialogue—Justice.

In the **Charmides** the discussion of σωφροσύνη is prompted by the observation of Critias that Charmides is σωφρονέστατος τῶν νυνί. In the **Laches** the question 'What is Courage?'

arises out of a talk about a certain form of instruction in the use of arms. In the **Lysis** the mention of the friendship of Lysis and Menexenus leads to a discussion of *φιλία*.

b. The device is familiar in the Socratic dialogues proper, that is to say, in the dialogues written when Plato was still endeavouring to reproduce as closely as possible the Socratic attitude and method, and before he arrived at the metaphysical and dogmatic stages of his development,—stages which are Platonic and not Socratic.

Practice of Socrates in taking up ethical questions.

It can hardly be doubted that the proceeding adopted here was characteristic of the real Socrates in conversation, whether with the young, who had never seriously meditated upon the terms they used, with the maturer citizen, satisfied with traditional morality in its practical effects, or with the sophist, who had arrived at some more speculative, often paradoxical, but mostly shallow notion concerning a question of ethics. In these conversations a remark might be dropped—often casually enough—containing a mention of 'justice,' 'temperance,' 'courage' and the like, and apparently taking for granted that the exact contents of the term needed no specification. Words like *δικαιοσύνη*, *σωφροσύνη*, *ἀνδρεία*, *ὁσιότης* were in everyday occurrence. They tripped readily off the tongue. Some of those who used them had never asked when, precisely, an action is or ceases to be *δίκαιον* or *σῶφρον*. Whether these 'virtues' were all one or different, whether virtue was teachable or not, whether it was possible to make sure of being virtuous without possessing a definite and consistently applicable criterion of action—these were questions about which the generality of people did not concern themselves. In a rough and ready way, partly from training and partly from intuition, they entertained what seemed to be a fair working conception of the various virtues, and with this they were satisfied.

Popular ethics.

Of this vagueness of apprehension and therefore precariousness of conduct Socrates was sadly, if humorously, aware, and the casual utterance of the term was his opportunity for demonstrating with what ignorance it was used.

At the same time there was current a series of saws and maxims, chiefly drawn from the poets and other 'sages,' from Homer downwards, which might be taken as practical definitions of

Ethics of poets and sages.

moral ideas. Greece had its more or less recognised 'catechism.' The usual type of respectable citizen was prepared to guide his conduct by the maxims derived from a sort of 'family Bible.' Sometimes it was the quotation of such a saw which gave Socrates his chance to demonstrate its inadequacy. More often appeal would be made to these *dicta*, during the dialogue, by those whom Socrates was pressing for the first degree of exactness.

There were, however, not wanting Greek minds of a more speculative or sceptical bent, which pondered over the basis of ethical conceptions and the origin of conventional ethics. The sophists (of whom more will be said below) had often prepared themselves to take up some positive attitude in regard to such matters. This, to Socrates, was the worst attitude of all, especially if the sophist 'taught' others—unless the 'teacher' had, perchance, really arrived at 'knowledge' and not simply at dogmatic 'opinion.' To know is the key to right action; to think one knows when one is ignorant must lead to wrong action. Hence no sooner did a sophist let fall, in the presence of Socrates, a remark implying knowledge in the domain of ethics (including politics), than he found himself required to stand and deliver before all the dialectical force of which Socrates was capable. If his 'knowledge' proved sound, none so grateful as Socrates to learn it; if unsound, none should be so thankful as the sophist himself to be delivered from the moral disease of a false opinion.

Ethics of sophists.

c. A comparison of the Memorabilia of Xenophon with the plain indications of Plato's **Apology** shews that Socrates frequently went out of his way to provoke discussion with those who were not, at the moment, particularly disposed for it. In the **Apology** (21 c sqq.) he is made to describe the way in which he went and cross-examined statesmen, poets and craftsmen, and proved their ignorance. His motives were naturally misconceived. They were too high and sounded too ironical. Much of the ill-will raised against him—an ill-will which was largely popular and extended beyond any mere circle of discomfited antagonists—was due to an inopportune and apparently gratuitous resolve to exercise his powers of disputation. *ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως πολλαὶ ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι* (Apol. 22 E). That

Socrates apparently aggressive. He provokes the discussions.

he should 'spoil for a fight' with an inflated sophist—though there is no reason to suppose that all sophists were inflated—was natural in a community so intellectually keen, so leisured, and so personal as Athens. But Xenophon (Mem. IV. 2) shews how deliberately he could plot a discussion, not with a sophist, but with a youth still 'too young for the *ἀγορά*,' the 'handsome Euthydemus,' whose fault consisted in his having made a large collection of books of 'poets and sophists' with the intention of becoming pre-eminent *τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν*. Socrates waylays him, lures him into a conversation, and sends him away crushed and disgusted with himself. The defence for such conduct lies in the honest 'mission' of Socrates and the beneficial results which might follow, as they did ultimately in the case of Euthydemus (Xen. l.c. § 40), though they failed in so many others (ibid.). It is probable, however, that the fine tact of Plato has divested the tone and practices of Socrates of certain elements which often gave offence through being misunderstood.

The aim and 'mission' of Socrates.

d. The aim of Socrates is the discovery of 'knowledge,' i.e. the knowledge of things in their 'essence,' the knowledge of their 'definition,' the knowledge by which alone we can in all cases direct our action so that it is virtuous. So far, however, he has only arrived at the knowledge that he is ignorant. Others have manifestly not yet learned so much. They mistake for knowledge what is only opinion (*δόξα*), unreasoned, traditional, or sophistic. Until they are made aware of their delusion and clear their minds for a new beginning, their conduct must be inconsistent and perverse. His 'mission,' therefore, is to disabuse men's minds, to convince them that they are ignorant, and to get them to join with himself in the search for ultimate truth. His method is dialectical, the method of the *ἔλεγχος*. He has, from the nature of the case, nothing to teach. He is simply a fellow-student with his opponents and interlocutors. They are assumed to have a common object, the bringing to birth of the truth. Unsparing dialectics are the proper obstetric instrument. 'Authority,' to him, is nothing: his own opinion is nothing: what he requires is that the interlocutor himself shall be made to testify by his reason. Cf. Gorg. 472 B *ἐγὼ δέ, ἐὰν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω,*

οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ. Of the 'irony,' or mock modesty, contained in this attitude of Socrates more will be said immediately.

Is Justice no more and no less than 'truth and paying back what one receives'?

Or is this sometimes just and sometimes unjust? For instance, if a friend lent you weapons, afterwards went mad, and then demanded his arms, it would be unjust to restore them, or to tell him the exact truth?

To this Cephalus agrees. [**331 C**]

8. Then this is no definition of Justice—'**telling the truth and paying back what one receives**' (*ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἃ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι*)?

a. The characteristic—and new—feature of the philosophy of Socrates lay in his search for general conceptions. In other words, in regard to any ethical idea, he sought for a 'definition' (*ὅρος* or *λόγος*), which should describe its essential nature, its *τί ἐστιν*, that which makes it what it is amid all the variety of particular applications. Hence Aristotle (Met. XIII. 4. 1078 b) says of him *Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητοῦντος πρώτου...ἐκεῖνος εὐλόγως ἐζήτει τὸ τί ἐστιν...δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἅ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους* ('inductive reasoning') *καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου* ('general definitions'). The inductive reasoning is his *method* of arriving at the definition, i.e. by gathering from particular cases the general conception. Xenophon dwells upon this resolve to discover *τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων* in Mem. IV. 6. 1, and gives frequent illustration of it in other parts of his Socratic Memoir. Socrates has not, it is true, reached scientific soundness in the application of his own method, inasmuch as his particular cases are anything but exhaustive. Nevertheless he deserves all credit for the method itself. For more on this question see Zeller *Socrates and the Socratic Schools* c. v.

Socrates and the inductive method. His general definitions.

b. In the 'Socratic' dialogues (e.g. the **Euthyphro, Lysis, Charmides** and **Laches**) we generally find a series of definitions tested and thrown aside, and these regularly advance from the popular

The process simply destructive.

to the more philosophical. Thus the first definition of 'courage' attempted in the **Laches** is 'remaining at one's post,' but gradually we progress to 'understanding of what deserves to be feared' (see Jowett's Introduction to that dialogue). Also (as will be found in the first book of the **Republic**) the result is simply destructive, no definition being reached.

Polemarchus interjects. 'The definition is correct, if we are to believe Simonides.'

Cephalus seizes the opportunity of handing over the discussion to his son, whom Socrates playfully assumes to be his heir.

Cephalus retires to attend to the sacrifice. [**331 D**]

c. The retirement of Cephalus, while dramatically desirable, is gracefully made. Cicero had observed the propriety of the proceeding and imitated it. In Epist. ad Att. IV. 16 he observes *quod in eis libris, quos laudas, desideras personam Scaevolae, non eam temere demovi, sed feci idem quod in* Πολιτείᾳ *deus ille noster Plato. Cum in Piraeeum Socrates venisset ad Cephalum, locupletem et festivum senem, quoad primus ille sermo haberetur, adest in disputando senex; deinde, cum ipse quoque commodissime locutus esset, ad rem divinam dicit se velle discedere, neque postea revertitur. Credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset.*

Graceful retirement of Cephalus.

Not only would it be inartistic to ask the aged man to remain through the discussion. He is too old to be troubled about questions of 'the new morality,' and it would obviously be bad taste to submit so amiable and venerable a person to the rather mortifying dialectic of Socrates. He has nothing to learn by remaining, since he must soon die in the faiths in which he has lived, and he can play no part in the dialogue.

In the **Laches** the aged Lysimachus, and with him Melesias, similarly withdraws from the discussion after the preliminary (though in that instance much longer) conversation. They sit by and listen, however. Lysimachus himself offers the excuse (Lach. 189 c) ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνομαι ἤδη τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὧν ἂν διανοηθῶ ἐρέσθαι καὶ αὖ ἃ ἂν ἀκούσω. ἐὰν δὲ μεταξὺ ἄλλοι λόγοι γένωνται, οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι.

9. Socrates turns upon Polemarchus. 'What are the words of Simonides which you find so true?'

'Definition' of Simonides: 'To return to each what is owing.'

'That **to return to each what is owing is just**' (ὅτι τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστιν). [**331 E**]

a. It will be observed that this is no 'definition' of justice on the part of Simonides. He does not say that 'Justice consists in rendering to each his due,' but that 'rendering to each his due is just.' Yet Socrates does not remark upon the point. The laxity belongs to Plato, whose logical acumen and coherence—matters upon which more will be said later—leave much to be desired. Logic was in its infancy, and neither the correct forms of propositions nor the necessary distinctions of meanings were readily apprehended. It is a misconception to suppose that the 'inexperience of Polemarchus in dialectic is thus indicated' (Bosanquet *A Companion to Plato's Republic* p. 42). Plato's own slips are too numerous for us to believe that he would think his readers sufficiently nimble logicians—without further comment on his part—to detect a point so subtle to them, if so patent to us. Moreover cf. 332 C, where Socrates himself is the speaker.

10. Soc. One cannot readily quarrel with an inspired sage like Simonides. But I fail to grasp his meaning.

The ethical authority of the poets.

a. Both the appeal to the authority of a poet-sage and the spirit in which Socrates meets the citation are characteristic. *σοφία* was an attribute of the great poets, epic, gnomic, lyric or dramatic. *σοφός* was, indeed, a standing epithet of poets. Their writings, together with the sayings of the recognised 'sages,' formed for the Greeks not only a kind of Bible, as a body of moral teaching, but also a summary of practical wisdom, largely available in the shape of 'proverbs.' As here Simonides is quoted, so in the **Meno** (77 B) 'a poet' is cited for a definition of *ἀρετή* as *χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι.* 'As Homer says,' 'as Hesiod, Simonides, Pindar say'—these expressions corresponded among the cultivated Greeks not merely to the modern expressions 'as Shakspere says,' 'as Goethe says,' but also to 'as Solomon says,' 'as St Paul says.' There is, of course, the difference that a special sanctity is attached to the Bible which was never attributed to the Greek poets. Nevertheless even to the latter there was paid a greater and

more universal deference than is offered to the corresponding writers in modern literature. They represented not only thought expressed by genius, but also doctrine approved and ratified by the consent of generations of the Greek world.

That poetry is primarily teaching was a view widely held in antiquity, and is not yet defunct. According to Plutarch (de aud. Poet. 1) *ἐν ποιήμασι προφιλοσοφητέον.* Even contemporary poets claimed respect on that score (Ar. Ran. 1009). [See Professor Butcher *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* Cap. v.]

b. The outward attitude (ironically adopted) of Socrates himself to the poets and sages is one of respectful admiration—they are 'wise and divinely gifted'—but he does not surrender his judgment to their dictation. When their sayings are found to be untenable, he is reluctant to declare them in the wrong, but 'they cannot mean what we think they mean.' In his heart he was assured that the ignorance of true conceptions which he found in average humanity was shared also by the poetic 'sages' whom it quoted. This proverbial morality was not based on 'knowledge,' and was therefore a stumbling-block in the path of sound ethical practice. Socrates is compelled to demolish it. It would, however, have appeared highly presumptuous, and would certainly have been impolitic, to treat the established authorities with the rigour with which he handles the contemporary sophist. Moreover Socrates apparently, and the earlier Plato certainly, entertained a genuine admiration for the finer literature.

Attitude of Socrates towards poet-sages.

As Plato develops he makes his Socrates bolder in discrediting poetic wisdom. In the **Protagoras** he objects to the poets being brought into philosophic conversation because 'we cannot put them questions on the subjects of which they speak, and, for the most part, in quoting them people differ as to the poet's meaning: one says he means *this*, and another says he means *that*, and, all the time, they are talking about a thing which they can neither prove nor disprove' (*οὐδὲν δέονται...ποιητῶν, οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐξελέγξαι* 347 E). He even makes Protagoras claim (316 D) that 'Homer, Hesiod and Simonides' were sophists who 'put on poetry as a dis-

guise'; and, though this should not be pressed as representing exactly the opinion of Plato, there is little doubt that he regarded their opinions as intrinsically worth no more than those of the sophists. When in a later part of the **Republic** (Bk II. ad fin.)—composed long after the first book—Plato boldly finds fault with Homer, Hesiod or Aeschylus, it is on the ground of the moral injury done by their fictions concerning the gods and the bad examples which they thus propose to men.

c. We may add the remark that the study and exegesis of poets tended, in the hands of a certain type of schoolmen whom we have always with us, to become sophistical and hair-splitting. See the treatment of a passage of Simonides in the **Protagoras** (339 A sqq.), where Socrates, if he is not acting a parody, is as great a sinner as the rest. Cf. also Charm. 161—163.

d. Of the poet-sages Simonides enjoyed a special reputation. He was *ὁ σοφός* almost *par excellence*, the fact being that, with less fervour and imagination than Pindar, he was the better suited to express moral sentiments, high but practical, in a finished form which brought them into general appreciation and currency. Moreover his width of sheer knowledge (which was especially valued in poets and included in their *σοφία*, just as it was expressed in the Roman epithet *doctus*) had remained an imposing tradition.

Reputation of Simonides.

Suppose a man deposits something with another, loses his senses, and then asks for the return of his deposit.

The deposit is 'owing' (*ὀφειλόμενον*)?

But by no means to be 'returned' (*ἀποδοτέον*) in such a case?

P. No.

S. Then Simonides means something else?

P. Of course. He thinks friends 'owe' to friends a *good* service, never the contrary.

S. Then when by 'returning' you hurt a friend, you do not 'return' what is 'owing'?

P. That is what Simonides means.

S. But must we 'return' to an enemy also what is 'owing' to *him*?

e. It is well to check the gradual shiftings in the meaning attached to words during the discussion.

ὀφείλειν is used

(i) of a concrete thing which does not belong to the holder, but is the property of some one else, and so 'owing':

(ii) of that which is morally 'due.' (Cf. the sense of the English 'ought' derived from 'owe.')

This includes appropriate behaviour, 'due' in a certain relation.

Ambiguity of Greek terms.

ἀποδιδόναι (cf. *reddere*) is used

(i) of literally 'returning' a thing which is not one's own;

(ii) of 'paying' 'rendering' certain conduct which is morally demanded by the situation. (Cf. 'to pay reverence.')

(iii) of 'rendering' in the arts (332 C) that course of procedure which the purpose demands, i.e. bestowing upon them the 'due' procedure.

The Greek admits of an equally natural use of ὀφείλειν and ἀποδιδόναι in these several senses (see note to the text on ἀποδιδοῦσα 332 C), but English varies its terms. To 'pay back,' to 'pay,' to 'render' cover only a portion of the sense respectively. For the argument here the shiftings are of little consequence, but there are many instances in which Greek reasoning was entirely confounded by the ambiguous or multifarious meanings of the terms employed. Cf. notes on εὖ ζῆν and εὖ πράττειν 353 D, E.

P. Certainly. And the return 'owing' is, in the fitness of things (ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει), some mischief. [331 E—332 B]

f. From this point it is assumed that Simonides himself asserts the duty of injuring enemies. Socrates makes Polemarchus read that meaning into the words of Simonides as a corollary, but it is not at all certain that the poet would have admitted that injury to enemies was an ὀφειλόμενον or even a προσῆκον. The ordinary Greek view of our duty towards our enemy was, indeed, unlike the Christian (see note on 332 B ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει), but Socrates himself can rise superior to it (335 D), and, logically at least, it cannot be forced upon the poet. Hence the remarks in 335 E, 336 A are based on a needless assumption.

11. S. Then Simonides apparently talked in riddles. He used 'owing' for 'fitting' and meant '**to return to each what is fitting**' (τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι)?

By 'owing' Simonides means 'fitting.'

P. Well, what have you to say to it?

S. Suppose we asked him, "There is an art called the medical art. What thing 'owing,' that is to say 'fitting,' does it 'render,' and to what objects?"

P. Drugs, food and drink—to bodies.

S. And the art of cookery?

P. Seasonings—to dishes.

S. Then what is 'returned,' to what objects, by the art which would be called Justice?

P. Consistency requires the answer '**Justice is the art which returns benefits and injuries to friends and enemies respectively.**' [**332 C, D**]

a. The assumption that justice is an 'art' or 'craft' is Socratic. To Socrates virtuous behaviour was the outcome of knowledge. It was the systematic application of definite ethical conceptions to the relations of life, in just the same manner as his special knowledge is applied by a craftsman or artist in the execution of his art. (Conditions of the will are not admitted by Socrates into the question. To understand justice is to use it, as well as to know *how* to use it.)

Justice as an 'art.'

Analogies drawn from *τέχναι* were a characteristic mark, and often an irritating one, of the method of Socrates. The word includes both 'arts' (the 'fine' and 'professional,' *ἐλευθέριοι*) and 'crafts' (*βάναυσοι τέχναι*). The practitioners of all these are alike *δημιουργοί*. Socrates is quite as likely to draw an analogy from shoemaking as from music, or from carpentry as from medicine. He was not afraid to repeat himself in this respect. Cf. Gorg. 490 E—491 A: ΚΑΛ. *ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.* ΣΩ. *οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ* Καλλίκλεις, *ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.* ΚΑΛ. *νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὥσπερ περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.* Similarly Alcibiades remarks (Symp. 221 E) *ὄνους κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειε.* When Critias (Xen. Mem. I. 2. 37) says *ἀλλὰ τῶνδέ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ἤδη κατατετρῖφθαι διαθρυλουμένους ὑπὸ σοῦ,* Socrates replies *οὐκοῦν*

καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων τούτοις, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων;

12. S. Then helping friends and hurting enemies is justice, according to Simonides?

Is Justice helping friends and hurting enemies?

a. i.e. according to the assertion unwarrantably forced upon him (§ 10 *f*).

P. Apparently.

S. Now the physician can help and hurt sick men in regard to health, and the navigator people at sea in regard to the dangers of the sea. How can the just man help and hurt? In what circumstances and in regard to what function?

P. In war, for or against. [**332 E**] In war.

13. S. But, as the physician is useless in the case of people not sick, and the navigator in that of people not at sea, is the just man useless in the case of people not at war?

P. Assuredly not.

S. Then justice is useful in peace also? In peace.

As agriculture is useful for the acquiring of produce, what is it for whose use or acquisition justice is useful?

P. For contracts (*ξυμβόλαια*).

a. Cases are ignored in which there may be justice applied to reputations, social claims &c. The whole trend of the discussion is towards an undue narrowing of the functions of justice.

S. That is to say, partnerships (*κοινωνήματα*)? [**333 A**]

Now in draughts a good and useful partner is the draught-expert, and in building the builder, rather than the just man.

What is that partnership in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist, as the latter is the better in a partnership of striking notes?

P. A money-partnership.

S. Hardly so, when money is to be *used*? In buying or selling a horse, the expert in horses is the better partner; in the case of a ship it is the nautical expert?

b. But justice is 'useful' in these cases. Even the *ἱππικός* and *ναυπηγός* need to be just. Socrates, however, would say that he is thinking of a partner who, being *ἱππικός*, acts simply *qua ἱππικός*, i.e. acts with a single mind, solely as ideal practitioner of his art. Cf. 340 D, E. Nevertheless the exercise of justice is involved, and cannot be eliminated.

Justice in peace-time seems to be useful only for the safe keeping of money and chattels.

In what joint use of money is it the *just* man who makes the best partner?

P. Where depositing and safe-keeping are concerned.

S. That is, when the money lies idle?

Justice then is useful in the case of money (&c.) only when the money is useless?

When money or any instrument is in use, it is other arts which are useful? [**333 B—D**]

In that case justice can be of little consequence.

c. i.e. in time of peace. The whole department of *τὸ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν*, mentioned in 332 E, is here ignored.

14. S. Let us see. In a fight the shrewdest (*δεινότατος*) to hit is also the shrewdest to guard himself?

Similarly the shrewdest to guard against disease is the shrewdest to implant it?

That man is a good (*ἀγαθός*) guard of an army who is shrewdest at 'stealing' (*κλέψαι*) the enemy's plans?

But the best safe-keeper is the best thief.

P. Yes.

S. Then whatever a man is clever at guarding he is clever at stealing?

a. This universal conclusion based upon one or two instances is, of course, without warrant, even if we admitted the instances themselves.

b. The whole of this discussion is hardly to be taken seriously. In the early days of logic there was a natural delight in the exercise of sheer ingenuity, and the Platonic Socrates enjoys the mischievous fun of entangling opponents who make too ready admissions. To moderns trained in logical processes there is a certain puerility in much of this and similar exhibitions of nascent dialectics. The **Euthydemus** is cari-

cature, but the sophisms which are there humorous and undisguised are not without likeness to others of which Plato himself is often guilty. In that piece the sophist brothers are made to juggle with words in a way which appears very clever to them and is meant to be amusing to the reader, but which, to a modern, is often worse than transparent. If the sophists actually did deal in such puerilities, the fact shews the dialectical crudeness of the age. If they were invented by Plato, he would scarcely have invented them if he had not thought them sufficiently salted with cleverness to be readable.

P. It appears so.

S. Then, if the just man is clever (δεινός) at guarding money, he is clever at stealing it?

c. Of course, the answer is that the δίκαιος is a 'good' guardian only in the sense of being incorruptible. He will do the right thing by the deposit in his hands, but he need be possessed of no particular shrewdness. Indeed, the strictly just man is apt to be the last to comprehend the wiles of knavery.

There is the frequent (by no means necessarily conscious) trickery with Greek words. Thus δεινός = (i) a 'terrible man to' do this and that, and in this sense the just man is δεινὸς φυλάττειν ἀργύριον in virtue of his tenacious fidelity: (ii) 'clever' or 'shrewd' at this or that; and in this sense Socrates here uses it, though it is manifestly unwarrantable when applied to mere justice in guardianship, apart from other qualities.

Similarly ἀγαθός is either (i) 'good' in the sense of 'trustworthy' or (ii) 'good' in the sense of 'able.' φυλάξασθαι, throughout, is treated as if identical with φυλάττειν. κλέπτειν, again, is either (i) 'to steal' in the literal sense, or (ii) 'to get knowledge of and forestall.' It is only by the use of these words without regard to their fluctuating senses that the egregious conclusion is reached.

So the just man turns out to be a thief.

For this Homer no doubt is your authority, in what he says of Autolycus, and you are in good poetic company in saying that justice is a sort of art of stealing, though for the benefit of

Justice therefore is an art of thieving.

one's friends and the injury of one's enemies. [**333 E—334 B**]

d. For the ironical politeness shewn towards both Homer and Polemarchus see notes on 334 A (fin.), 334 B.

15. P. I don't know *what* I meant. But I still believe that justice helps friends and injures enemies.

Polemarchus is not satisfied.

a. The same result of the Socratic dialectic appears in Alcib. I. 127 D *ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγω.* That it was generally recognised appears from Meno 80 A *ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἄλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ. καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι, ναρκᾶν. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι.*

Polemarchus is, naturally enough, not satisfied. He cannot but feel that there has been something wrong somewhere. So Callicles in Gorg. 513 C *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.*

S. By 'friends' and 'enemies' do you mean those who *seem* so, or those who *are* so?

Enemies may be good men. Must we injure the good?

P. One naturally makes friends of those whom one thinks good (*χρηστούς*), and hates those whom he thinks the contrary (*πονηρούς*).

Sophisms of Socrates.

b. The answer introduces a new consideration, which, properly considered, is irrelevant to the argument. The question is whether the 'friends' (*φίλοι*) are those who are 'thought to be,' or those who 'are.' A *φίλος* is one who acts with *φιλία*, and Simonides might retort that *φίλοι* are simply those who *φιλοῦσι*, and that whether they are *χρηστοί* or *πονηροί*—in the sense which Socrates attaches to these words—is not in point. The only essential matter is that they should be friends. Plato, like Aristotle (Eth. VIII. 3), may, indeed, have conceived that ideal friendship can exist only between good men, inasmuch

as a basis of sterling character is necessary for its continuance. Nevertheless that very arguable assumption has no right to appear here. Yet upon it, thus awkwardly introduced, the whole discussion turns.

It is hard not to believe that Plato was himself aware of the fallacy in the argument of Socrates here. Otherwise it is not readily explicable how he came to substitute *ἀγαθοί* and *κακοί* immediately below for *χρηστοί* and *πονηροί*. The latter terms, as used by Polemarchus, may denote respectively 'soundness' and 'unsoundness' ('good and true' and the contrary) in friendship itself. But Socrates takes the words in their familiar acceptation of 'good' and 'bad' in the general moral sense, and Polemarchus does not pull him up, as he obviously should have done.

S. But we are fallible, and often misjudge in choosing our friends.

In such cases the good (*ἀγαθοί*) are made enemies and the bad (*κακοί*) friends?

It would then be just to help the bad and hurt the good?

P. It appears so. [**334 C**]

S. But the good are just and do no injustice?

c. That the 'good' are 'just' is an axiom which Socrates is content to borrow from the traditional morality. Even though he 'does not know what justice is,' he does not dispute that the *ἀγαθοί* are those who practise *ἀρετή*, and *δικαιοσύνη* is one form of *ἀρετή*.

Thus it is just to hurt those who do no injustice. [**334 D**]

16. **P.** We cannot allow that.

S. Well, then, it is just to hurt the *unjust* and to help the just?

P. That is better.

S. Therefore, when people have misjudged character (in choosing their friends), it is just to hurt their *friends* (seeing they are bad) and to help their *enemies* (seeing they are good).

We thus come to the exact opposite of the statement we attributed to Simonides. [**334 E**]

a. Though the words 'the statement which we attributed to Simonides' instead of 'the statement of Simonides' are

meant to be ironical, they are more literally accurate than Socrates appears to suspect (v. sup. § 10 *f*).

17. P. Logically it is so. But let us readjust our notion of friend and foe.

Readjustment. Assume 'friends' to be good.

Instead of making the friend him who *seems* good (*χρηστός*), let us say 'him who not only seems, but is, good'; and similarly with an enemy. **[334 E, 335 A]**

S. Then the good (*ἀγαθός*) will be a friend and the bad (*πονηρός*) an enemy?

You require an amending addition to our statement of justice; thus—'it is just to help a friend, if he is good (*ἀγαθός*), and to hurt an enemy, if he is bad (*κακός*)'? **[335 A]**

P. I am satisfied with that.

18. S. But is it right for a just man to hurt anybody at all?

But should we hurt anyone at all?

P. Certainly: men who (as we now suppose them) are both bad and enemies.

S. But horses and dogs, when hurt, become worse; that is, worse in their excellence (*ἀρετή*) *as* dogs and horses?

Is it not the same with men?

P. No doubt.

S. But justice is a human excellence (*ἀρετή*)?

And therefore men, when injured, become less just? **[335 B, C]**

a. It need hardly be pointed out that the reasoning here is very inexact. There is no analogy between the *ἀρετή* of the animal and the *ἀρετή* of the man, even if we admit (what the dialogues sometimes discuss) the oneness of human *ἀρετή*. *βλάπτειν* is used of (1) physical injury, (2) other forms of damage. The injury done to horses and dogs is physical; the 'injury' done to men may take other shapes (e.g. loss of property, position, or reputation; mental pain, &c.). Physical injury to a horse or dog naturally renders it worse in respect of its ability to perform the functions of such an animal, which are physical. Physical injury to man (unless it is damage to the

Tricks with words.

brain) may only affect his performance of physical functions; while loss of property and position may affect neither these nor the moral functions (on which, indeed, it may have a wholesome effect). Mental pain, again, may exert no injurious influence on ethical practice. Men do not become less just because they are 'injured' in either sense.

P. It seems so.

19. S. But experts in music or horsemanship cannot, by the exercise of their respective arts, make men the contrary?

[See above § 11 *a* on analogy from the arts.]

Can the just, therefore, make men unjust by the exercise of justice, or, in general, the good make men bad by the exercise of excellence (ἀρετή)?

The just man cannot injure anyone.

P. Impossible.

S. Heat cannot cool, nor dryness moisten?

So, then, the good cannot injure?

But the just man is good?

a. It has been accepted above, § 15 (*c*), that the 'good' are just. Here the converse is stated on the same warrant, but not in the same broad sense. ἀγαθός has both moral and non-moral meanings. It is the adjective of ἀρετή ('excellence'). But δικαιοσύνη is an ἀρετή. The δίκαιος is therefore ἀγαθός in that domain, just as the musician is ἀγαθός in his and the horse-expert ἀγαθός in his. Whatever may be the case when fully investigated, Socrates is not here committing himself to the statement that a just man is necessarily a 'good' man in the fuller sense.

Therefore the just man cannot injure either friend or enemy? **[335 D]**

P. That seems quite true.

20. S. Then if anyone says that it is just 'to return to each what is owing,' and if this means that harm is owing to enemies and help to friends, he is no 'sage'?

We will therefore make common cause against ascribing such a saying to Simonides or Bias or any other sage?

The saying cannot come from Simonides.

P. I am with you. **[335 E]**

S. I fancy it was said by Periander or some other wealthy and powerful person.

Justice, then, is **not** this. What else can it be? [336 A]

21. Meanwhile Thrasymachus had been burning to break in. At this pause he was upon them like a wild beast.

The sophist is contemptuous.

A. *a.* The character of Thrasymachus is very unamiably delineated, and it is impossible not to feel that he had incurred the special personal dislike of Plato. If our knowledge of him were gathered only from the **Republic** it would appear incredible that he could have been a man of the high repute indicated by other writers (see above § 3 c). That his manner was conspicuously offensive is tolerably certain; otherwise Plato would hardly have cared or dared to give us the present representation of the sophist who 'had to be held back' from interfering, who 'wanted to shew off,' who 'sprang upon us like a wild beast,' who gives vent to a 'sardonic cackle,' who berates Socrates with disingenuousness, sneers at his 'mock modesty,' accuses him of picking other people's brains without a thank-you, calls him a 'gross buffoon' (*βδελυρός*) and a pettifogger (*συκοφάντης*) and 'my good fool' (*εὐηθέστατε*), tells him he 'drivels,' grows sulky and refuses to do more than nod his head, gets into a perspiration, and blushes 'for the only occasion on which I ever saw him blush.'

Character of Thrasymachus.

He is not only rude, but vulgar; not only dogmatic, but snarling. His is not simply the overbearing behaviour of a Dr Johnson, who, 'when his pistol misses fire, knocks you down with the butt.' He is not merely arrogant and irritable. Plato meant to make him 'no gentleman,' and so contrast him the more forcibly with the suavity of Socrates.

b. No doubt 'the mighty Chalcedonian' actually had these faults, however much Plato may have coloured them. In the dialogues the sophists are as distinctly individualised as the rest of the characters. They were historical personages, and, as Plato sought to impart every element of verisimilitude to his conversations, he had no choice but to give recognisable outlines, even in a caricature. The pen-and-ink sketches of

Plato's sophists individualised.

Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus in the **Protagoras** are too delightful and convincing not to have been essentially true.

In the dialogues which bear their names Protagoras and Gorgias are treated by Plato with personal respect, however unmercifully their views may be impugned. If the little foibles of Protagoras and the atmosphere of admiration in which he moved are lightly satirised, and if he is made to grow slightly ruffled in the debate, he is all the time drawn as a man of polish and real ability, and as a chivalrous antagonist. In the Gorgias the special art of the sophist, rhetoric, is attacked and its vicious emptiness exposed, but, beyond a certain excess of vanity, there is nothing in the man himself to take from our esteem. He is as courteous as Protagoras in his bearing towards the vexatious Socrates. To these, who were men of real eminence and character, Socrates is deferential. It is clear that Plato, while disapproving of the sophist, esteemed the man of talent and breeding.

Hippias, whether in the dialogues of that name (one of which may be spurious) or in the **Protagoras**, meets with despiteful treatment, principally on account of his inordinate conceit. Polus (in the **Gorgias**) has much of the insolence of Thrasymachus, which is tamed in a similar manner. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are meant to be frivolous and amusing impostors.

Is Plato misanthropic?

c. Plato is sometimes accused of positive misanthropy. The charge is not borne out by the dialogues. It gains colour only from his treatment of the sophists and other wiseacres. To these his attitude is one of general antagonism. He followed Socrates in his onslaughts on the 'conceit of knowledge' passing itself off for knowledge. But he found this everywhere around him, both in the teacher (whether of rhetoric, ethics, or general *savoir faire*) and in the so-called practical man, who proposed legislation or directed affairs. Congenitally, no doubt, Plato was of a highly critical and somewhat supercilious turn of mind. In addition to this his culture was high, and, as an 'apostle of culture,' he looked from a superior eminence upon those who were not in a constant condition of self-criticism. The world, as viewed from his standpoint, was apt to consist of men of crude views or narrow views, of pretenders or Philistines. It needed sweet-

ness and light. Light was wanting even in the best cases, in a Protagoras or a Gorgias. Sweetness these did possess. But all the contempt of Plato's nature and style—at least in his earlier days—was bestowed on those who, lacking light, were obtrusively lacking in sweetness. Of these Thrasymachus was the worst offender.

Whether the general attitude of Plato is a justifiable one is a question which we need not here discuss. It will be enough to point out again that the Socratic dialogues have a purpose—the examination of existing views, preliminary to the possible establishment of a sound basis for conduct. These existing views found expression chiefly in the professional sophists, second in the 'sages,' third in the representative citizen with his strict morality. The sophist, sage, representative citizen and man of affairs are therefore the natural *personae* whom Plato sets up for Socrates to assail. Truth to life in some cases, the requirements of literary vivacity in others, and the 'mimic' character of the dialogues, necessitate a lively handling in which personal idiosyncrasies play their part. The pieces are both philosophic dialogues and also little dramas of 'the humours.' It is by no means necessary to suppose that Plato, any more than Aristophanes, hated and despised his fellow-citizens in the ordinary intercourse of life.

[For a discussion of the relations of Socrates and the Sophists, with a defence of the latter, see Grote Hist. Gr. Pt II. c. lxvii. (vol. 8 of the 12 vol. edition of 1869), and compare therewith the remarks by Jowett in his Introduction to the translation of the **Sophistes** pp. 376 sqq.]

'What is the use' cries Thrasymachus 'of this foolish and disingenuous complaisance to each other? If you are in earnest, stop this perpetual asking and confuting, and give us something positive.'

Negative attitude of Socrates.

B. A usual objection to Socrates was that he merely created difficulties to be left unanswered. Cf. Meno 80 A *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν*. His wholly destructive procedure was reputed to come of a mischievous or captious spirit. Xen. Mem. IV. 4. 9 *τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷς, ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδενὶ ἐθέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενός*. The same expres-

sion τῷ μηδὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι is used by Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. 999 E.

Most people imagined that Socrates must be in a position to be positive in matters in which he could confute others. Apol. 23 A οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. If he pleaded ignorance and inability it was put down to his mock-modesty. A sophist like Thrasymachus, failing to comprehend the honesty of Socrates' attitude and irritated at it, was anxious to have it appear that he refused to be positive simply to avoid being himself subjected to confutation.

And don't tell me that justice is 'obligation' (τὸ δέον) or 'the salutary' (τὸ ὠφέλιμον) or 'the best policy' (τὸ λυσιτελοῦν) or 'the profitable' (τὸ κερδαλέον) or 'interest' (τὸ ξυμφέρον). I shall accept no such rubbish.

C. These definitions, most of which are practically synonymous, had apparently been enunciated in certain quarters and were in some vogue. Grote's remark (Hist. Gr. vol. VIII. p. 235) that the answers offered to Socrates in the dialogues 'purported to be the explanation or definition of a term...given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant' cannot apply to sophists and their pupils. As a fact these were much concerned with rendering to themselves 'an account of what it meant,' as Thrasymachus' own definition immediately shews. Attempts to analyse justice had, of course, been made, and some had come to the conclusion that it was simply 'the best policy.' This notion is elaborated in Glaucon's speech in Book II.

But Socrates had 'seen the wolf first.' He therefore still had the use of his tongue.

'Nay, Thrasymachus: if we had been looking for gold we should not have been pretending, and justice is worth far more than gold. Clever men like you should pity our incompetence, not be angry.' [336 B—E]

Socrates is ironical.

22. Thrasymachus (with a sardonic guffaw). 'The usual Socratic mock-modesty (εἰρωνεία)! Anything rather than answer!'

a. For the exact meaning of *εἰρωνεία* see the note (337 A) and the passage of Cicero there quoted. It appears in Apol. 37 E, where Socrates pleads 'If I say that it would be disobedience to the god to let people alone, you will disbelieve me *ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ*' (i.e. think I am pretending to humbler motives than I possess).

The 'irony' of Socrates.

The passage to the modern sense of 'irony' is not difficult to trace. An air of ignorance which seeks to be taught goes with an implication that the person addressed is in a position to teach. To depreciate oneself in comparison with others is correspondingly to exalt those others. If the air of ignorance or the self-depreciation is only assumed, the ascription of knowledge or superiority to the other parties is equally a pretence, and therefore a disguised expression of contempt. Socrates was *εἴρων* in both the Greek and the modern sense. His acknowledgment of ignorance, indeed, was genuine so far as it implied that he knew he had not arrived at true 'knowledge.' But his modest request for instruction from others was a pretence, and therefore 'irony' in the modern sense. He was perfectly satisfied that the sophists did *not* know and could *not* teach, and he was conscious of his own superiority over them. In the **Apology** he finds the oracle to be true that Socrates is the wisest of men, on the ground that he is aware of his own ignorance, while others—sophists, poets, politicians, craftsmen—are not.

To us there is pure 'irony' in the passage of the **Laches** (186 B) *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ λέγω ὅτι διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου πέρι. καίτοι ἐπιθυμῶ γε τοῦ πράγματος ἐκ νέου ἀρξάμενος. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἔχω τελεῖν μισθούς, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπηγγέλλοντό με οἷοί τ' εἶναι ποιῆσαι καλόν τε κἀγαθόν. αὐτὸς δ' αὖ εὑρεῖν τὴν τέχνην ἀδυνατῶ ἔτι νυνί.* To Socrates' opponents there was 'mock modesty' in such language, but they also smarted under the 'irony' implied.

The extent to which Socrates actually practised this characteristic *εἰρωνεία* was perhaps excessive. In Symp. 216 E it is said of him *εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ*, and probably anyone who reads the Socratic dialogues of Plato continuously, rather than in portions at different times, will occasionally find himself tiring of a device which is so entertaining in separate instances. 'After he had acquired celebrity, this uniform profession of ignorance in debate was usually construed as

a mere affectation; and those who merely heard him occasionally, without penetrating into his intimacy, often suspected that he was amusing himself with ingenious paradox. Timon the satirist and Zeno the Epicurean accordingly described him as a buffoon who turned everyone into ridicule, especially men of eminence' (Grote H. G. Vol. VIII. p. 249). See also Zeller *Socrates and the Socratic Schools* (Eng. Trans.) pp. 126 sqq.

Sparring between the sophist and Socrates.

S. Nay. Ask a man what 'twelve' is, and forbid him to say 'twice six' or 'thrice four.' What can he say? Suppose one such answer happens to be right? At least suppose he thinks so?

T. Do you mean to give one of these forbidden answers?

S. Possibly: if inquiry leads me to it. [337 A—C]

23. T. What do you deserve, if I offer you a better account of justice?

S. Instructing, I presume.

T. Sweet innocent! I must have a fee.

S. When I get the money.

The question of fees.

a. See note on ἀπότεισον 337 D. To the ordinary world Socrates might have appeared, and, to judge from the references in Aristophanes and elsewhere, actually did appear, to be himself a sophist, though one of an unusual variety, his 'teaching' being purely negative and his method dialectic. Even the sophists might have regarded him as one of themselves. They were not of one school, and the fact that he was at variance with each and all of them would not have made him the less a sophist. There was, however, an important distinction which could not escape the notice of either the public or the sophists, and it is one on which Socrates is given to insisting. The difference lay in the fact that Socrates took no fees for his ξυνουσίαι or dialectic discourses with his associates. He could not regard himself— who knew nothing—as a teacher (διδάσκαλος), nor his young friends as disciples (μαθηταί). They were simply (as the later terms go) ἑταῖροι or ὁμιληταί. Jointly with them he sought the truth (κοινῇ ἐσκόπει). As he had no wisdom or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) to sell, he could not honestly pretend to sell it.

The sophists, on the other hand, were avowed teachers. They professed to have something to impart, and they received payment for imparting it. Had Socrates been assured that the sophists were really dealing in a genuine commodity, he would not have shrunk from recognising their claims to remuneration, any more than he would those of a schoolmaster or of any *δημιουργός*, whether as practitioner of the learned profession of medicine, the fine arts of painting and sculpture, or the crafts. As a fact their fees, to his mind, were obtained under false pretences. This is curtly expressed by Aristotle Sophist. Elench. 1 *ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσης.*

Sophistry as a profession.

b. But apart from the reasoned Socratic view there was also the popular objection. In any case the Greek view of 'liberal' professions was very narrow. *ἰατροί* were allowed to be 'liberal,' but a military engineer (*μηχανοποιός*), for instance, was not (Gorg. 512 c). For sophists there was a special contempt, based partly upon the unanalysed notion that it was illiberal to charge fees for helping one's fellow-citizens to wisdom and virtue, and partly upon the impression that sophistical instruction resulted in a confounding of words, and a fondness for 'making the worse appear the better reason.' The former consideration is expressly stated in Gorg. 520 E *περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν' ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοίη ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον δῷ.* For the latter, the immoral ability was naturally dreaded by the Athenian public, since the practical exhibition of it would be in the assembly and the courts. The Athenian youths sought teaching of this kind not from a love of learning in the abstract, but with the same view as that with which young Romans studied rhetoric,—to fit themselves for a life of affairs.

A specially instructive passage may be found in the **Meno** (91 A sqq.), where Socrates, speaking to Anytus on behalf of Meno, who 'wants to learn that wisdom and excellence by which men successfully administer their households and their states' and treat parents, fellow-citizens and strangers 'in a way worthy of a good man (*ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ*),' suggests (ironically, of course) that he should go to *τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας*

αὐτοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους. On learning that these are the 'sophists' Anytus breaks out 'May no relative or friend of mine, no citizen or foreigner, ever be so mad as to go and be corrupted by them, *ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων.*' Socrates cannot believe that they get money for *that.* 'There is Protagoras, getting more money for this wisdom of his than Pheidias and ten other statuaries for indisputably beautiful works. Is it possible that Protagoras can have been for forty years ruining the material given him to work upon? And all the rest—can we suppose that they wittingly deceive and corrupt, or do they do so without knowing it? Or are they mad?' Anytus replies that it is those who pay them money who are mad.

In the **Protagoras** Hippocrates is eager to pay money to that sophist in order to be *σοφός* (310 D—E). Thereupon Socrates asks him what he expects to be made into by Protagoras, in the way in which he would be made into a sculptor by Pheidias. 'It would naturally be a sophist,' and Hippocrates blushes at the confession. Upon Socrates asking *πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων;* he is obliged to admit that he would be ashamed. This agrees with the popular attitude towards the profession. The Socratic objection is then pressed. The particular object sought by Hippocrates is to become *δεινὸς λέγειν.* But that, says Socrates, involves knowledge of the subjects on which one speaks; and what is that *περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ;* Hippocrates cannot tell. Protagoras, however, is not ashamed of being a sophist (317 B—C). He thinks frank 'confession is better than denying the fact.'

Long after philosophy, largely deriving from Socrates, had produced its special schools and systems, the payment of fees provoked expressions of contempt from writers like Lucian.

Glaucon and his friends are ready to club together to provide the fee, and Socrates, who cannot be positive 'because he does not know or pretend to know,' implores Thrasymachus to be liberal with his instruction. **[337 D—338 A]**

24. Thrasymachus is eager to shew off, but makes a pretence of preferring to hear Socrates.

"Socrates goes round picking other people's brains without so much as a 'thank you.'"

S. Nay, I pay my meed of praise, as you will find, when you give the answer. [**338 A, B**]

Definition of Thrasymachus. 'Justice is the interest of the stronger.'

T. Listen then. Justice is simply '**What is to the interest of the stronger**' (*τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον*).

Why don't you praise?

a. The same definition, equivalent to the modern expression that 'Might is Right,' and the same line of argument which is pursued immediately by Thrasymachus, recur Legg. 714 C sq. In all probability, therefore, it was a definition in current repute. The sophists and men of the world largely held that an abstract 'justice' had no existence. Justice was not *φύσει* but *νόμῳ*, and the *νόμος* was determined by the governing power in its own interests, or else (what amounts to the same thing) by the majority (as *τὸ κρατοῦν*), which makes compacts and passes self-denying ordinances for reciprocal protection. Cf. the remarks of Callicles in Gorg. 482 D sqq., and especially 483 B—D *οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν.*

S. I will praise, when I understand.

Polydamas, the athlete, is stronger (*κρείττων*) than we are. A beef diet is to his interest (*ξυμφέρει*). You don't mean that the same diet is to the interest of, and just for, those less strong? [**338 C**]

b. Thrasymachus had *not* said that the interest of the stronger is 'the interest' of the weaker also, but only that it is 'justice.' According to Thrasymachus *τὸ ξυμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος* is *τὸ δίκαιον*. In the crude *ad absurdum* illustration of Socrates *τὰ βόεια κρέα = τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον*. The only logical inference would be that, therefore, *τὰ βόεια κρέα* represent what is *δίκαιον τοῖς ἥττοσι*. Nothing can be said of this being *ξυμφέρον* also.

25. T. Another of your malicious tricks, Socrates!

Some states are under a despot, some under a democracy, some under an aristocracy.

That which is 'the stronger' (κρατεῖ) in each is the ruling power.

Explanation. The 'interest of the stronger' = the laws of the ruling power.

Each form of rule makes laws adapted to its own interest (ξυμφέρον).

In this shape this 'interest' is declared 'just' for the subjects, and its violation is punished.

Thus 'the interest of the stronger' is justice everywhere. **[338 D—339 A]**

S. Now I understand. Whether you are right, remains to be seen.

You forbade *me* to say that 'interest' was 'just.'

a. The thinking (and therefore the expression) is lax. Thrasymachus had said 'do not tell me that justice is τὸ ξυμφέρον.' He had not said 'do not tell me that τὸ ξυμφέρον is just.'

True, you add 'of the stronger.'

T. A slight addition, no doubt!

S. I do not know yet. I agree that justice is some sort of 'interest,' but your specification needs examining. **[339 A, B]**

T. Proceed.

26. **S.** You say, of course, that it is just to obey the ruling power?

First Elenchus. The laws of the stronger may (by mistake) be against his interests.

But ruling powers are fallible?

They therefore sometimes make laws against their own interests?

Yet the subjects must obey, and that is 'justice'?

Therefore justice may be *the opposite* of the interest of the stronger. **[339 C, D]**

The point thus scored startles Thrasymachus, and Socrates briefly reviews and drives home the argument. **[339 D, E]**

a. Plato is aware that the point here made is a really good one and sound enough to secure universal approval. He is, therefore, evidently pleased with it and enjoys tasting it over.

27. A slight diversion occurs in a small passage of arms between Polemarchus (supporting Socrates) and Cleitophon (supporting Thrasymachus).

Cleitophon ends by trying to make out that Thrasymachus meant 'what the stronger *thinks* to be his interest.'

Socrates will consider that view if Thrasymachus chooses. [**340 A—C**]

28. Thrasymachus disowns it.

a. Of course Thrasymachus cannot be represented as novice enough to accept so elementary a correction. He may not possess ἐπιστήμη in the Socratic sense; he may be superficial; but his superficiality is not so patent as this. He adopts a nimble resource of experienced sophistry.

T. Do you think I call a man 'stronger' when he is going wrong?

S. I did, when you admitted that rulers were not infallible.

T. A quibble, Socrates!

Do you call a man a 'physician' when he is making a mistake in medicine? Is he a physician *qua* that mistake (κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει)? Loosely, no doubt, we say so; but strictly—and you are a stickler for strictness—no craftsman or artist makes a mistake. The mistake occurs where knowledge fails, and at that point the practitioner is no craftsman.

Thrasymachus amends. 'The interest of the ruler, who, while really ruler, can make no mistakes in his laws.'

The 'ruler,' then, so far as he *is* a ruler, makes no mistake in legislating for his own interest. To obey his legislation is just. Therefore to do what is 'the interest of the stronger' is just after all. [**340 C—341 A**]

b. It is difficult for Thrasymachus to extricate himself, and he does it badly with a quibble. He had incautiously acknowledged that ἄρχοντες make mistakes as to their own interest. He does not frankly confess that he would not have made the admission if he had foreseen the consequences, but explains that he used the word ἄρχοντες in the lax popular sense (i.e. of persons actually exercising ἀρχή). But, as a fact, the ἄρχων, while ἄρχων in the ideal sense, makes no mistake in

his ruling. When he does make a mistake, he is *not* an ἄρχων for the time being. He becomes another character. It is only his legislation in the *real* character that we are to consider.

If he must quibble, it would have been easier for him to say that the ἄρχων, when making a mistake, is not really κρείττων. But that way of putting it would not have suited Plato's purpose.

29. S. So you think I quibble?

T. I know it; but it is useless with me.

S. Let us avoid the danger of it.

Do you henceforth mean by the 'ruler,' i.e. the 'stronger,' the ruler in your *strict* sense?

T. Yes. Now quibble, and do your worst.

S. I should as soon think of bearding a lion.

But enough of banter. [**341 A—C**]

30. Your physician—in the strict sense—is not a money-maker, but a healer of the sick? Your navigator is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor (though he is that incidentally).

Second Elenchus. The art of ruling (in the strict sense) has no interest of its own to consider, but only the interest of the subject.

There is an 'interest' (ξυμφέρον) in each case?

The essential purpose of the art in each case is to look after that 'interest'? [**341 C, D**]

T. Granted.

S. Has each *art* any other 'interest' than its own ideal perfection?

T. How do you mean?

S. It is not enough for a *body* to be a *body*. It must be sound. The art of medicine is required to look after the 'interests' of the body.

But is the art of medicine *itself* unsound or defective, requiring some further art to look after *its* soundness (its 'interests') and so *ad infinitum*?

Or is not every art—while it is what it pretends to be—complete and without defect?

Has it any other interest to look after than the interest of that which is the subject of the art?

T. I suppose not.

S. Then the art of medicine, having no deficiency of its own, looks after the 'interest,' not of the art of medicine, but of the body, and so on? [341 D—342 C]

T. Apparently.

31. S. Well, the *arts* 'rule' over and are 'stronger' than that which is the subject of their exercise?

[Thrasymachus was very reluctant to grant this.]

Then no science (ἐπιστήμη) looks after the 'interest of the stronger,' but after that of the weaker and the subject?

[Thrasymachus sparred for a time, but was compelled to give in.]

Therefore no physician, no navigator, no other kind of 'ruler,' so long as he is strictly 'ruler,' looks after his own interest, but after that of the subject upon which his art is exercised? [342 C—E]

A sophism of Socrates.

a. The arts are supposed to stand to those upon whom they are practised as government and superior strength stand to the governed and the weaker. The 'subjects' of the arts obey the prescriptions of those arts. Consequently the practitioner of an art is in the same position relatively to those upon whom he exercises it as an ἄρχων and κρείττων is relatively to the ἀρχόμενοι and ἥττονες.

The analogy is, of course, skilful; but for its application to prove that an ἄρχων, in so far as he *is* an ἄρχων, considers the good of his subjects only, it is obviously fallacious, unless we beg the whole question by assuming for ἄρχων the sense of *keeping a thing in good condition* as manager and director. This is what Socrates actually does beg. Cf. inf. 345 D τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ.

The perfect 'art' of ἄρχειν, in the literal sense, and the sense meant by Thrasymachus, might rather be defined as the perfect art of keeping others in subjection. The perfect 'art' of being κρείττων is simply the perfect art of keeping other people down. There might be a perfect art of poisoning, and, so far as the poisoner was a poisoner and nothing else, he would consider only the perfection of his art. He might not, indeed, be considering his own 'interest,' but it would

certainly not be the ξυμφέρον of his 'subjects.' It would be simply the most effectual way of exercising his art upon his victims.

Arts are not all beneficent, and if, indeed, the most strict and single-minded application of a beneficent art necessarily means the greatest ξυμφέρον of the 'subject,' the most strict and single-minded application of the contrary kind would mean his greatest injury. The 'subject' (οὗπέρ ἐστι τέχνη) may be a victim instead of a patient, and the assertion that no sort of ἐπιστήμη aims at the advantage of the stronger is therefore one against which Thrasymachus might have made a better stand. And is the mere art of 'being lord and master' beneficent?

32. Thrasymachus, seeing the result, suddenly says: 'Where is your nurse? You are drivelling. You cannot tell sheep from shepherd.'

Thrasymachus makes a speech. 'Ruler is to ruled as shepherd to sheep. He looks for the good they can do to himself.'

S. Why, precisely?

T. You seem to think that herdsmen look after the good of their herds, instead of after that of their masters and themselves. [343 A, B]

(Here Thrasymachus enters upon a set speech.)

Now rulers stand to ruled as herdsmen to their herds.

'Justice' is the interest of the stronger, i.e. the ruler. It is the subject's loss and another's gain (ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν).

Injustice is the contrary. It rules, and the 'just' obey, all for the good of the ruler.

A panegyric upon injustice.

In private contracts and in public dealings the just man always gets the worst of things and the unjust man the best.

The just man in office neglects his affairs and offends his friends by his probity: the case of the unjust man is just the contrary.

Take the most consummate injustice, ideal in form and opportunity—despotism (τυραννίς). It can rob, enslave, and so forth, with impunity, and win the envy of men.

Men do not shrink from doing, but from suffering injustice.

Given injustice on a large scale, it is a stronger (ἰσχυρότερον), finer-spirited (ἐλευθεριώτερον) and more masterlike (δεσποτικώτερον) thing than justice.

And so justice is the 'interest of the stronger,' while injustice is to one's *own* interest. **[343 B—344 C]**

33. After this shower-bath of words Thrasymachus rose to go, but the company insisted that he should stay.

a. For the μακρολογία of the sophists as opposed to the question and answer of Socrates see § 41 *a*.

Socrates reminds him of the importance of the subject, which involves the whole question how to live.

'They will all be grateful if he will pity and help them with his knowledge.'

S. For my part, I am not convinced. I cannot think injustice—even with a free hand—more profitable (κερδαλεώτερον) than justice.

Shew me my error.

T. What more can I do? Am I to cram the argument into your mind?

S. Pray don't. **[344 D—345 B]**

b. The idea is naturally repugnant to Socrates, whose creed was that truth should be brought out of a man by discussion (a 'maieutic' process), not crammed in by dogmatising. (We may compare the two lights in which 'education' is regarded.)

34. First keep to your premises, or, if you shift your ground, do it openly.

Repetition of second Elenchus. 'We must keep to the ruler in the strict sense.'

Observe. You first defined your physician as a physician 'in the strict sense.' When it came to the shepherd, you forgot 'the strict sense,' and you turned him into a feaster or a money-maker, fattening sheep for his own interest and not for that of the sheep.

But this is not the business of the 'art of shepherding.'

a. It is perhaps scarcely worth while to treat all this seriously. The art of shepherding might, indeed, be defined as the art of making sheep most nearly realise the ideal sheep. But

'ideal' from what and whose point of view? It is an art which looks after making the best of its subjects: but 'best' from what and whose point of view?

Remember our admissions. No (art or) form of rule looks after the best (τὸ βέλτιστον) for anything else than its 'subjects.' [345 B—E]

35. Do you think your 'true rulers' in the different states rule voluntarily?

T. I am sure they do.

S. But no one voluntarily 'rules' in the other forms of rule (the arts). Men require payment, which implies that the benefit of the art goes to the subjects of it?

Third Elenchus. Those who practise arts require pay. This shews that the benefit of an art, as such, goes to the subject.

a. This would certainly not be admitted in modern, nor, we may suppose, in ancient times. The practice of art for the love of art is independent of any other reward than the glow of satisfaction in the exercise of an ability.

Now each art differs from others in having a *special* faculty (δύναμις)? It provides a *special* benefit (ὠφελία), and not the same in all cases?

As the art of medicine provides health, so it is the 'art of pay-getting' (μισθωτική) which provides pay?

'The art of getting pay' (μισθωτική).

b. Such an art is, of course, not easily conceivable. A special ἐπιστήμη of the way to obtain pay in every circumstance in which pay comes into the question, and therefore applicable on scientific principles to all occupations and professions, is an idle abstraction which Socrates finds it necessary to conjure up. The notion is that an ἰατρός, for instance, while acting as ἰατρός and nothing else, is exercising the art of ἰατρική, the aim of which is simply to heal (ἰᾶσθαι) the subject of its exercise. This is the particular ὠφελία in the case, and it is conferred on the 'subject.' Whether the ἰατρός is paid or not, has nothing to do with ἰατρική itself. The getting of pay out of his exercise of ἰατρική is a secondary or simultaneous occupation of the ἰατρός in another character. To do this in the best way requires an 'art.'

But the ὠφελία in that case is the rewarding of the practitioner, and, while Socrates was erecting the obtaining of pay into an art, he might have been asked whether *this* art, at least, does not seek the advantage of him who practises it.

The fact that incidentally you earn pay while practising the art of medicine does not make medicine an 'art of earning pay' (*μισθαρνητική*)?

Each art (we said) works a *special* benefit. Therefore any benefit which accrues to *all* practitioners of the arts must come from the common use of something else in *addition* to their proper art?

Thus the earning of pay comes from the additional use of the art of pay?

[Thrasymachus assents with reluctance.]

Thus each art, in itself, attends to its own function, and benefits that which is the 'subject' in its department?

An art without pay is of no benefit to the practitioner, though it is just as beneficial to the 'subject'?

Therefore no one, as practiser of a given art and of no other, considers any 'interest' but that of the subject of his art? **[345 E—347 A]**

36. For this reason the ruler requires the inducement of pay, either money, or loss (*ζημία*) if he refuses?

Glaucon does not understand how 'loss' can be payment.

S. It is *the* inducement to the best men.

Ambition and avarice are reprehensible?

Accordingly, the good will not rule for either place or pay.

They must be compelled by fear of damage if they refuse.

The worst form of such damage is being ruled by worse men.

If a state were composed of good men office would be avoided as eagerly as it is now sought.

Thus it would be demonstrated that the genuine ruler does *not* look for his own interest, but for that of the subject. **[347 A—E]**

37. More important is the assertion by Thrasymachus that the *life of the unjust man is preferable* (κρείττω) to the life of the just.

Attack on the position that the unjust life is preferable,

It is of little use to count up and contrast the list of advantages on either side. It will be better to proceed by the previous method of reciprocal admissions. [**347 E—348 B**]

Come, Thrasymachus. Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable (λυσιτελεστέραν) than complete justice?

and that injustice is ἀρετή and justice κακία,

T. I have given my reasons.

S. One of the two is an excellence (ἀρετή) and one badness (κακία)?

Justice is, of course, the ἀρετή and injustice the κακία?

T. A likely thing! Quite the contrary.

S. What! Justice is κακία?

a. It is unfortunate for the argument, when translated, that there are no English words sufficiently free to correspond to the Greek senses of ἀρετή and κακία. ἀρετή is not properly 'virtue' as we understand it. In the **Gorgias** (492 D, E) it can even be discussed whether the satisfaction of sensual desires is ἀρετή. ἀρετή implies excellence and desert, while κακία implies imperfection and demerit. *Moral* excellence and desert are equivalent to 'virtue,' moral imperfection and demerit to 'vice.' Nevertheless 'virtue' and 'vice' cover but one department of ἀρετή and κακία. ἀρετή may embrace *intellectual* or *practical* excellence, and κακία the opposite qualities. ἀρετή may correspond to that which evokes admiration of any kind, e.g. strength of character (even if the exertion of it is not strictly 'moral'), while κακία may denote weakness and foible. Hence (inf. E) κακία and αἰσχρὸν are set by chiasmus against καλὸν and ἰσχυρόν. Cf. 444 E ἀρετὴ μὲν ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.

(Meaning of ἀρετή and κακία.)

For these reasons Thrasymachus, regarding the practice of justice as serving the interest of the stronger, can go on to declare that it is 'egregious good nature,' which is a form of weakness and foible and therefore κακία; while the practice of injustice, being the serving of one's own interest, is εὐβουλία and a mark of strength, and therefore ἀρετή.

Nevertheless the sense of ἀρετή and κακία tended early towards that of 'virtue' and 'vice,' and some confusion arose. For this reason Thrasymachus, though he at first promptly grants that, of justice and injustice, one is an ἀρετή and the other a κακία, is not altogether prepared to call justice flatly κακία and injustice ἀρετή. He is for substituting milder terms, until driven to take up an uncompromising attitude (inf. E). Had he kept the wider and narrower senses of ἀρετή and κακία distinctly apart, his position would have been easier.

T. No, but right royal good-nature (simpleness, quixotism, εὐήθεια).

S. Then injustice you call 'bad-nature' (κακοήθεια)?

b. For the half-truth in this retort see note on κακοήθειαν 348 D.

T. No, good sense (judgment, εὐβουλία). [348 B, C]

38. S. Do you regard the unjust as possessed of wisdom (φρόνιμοι) and excellence (ἀγαθοί)?

and that the unjust is φρόνιμος and ἀγαθός.

a. The adjectives correspond to σοφία and ἀρετή respectively (inf. E), and must be understood according to the senses attaching to those nouns (sup. § 37 *a*). The φρόνιμος is 'practically wise,' the ἀγαθός is a man of ἀρετή, of parts and quality, without necessary reference to 'moral' acts.

At the same time, since to the Socratic mind all virtue is knowledge, it would be quite conceivable that a man *conventionally* known as ἄδικος should turn out to be in reality the possessor of superior wisdom, and therefore of virtue.

T. Yes, when their operations are large. I am not thinking of pickpockets.

S. Of course. But do I really understand that you treat injustice as excellence (ἀρετή) and wisdom (σοφία), and justice as the contrary?

T. I do.

S. Your position has grown more stubborn. If you had called injustice 'profitable,' but 'weak' or 'disgraceful,' my task would have been easier.

But of course you will call it also fine (καλόν) and strong (ἰσχυρόν)?

b. Since ἀρετή necessarily implies these qualities.

T. Your prophecy is correct.

S. You are not jesting?

T. What does it matter whether I am or not? [**348 D—349 A**]

c. A side hit at a familiar attitude of sophists, as contrasted with the almost religious earnestness of Socrates in the cause of truth.

39. S. Well, let us proceed.

Would the just man be willing to have advantage over (or overreach) the just man?

a. The following piece of argumentation, however specious it might have appeared to the Greek mind, is perplexed for us, and its weakness betrayed, by the impossibility of representing *πλέον ἔχειν* and *πλεονεκτεῖν* consistently by any adequate term. Remarks upon its meaning and the fallacies which it involves are best reserved till the close of the argument (inf. § 40 *g* (i)).

T. No.

S. Nor the just performance (or circumstances, *πράξεως*)?

T. Not even if just.

S. But would he think it fair to overgo (*πλεονεκτεῖν*) the *un*just man?

T. He would, if he could.

S. Whereas the unjust man would seek advantage over *both* just and unjust?

T. Yes.

S. Then the just man takes advantage over his unlike; the unjust over both like and unlike? [**349 A—C**]

T. Quite so.

40. S. Now the unjust man has wisdom (*φρόνιμος*) and excellence (*ἀγαθός*), and the just man neither?

Argument by analogy from the arts. Expert does not go beyond expert, but 'unjust' goes beyond 'unjust,' and is therefore unlike the expert.

The unjust man is *like* the wise and excellent; the just man is not?

T. If you are so-and-so, you must be *like* people who are so-and-so.

S. Well, each of the two is of the same kind as those whom he is like? [**349 D**]

a. An unwarrantable assumption, upon which, however, Socrates has to rely as a premise to the conclusion in 350 c.

From the fact that one person resembles another we are only justified in saying that he is τοιοῦτος in regard to the thing or quality in which he does so resemble him. Socrates ignores this necessary qualification of τοιοῦτος.

T. What of it?

S. One man is expert in music (μουσικός); another is not?

The expert has wisdom (φρόνιμος), the other has not?

b. i.e. relatively to what is required in music.

What a man is wise (φρόνιμος) at, he is good (ἀγαθός) at?

Well, in tuning a harp, an expert in music (μουσικός) will not covet something which 'overgoes' another expert?

He *will* do so with the non-expert (ἄμουσος)?

c. i.e. he will naturally expect to 'arrive at more' (in the way of artistic success) than the unmusical man.

So in all cases of science and its contrary. The expert will be satisfied with the same as another expert (his like) in regard to the same performance (circumstance)?

T. I presume it must be so. [**349 E, 350 A**]

S. But the expert has wisdom (σοφός)?

And the wise has excellence (ἀγαθός)?

But it is the expert who is *φρόνιμος καὶ ἀγαθός*.

d. i.e. in the particular department.

Therefore the man of excellence and wisdom will not strive for more than his like, whereas the bad and ignorant will strive for more than both his like and his unlike?

e. There is nothing to prove this in the domain of the arts.

Therefore the *just* man is *like the excellent and wise*, and the unjust like the bad and ignorant?

And each is of the character of that which he is like?

f. i.e. according to the false assumption made above (*a*).

Therefore the just man, and not the unjust, turns out to be excellent and wise. [**350 B, C**]

g. (i) The whole of the preceding discussion is puzzling and almost meaningless through the want of fixity in the terms in which it is couched. The point chiefly turns upon the floating sense of πλέον ἔχειν, which literally = 'to have more,' 'to come off better,' but which generally connotes an unfairness in the distribution. Where two persons have the same claims, but one fares better than the other, the one πλέον ἔχει, the other ἔλαττον. πλέον thus means 'too much' as well as 'more.'

The meaning of 'overgoing' and 'overreaching.'

That the δίκαιος should be unwilling πλέον ἔχειν τοῦ δικαίου is so far clear. That he should think it right to have an advantage over the undeserving ἄδικος is an axiom of equity. But it is not so evident how he could πλέον ἔχειν τῆς δικαίας πράξεως. Of πρᾶξις it must be remarked that it includes both 'doing' and 'faring' (cf. 332 E). In the latter sense 'to have an advantage over the just state of affairs' is intelligible enough. In the former, 'to have an advantage over the just action' does not mean 'to get more out of a situation than just action permits' (a sense apparently simple enough, but not in keeping with the application to the arts in 349 E sq.), but 'to do (in the way of justice) more than the claims of exact justice warrant.' In other words ἡ δικαία πρᾶξις is action which is just: there can be but one really just form of action in a given case: all δίκαιοι, so far as they are δίκαιοι in the absolute sense, will perform that same act in the same degree: so long as it is just, it cannot be *more* just: the δίκαιος will not, therefore, think of such a thing as being more just 'than the just action.' Jowett very aptly quotes Shakspere *King John* IV. 2. 28

'When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

Hence Thrasymachus—who for Plato's purposes is assumed to have readily understood all this intricate train of thought—replies 'οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας' 'no, not even than the *just* (action),' i.e. however just the action (and it might look as if one could not get too much of a good thing), the just man does not want to be *more* just (than the true point). This is by no means the same as if he had said οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως, although commentators seem not to have been sufficiently alive to the fact. πράξεως could not be omitted unless δικαίας bore all the emphasis.

Later the same πλέον ἔχειν is brought into the usual analogy

of the arts, where, corresponding to πλέον ἔχειν τῆς δικαίας πράξεως (as above explained), it is asked (349 E) if a musician ἁρμοττόμενος λύραν will be ready to 'overgo' ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν (which is a μουσικὴ πρᾶξις). The notion entertained there is that the μουσικός, *qua* μουσικός, can only seek to tighten or loosen his strings to the proper point required by the art of μουσική. There is only one such point, and all μουσικοί, as such, will seek that point and no more. There is no 'more' or 'less' in the matter. All real artists will therefore do and prescribe, and expect all other real artists to do and prescribe, precisely the same things in the same cases.

On the other hand the ἄδικος will always seek to over-reach (πλεονεκτεῖν). He will try for (unfair) advantage over the δίκαιος and the ἄδικος alike. Also he will seek to go beyond an ἄδικος πρᾶξις by action still more unjust. As for the δικαία πρᾶξις, it cannot be said that he will endeavour πλέον ἔχειν in the manner above explained for the δίκαιος, but he will, in another sense, try to get an advantage beyond 'what is warranted by a just course of conduct.'

It is evident that the expression πλέον ἔχειν fluctuates between the meanings 'to have more' (i.e. an advantage rightfully) and 'to have too much' (an advantage wrongfully). In this fluctuation is involved a quibble, which might easily be intentional. This, however, is not the only sophism in the context.

Sophisms in the argument.

(ii) There is a certain speciousness in the whole argument, which we may thus summarise.

'You say that the unjust man, being φρόνιμος καὶ ἀγαθός (341 D), is like the φρόνιμος καὶ ἀγαθός in general, while the just man is not. Well, we are to understand that the just and unjust are respectively of the same description as those whom each resembles. We will accordingly take resemblance as the criterion. I go on to prove that the ἐπιστήμων in the arts (who is σοφός and ἀγαθός) has no desire to overreach his like, while the ἀνεπιστήμων, who is ἀμαθὴς καὶ κακός, has that desire. But the ἄδικος desires to overreach, and is therefore like the ἀμαθὴς καὶ κακός, while the δίκαιος has no desire to overreach, and is therefore like the σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθός. But to be like implies (as we have said) to be of the same description. Therefore the ἄδικος is of the same description with the ἀμαθὴς καὶ κακός. In other words, he is himself ἀμαθὴς καὶ κακός.'

But the 'overreaching' of the unjust man is, to begin with, hardly commensurable with the overreaching of a craftsman in his craft. It is impossible to attach consistent meanings to the same word. If we attempt consistency, we are apparently led to something which Socrates would by no means desire, viz. this—An artist, *qua* artist, tries simply to attain to an ideal exercise of his art. Granted. But then is not the business of the ἄδικος, *qua* ἄδικος, to attain to an ideal exercise of *his* art of injustice, which involves overreaching everybody? If the analogy of the arts is to be brought in, the μουσικός, ἰατρός, δίκαιος and ἄδικος are all φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοί in their own departments.

Again, if the μουσικός is φρόνιμος καὶ ἀγαθός, it is only in regard to knowledge and excellence in music that he can claim those titles. He is σοφός and ἀγαθός in regard to his ἐπιστήμη. This being so, why may not the ἄδικος be equally σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς in *his* particular ἐπιστήμη? Further there is practically no meaning in the remark that the ἀνεπιστήμων will 'overreach' both the ἐπιστήμων and the ἀνεπιστήμων. If it has a meaning at all, it is a pure assumption.

(iii) Even if we gave to the argument about 'overreaching' more value than it deserves, the fact that the 'wise and good' do not overreach, while the just man also does not overreach, would merely shew that in that one respect he resembled the 'wise and good.' It would not prove that he himself was τοιοῦτος, i.e. wise and good. Because *A* is never *B*, and *C* also is not *B*, it does not follow that *C* is *A*.

41. All these admissions were wrung from Thrasymachus, who was perspiring, and, for this occasion only, blushed.

Socrates resumes:

'In the next place you said that injustice was *strong* (ἰσχυρόν). You remember it?'

T. I do. But I am not satisfied as far as we have gone. If I speak, however, you will say I am making a speech.

So ask what you like, and I will nod or shake my head. **[350 D, E]**

a. The objection of Socrates to long speeches during discussion is amusingly illustrated in the **Protagoras**. That sophist has delivered himself of a lengthy utterance, and Socrates (328 D) has

The μακρολογία of sophists.

been 'spell-bound' by it. He ironically pretends to be waiting eagerly for more: 'but when I perceived that he *had really done*, I, as it were, gathered myself together.' He complains that Pericles or some other δημήγορος might speak in that way, εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό (τις) τινά τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηταί τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου (329 A). But 'Protagoras is equally capable of either making fine long speeches or of dialectic question and answer κατὰ βραχύ,' and Socrates desires him to carry on the discussion in the latter way. At 334 A Protagoras drops into oratory again, whereupon Socrates plaintively observes that he has 'a poor sort of memory' καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ὁ λόγος. 'It is so easy for Protagoras to speak καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ.' At last, though after a struggle, Protagoras is induced to try *altercatio* rather than *oratio*.

The same position is taken up in the **Gorgias** (449 B, C), where Socrates asks for question and answer instead of τὸ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο. Polus (471 D) is well trained πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικήν, but has neglected τὸ διαλέγεσθαι.

The objection, of course, is based on the difficulty of checking each link in the argument during the course of a long speech, and the consequent opportunity for sophisms, or, at any rate, for getting wide of the point by imperceptible degrees. In the dialectic process this danger appears to be avoided, and perhaps is largely so in real discussion between men of real intelligence. But in the Platonic dialogues the interlocutors assent so readily to palpable fallacies that their 'answers' do little towards keeping the discussion on sound lines.

In one amusing case, in the **Gorgias** (505 D), Callicles asks Socrates whether he can't just as well ask and answer his own questions. Thereupon Socrates proceeds to interrogate himself as if he were Callicles. Later in that piece, however, he is led, as he confesses, to make a long speech because he finds nobody to answer him. In the later dialogues Socrates himself indulges freely in μακρολογία.

It may further be remarked that Plato is fond of reproducing or parodying the individual styles of speech employed by particular sophists. This is manifestly the case with the

speeches of Hippias, Prodicus and Protagoras in the dialogue named after the last.

S. As you please, but do so conscientiously.

As for injustice being 'strong.' That might seem to be disproved already. But let us be exact.

Attack on the position that injustice is 'stronger.'

A state may be unjust and enslave others?

But will it be able to do this, as the 'stronger,' without the presence of justice?

T. Not if justice is wisdom. But I hold that *in*justice is wisdom.

S. Thank you for replying so nicely after all.

But can state, army, pirates or thieves act in concert if the members are unjust to each other?

Injustice begets feuds, justice begets unanimity?

T. Anything not to quarrel with you!

S. Many thanks.

Then will not the presence of injustice cause faction (1) in a state, (2) between two persons?

It produces feud, thwarts action and alienates the gods.

It will thwart just action, and it will produce enmity internally, towards all opponents, and, therewith, towards the just?

It will do this (3) in the individual, and make him, first, incapable of consistent action, second, at enmity with himself and the just?

b. A similar transference to the individual occurs in Gorg. 491 D of the ruler ruling himself. The remark is in keeping with a view developed later in the **Republic** that justice is the due relation and proportion of the component parts of the soul. In the *Ὅροι Σπευσίππου* we have *Δικαιοσύνη· Ὁμόνοια τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν καὶ εὐταξία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα.* Nevertheless Thrasymachus might well have asked for some explanation.

T. Yes.

S. But the gods are just?

c. The existence of gods, and their justice, are assumed as axioms. In Theaet. 176 B 'the way to become like God' (*ὁμοίωσις θεῷ*) is to become 'just and pious with wisdom' (*δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι*).

Therefore the unjust man will be the enemy of the gods and the just man their friend? [351 A—352 B]

d. Cf. Alcib. I. 134 C—E. Phileb. 39 E (*δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἆρ' οὐ θεοφιλής ἐστι;*). The absoluteness of this truth is questioned in the popular view stated by Adeimantus in Bk II., where it is urged that the gods may be bribed with offerings.

T. Go on till you are satisfied. I do not want to get myself disliked.

S. It is now clear that, if the unjust do transact anything jointly, it is in virtue of a tincture of justice. They are only *ἡμιμόχθηροι*. [352 B—D]

42. Our next business is to find out whether the life of the just is the happier, or not.

The matter is of such importance that we cannot assume this, even now.

Is the unjust life the happier?

T. Proceed.

S. A horse has a function (*ἔργον*)?

A thing's function is that which can be done only, or best, with that thing?

For instance, the function of the eyes is seeing; of a pruning-hook, pruning.

T. So far, so good.

S. And everything which has a special function has a special excellence?

That excellence is essential to the proper performance of the function?

T. I am satisfied.

S. But the soul (*ψυχή*) has its special function, such as ruling, planning &c.?

a. If another had said this, Socrates would have asked for a more specific name for the function of the soul.

And is not *life* a function of the soul?

'Living well' is living happily, and living well implies *ἀρετή* in the soul. But it is justice which is *ἀρετή*.

b. 'Life' is, however, either 'living' (which of course requires *ψυχή*, *anima*, in one sense) or 'the conduct of life' (which depends on *ψυχή*,

the mind, in another sense). The two meanings are confused in the argument which follows.

And will that function (living) be properly performed by the soul, if the soul lacks *ἀρετή*?

But we granted that justice is *ἀρετή*?

T. We did.

S. Then the just soul and the just man will live 'well' (*εὖ βιώσεται*), and the unjust not?

And he who lives 'well' (*εὖ ζῶν*) is happy (*μακάριος καὶ εὐδαίμων*)?

c. Early Greek logic was under the domination of ambiguous expressions like *εὖ ζῆν*, *εὖ πράττειν*. Reasoning was indeed *λόγος* in an unfortunate sense. Students trained in logic and alert to the various renderings which the same Greek expression requires in a modern tongue according to the context, readily detect the *non sequitur* in passages like the present. It would, however, be by no means obvious to those who themselves habitually used the one expression in several senses. *εὖ πράττειν* is 'acting rightly' (=*ὀρθῶς πράττειν*) and also 'faring well': *εὖ ζῆν* is 'conducting life properly' and also 'living well' (i.e. in comfort and happiness). The former depends on a condition of mind, the latter largely on external circumstances.

The ambiguity of *εὖ ζῆν*.

In Charm. 172 A we have the same ambiguity utilised as here, *ἁμαρτίας ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης ἐν πάσῃ πράξει, ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι.* So 173 D *ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν.* Cf. Alcib. I. 116 B *ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει; οἱ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες;* Gorg. 507 C, Prot. 344 E, 351 B (where *εὖ ζῆν* is treated as interchangeable with *ἡδέως ζῆν*). The Platonists used *εὖ πράττειν* for *χαίρειν* in salutations by letter. Aristotle still tolerates the ambiguity Eth. I. 4. 2, and VI. 2. 5 (*εὐπραξία*).

Therefore the just man is happy and the unjust miserable?

But to be miserable is not 'profitable'?

Therefore injustice is in no case more 'profitable' than justice. **[352 D—354 A]**

43. T. I hope you have enjoyed your feast of Bendis.

a. It is probable that this should be read as a reproach. The occasion is festive. Socrates has turned it into a meeting for debate; and Thrasymachus, who is fond enough of 'shewing off,' now pretends to disapprove of this way of celebrating the feast of Bendis.

S. Yes, thanks to you.

We have, however, been merely tasting a number of dishes in passing.

We set out to discover the *nature* of justice: then I left that question to consider whether it is weakness and ignorance, or wisdom and excellence.

Next there came up the argument that injustice was more *profitable* than justice, and I attacked that.

Summary of the discussion. The result is *nil.*

The result is *nil.*

If I do not know what justice *is*, I cannot tell whether it is a virtue (excellence) or not, nor whether its possessor is happy or not. [354 A—C]

b. The dialogue which, in its original form, probably ended here, is one of the earlier Socratic tentative dialogues. (See below §§ 57 sqq.) The setting up and demolishing of definitions has proceeded as in the **Euthyphro**, **Lysis**, **Charmides** and **Laches**. Similarly to the present case the **Lysis** ends with the remark *οὔπω δὲ ὅ τι ἐστὶν ὁ φίλος οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἐξευρεῖν.*

It might, perhaps, have seemed as if Socrates had actually demonstrated that justice is *ἀρετή* and the source of happiness. But he himself regards the whole discussion as so much dialectics destructive of the definition and assertions of Thrasymachus. He has arrived at no definition for himself, and yet such a definition is essential. His conclusions have not come from a knowledge of the *τί ἐστι* of justice.

II. THE REMAINDER OF THE PROEM.

(BOOK II. TO 369 B.)

44. Socrates thought discussion was over. It turned out to have been merely the prelude.

Glaucon not convinced.

Glaucon was not satisfied. 'Socrates, you have not really convinced us that it is better to be just.' [**357 A, B**]

45. G. There are three species of good things (*ἀγαθά*), viz.;

(i) Things welcomed for themselves, without an eye to their consequences—harmless pleasures;

How is Justice good in its essence, apart from rewards?

(ii) Things welcomed both for themselves and their consequences—e.g. health and sanity;

(iii) Things welcomed for their consequences, but irksome in themselves—e.g. money-making, practising or taking medicine &c.

In which class is justice?

S. I should think it is in the best class, the second.

G. Most people think otherwise. They place it in the third.

S. That is the position of Thrasymachus. But I must be a dunce. [**357 B—358 A**]

46. G. Thrasymachus gave in too soon. I want to hear **what justice and injustice are in their essence, in the soul itself, apart from all question of rewards and results.** [**358 B**]

Glaucon will therefore take up anew (*ἐπανανεώσομαι*) the argument of Thrasymachus.

Glaucon will press the popular view.

He will maintain as uncompromisingly as possible

(1) the current allegation as to the nature and origin of justice:

(2) that it is practised unwillingly, as a necessity and not as a good:

(3) that such conduct is natural, since the life of the unjust is much to be preferred.

Not that Glaucon himself holds these views, but he wants to hear how Socrates will meet them. [**358 C, D**]

47. First, then, as to **the nature and origin of justice.**

To do injustice (*ἀδικεῖν*) is a good thing; to suffer it (*ἀδικεῖσθαι*), a bad thing.

First—Justice is a social compromise, a self-denying ordinance.

But the harm in suffering it is greater in proportion than the advantage in committing it.

Hence, when committing injustice entails suffering it, men make covenants (*ξυνθήκας*) and laws (*νόμους*) to prevent both.

This preventing by law and covenant is called 'legality and justice' (*νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον*).

Hence justice is a compromise between the best (doing injustice with impunity) and the worst (suffering injustice without redress).

A man would be a madman to make such a compromise if he could do as he chose. [**358 E—359 B**]

48. Second, as to justice being **practised from compulsion only.**

Second—justice is practised only from compulsion.

If we gave a 'just' and an 'unjust' man a free hand, and then watched them, we should find that they would seek the same selfish objects.

Let us suppose each to have a 'ring of Gyges.' No one would be found to be above temptation. With full power to take, to slay, and so forth, there would be no 'just' man. For no one believes in justice as intrinsically preferable. The praise of justice is a piece of cant and mutual deception. [**359 B—360 D**]

49. Third, as to which is **the preferable life** of the two.

Let us assume the 'just' and the 'unjust' man to be perfect examples in their respective departments (*τέλεον ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα*), i.e. let the unjust man know how to work

Third—the unjust life is superior.

his will, and never to be found out, but actually to secure the best possible reputation for *justice*;

and let the just man be absolutely immovable in his principles, but let him gain the worst possible reputation for *in*justice.

Our just man will be flogged, tortured and impaled, and will learn that it would be better to 'seem' than to 'be' (just).

Meanwhile the unjust man, who is wise after the Aeschylean standard in 'being' (unjust) without the 'seeming,' will do what he chooses and to whom he chooses. His ill-gotten gains will enable him to help friend and hurt foe, as well as to propitiate the gods with offerings. His life will therefore be the more prosperous and desirable. [**360 E—362 C**]

Adeimantus supplements Glaucon's speech.

Socrates was preparing to reply, when Adeimantus joined in: 'You surely don't think the position has been adequately stated?'

S. Why not?

A. The most important point has not been made.

S. Then 'A brother to the rescue!'—though I am overwhelmed already. [**362 D**]

The praise of justice always dwells on the advantages of a just reputation, not on the advantage of justice in the abstract.

50. **A.** Men praise justice and blame injustice. On what grounds? Parents and guardians preach justice, not for its own sake, but for its effects on the reputation. A good reputation brings the powers and advantages which Glaucon has described.

But these preachers of justice do not stop here with the effects of reputation (δοξῶν). They describe, after the manner of Homer and Hesiod, the blessings which *heaven* showers on the just. Musaeus and Eumolpus go further still; they reward the just with an *afterlife* of feasting and everlasting carouse. The unjust, on the contrary, in their afterlife, are buried in mud or made to carry water in a sieve; and, in the present world, fall into ill odour and meet with the penalties which Glaucon has imagined for his misjudged just man.

Such are the grounds on which justice is preached up and injustice preached down. [362 E—363 E]

51. Take another set of traditional statements. Whether in ordinary talk or in poetry, the chorus is that justice and temperance are fine things, but difficult and irksome, while injustice and intemperance are easy and pleasant, and only made disreputable by convention. Unjust deeds are admitted to be generally more profitable. Praise and compliments are given to the rich and powerful knave, while the honest man, if weak and poor, meets with contempt: *laudatur et alget.* [364 A]

Justice is called honourable, but irksome.

Most astonishing are the views expressed about the gods and their relations to virtue. The gods, it is said, often reward men in life quite contrary to their deserts. Religious mendicants persuade rich men that, with a little expenditure of money, they can conjure the gods into granting indulgences and pardons for acts of injustice. [364 B, C]

The gods do not necessarily reward it.

For all these assertions the poets are quoted; Hesiod to shew that vice is easy and virtue hard, Homer to shew that the gods are bribable, the Orphic bards to shew that expiatory rites will make the wrongdoer comfortable both in this life and in Hades. [364 C—E]

Evidence is quoted from the poets.

52. Here we have a number of statements which must affect the minds of intelligent youth. A young man asks 'Am I to entrench myself in justice or in deceit? Justice without its reputation is useless: injustice with a good reputation means a splendid life. All depends on appearance. I must therefore practise hypocrisy. It may be hard to escape detection, but faint heart never won anything great. I must make myself friends, and use persuasion where I can, and force where persuasion fails. Of course the gods are not amenable to deception or force. But how do we know if there *are* gods, and if they trouble about us? Only from the

Intelligent youths will therefore combine injustice with hypocrisy.

They will deceive men and bribe the gods.

same authorities who tell us they can be bribed. Let us, therefore, bribe them. True, there is the after-world; but it is admitted that certain rites and ceremonies will make us safe for that.' [**365 A—366 B**]

53. What argument is left to support a man of power and ability in choosing a life of justice?

What argument is left for practising justice?

If the position we have represented is wrong, it is at least so natural that one may be forgiven for taking it up and acting upon it. Only a godlike nature or some deeper insight can save a man from such a view. [**366 B—D**]

54. The reason of this attitude lies in the fact which has prompted Glaucon and myself to press you in this way, Socrates. All of you who have preached justice, from the demigods down to our present prose and poetry, have praised it for its reputations, rewards and suchlike consequences. But what is it *in itself*, existing in the soul, unknown to gods and men? How is it *essentially* the greatest good, while injustice is the contrary?

It must be shewn that justice is good in itself.

If we had been enlightened as to that, we should have practised justice, and shrunk from injustice, spontaneously. [**366 D—367 A**]

55. I have represented the case as strongly as I could, not from my own convictions, but from the standpoint of Thrasymachus and others.

It remains for you, Socrates, to strip justice of all its accidentals and exterior consequences, and to shew us what it is and what it does, in and by itself, perceived or unperceived, in the soul of its possessor. How and why is it a good thing, when so considered? [**367 A—E**]

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56. Socrates greatly admires the gifted brothers. They must have remarkable turns of mind if they can speak so forcibly against justice and yet think otherwise in their hearts.

Socrates recognises the difficulty,

For his own part he hardly knows what to do, but he cannot stand by and see Justice maligned. [**367 E—368 C**]

One way out of the difficulty occurs to him. If we were bidden to read small writing at a distance and our sight was indifferent, we should welcome the hint that the same writing existed elsewhere in a larger form and on a larger ground, and that we could first read the latter and then compare it with the former.

but thinks it can be met by tracing the birth of justice in the birth of a State.

So in a state (πόλις) justice exists on a larger scale and in a more distinguishable shape.

Suppose, therefore, that we try to see *justice* coming into existence while a *state* is coming into existence? [**368 D—369 B**]

This proceeding is agreed to, and from this point the construction of the ideal πόλις begins.

III. THE COMPOSITION OF THE **REPUBLIC**.

RELATION OF THE FIRST BOOK AND OF THE WHOLE PROEM TO THE REMAINDER.

57. Probably every reader who has made himself conversant with both the matter and the style of the dialogues of Plato is struck with a peculiar phenomenon in the case of the **Republic**. It is that, while the work as a whole is made to rise out of matter discussed in the first book, and takes as a text the occurrence of a disputation on justice, the first book itself is separable from the rest as an entirely independent dialogue. In other words, if all the remaining books had been lost, the first book of the **Republic** would have been accepted as a complete and typical dialogue in Plato's earlier or Socratic vein. No sequel would have been looked for, and, though it could not then have borne the name of the **Republic**, it might well have borne that of the **Thrasymachus**, with Justice as its subject-matter. The title Θρασύμαχος (ἢ περὶ

Independence of the First Book as a dialogue περὶ δικαίου.

δικαίου) would have been as satisfactory a heading as Εὐθύφρων (ἢ περὶ ὁσίου) and the like.

Early character of the first book.

58. That the dialogue would be occupied with purely destructive criticism and end with a confession of ignorance, would place it along with the **Lysis**, **Charmides**, **Laches** and other short pieces of Plato's Socratic period. The 'mimic' or dramatic setting, the reiterated Socratic 'irony,' the malicious delineation of the sophist, the delight in dialectics for dialectics' sake, the logical fallacies and sophisms in which the Socratic dialectic itself indulges, together with the absence of any allusion to the characteristic elements of the later philosophy of Plato (such as the doctrine of 'ideas' and of *anamnésis*) and the complete absence of anything didactic or dogmatic, go to mark this book as composed at the same stage of development and in the same disposition as the earliest dialogues. In the later books the dramatic environment of the feast of Bendis and the 'going out to talk to the young men' are quite forgotten, the disputation becomes a discourse, and Socrates is metaphysical and expository in the most mature manner of the emancipated Plato.

59. With students of Plato these considerations of manner, method and result could not count for little even if they stood alone. They are too strongly in evidence, thrusting themselves upon the reader without the necessity of any of that detective work in which the critic sometimes unhappily confounds himself while testing dates and authenticities. But, as has been indicated, they do not stand alone. Even if we set aside these distinguishing marks of early views and early treatment in the first book, there remains the remarkable fact above-mentioned, that it is cleanly separable, as no portion of any other Platonic work is separable. It is true that other dialogues sometimes appear to blend the treatment of two different subjects, so that it becomes difficult to decide which is the real theme. But in no case can a portion be cut off at such and such a page and

left to exist as a complete dialogue in itself. Yet this can be done in the **Republic**.

60. The next observation which naturally occurs to the reader as he reviews the **Republic** is that later reference to the first book practically ceases with the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second. They think Thrasymachus 'gave in too soon,' and they re-state his position, though more strongly. This done, Socrates begins the construction of the ideal *πόλις*, and the whole of the previous matter is so little involved in the eight-and-a-half books which are to come, that critics, endeavouring to establish a close organic unity in the whole work, have been at a loss to discover more than one or two places where there seems to be a faint reminiscence of something said in this earlier portion.

Slight connexion of the first book with the remaining portions.

61. Arguments based upon linguistic data, though they can hardly be conclusive, are not without great value. Elaborate attempts have been made to determine the chronological order of the Platonic dialogues by criteria of language, in the departments of both words and their arrangements, in the avoidance of hiatus &c. Observations have been made upon changes which apparently came over the style of Plato in the course of years, and upon the relative frequency at different periods of one class of words and phrases as compared with another class, e.g. of *τοίνυν* as compared with *μέντοι*, *καθάπερ* as compared with *ὥσπερ* &c. For the application of these principles of 'stylometry' the student may be referred to Cap. III. (pp. 64—193) of the 'Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic' by W. Lutoslawski, where typical statistics are illustrated with a more scientific spirit and method than has usually been the case in this class of investigations. Of the **Republic** the writer says that 'the earlier part has always fewer peculiarities of later style,' and of the first book in particular that it is marked 'by a surprisingly early style, having less than half as many peculiarities of later style as the first sixteen pages of the fifth book, even fewer than the **Laches**,

Stylistic arguments for earlier date.

which is inferior in size.' When, however, he proceeds to say that the first book of the **Republic** 'must have been revised, emended and corrected in order to be absorbed into the larger work' he is travelling beyond the record, inasmuch as there is absolutely nothing in the book as it stands to indicate that it need ever have had any other shape in any one expression. The later portions are linked to the first by the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but nothing whatever is done to adapt the first book to what is coming or to absorb it in any larger scope.

62. It thus appears that the first book, approached whether from the point of view of (*a*) the philosophy, (*b*) the handling, or (*c*) the language, implies a composition both early and independent. The internal evidence for this view is complete in every particular.

63. External evidence of a trustworthy character is lacking. Aulus Gellius, indeed (XIV. 3), gives the story that '*Xenophon inclito illi operi Platonis, quod de optimo statu reipublicae civitatisque administrandae scriptum est, lectis ex eo* **duobus fere libris, qui primi in vulgus exierant,** *opposuit contra conscripsitque diversum regiae administrationis genus, quod* Παιδείας Κύρου *inscriptum est.*' The story is not likely to be true in any case; but at least the 'two books' could not have been the same as our first two books, since they obviously included the treatment of education. Moreover our division of the books did not come from Plato, but from the Alexandrians. Even if we give the utmost credit to the story, it would prove no more than that the *magnum opus* περὶ πολιτείας came out in sections. It has no bearing upon the question whether the first book may not have had an independent existence and title before it was made introductory to the *magnum opus*.

The external evidence.

Aulus Gellius.

More importance on the other side might be attached to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue of the **Cleitophon**. This was

evidently written after the appearance of the first book of the **Republic**, and from a dissatisfaction with it. Thus (410 A, B) *καὶ εἶπές μοι δικαιοσύνης εἶναι τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν· ὕστερον δὲ ἐφάνη βλάπτειν γε οὐδέποτε ὁ δίκαιος οὐδένα κ.τ.λ.*, cf. 407 D, and the reference to Thrasymachus (410 C). In the same piece (409 D) the words *ἀπεκρίνατό τις...τῶν σῶν ἑταίρων, ὃς δὴ κομψότατα ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἴη τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἴδιον ἔργον, ὃ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶς, φιλίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ποιεῖν* may allude to the Platonic notion, already developing, that justice might best be investigated in a state. But, if the portion of the **Republic** dealing with the question of justice and the state had been actually published, it is hard to believe that the **Cleitophon**, by whomsoever composed, would have passed it over so lightly, or have contained the same reproaches against Socratic results. One may hazard the conjecture that the **Cleitophon** was written by an inferior spirit, contemporary with Plato, who had read the Socratic dialogue (perhaps called *Θρασύμαχος*) which is now Book I. of the **Republic**, and who chooses Cleitophon, as the supporter of Thrasymachus, for his mouthpiece in expressing dissatisfaction with the outcome of the disputation. The general criticism of Athenians may have been similar, and Plato, who was elaborating and enunciating in lectures his notion of justice and the state (and who may be the very *ἑταῖρος* referred to), thereupon completed the larger work as we have it.

The **Cleitophon**.

64. It seems difficult, after pondering the whole work, to avoid the conclusions that—

Conclusions as to the composition.

(i) The first book was originally an independent Socratic dialogue of the exercitatory (*γυμναστικός*) division of the inquiring (*ζητητικός*) type upon an ethical subject (in this case, Justice), and ending in the usual deadlock.

(ii) At a later period Plato, having formulated more positive opinions, and having recognised how great and natural was the logical difficulty of preferring justice on

abstract grounds, was dissatisfied with the apparent futility of the discussion.

(iii) He thereupon took up the early dialogue, expressed through the mouths of Glaucon and Adeimantus both his own and the popular dissatisfaction, and set himself to arrive at something positive.

(iv) The speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus are a very dexterous and artistic device for re-opening the case and introducing his essay.

(v) Apart from his inquiries into justice pure and simple, Plato had also developed views as to an ideal commonwealth, and seizes the opportunity of 'watching justice growing in a growing state' to ventilate those views at great length.

(vi) Thus the consideration of the ideal state comes to preponderate in the work, and, whereas the first book was *wholly* concerned with τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν (354 B), and the later books nominally so, the dialogue as a whole comes to be concerned apparently with a 'commonwealth,' and so earns the name Πολιτεία.

(vii) The work, constructed into a unity long after the proem, was probably composed in different parts at different times, Books V.—VII. being chronologically the last.

IV. THE TEXT.

65. The MSS of our portion of the Republic are numerous. Chief among them stands

A (or Par. A), a MS of the 9th century now in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris. The first hand is denoted by A^1, that of the corrector (διορθωτής) by A^2.

The representative of a second class is

Π (or Ven. Π), a MS of the 12th century in the library of St Mark at Venice. Π^2 denotes corrections by a somewhat later hand.

Typical of a third class is

M, a MS of the 12th or 13th century in the Malatestan library at Cesena.

Others of the MSS more frequently quoted are K and *q*, 'edited' or 'learned' copies related to Π, and Ξ, an 'edited' or 'learned' copy cognate to M.

Of these MSS A is indisputably the best, but is far from invariably sound.

66. The present text follows A as closely as possible. Apart from one or two changes of accent in the case of pronouns which seem to demand emphasis (e.g. 329 E *ἡγεῖσθαι σὲ* for *ἡγεῖσθαί σε* of MSS and 338 B *οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ* for *οἶμαι γάρ σε*), one or two modifications of the punctuation (e.g. 329 C, 364 C, 368 D), which involve new views of the construction, and the substitution of true orthographies for those which are incorrect in MSS, the new elements introduced for the first time here are in the following much-vexed passages—

The present text.

	MSS.	THIS TEXT.
330 B	...ἢ ἐπεκτήσω; Ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις κ.τ.λ.	...ἢ ἐπεκτήσω; <Ὁ>ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μέσος τις κ.τ.λ.
330 E	καὶ αὐτὸς ἤτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ αὐτά, ὑποψίας δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.	....καὶ ὥσπερ <εἰ> ἤδη ....
337 E	πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφην ἐγώ...τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη κ.τ.λ.	.... ἔπειτα εἰ, <ὅ>τι καὶ........... ....

MSS.	THIS TEXT.
351 E—352 A	
οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἵαν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, ...πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ (ποιεῖν **Π**) *πράττειν κ.τ.λ.*	*οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν;* [*οἵαν*] *ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται*.............................. ....*ποιεῖ πράττειν κ.τ.λ.*
358 E	
περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη [*τί οἷόν τε* **Π**, *τί οἴονται* $q\beta^1$.]	......................*τί* <*τῷ*> *ὄντι καὶ ὅθεν*..............................
365 D	
οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν. [*τί καὶ ἡμῖν...;* **x**, *οὐδ' ἡμῖν* $q\beta^1$, *καὶ ἡμῖν οὐ μελητέον* **D**]	.... <**οὐδὲν**> *καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον*... ....

In 351 B—C [*σοφία*] is bracketed as the easiest means of restoring construction with sense. In 333 E †*λαθεῖν* is obelised in order to indicate the probable seat of error.

Of emendations previously made it has seemed well to incorporate Stallbaum's bracketing of [*ἔστι*] in 329 D, Bekker's *τουτοισί* in 330 B, provisionally Bekker's *οἵου γε σύ* in 336 E, Madvig's punctuation in 339 E, *φαῖμεν* from Stephanus in 352 E, Hermann's bracketing of *Γύγου* in 359 C, and <*μὲν*> from Muretus in 366 A.

On the other hand *τῷ δικαίῳ* has been retained in 363 A.

One or two suggestions are offered for what they are worth in the footnotes to 328 C (*οὐ δή*), 336 E, 341 D, 346 B (<*τοῦ*> *πλεῖν*), 359 D—E (<*περικεῖσθαι*>), 366 E &c. In 333 E I find that *ἀλθεῖν* has been anticipated by Salvini.

CHIEF SIGNS OR ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES OR TEXT.

A[1], **Π**[1] &c. = the first hand of **A**, **Π** &c.

A[2], **Π**[2] &c. = the second hand of **A**, **Π** &c.

A corr., **Π** corr. = a correction in **A**, **Π**.

A+, **Π**+, &c. = **A**, **Π** &c. supported by other MS evidence.

mg. or marg. = a reading recorded in the margin.

om. = omitted by the MS in question.

ej. = ejected by the editor in question.

vulg. = the common reading in texts not further specified.

cett. = the reading in texts other than that specified.

[ ] enclosing words of the MSS which were probably not written by Plato.

< > enclosing words not in the MSS which should probably be supplied.

* marking a new reading other than the above.

† marking a reading of the MSS which probably still requires emendation.

Meisterhans = Meisterhans' Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften (2nd edition).

Goodwin M. and T. = Goodwin's Greek Moods and Tenses (edition 1889).

J. and C. = Jowett and Campbell's edition of the *Republic*.

L. and S. = Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

Α.

St. T. II. p.

Ι. Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος 327
τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος, προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα
τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον
ποίησουσιν, ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν
μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέν-
τοι ἧττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἣν οἱ Θρᾷκες ἔπεμπον.
προσευξάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπῇμεν πρὸς τὸ B
ἄστυ. κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὡρμη-
μένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα
τὸν παῖδα περιμεῖναί ἑ κελεῦσαι. καί μου ὄπισθεν
ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη,
Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε
καὶ ἠρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἴη. Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὄπισθεν
προσέρχεται· ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. Ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦ-
μεν, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Γλαύκων. καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον ὅ τε
Πολέμαρχος ἧκε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος C

327 A. *ποιήσουσιν*. For the orthography of *ποιεῖν*, *ποεῖν* see Meisterhans Gr. Att. Ins. § 16 a). Since comedy says indifferently *ποῖεῖν*, *ποῖεῖν*, and since the omission of *ι* before *η* can hardly have been more than optional, we gain nothing by writing *ποήσουσιν*.

ἀδελφὸς καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικίου καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς. ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη, Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἄστυ ὡρμῆσθαι ὡς ἀπιόντες. Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἢ τοίνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ' αὐτοῦ. Οὔκουν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐλλείπεται τὸ ἢν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς, ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι; Ἦ καὶ δύναισθ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεῖσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων. Ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε. καὶ ὁ
328 Ἀδείμαντος, Ἆρά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἴστε ὅτι λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἀφ' ἵππων τῇ θεῷ; Ἀφ' ἵππων; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἁμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος· καὶ πρός γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἣν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι. ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα καὶ ξυνεσόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων
B αὐτόθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε. καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων, Ἔοικεν, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι. Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

II. Ἤιμεν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον τὸν Καλχηδόνιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανιᾶ καὶ

327 C. ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς **A**+**M**+. ὡς om. **Π**+. See note. The omission was probably quite accidental.

οὐκοῦν MSS. *οὔκουν* (*nonne*) is preferable; *ergo* is out of place.

ἔτι ἐλλείπεται **A**+**Π**+**M**. ἔτι ἐν λείπεται **M** marg.+, γρ. **A**² marg. Each reading is capable of having been derived from the other (ΕΝΛ for ΕΛΛ or vice versa), or both may be from ΕΛ̄.

328 B. Καλχηδόνιον **A** correctly. See note. Χαλκηδόνιον **Π**+. The mistake Καρχηδόνιον **M**+ is not rare.

Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου· ἦν δ' ἔνδον καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος. καὶ μάλα πρεσβύτης μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι· διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ C
ἑωράκη αὐτόν. καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπί τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου· τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν· ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ. εὐθὺς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ εἶπεν, Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ θαμίζεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ· χρῆν μέντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦ τοῦ ῥᾳδίως πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἂν σὲ ἔδει δεῦρο ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σὲ ἦμεν· νῦν δέ D
σε χρὴ πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε, ὅσον αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὔξονται αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεανίαις ξύνισθι καὶ δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς

Χαρματίδην Π+. The wrong omission and insertion of *ν* (represented by a stroke) are both common. In old Attic vase-inscriptions the nasal is sometimes not written at all before explosives (e.g. *Ἀταλάτη*, *Τιμάδρα*), v. Meisterhans § 31. 2.

Παιανιέα MSS. I have replaced the proper form *Παιανιᾶ*. Cf. Meisterhans § 55 b) 9.

328 C. *ἑωράκη* **A**Π. *ἑωράκειν* vulg. See note. Add Photius *ἑωράκη τὸ πρῶτον πρόσωπον ὡς ἐπεπόνθη καὶ ἐπεποιήκη καὶ ᾔδη. Πλάτων τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆται σχηματισμοῖς.* Eustath. Od. 1946. 22. Schanz Plat. Vol. XII. Proleg. § 12.

οὐδὲ θαμίζεις MSS. *οὐ δὲ* J. and C. *οὔτι* Ast. If any change were required *οὐ δὴ* would be easiest: but see note.

ἐν δυνάμει ἦ Π. *ἦν* vulg. See note, and Rutherford New Phryn. cxxx.

οὐδὲν ἄν σε ἔδει MSS. But the pronoun is opposed to *ἐγώ*. The accents of MSS carry little authority.

328 D. *νεανίαις* **A**+**M**+. *νεανίσκοις* Π+ and Stobaeus (Serm. CXII. p. 589) perhaps rightly.

φοίτα ὡς παρὰ φίλους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος
E τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστιν, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥᾳδία καὶ εὔπορος· καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην, ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἶ τῆς ἡλικίας, ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ φασὶν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου, ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις;

III. Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, νὴ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
329 οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταὐτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασῴζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. οἱ οὖν πλεῖστοι ἡμῶν ὀλοφύρονται ξυνιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενοι περί τε τἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ πότους καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες,

χαίρω γε **Π**+ Stob. (l. c.). *γε* om. **A**+**M**+. *χαίρω τε* some Florentine copies, by a common error (though *τε might* look forward to *καὶ δὴ καὶ*).

328 E. *πότερον* before *τραχεῖα* interpol. *q*β[1]. See note.

ὅ τί σοι MSS. Qu. *ὅ τι σοί?*

αὐτὸς ἐξαγγέλλεις **A**[2].

329 A. *διασῴζοντες.* The ι-subscript is correct. Meisterhans § 63. 26. Its omission in inscriptions is late.

ξυνιόντες MSS. *ξυνόντες* Ast, Stallbaum &c. But the 'birds of a feather *flock* together.'

πότους τε καὶ εὐωχίας **Π**+, perhaps not so well, inasmuch as there are three terms depending on the second *περὶ*. Yet *τε* may join *πότους καὶ εὐωχίας* into one compact notion to be set against the wider *ἄλλ' ἄττα*: i.e. *περί τε τἀφροδίσια* **καὶ** *περὶ* {*πότους τε καὶ εὐωχίας* / *καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα.*}

νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων B
προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως ὀδύρονται, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο αἴτιον, κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη ἕνεκά γε γήρως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας. νῦν δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμην ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπό τινος, Πῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς C
τἀφροδίσια; ἔτι οἷός τε εἶ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι; καὶ ὅς, Εὐφήμει, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγών. εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἧττον. παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία. ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσιν, παντάπασιν τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν D

329 B. *ἐπεπόνθη* **AΠ**[1]. *ἐπεπόνθειν* vulg. v. sup. 328 c.

329 C. *ἀσμενέστατα* **A+M+**. *ἀσμεναίτατα* Π. Both forms being in use, we may follow the best MS. Etym. M. p. 31. 17, indeed, quotes *ἀσμεναίτατα* from Plato *ἐν α' πολιτειῶν*, but from what MS? In 616 A there appears to be no variant to *ἀσμενέστατα*.

αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον MSS. *αὐτὰ* Clem. Alex. Paed. II. 10, Strom. III. 3. The textual value of ancient quotations is slight. *αὐτὸ* goes better with the following singular and is in Plato's style ('that sort of thing'). Cf. Symp. 192 c. *ἀποφυγὼν* om. Clem., while *ἀποδρὰς* is substituted in Theon Progymn. p. 74.

ἐπειδὰν αἱ **AΠ**[1]. *ἐπειδὰν γὰρ αἱ* **M+**. The accidental omission of *γὰρ* is much less likely than its deliberate insertion. Cf. inf. 351 A. See note. J. and C. would have done better to punctuate at *ἐλευθερία*. So Adam.

[ἔστι] καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ εὔκολοι ὦσιν, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίπονον· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ γῆρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυμβαίνει.

IV. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον· Ὦ
Ε Κέφαλε, οἶμαί σου τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃς, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡγεῖσθαι σὲ ῥᾳδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθιά φασιν εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσι μέν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὃς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λοιδορουμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι, ὅτι οὐ δι'
330 αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοίη, ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν αὐτὸς Σερίφιος ὢν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναῖος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικὴς πάνυ τι ῥᾳδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι, οὔθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικὴς πλουτήσας εὔκολός ποτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ γένοιτο. Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε,

329 D. [*ἔστι*] Stallbaum. The word follows *μαινομένων* in **K**. If it is retained, there must be fuller punctuation at *γίγνεται*.

329 E. *ἡγεῖσθαί σε* MSS. But the emphasis is clear: '*your* case is a special one.'

330 A. *εὐδοκιμοῖ* MSS. See note.

πάνυ...ἐπιεικής om. **ΠΚ** (homoeoteleuton).

πάνυ τι **A**+. *πάνυ τοι* vulg. The confusion is of the commonest. Cf. 331 A, 332 D, 358 C.

ὧν κέκτησαι τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω;
<Ὁ>ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μέσος τις B
γέγονα χρηματιστὴς τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοὶ σχεδόν τι
ὅσην ἐγὼ νῦν οὐσίαν κέκτημαι παραλαβὼν πολλάκις
τοσαύτην ἐποίησεν, Λυσανίας δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἔτι ἐλάττω
αὐτὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νῦν οὔσης· ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, ἐὰν μὴ
ἐλάττω καταλίπω τουτοισί, ἀλλὰ βραχεῖ γέ τινι
πλείω ἢ παρέλαβον. Οὗ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην, ἦν δ'
ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. C
τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἳ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτή-
σωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπά-
ζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὑτῶν
ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσιν,
ταύτῃ τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα
σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν,
ᾗπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι εἰσίν,
οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον. Ἀλη-
θῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

πλέω **A**+. But *ει* is required before the long vowel. Meisterhans § 58. 17.

330 B. *ποῖ'* Π²+. *ποῖ* vulg. (with question at *Σώκρατες*). For the conjecture in the text see note.

Λυσανίας MSS. *Λυσίας* van Prinsterer.

τουτοισί Bekker. *τούτοισιν* MSS.

οὗ τοι ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ. **b**. *οὕτοι* Π (rec. Castellani). *οὕτοι* **A**+. The idiom was not understood.

330 C. *τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα* **A**, which often has the breathing wrong in the reflexive (Campbell).

ταύτῃ τε δὴ...καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν **A**+Π+, but for some reason the sense was missed at an early date. Hence *καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν* some inferior MSS and Ficinus. These MSS keep *τε*, however.

ἤπερ **A**+ for *ᾗπερ*.

D V. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλά μοι ἔτι
τοσόνδε εἰπέ· τί μέγιστον οἴει ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι
τοῦ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι; Ὅ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἴσως οὐκ
ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ οἴεσθαι
τελευτήσειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ
ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσῄει. οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι
περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ
ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ
E στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν, καὶ
αὐτὸς ἤτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ
<εἰ> ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ
αὐτά, ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται
καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἴ τινά τι ἠδίκηκεν.
ὁ μὲν οὖν εὑρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδική-
ματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ
ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ζῇ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος·
331 τῷ δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον ξυνειδότι ἡδεῖα ἐλπὶς ἀεὶ
πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος
λέγει. χαριέντως γάρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος
εἶπεν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως τὸν βίον διαγάγῃ,
γλυκεῖά οἱ καρδίαν ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος
συναορεῖ ἐλπίς, ἃ μάλιστα θνατῶν πολύ-
στροφον γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ. εὖ οὖν λέγει θαυμα-
στῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτ' ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν
τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πλείστου ἀξίαν εἶναι, οὔ τι

330 E. ὥσπερ ἤδη MSS. See note. Either ὥσπερ <**εἰ**> ἤδη or ὥσπερ **εἰ δὴ** will restore grammar and sense; but ἤδη should be retained.

σ
ἠδίκηκεν **A.** ἠδίκησεν Π + and Justin Martyr (Cohort. ad Gr. 26). But the perfect better expresses the abiding guilt.

331 A. οὔτοι for οὔ τι appears in inferior copies. Cf. 330 A. Stobaeus (Serm. xcii. p. 512) has οὔτι που.

παντὶ ἀνδρί, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά B
τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ' αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἡ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρείας πολλάς· ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι. Παγκάλως,
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν C
δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι, ἄν τίς τι παρά του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πᾶς ἄν που εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὅπλα, εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοίη, ὅτι οὔτε χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα
ἐθέλων τἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκ D
ἄρα οὗτος ὅρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἃ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἴπερ γέ τι χρὴ Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι. Καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον· δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὃς γελάσας· καὶ ἅμα ᾔει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά.

331 B. *ἀλλά γε ἓν* MSS. *ἀλλὰ ἕν γε* Stob. (l. c.). See note.

331 C. *ἀπαιτοῖ* MSS. v. sup. 330 A (note).

331 D. *οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ* Ξ. *ἔφη ἐγώ* **A**+Π+**M**+. The stroke — for *ν* must have been very early omitted by accident. Adam, however, reads *οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ ὁ Πολέμαρχος...*, which may very well be right.

E VI. Λέγε δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τί φῂς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; Ὅτι, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι· τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέγειν. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδῃ γε οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ· τοῦτο μέντοι ὅ τί ποτε λέγει, σὺ μέν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τό τινος παρακαταθεμένου τι ὁτῳοῦν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι
332 ἀποδιδόναι· καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν πού ἐστιν τοῦτο, ὃ παρακατέθετο· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν τότε, ὁπότε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοίη; Ἀληθῆ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλο δή τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικεν, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι. Ἄλλο μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἴεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μέν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν. Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν, ὃς ἄν τῳ χρυσίον
B ἀποδῷ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λῆψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὦσιν ὅ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδιδούς· οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῂς τὸν Σιμωνίδην; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον, ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ ὀφειλόμενον; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς. ὀφείλεται δέ γε, οἶμαι, παρά γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ, ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακόν τι.

VII. Ἠινίξατο ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ

331 E. *ἀνήρ* **A**+**Π**+. *ὁ ἀνήρ* the old texts (qu. with what authority?). *ἀνὴρ* Stallbaum. Cf. Phaedr. 266 c, where the answer *βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες* appears in MSS as *ἄνδρες*. See note, however.

332 A. *ἀπαιτοῖ* MSS. See 330 A note.

Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἴη. διενοεῖτο
μὲν γάρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἴη δίκαιον, τὸ C
προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν
ὀφειλόμενον. Ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; ἔφη. Ὦ πρὸς Διός,
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο· Ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ἡ
τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον
τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἴει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀπο-
κρίνασθαι; Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἡ σώμασιν φάρμακά τε
καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. Ἡ δὲ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα
ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖ-
ται; Ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα. Εἶεν· ἡ οὖν δὴ D
τίσιν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;
Εἰ μέν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς
ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς
ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδοῦσα. Τὸ τοὺς φίλους
ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην
λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι. Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας
φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ
ὑγίειαν; Ἰατρός. Τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς E
θαλάττης κίνδυνον; Κυβερνήτης. Τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος;
ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατώτατος φίλους
ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; Ἐν τῷ προσπολε-

332 C. *ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; ἔφη. Ὦ πρὸς Διὸς* **A**+. *ἀλλὰ τί οἴει ἔφη πρὸς Διὸς* Π + **M** +. Madvig's *ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; Ἔφη. Ὦ πρὸς Διὸς* is abrupt and unnecessary. v. note.

332 D. *εἶεν* MSS. *εἰέν* is a correction of **A** by a later hand in 341 A and elsewhere, and was evidently the recognized pronunciation (cf. *ταῶς*), probably intended to distinguish it from the verb.

εἰ μέν τοι some second-rate copies. Cf. 330 A.

ὠφελίας: the regular spelling of the original hand of **A**. *ὠφελείας* vulg. Epigraphy favours the former (Meisterhans § 15. 32), as do the MSS of Plato. See Schanz Plat. Vol. II. Proleg. § 3 (where *εὐμαθία, δυσμαθία, εὐμαρία, προμηθία* &c. are added).

μεῖν καὶ [ἐν τῷ] ξυμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Εἶεν· *μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, ὦ φίλε* Πολέμαρχε, *ἰατρὸς ἄχρηστος.* Ἀληθῆ. Καὶ *μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης.* Ναί. *Ἆρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος;* Οὐ *πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο.* Χρήσιμον *ἄρα καὶ*
333 *ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη;* Χρήσιμον. Καὶ *γὰρ γεωργία· ἢ οὔ;* Ναί. Πρός *γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν.* Ναί. Καὶ *μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική;* Ναί. Πρός *γε ὑποδημάτων ἄν, οἶμαι, φαίης κτῆσιν.* Πάνυ *γε.* Τί *δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι;* Πρὸς *τὰ ξυμβόλαια, ὦ* Σώκρατες. Ξυμβόλαια *δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι*
B *ἄλλο;* Κοινωνήματα *δῆτα.* Ἆρ' *οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός;* Ὁ *πεττευτικός.* Ἀλλ' *εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ;* Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ' *εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων;* Εἰς *ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.* Πλήν *γ' ἴσως, ὦ* Πολέμαρχε, *πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυρίου*
C *κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον· τότε δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἱππικός· ἦ γάρ;* Φαίνεται. Καὶ *μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης.* Ἔοικεν. Ὅταν *οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων;* Ὅταν *παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ* Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν *λέγεις, ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι;* Πάνυ *γε.* Ὅταν *ἄρα ἄχρηστον ᾖ ἀργύριον, τότε*
D *χρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡ δικαιοσύνη;* Κινδυνεύει. Καὶ

332 E. *καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν* **M**+. *καὶ ἐν τῷ ξυμμαχεῖν* **A**+**Π**+. See note. *καὶ ἐν* should be *κἂν* in any case.

ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέῃ φυλάττειν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἡ ἀμπελουργική; Φαίνεται. Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέῃ φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικήν; Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ περὶ τἆλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἑκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος; Κινδυνεύει.

VIII. *Οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον* E
εἴη ἡ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὂν τυγχάνει. τόδε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἆρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ †λαθεῖν, οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ 334

333 D. *καὶ ὅταν δὴ...δέοι* **A** + (shewing that the best may err). *μηδὲν χρῆσθαι* **A** + Π^2. *μὴ χρῆσθαι* Π^1 + by a slight negligence. The former is more forcible.

333 E. *οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε,* **A** + **Π** + **M** +. *οὐκ ἂν οὖν* **Ξ** and an early hand in marg. **A**. The accidental omission of *ἂν* in connexion with *οὖν*, and its confusion with that word, are frequent.

χρήσιμον ὂν MSS. Baiter's *χρήσιμον μόνον ὂν* is bad, both for its cacophony and the misplacement of *μόνον*. See note.

ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν MSS, except that *q*β[1] have *φ. καὶ μὴ παθεῖν* (an evident correction). Schneider, Stallbaum &c. read *φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν...ἐμποιήσας*. See note. The place has evidently suffered unusual tampering, probably through some rare word such as Plato affects (cf. next note and inf. 345 C, and the medical word *ἐξάντης* Phaedr. 244 E). *ἀμυναθεῖν* might be suggested, but *καὶ ἀλθεῖν* (a suggestion already made by Salvini) is preferable. *ἀλθεῖν* ('heal') is, in its cognates at least, a word of medical writers, and stands to *ἀλθίσκω* as *εὑρεῖν*, *ὀφλεῖν* to their presents.

τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις. Πάνυ γε. Ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φὼρ δεινός. Ἔοικεν. Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. Κλέπτης ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀναπέφανται· καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὁμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως πρὸς μητρὸς πάππον
B Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καί φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνῃ θ' ὅρκῳ τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον καὶ κατὰ Σιμωνίδην κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ μέντοι τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅ τι ἔλεγον· τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ
C τοὺς ἐχθρούς. Φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἑκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως; Εἰκὸς μέν, ἔφη, οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστούς, φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν πονηρούς, μισεῖν. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον; Ἁμαρτάνουσιν. Τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον

334 B. *κεκρᾶσθαι* (Π corr. Θ) for *κεκάσθαι* is instructive as to the fate of rare words.

ὠφελίᾳ: v. sup. 332 D.

ὠφελεῖ...βλάπτει (a piece of editing) Π+.

334 C. *φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι* **A**+Π+**M**+. *εἶναι* om. **Θ. Φ. r.** In view of the second *εἶναι* the sentence would be more elegant without it. There may, however, be emphasis, 'do you say they *are...?*'

τότε τούτοις, τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ D
ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν. Φαίνεται. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε
ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοί τε καὶ οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν. Ἀληθῆ.
Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας δίκαιον
κακῶς ποιεῖν. Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· πονηρὸς
γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος. Τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ'
ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν.
Οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται. Πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ
Πολέμαρχε, ξυμβήσεται, ὅσοι διημαρτήκασιν τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάπτειν· E
πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσίν· τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς ὠφελεῖν·
ἀγαθοὶ γάρ· καὶ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἢ
τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω
ξυμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ
οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι. Πῶς
θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέμαρχε; Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστόν, τοῦ-
τον φίλον εἶναι. Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα;
Τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν φίλον·
τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μέν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ 335
εἶναι φίλον· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ θέσις.
Φίλος μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς
ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός. Ναί. Κελεύεις δὴ
ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν,
λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν
δ' ἐχθρὸν κακῶς, νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν, ὅτι
ἔστιν δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν,
τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,
ἔφη, οὕτως ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι. B

334 E. *καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν* MSS. *τὸν* om. Ast, Bremi &c. See note.

335 A. *ἄλλο* interpol. before *προσθεῖναι* in one or two inferior copies. Cf. inf. 347 D.

IX. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς
βλάπτειν καὶ ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων; Καὶ πάνυ γε,
ἔφη, τούς γε πονηρούς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν.
Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίγνονται;
Χείρους. Ἆρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετήν, ἢ εἰς τὴν
τῶν ἵππων; Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ
κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίγνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν
κυνῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετήν; Ἀνάγκη.
C Ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν βλαπτομέ-
νους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους γίγνεσθαι;
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία
ἀρετή; Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη. Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους
ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους
γίγνεσθαι. Ἔοικεν. Ἆρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ
ἀμούσους δύνανται ποιεῖν; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλὰ τῇ
ἱππικῇ οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἀφίππους; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἀλλὰ
τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ ξυλλήβδην
D ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακούς; Ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. Οὐ γὰρ
θερμότητος, οἶμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.
Ναί. Οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.
Πάνυ γε. Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός;
Πάνυ γε. Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὦ
Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ
E λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα
ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησίν τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ
δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι

335 D. *οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον* **A**+**Π**+. *ἔργον βλάπτειν* **b**. *ἔργον* om. **M**. But, after the break caused by the last question and in summing up, *ἔργον* is better expressed (in the absence of *ἐστί*).

παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών· οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὂν βλάπτειν. Συγχωρῶ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιττακὸν εἰρηκέναι ἤ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν; Ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη, ἕτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης. Ἀλλ' οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗ μοι 336
δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; Τίνος; ἔφη. Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἤ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι;

X. Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ δια- B
λεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὥρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἧκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος. καὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δείσαντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος, Τίς, ἔφη, ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; C
καὶ τί εὐηθίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τι ἐστί, μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ

336 A. For fear *τὸ φάναι* should be regarded as adscript, see Alc. I. 110 D.

336 B. *δὴ ἐπαυσάμεθα* Cobet for *διεπαυσάμεθα*, to the deterioration of the sense. *διασπασόμενος* Cobet: but see note.

ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδάν τίς τι ἀποκρίνηται, ἐγνωκὼς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥᾷον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἰπέ, τί φῄς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ ὅπως
D μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ξυμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, ἐὰν ὕθλους τοιούτους λέγῃς. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων αὐτὸν ἐφοβούμην, καί μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἑωράκη αὐτὸν [ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ], ἄφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἡνίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο
E ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὥστε αὐτῷ οἷός τ' ἐγενόμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον ὑποτρέμων, Ὦ Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγώ τε καὶ ὅδε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄκοντες ἁμαρτάνομεν. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἑκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ζητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὕρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητοῦντας, πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμιώτερον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό. οἴου γε

336 D. *ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς* best MSS. *μοι* om. **Ξ**q**β**[1]. The pronunciation of *μοι* and *μὴ* had become practically identical.

τὸ δίκαιον **Π**+ for *τὸ δέον*, by a slip.

ἑωράκη **A**. *ἑωράκειν* vulg. See 328 C note.

ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ appears to be an interpolation.

336 E. *εἰ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν* **A**+**M**+. *εἰ γάρ τι ἐξ.* **Π**+. There is little to choose.

μὴ σπουδάζειν one or two edited MSS. But the construction is *μὴ οἴου ἡμᾶς οὐ-σπουδάζειν*.

οἴου τε σὺ **A**+**Π**+**M**+. *μὴ οἴου σὺ* **Ξ**q Stallbaum &c. *καὶ οἴου σύ* **β**′. *οἷόν γε ἐστὶν* **Ξ** (i.e. after *φανῆναι*), a manifest conjecture. Bekker's *οἴου γε σύ* is provisionally accepted, though see note.

σύ, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα· ἐλεεῖσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστίν που ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν 337 δεινῶν ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

XI. Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν, Ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη 'κείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ᾔδη τε καὶ τούτοις προὔλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ. Σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· εὖ οὖν ᾔδησθα ὅτι, εἴ τινα ἔροιο ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῷ, B Ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι ἔστιν τὰ δώδεκα δὶς ἓξ μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου, ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῇς· δῆλον, οἶμαι, σοὶ ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο τῷ οὕτως πυνθανομένῳ. ἀλλ' εἴ σοι εἶπεν· Ὦ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν; πότερον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, μηδ' εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἴπω τι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς C ταῦτα; Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ. Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὅμοιον,

The sense seems to be satisfied with e.g. <*καὶ ταῦτ' ἐναντίον*> *οἵου γε σύ* (or *σοῦ*).

337 A. *ἀνεκάγχασε* **A**. A recent hand has erased *γ*. See note. *σαρδάνιον* **AΠ**+. *σαρδώνιον* **DK***q*+. See comment. A frequent form is *σαρδόνίον* **Ξ**.

αὕτη 'κείνη. Aphaeresis must be marked. *κεῖνος* is not a Platonic form. Schanz Plat. Vol. II. Proleg. § 2.

ἐθελήσεις **Θr**+, but these are not consistent in their treatment of the following future optatives.

337 B. *τι* om. **Ξ**+ in *εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν.* The gen. of the class might stand, but the loss of *τι* was easy.

φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἧττόν τι αὐτὸν οἴει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, ἐάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐάν τε μή; Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις; ὧν ἐγὼ ἀπεῖπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρινεῖ; Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω
D *δόξειεν. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἑτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίω τούτων; τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν; Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότι; προσήκει δέ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιῶ παθεῖν. Ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδάν μοι γένηται, εἶπον. Ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· ἀλλ' ἕνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς*
E *Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν. Πάνυ γε, οἶμαι, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξηται, αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνῃ λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἔπειτα εἰ, <ὅ> τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων,*

337 C. *τοιοῦτον* rather than *τοιοῦτο* is the Platonic form. Schanz Proleg. to Laws p. VI. So *ταὐτὸν* &c.

ἀποκρινεῖ (**A**[1]), not *ἀποκρινῇ*, has the best MS authority in Plato (see Stallbaum's crit. note). Meisterhans § 61 a) says that the 2nd pers. medio-passive in *-ει* appears to have been established from the 4th cent. through identity of pronunciation. Yet originally it was *-η* (the contraction of *-εσαι*), Brugmann Grundriss § 1047. We cannot decide whether the change had been effected in Plato's day. Cobet (Var. Lect. pp. 39 sq.) is not sound upon this point.

337 D. *ἀπότισον* MSS. *ἀπότεισον* alone is correct. See note.

337 E. *ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ...* MSS. *εἴη* om. Ast, Bremi &c. It is just possible that Plato wrote the ungrammatical passage. See note. I venture, however, to emend *ἔπειτα εἰ, <ὃ> τι καὶ...*

ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη, ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὧν ἡγεῖται, ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου; ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῂς εἰδέναι καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ 338
οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλ' ἐμοί τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

XII. Εἰπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα ὅ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν, ἵν' εὐδοκιμήσειεν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. τελευτῶν δὲ ξυνεχώρησεν, κἄπειτα, Αὕτη δή, ἔφη, ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ B
ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιιόντα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. Ὅτι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· ὅτι δὲ οὔ με φῂς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδει· ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω· ὡς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, ἐάν τίς μοι δοκῇ εὖ λέγειν, εὖ εἴσει αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνῃ· οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ εὖ C
ἐρεῖν. Ἄκουε δή, ἦ δ' ὅς. φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις. Ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφην, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὔπω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῂς ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό

338 A. φιλονεικεῖν MSS. φιλονικεῖν Baiter. See the commentary and also Schanz Plat. Vol. vi. (proleg.).

338 B. οἶμαι γάρ σε MSS; but the pronoun is emphatic here, if anywhere.

γε τοιόνδε φῄς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστὴς καὶ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρει τὰ βόεια κρέα
D πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον. Βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτῃ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ᾗ ἂν κακουργήσαις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἰπὲ τί λέγεις. Εἶτ᾽ οὐκ οἶσθ᾽, ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεται δέ γε
E τοὺς νόμους ἑκάστη ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὑτῇ ξυμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως· θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι ξυμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα. τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐστίν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὃ
339 λέγω, ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς ξυμφέρον· αὕτη δέ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε ξυμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. Νῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι· καίτοι ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην·
B πρόσεστι δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. Σμικρά

338 C. Πουλυδάμας best MSS. Πολυδάμας is an Atticised form.

338 D. κακουργήσαις MSS. For the form see note.

338 E. ἑκάστηι **A** for ἑκάστη cett. It is not necessarily wrong. See comment.

τοῦτο ἐκβαίνοντα Ξ. v. note.

339 A. Two or three inferior copies interpolate ξυμφέρον after τοῦ κρείττονος.

γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη. Οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ξυμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστίθης καὶ αὐτὸ φῂς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον δή. Σκόπει, ἔφη.

XIII. Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καί μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δίκαιον φῂς εἶναι; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες C
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκάσταις ἤ οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; Πάντως που, ἔφη, οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασιν, τοὺς δέ τινας οὐκ ὀρθῶς; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἆρα τὸ τὰ ξυμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀξύμφορα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως. Ἃ δ' ἂν θῶνται, ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον D
ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον. Τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη. Ἃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ· σκοπῶμεν δὴ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὡμολόγηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἄττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἃ δ' ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν; ταῦτ' οὐχ ὡμολόγηται; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀξύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς E
ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὡμολογῆσθαί σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὑτοῖς προστάττωσιν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῂς ταῦτα ποιεῖν

339 B. *δίκαιον φῂς* Π + **M** +. *καὶ δίκαιον φῂς* **A**.

339 C. The second *οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν* om. Ξ +. But the preceding question was a double one.

339 D. *σκοπῶμεν δὴ* **A** + Ξ +. *δὲ* **M** + Ξ +. 'Come, let us...'

ἃ ἐκεῖνοι προσέταξαν· ἆρα τότε, ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὑτωσὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοὐναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀξύμφορον δήπου προστάττεται
340 τοῖς ἥττοσιν ποιεῖν. Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατά γε. Ἐὰν σύ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃς, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβών. Καὶ τί, ἔφη, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὦ Κλειτοφῶν, συμφέρον
B δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφότερα θέμενος ὡμολόγησεν αὖ ἐνίοτε τοὺς κρείττους τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀξύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον. Ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὃ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὑτῷ ξυμφέρειν· τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ
C Πολέμαρχος, ἐλέγετο. Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχώμεθα.

XIV. Καί μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἦν ὃ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, ἐάν τε ξυμφέρῃ ἐάν τε μή;

339 E. Editors punctuate variously, (1) after οὑτωσί, (2) after ποιεῖν, (3) as in the text (after Madvig).

340 A. αὐτὸς Θρασύμαχος (without γὰρ) **M**.

340 B. ὃ ἡγοῖτο **A**+Π^1. The vulgate ἡγεῖτο is a mistake. See note.

οὕτως σε φῶμεν λέγειν; Ἥκιστά γ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἴει καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ; Ἔγωγε, εἶπον, ᾤμην σε τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι, ἀλλά τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Συκοφάντης γὰρ D
εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἢ λογιστικόν, ὃς ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ ἁμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἁμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής· τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ἕκαστος τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ προσαγορεύομεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἁμαρτάνει· ὥστε κατὰ E
τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἁμαρτάνει. ἐπιλιπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός· ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἥμαρτεν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἥμαρτεν. τοιοῦτον οὖν δή σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί, μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντα 341
δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον. ὥστε, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, δίκαιον λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.

340 E. *ἐπιλιπούσης* **A**[1] + Π +. *ἐπιλειπούσης* **A**[2]**M** +. Either is possible. He fails when his knowledge has deserted him, or he begins to fail at the point where his knowledge begins to desert him.

καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἥμαρτεν om. Π through the homoeoteleuton.

νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνασθαι a few inferior MSS. But *ἀποκρίνεσθαι* is imperfect.

XV. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντεῖν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οἴει γάρ με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἠρόμην; Εὖ μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἔφη· καὶ οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε
B μὴ λαθὼν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο. Οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι, ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὗ τὸ ξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἥττονι ποιεῖν. Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἔφη, λόγῳ ἄρχοντα ὄντα. πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει, εἴ τι
C δύνασαι· οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι· ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἷός τ' ᾖς. Οἴει γὰρ ἄν με, εἶπον, οὕτω μανῆναι, ὥστε ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύμαχον; Νῦν γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα. Ἅδην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι· ὁ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἰατρός, ὃν ἄρτι ἔλεγες, πότερον χρηματιστής ἐστιν ἢ τῶν καμνόντων θεραπευτής; καὶ λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἰατρὸν ὄντα. Τῶν καμνόντων, ἔφη, θεραπευτής. Τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβερνήτης

341 A. *ἐρέσθαι* **K.** The common accentuation is *ἔρεσθαι.* See Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 8 and cf. *ἀπεχθέσθαι* 343 E. So *ἐξεγρέσθαι, αἰσθέσθαι* are apt to be treated as presents by the later Greeks. A present *ἔρομαι* is not provable for classical Greek, *ἐρωτῶ* being in regular use.

341 B. The trouble of Ast &c. with *οὔτε μὴ λαθὼν* is due to missing the sense. See note.

ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες MSS, except that **A** shews *ὃ* over an erasure. *ὃν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες* Benedictus, Hermann, J. and C. *ὃν* might, of course, lose its *ν* through the *ν* following, but the erasure in **A** is more probably due to *ὃ* acquiring a false *ν* from the same cause. See note.

ναυτῶν ἄρχων ἐστὶν ἢ ναύτης; Ναυτῶν ἄρχων. D
Οὐδέν, οἶμαι, τοῦτο ὑπολογιστέον, ὅτι πλεῖ ἐν τῇ νηΐ,
οὐδ' ἐστὶν κλητέος ναύτης· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν
κυβερνήτης καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν
τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἑκάστῳ
τούτων ἔστιν τι ξυμφέρον; Πάνυ γε. Οὐ καὶ ἡ
τέχνη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ
ξυμφέρον ἑκάστῳ ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν; Ἐπὶ
τούτῳ, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστιν
τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι; Πῶς E
τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς; Ὥσπερ, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἔροιο, εἰ
ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι εἶναι σώματι ἢ προσδεῖταί τινος,
εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ
ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἰατρικὴ νῦν ηὑρημένη, ὅτι
σῶμά ἐστι πόνηρον καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ
εἶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἐπὶ
τούτῳ παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη. ἦ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ,
ἔφην, ἂν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὔ; Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Τί 342
δὲ δή; αὐτὴ ἡ ἰατρική ἐστιν πονήρα, ἢ ἄλλη τις
τέχνη ἔσθ' ὅ τι προσδεῖταί τινος ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ
ὀφθαλμοὶ ὄψεως καὶ ὦτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ'
αὐτοῖς δεῖ τινὸς τέχνης τῆς τὸ ξυμφέρον εἰς ταῦτα
σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριζούσης; ἆρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ

341 D. *οὐκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τούτων* MSS. Qu. *οὐκοῦν* <*εἴδει*> *ἑκάστῳ τούτων* or something similar?

ἔστιν τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο. How far interpolation may go in a passage which an early reader felt to be too condensed is seen in *q* and **β**[1] *ἔστι τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο οὗ προσδεῖται, ἢ ἐξαρκεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτὴ αὑτῇ, ὥστε ὅτι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι.*

341 E. *εὑρημένη* MSS. *ηὑρημένη* is the true form. Meisterhans § 62. 14. *πονηρὸν* MSS. *πόνηρον* is the proper accentuation (in the *physical* sense) according to grammarians. Hence *πονήρα* is required immediately.

342 A. *ἐκποριούσης* *q***β**[1] (edited MSS).

τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνι τις πονηρία, καὶ δεῖ ἀεὶ ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ ἄλλης τέχνης, ἥτις αὐτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπουμένῃ ἑτέρας αὖ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν
B ἀπέραντον; ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται; ἢ οὔτε αὑτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσδεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτῆς πονηρίαν τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει τέχνῃ ἄλλῳ τὸ ξυμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀκέραιός ἐστιν ὀρθὴ οὖσα, ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖ ἑκάστη ἀκριβὴς ὅλη ἥπερ ἐστί; καὶ σκόπει ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ· οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως ἔχει; Οὕτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
C ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σώματι. Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐδὲ ἱππικὴ ἱππικῇ ἀλλ' ἵπποις· οὐδὲ ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμία ἑαυτῇ, οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν. Φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου, οὗπέρ εἰσιν τέχναι. ξυνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγις. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ'
D ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἥττονός τε καὶ ἀρχομένου ὑπὸ ἑαυτῆς. ξυνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡμολόγησεν, Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς οὐδείς, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, τὸ τῷ ἰατρῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ κάμνοντι; ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ

δεῖ αἰεὶ **A**. *αἰεὶ* om. Π + **M** +. On the principle of keeping to the best MSS as far as possible we may retain *ἀεὶ*, and suppose it to have been lost from ΔΕΙΑΕΙ. Plato, like Thucydides, may have used the form *αἰεί*, which vacillates with *ἀεί* till 360 B.C. (Meisterhans § 14 a). The arguments of Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 7 are not conclusive for *ἀεί*.

342 B. *αὕτη δὲ ἀβλαβής* **A**, for *αὐτὴ κ.τ.λ.* Cf. sup. 330 C.

ἀκριβὴς ἰατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής. ἢ οὐχ ὡμολόγηται; ξυνέφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβὴς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ ναύτης; Ὡμολόγηται. Οὐκ ἄρα ὅ γε τοιοῦτος E
κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων τὸ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ξυμφέρον σκέψεταί τε καὶ προστάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ναύτῃ τε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ. ξυνέφησε μόγις. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, τὸ αὑτῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ξυμφέρον καὶ πρέπον καὶ λέγει ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.

XVI. Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ 343
πᾶσι καταφανὲς ἦν, ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τοὐναντίον περιειστήκει, ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίτθη σοι ἔστιν; Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν; Ὅτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις. Ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅτι οἴει τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν B
ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὑτῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, ἄλλως πως ἡγεῖ διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ ὥσπερ ἄν τις

342 E. *πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων* best MSS. *ἐκεῖνον* **r**+; but *τῷ ἀρχομένῳ* is neuter.

343 A. *ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν* **AM**. *χρὴ* Π+. The former is more idiomatic.

343 B. *διανοεῖσθαι* MSS, *διακεῖσθαι* Faesi; but see note.

πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τοῦτο ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ὠφελήσον-
C ται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἶ περί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ξυμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα
D ἐκεῖνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. σκοπεῖσθαι δέ, ὦ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες, οὑτωσὶ χρή, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβολαίοις, ὅπου ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινωνήσῃ, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εὕροις ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίας πλέον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ' ἔλαττον· ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τέ τινες εἰσφοραὶ ὦσιν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ
E δ' ἔλαττον, ὅταν τε λήψεις, ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχήν τινα ἄρχῃ ἑκάτερος, τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία, τά γε οἰκεῖα δι' ἀμέλειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπεχθέσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλῃ αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον· τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τἀναντία

ὠφεληθήσονται **M**+. The substitution of these analogical forms is frequent.

343 C. *ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας* vulg. *τε* om. **A**, Π¹. Cf. 329 A. See note.

343 E. *ἀπέχθεσθαι* MSS (except for *ἀπεχθάνεσθαι* q+). For the accentuation see comment. and cf. sup. 341 A.

ὑπάρχει. λέγω γὰρ ὅνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. τοῦτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ 344 βούλει κρίνειν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἰδίᾳ αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥᾷστα μαθήσει, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς, ἣ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἣ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τἀλλότρια καὶ λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ ξυλλήβδην, ὧν B ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ζημιοῦταί τε καὶ ὀνείδη ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται· ἐπειδὰν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν C ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἠδικηκότα· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὀνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὀνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον.

XVII. Ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν D

344 A. *ἢ τὸ δίκαιον* best mss, *τὸ* om. **DK***q*+. The whole expression might be bracketed by a certain school.

λάθρᾳ: rather than *λάθρα*. Meisterhans § 57. 1.

ἀπιέναι, ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὤτων ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον. οὐ μὴν εἴασάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναί τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον. καὶ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς πάνυ ἐδεόμην τε καὶ εἶπον, Ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, πρὶν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει; ἢ σμικρὸν οἴει ἐπιχειρεῖν
E πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ βίου διαγωγήν, ᾗ ἂν διαγόμενος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην ζωὴν ζῴη; Ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν; Ἔοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι, οὐδέ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες ὃ σὺ φῂς εἰδέναι. ἀλλ', ὦ 'γαθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι. οὔτοι κακῶς
345 σοι κείσεται ὅ τι ἂν ἡμᾶς τοσούσδε ὄντας εὐεργετήσῃς. ἐγὼ γὰρ δή σοι λέγω τό γ' ἐμόν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδ' οἶμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐὰν ἐᾷ τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. ἀλλ', ὦ 'γαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι· ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆς
B δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον. ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπονθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ. πεῖσον οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἱκανῶς ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευόμεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι. Καὶ

344 D. *ἀθρόον* is the regular form in **A**, and (according to Aristarchus) was more Attic than *ἁθρόον*. On irregularities of the spiritus asper in Attic see Meisterhans §§ 32 and 37.

344 E. *ζῶν* **A**[1] for *ζῴη*, by confusion of N and H.

οὔτοι *q*β[1] for *ἤτοι*. The point of *ἤτοι* was missed.

345 A. *οὐ πείθει* MSS. *οὐ πείθεις* Ficinus. See comment.

πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον; Μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ σύ γε· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν, ἃ ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετατιθῇ, φανερῶς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἔτι γὰρ τὰ C
ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα, ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὁριζόμενος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ᾤου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἴει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ' ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ D
δήπου ἄλλου του μέλει ἤ, ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ· ἐπεὶ τά γε αὑτῆς, ὥστ' εἶναι βελτίστη, ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἕως γ' ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέῃ τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι· οὕτω δὲ ᾤμην ἔγωγε νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν, πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ. E
σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἑκόντας οἴει ἄρχειν; Μὰ Δί' οὔκ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα.

XVIII. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἑκών, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν

345 C. *πιαίνειν* **A** rightly. *παχύνειν* (a gloss) in a few inferior copies. *ποιμαίνειν* Π + **M** + **A**² mg. See note and the remark sup. 333 E.

ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχο-
346 μένοις; ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε εἰπέ· οὐχὶ ἑκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἑκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν; καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. Ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφελίαν ἑκάστη ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
B μισθωτικὴ μισθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις. ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἐάνπερ βούλῃ ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἐάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιὴς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἕνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικήν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Οὐδέ γ', οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικήν, ἐὰν ὑγιαίνῃ τις μισθαρνῶν. Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρνητικήν, ἐὰν ἰώμενός τις μισθαρνῇ;
C Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τήν γε ὠφελίαν ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὡμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Ἥντινα ἄρα ὠφελίαν κοινῇ ὠφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Φαμὲν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δη-

345 E. *ὠφελείας ἐσομένης* **xa.** The accusative absolute was less familiar.

346 B. *διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν* **A** + **Π** + **M** +. *ξυμφέρειν* $\Xi^2 q$ is an emendation. The participle is probably due to the frequency of *τὸ ξυμφέρον* in the discussion. Otherwise we might suggest *διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ <τοῦ> πλεῖν*.

μισθαρνικήν **M** +.

346 C. *τὸ μισθὸν* **A** +. *τὸν μισθὸν* of many MSS illustrates the common error of false adaptation.

μιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. ξυνέφη μόγις. Οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἑκάστῳ αὕτη ἡ ὠφελία ἐστίν, D
ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἑπομένη μισθόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτως· τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο, ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθ' ὅ τι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; Οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐδ' ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζηται; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν, E
ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὑτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ', ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον ἥττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἑκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέποτε αὑτῷ τὸ 347
βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ· ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα, ὡς

346 D. ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις om. **M**[1]. It adds clearness, however.

μισθαρνικὴ **M** + . Reversely οἰκοδομητικὴ in some inferior copies.

346 E. ἀνορθοῦντα MSS. ἐπανορθοῦντα Euseb. Praep. Ev. p. 582 c.

347 A. οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει om. some inferior copies (after πράττει) through homoeoteleuton.

ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα **M**. οὗ Π. ὧν οὗ (by conflation) Ξ. ὧι **A** (which is probably due to -ωι of the last word). It looks as if ὧν had been lost after -ωι, and then the passage corrected variously.

ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμήν, ἢ ζημίαν, ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ.

XIX. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γιγνώσκω· τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ἥντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἴρηκας, οὐ ξυνῆκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα μισθόν,
B ἔφην, οὐ ξυνιεῖς, δι' ὃν ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε τιμῆς· οὔτε γὰρ φανερῶς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕνεκα μισθὸν μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκλῆσθαι, οὔτε λάθρᾳ αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται· οὐδ' αὖ τιμῆς ἕνεκα· οὐ γάρ εἰσι φιλότιμοι. δεῖ δὴ
C αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν· ὅθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἑκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι. τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ ἄρχειν· ἣν δείσαντές μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν τι ἰόντες οὐδ' ὡς εὐπαθήσοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν
D βελτίοσιν ἐπιτρέψαι οὐδὲ ὁμοίοις. ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει,

δεῖν ὑπάρχειν MSS. *δεῖ* Euseb. (l. c.), Ast &c. See note.

οὐ ξυνῆκά πω some edited copies. But the aorist here is independent of *πω*.

ξυνιεῖς **A**Π+. *ξυνίεις* Ξ. *ξυνίῃς* vulg. See note.

347 B. *δεῖ δὲ* **A**. *δεῖ δὴ* Π**M** vulg., 'It is necessary, *in fact*,' makes the preferable sense.

347 D. *ἐπιτρέψαι τὴν ἀρχὴν* Ξ+, objecting to the absolute verb. Cf. sup. 335 **A**.

πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἂν καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὑτῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ· ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιγνώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἕλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε οὐδαμῇ συγχωρῶ Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν E
τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα· πολὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖ μεῖζον εἶναι, ὃ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου. σὺ οὖν ποτέρως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, αἱρεῖ καὶ πότερον ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; Τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε, ἔφη, λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι. Ἤκουσας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα ἄρτι Θρασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διῆλθε τῷ 348
τοῦ ἀδίκου; Ἤκουσα, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐ πείθομαι. Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθά πῃ ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἂν μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὖθις οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει τἀγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν ὅσα ἑκάτεροι ἐν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν B
διακρινούντων δεησόμεθα· ἂν δὲ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἅμα αὐτοί τε δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ὁποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει. Οὕτως, ἔφη.

347 E. ποτέρως...αἱρεῖ MSS, followed by πότερον ὡς ἀληθεστέρως (**A** + Π +) or πότερον ἀληθεστέρως (**M** +). Ast, Hermann &c. read πότερον...ποτέρως. See note.

348 B. ὁποτέρως MSS, except for the intended correction ποτέρως Vind. **F**.

XX. Ἴθι δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀποκριναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὔσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῂς εἶναι; Πάνυ μὲν
C οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ δι᾽ ἅ, εἴρηκα. Φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μέν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετήν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν; Εἰκός γ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ ἥδιστε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ᾽ οὔ. Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; Τοὐναντίον, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. Ἦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν;
D Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν. Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοήθειαν καλεῖς; Οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη. Ἦ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι; Οἵ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἷοί τε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. σὺ δὲ οἴει με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ· ἔστι δὲ οὐκ
E ἄξια λόγου, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον. Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὅ τι βούλει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ οὕτω τίθημι. Τοῦτο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἤδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον ἔχειν ὅ τί τις

348 D. *ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς* some inferior copies. See note.

βαλλάντια **A** + Π +. The variant *βαλάντια* Ξ + was tolerably sure to appear, as in 575 B. There is nothing in which MSS are less to be trusted than in the double λ. Cf. inf. 358 C (*θρυλεῖν*) and 359 E (*ἐξαγγέλοιεν*). The Ravenna MS of Aristophanes has *βαλλάντιον* and in Ran. 772 the best reading points to *βαλλαντιοτόμοις* as metrical. The *quantity* at least is long. Cf. Simon. Frag. 181 (Epig. 60) *ἔμπορε καὶ φορτηγὲ τὸ σὸν βαλλάντιον οἶδεν.*

348 E. *ῥᾷον* (*ῥαῖον*) MSS, except for *ῥᾴδιον* **x**. The preceding comparative may have caused hallucination, but in any case

εἴπῃ. εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο,
κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι,
ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ
νομιζόμενα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις
αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τἆλλα αὐτῷ
πάντα προσθήσεις, ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν, 349
ἐπειδή γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐτόλμησας
θεῖναι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, μαντεύει. Ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι,
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποκνητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν σκο-
πούμενον, ἕως ἄν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἅπερ
διανοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς
νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς
ἀληθείας λέγειν. Τί δέ σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει,
εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις;
Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι πρὸς B
τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί
σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἔχειν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ
ἂν ἦν ἀστεῖος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης. Τί δέ; τῆς
δικαίας πράξεως; Οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἔφη. Τοῦ δὲ
ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξιοίη ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο
δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον; Ἡγοῖτ' ἄν,
ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἀξιοίη, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο. Ἀλλ' οὐ
τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ C
ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ
ἀδίκου; Ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἄδικος;
ἆρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας

ΡΑΙΔΙΟΝ and ΡΑΙΟΝ were liable to confusion. Cf. 370 A, where ῥᾴδιον of **A** is an error for ῥᾷον of *q*.

349 B. πλεῖον ἔχειν **A**, but πλέον is the only form. Meisterhans § 58. 17.

οὐδὲ τῆς <πράξεως τῆς> δικαίας Adam. See note.

ἀξιοίη ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν **ΘΦΞ**. ἀξιοῖ vulg. v. sup. 330 A. All give ἀξιοῖ in the next instance, but that *might* be indicative.

πράξεως; Πως γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλέον
ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ
πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἁμιλλήσεται ὡς
ἁπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; Ἔστι ταῦτα.

XXI. Ὧδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν
ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος
D τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου. Ἄριστα, ἔφη,
εἴρηκας. Ἔστιν δέ γε, ἔφην, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς
ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα. Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, εὖ.
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ
ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔοικεν; Πῶς γὰρ
οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ ἐοικέναι τοῖς
τοιούτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐοικέναι; Καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἄρα
ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν. Ἀλλὰ τί
μέλλει; ἔφη. Εἶεν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· μουσικὸν δὲ
E τινα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ ἄμουσον; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον
φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα; Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν
δήπου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα. Οὐκοῦν
καὶ ἅπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἃ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν;
Ναί. Τί δὲ ἰατρικόν; οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτως. Δοκεῖ
ἂν οὖν τίς σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἁρμοττό-
μενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει
καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον
ἔχειν; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Τί δέ; ἀμούσου; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
350 Τί δὲ ἰατρικός; ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἄν τι
ἰατρικοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος; Οὐ
δῆτα. Μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δέ; Ναί. Περὶ πάσης δὲ ὅρα
ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ

349 C. ὧδε δὴ λέγομεν some inferior copies.

349 D. ὁ δὲ μὴ **A**+Π+**M**+. ὁ δέ, μὴ **A**^{2}. ὁ δὲ μή, μὴ **x***q*+ Stallbaum, J. and C. The sentence is both more idiomatic and more euphonious without the second μή.

ἐπιστήμων ὁστισοῦν πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλος ἐπιστήμων ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρᾶξιν. Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχειν. Τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμονος πλεονεκτήσειεν ἄν, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονος; Ἴσως. Ὁ B
δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός; Φημί. Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; Φημί. Ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Ὁ δὲ κακός τε καὶ ἀμαθὴς τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ἄδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτήσει, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου; Ναί. Ἔοικεν ἄρα, C
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ. Κινδυνεύει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογοῦμεν, ᾧ γε ὅμοιος ἑκάτερος εἴη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι. Ὡμολογοῦμεν γάρ. Ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὢν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός.

XXII. Ὁ δὴ Θρασύμαχος ὡμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥᾳδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἑλκόμενος D
καὶ μόγις, μετὰ ἱδρῶτος θαυμαστοῦ ὅσου, ἅτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος. τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὔπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν,

350 C (fin.). ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος **A**+**M**+. ὁ δὴ **Π**+ vulg. See note.

350 D. Punctuation is made after τότε in **A**+**M**+, followed by Bekker. But the story is of what happened yesterday. **Π**+ give the right division.

τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἶεν, *ἦν δ'*
ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτω κείσθω· ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ
ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦ Θρα-
σύμαχε; Μέμνημαι, *ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ἃ νῦν*
λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν
E *λέγοιμι, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης· ἢ οὖν*
ἔα με εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι, ἤ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν,
ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶν ταῖς τοὺς
μύθους λεγούσαις, εἶεν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ
ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμῶς, *ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρά γε τὴν*
σαυτοῦ δόξαν. Ὥστε *σοι, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ*
οὐκ ἐᾷς λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; Οὐδὲν *μὰ*
Δία, *ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ*
δὲ ἐρωτήσω. Ἐρώτα *δή.* Τοῦτο *τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ*
351 *ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἑξῆς διασκεψώμεθα τὸν λόγον, ὁποῖόν*
τι τυγχάνει ὂν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη
γάρ που, ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἴη
ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην, εἴπερ σοφία τε
καὶ ἀρετή ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη, ῥᾳδίως, οἶμαι, φανήσεται
καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἡ
ἀδικία· οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοήσειεν. ἀλλ' οὔ τι
οὕτως ἁπλῶς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, *ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ*
τῇδέ πῃ σκέψασθαι· πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ
B *ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ*
καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν
δουλωσαμένην; Πῶς *γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτό γε ἡ*
ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος.
Μανθάνω, *ἔφην· ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ*

351 A. *ἔφη, εἴπερ* **A+Π+M+**. *ἔφην, εἴπερ q***x**. 'In **A** the breathing of *εἴπερ* has absorbed the sign — for *ν*' (Campbell).

*οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν q***β**[1], objecting to the asyndeton. Cf. sup. 329 c. *τῇδ' ἐπισκέψασθαι* Π+ for *τῇδέ πῃ σκέψασθαι*, by itacism.

τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἡ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἕξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; Εἰ μέν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει ἡ δικαιοσύνη [σοφία], μετὰ C δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας. Πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνει πάνυ καλῶς. Σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι.

XXIII. Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ λῃστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῇ ἐπί τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πρᾶξαι ἄν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν ἀλλήλους; Οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖεν; D οὐ μᾶλλον; Πάνυ γε. Στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἥ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἦ γάρ; Ἔστω, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι. Ἀλλ' εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἆρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων πράττειν; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν ἐν E δυοῖν ἐγγένηται, οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσιν καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; Ἔσονται, ἔφη. Ἐὰν δὲ δή, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἑνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μῶν μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕξει; Μηδὲν ἧττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε

351 B. εἰ μέν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία best MSS. ἐστιν for ἔχει of Ξ is an obvious correction. ἔχει, <εἰ> Baiter, Stallbaum. See note. I bracket σοφία as adscript.

351 D. διαφέρωμαι Π + Ξ. διαφέρωμεν **AM**. The middle is proper in this sense. Cf. 352 A (διαφέρεσθαι).

τινὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν; [οἵαν] ᾧ ἂν
ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ
352 εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ
πράττειν μεθ' αὑτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέ-
ρεσθαι, ἔτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ
παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ
ἐν ἑνὶ δή, οἶμαι, ἐνοῦσα ταῦτα πάντα ποιήσει, ἅπερ
πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν
πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα
αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς
δικαίοις· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Δίκαιοι δέ γ' εἰσίν, ὦ φίλε,
B καὶ οἱ θεοί; Ὄντων, ἔφη. Καὶ θεοῖς ἄρα ἐχθρὸς
ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος.
Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη, θαρρῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ σοι
ἐναντιώσομαι, ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι. Ἴθι δή,
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπά μοι τῆς ἑστιάσεως ἀποπλήρω-
σον ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ
σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ
δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ'
C ἀλλήλων οἷοί τε, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὕς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως
πώποτέ τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πρᾶξαι ἀδίκους ὄντας,
τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον
ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτοι

351 E—352 A. *οἵαν...ποιεῖ* **A**+**M**+. *ποιεῖν* Π+. I bracket *οἵαν*, and make the sentence with asyndeton explanatory of *τοιάνδε*, after the manner of Plato. ΟΙΑΝ arose from ΩΙΑΝ. See note.

352 A. *ἔστωσαν* MSS. *ἔστων* Schanz (on MS evidence. Plat. Vol. XII. Proleg. § 17). For *ὄντων* (on epigraphic evidence) see note.

352 B. *δικαίους* **A**[1] for *δὴ καὶ οὓς*, partly by itacism, partly by association of ideas.

καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς ἦσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, δι' ἣν ἔπραξαν ἃ ἔπραξαν, ὥρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικίᾳ ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἵ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶν καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατοι· ταῦτα D
μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, μανθάνω, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προὐθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν· ὅμως δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὅντινα τρόπον χρὴ ζῆν. Σκόπει δή, ἔφη. Σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καί μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; Ἔμοιγε. E
Ἆρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ὧδε· ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαῖμεν ἔργα εἶναι; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; μαχαίρᾳ ἂν 353
ἀμπέλου κλῆμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἀλλ' οὐδενί γ' ἄν, οἶμαι, οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δρεπάνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐργασθέντι. Ἀληθῆ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν; Θήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

XXIV. Νῦν δή, οἶμαι, ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὃ ἄρτι

352 D. *ὥς γέ μοι* Π + **M** +. *ὡστέμοι* **A**[1]. *ὡς γ' ἐμοί* **A**[2]. The point is 'It seems so to *me*, but let us all be quite satisfied.'

ὅμως δέ τι vulg. *δ' ἔτι* Ξ +. 'Somewhat better' is a possible rendering, but this would usually be *βέλτιόν τι*.

352 E. *ἀκούσαις* <*ἂν*> *ἄλλῳ* Ast.

φαμὲν MSS. *φαῖμεν* Stephanus. In 357 C *φαῖμεν* of **A** has been made from a previous *φαμεν*.

353 A. *μαχαίρᾳ ἀμπέλου* MSS, except for *μαχαίρᾳ ἂν ἀμπέλου* of **x**.

ἠρώτων, πυνθανόμενος εἰ οὐ τοῦτο ἑκάστου εἴη ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ᾖ μόνον τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται. Ἀλλ', ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἑκάστου
B πράγματος ἔργον εἶναι. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ᾧπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν. ὀφθαλμῶν, φαμέν, ἔστιν ἔργον; Ἔστιν. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστιν; Καὶ ἀρετή. Τί δέ; ὤτων ἦν τι ἔργον; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετή; Καὶ ἀρετή. Τί δὲ πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω; Οὕτω. Ἔχε δή· ἆρ' ἄν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον καλῶς
C ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὑτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν; Καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη· τυφλότητα γὰρ ἴσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως. Ἥτις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή· οὐ γάρ πω τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς. Ἀληθές, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὦτα στερόμενα τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα εἰς
D τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἴθι δή, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι· ψυχῆς ἔστιν τι ἔργον, ὃ ἄλλῳ τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ πράξαις; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε· τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαῖμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι; Οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ. Τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι;

353 C. ἀπεργάσαιντο MSS (except for ἀπεργάσονται Θ, -ωνται r). No correction to the singular is required. See note.

353 D. ἴδια ἐκείνου Ξq by editing. See note. ψυχῆς φήσομεν best MSS. οὐ ψυχῆς φ. three Florentine copies (by editing) and Stobaeus.

Μάλιστά γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετήν φαμέν τινα
ψυχῆς εἶναι; Φαμέν. Ἆρ' οὖν ποτέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, E
ψυχὴ τὰ αὑτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς
οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀνάγκη
ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν. Ἀνάγκη.
Οὐκοῦν ἀρετήν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δι-
καιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἀδικίαν; Συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ.
Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ
βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος. Φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ
τὸν σὸν λόγον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε 354
καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τἀναντία. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ὁ
μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ' ἄδικος ἄθλιος. Ὄντων,
ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαί-
μονα δέ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐδέποτ' ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε
Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης.
Ταῦτα δή σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἱστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς
Βενδιδίοις. Ὑπὸ σοῦ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε,
ἐπειδή μοι πρᾶος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω.
οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἱστίαμαι, δι' ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ B
διὰ σέ· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ ἀεὶ παραφερομένου
ἀπογεύονται ἁρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως
ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον

354 A. *ἔστωσαν* MSS. v. sup. 352 A.

Βενδιδίοις **AΠ**+. Βενδιδείοις vulg. Names of festivals are more regularly formed in *-ια* attached to the stem (*Διονύσια*, *Διάσια*, *Ποσειδώνια* &c.). MSS of Proclus and Origen (see note on 327 A concerning Bendis) have Βενδίδεια, but MSS are not to be trusted in *ι* and *ει*. The name of the *temple*, on the other hand, is naturally Βενδίδειον (Xen. Hell. II. 4. 11).

354 B. *καὶ ἐγῶμαι δοκῶ* **A**+**Π**+**M**+. *καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ* **r**+. The error was probably caused by the general sense of the clause obtruding on the copyist's mind, viz. 'so I think...'

ἐσκοποῦμεν εὑρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν, ἀφέμενος ἐκείνου ὁρμῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε κακία ἐστὶν καὶ ἀμαθία εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὖ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἡ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ
C ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστιν, σχολῇ εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.

B.

357 I. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ᾽ ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων ἀεί τε ἀνδρειότατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔφη, Ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς
B πεῖσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον; Ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγ᾽ ἂν ἑλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοὶ εἴη. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὃ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι· ἆρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι; οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

357 A. *τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι* **K**, which makes a different sense. See note.

357 B. *καὶ μηδὲν...γίγνεται* all best MSS. *εἰ καὶ...* **Ξ**+ (by editing). *κἂν...γίγνηται* Stallbaum and old texts.

Ἔμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Τί δέ; ὃ C
αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ
γιγνομένων; οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ
ὑγιαίνειν· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που δι' ἀμφότερα ἀσπαζό-
μεθα. Ναί, εἶπον. Τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾷς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος
ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα
ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματι-
σμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαῖμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ
ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα D
ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα
γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ
τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δή; Ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν
δικαιοσύνην τίθης; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ 358
καλλίστῳ, ὃ καὶ δι' αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι.
Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπι-
πόνου εἴδους, ὃ μισθῶν θ' ἕνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων
διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δι' αὑτὸ φευκτέον ὡς
ὂν χαλεπόν.

II. Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω, καὶ πάλαι
ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὂν ψέγεται, ἀδικία δ'
ἐπαινεῖται· ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής. Ἴθι
δή, ἔφη, ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐάν σοι ταὐτὰ δοκῇ. B
Θρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρῳαίτερον τοῦ
δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ
οὔπω κατὰ νοῦν ἡ ἀπόδειξις γέγονεν περὶ ἑκατέρου·

357 C. *φαῖμεν* made from *φαμεν* **A**. Cf. sup. 352 E.

358 A. *ἐγὼ μέν, οἶμαι,*? or *ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι*? See note.

ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται om. **A**+ through homoeoteleuton. The words are not strictly necessary.

358 B. *ταῦτα δοκῇ* ΠΞ for *ταὐτὰ δοκῇ*. But *τάδε* would be required.

ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τ' ἔστιν ἑκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν. οὑτωσὶ οὖν ποιήσω, ἐὰν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπανανεώσομαι
C τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασιν καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν· τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτι δοκεῖ οὕτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὦτα ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον,
D ὡς ἄμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι· βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι. μάλιστα δ' οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι· διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαί σοι, ὃν τρόπον αὖ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἃ λέγω. Πάντων μάλιστα,
E ἦν δ' ἐγώ· περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὃ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί <τῷ> ὄντι καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.

358 C. *οὔτοι δοκεῖ οὕτως* qβ[1]. v. sup. 330 A.

διατεθρυλημένος best MSS. The false -λλ- is apt to make its appearance in this word. v. Schanz Plat. Vol. VII. Proleg. § 4. Cf. sup. 348 D. Eustath. (Il. XIII. 396) *ἡ πλείων χρῆσις δι' ἑνὸς λ.* *θρύλλω* might exist beside *θρυλέω*, but hardly *θρυλλέω*.

358 E. *τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε* **A**+**M**+. *τί οἷόν τε* Π+. *οἷόν τε* **x**+. *τί οἴονται* qβ[1] (followed by *γεγονέναι δικαιοσύνην*), an obvious correction. See commentary for the suggestion in the text *τί τῷ ὄντι* (sc. *ἐστί*) *κ.τ.λ.* *οἷόν τέ τι* Adam.

Πεφυκέναι γὰρ δή φασιν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν,
τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν
τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὰν
ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων
γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ 359
αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μήτ᾽
ἀδικεῖν μήτ᾽ ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι
νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν, καὶ ὀνομάσαι
τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον·
καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιο-
σύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν
ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικού-
μενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν
μέσῳ ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, B
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν
δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδ᾽ ἂν
ἑνί ποτε ξυνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι·
μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄν. ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης,
ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε,
τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.

III. Ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ
ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν
αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες C
ἐξουσίαν ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε

πλέονι **A**+. *πλέον* **ΠM**[1].

γένωνται **r** for *γεύωνται* illustrates errors 'of general resemblance.'

359 A. *αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ* MSS. *δοκεῖν* Ast, but see note.

ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν **A**. *αὐτῶν* vulg. *αὐτοῖς* *q*β[1] (edited). See comment.

ταύτην τὴν γένεσιν **DK**, an easy and frequent mistake, spoiling the sense.

δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι, ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἣν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἵαν ποτέ φασιν δύναμιν τῷ [Γύγου]
D τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναί τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ᾗ ἔνεμεν· ἰδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι· καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ μυθολογοῦσιν θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν κοῖλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ἃς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι, μείζω ἢ κατ'
E ἄνθρωπον· τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποίμνια, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον. καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην

359 C. *τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ* might be bracketed by the school of Cobet.

νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ **A**. *ν. δ. καὶ βίᾳ* Π + **M** +, a mistaken emendation.

τῷ Γύγου best MSS. *τῷ Γύγῃ* **x** Ficinus, without grammar. Hermann ejects the word. *τῷ* <*Γύγῃ τῷ*> *Γύγου* Adam.

359 D. *μυθολογοῦσιν* **A** +. *ἃ μυθολογοῦσι* Π + **M** +, a mistaken correction.

359 D—E. *τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδὲν* Π + **M** +. *ἔχειν* om. **A** +. Its place is taken in Ξ by *φέρειν* (= *φορεῖν*) after *δακτύλιον*, an evident attempt to make grammar in the absence of *ἔχειν*. The archetype almost certainly had no *ἔχειν*. Perhaps e.g. *τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν* <*περικεῖσθαι*>, *περὶ δὲ... ὃν* om. Jackson (without *ἔχειν*), but the case of *δακτύλιον* is questionable.

τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἴσω
τῆς χειρός. τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν
γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς 360
περὶ οἰχομένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν
ἐπιψηλαφῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν
σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ
τοῦτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου, εἰ
ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν,
στρέφοντι μὲν εἴσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλῳ γίγνεσθαι,
ἔξω δὲ δήλῳ. αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθὺς διαπράξασθαι
τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα·
ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετ' B
ἐκείνης ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν
ἀρχὴν κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίω
γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ
ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάν-
τινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν
ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, ἐξὸν
αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅ τι βούλοιτο λαμβά-
νειν, καὶ εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτῳ C
βούλοιτο, καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν
οὕστινας βούλοιτο, καὶ τἆλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς

360 A. *καὶ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν* *q*β¹. 'Always' is sufficiently implied.

τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα om. **A**¹, supplied by **A**² marg. The words are not indispensable, but **A**¹ is guilty of omissions.

360 B. *ὡς δόξειεν* MSS. *ἂν* add. Ast, without reason. See comment.

360 C. *ἀποκτιννύναι* MSS, the usual form of the present in the Platonic MSS, though *ἀποκτεινύναι* is sufficiently warranted. Schanz Plat. Vol. VIII. Proleg. § 3. In 517 A we have *εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν;* (though not without variation).

ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα. οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοίη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἴοιεν ἀμφότεροι. καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γ' ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν. λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ
D οἴεται πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος μηδέν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἅψαιτο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἐπαινοῖεν δ' ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτω.

IV. Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου πέρι ὧν
E λέγομεν, ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, οἷοί τ' ἐσόμεθα κρῖναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἥδε· μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν

διαφέρον Π+.

ποιοῖ MSS. v. sup. 330 A.

ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἂν ἴοιεν Π+. *ἂν* was suggested by the following optative.

ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν **A**Π[1]. *ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖ* vulg. See note.

360 D. *ὡς φήσει* **A**+Π+. *ὡς φησὶν* **M**.

ἀνοητοτάτοις **A** corr., by a hasty adaptation to the other dative.

αὖ τὴν Adam for *αὐτὴν*.

360 E. *τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις ἥδε;* some texts. See note. *τί οὖν* of **A**+ is possible but not probable.

τὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐπιτήδευμα **A** (proving that the best may err).

ὁ ἄδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιείτω· οἷον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἰατρὸς τά τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διαισθάνεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν 361
ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐᾷ· ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα πῃ σφαλῇ, ἱκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι· τὸν ἁλισκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον, ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὑτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλληταί τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ B
εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐάν τι μηνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι, ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται, διά τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον παρ' αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ C
δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιούτῳ εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα ᾖ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι

τά τε δυνατὰ...καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα (by mistaken editing) **x**, Ficinus, Stallbaum &c. See note.

361 C. *δωρεαί* MSS. In Plato's day this is equally possible with *δωρειαί*. From the 3rd cent. the shorter form prevails. Meisterhans § 15 (c) 11. No doubt the *pronunciation* was *δωρεαί*.

τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη **x**, an erroneous conjecture.

ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων· ἀλλὰ
D ἴτω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι
ἄδικος διὰ βίου, ὢν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵνα ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ
ἔσχατον ἐληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας,
κρίνωνται ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος.

V. Βαβαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἑκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν. Ὡς μάλιστ', ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὄντοιν δὲ τοιούτοιν, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἑκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει.
E λεκτέον οὖν· καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικοτέρως λέγηται, μὴ
ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας
πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω
διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται,
362 δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τὠφθαλμώ, τελευτῶν πάντα
κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται καὶ γνώσεται, ὅτι
οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν· τὸ δὲ τοῦ
Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ
ἀδίκου. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἄδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτη-

τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων Euseb. (flor. a.d. 315) Praep. Ev. xii. 10 p. 583 and Theodoret (fl. a.d. 420), Therap. xii. p. 667. *τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῆς γ.* mss. The confusion of the prepositions is common. Cf. inf. 363 a.

ἀλλ' ἴτω Neukirch. *ἤτω* **A** (with *η* from *ι*) **M** +. *ἠτῶ* **Π** (which might suggest *ἤσθω*). *ἔστω* Euseb., Theod. and γ^1. All the readings derive most naturally from *ἤτω*, an early error by itacism.

361 E. *ἐκκαυθήσεται* **A** + **Π** +. *ἐκκοφθήσεται* **M** + (partly, at least, through confusion of pronunciation, when *υ* had become = Eng. *f*). *ἐκκοπήσεται* $q\beta^1$ Euseb., Theod. (a frequent substitution of 2nd fut. form. See comment.).

362 A. *ἀνασκινδυλευθήσεται* **x** +, Clem. Alex., Euseb. *-δαλ-* a few inferior copies. The form is discussed in the notes. *ἀνασκολοπισθήσεται* of **K** is a gloss.

δεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν,

βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα, B

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ τούς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς C *καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς ἂν βούληται, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον. οὕτω φασίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.*

VI. Ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν D νῷ εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, Οὔ τί που οἴει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἶπον. Αὐτό, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη· ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε. καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιο-

362 D. *ἔφη* after *οὔ τί που οἴει* om. **A + M.** The cause of loss was perhaps the general pronunciation of the sentence.

E *σύνῃ. καὶ ὅς, Οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε· δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν, οἳ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵν' ᾖ σαφέστερον ὅ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων. λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε υἱέσιν καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν*
363 *κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διῆλθεν ἄρτι, ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσιν· τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ὁσίοις, ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι, ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος*
B *Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρός φασιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρῦς τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν*

> *ἄκρας μέν τε φέρειν βαλανους, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας·*
> *εἰροπόκοι δ' ὄϊες, φησίν, μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι,*

καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα· παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος· ὥστε τευ γάρ φησιν

362 E. *υἱέσι* editors. Schanz (Plat. Vol. XII. Proleg. § 5) concludes from MSS that **ὑός*, not *υἱός*, was the form in the archetype. But Meisterhans (§ 17. 4) shows that *υἱός* is good for Plato's date. The remark of Theognostus (Bek. Anecd. 1426 b) *υἱὸς καὶ γυιός· ταῦτα δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ῑ γράφουσι* refers to a more modern Attic.

363 A. *αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην* **r**+, the facile change of misconception.

τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῆς **A**[1]. Cf. sup. 361 c.

τῷ δικαίῳ **A**+**Π**+**M**+. om. **DK** Ficinus. *τῷ ἀδίκῳ* **x***q*, followed by most editors. But see comment.

ἤ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὅστε θεουδὴς
εὐδικίας ἀνέχῃσι, φέρῃσι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα
πυροὺς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθῃσι δὲ δένδρεα C
καρπῷ,
τίκτῃ δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ
ἰχθῦς.

Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τἀγαθὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασιν τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς Ἅιδου γὰρ ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλίναντες καὶ συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἐστεφανωμένους ποιοῦσιν τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἤδη διάγειν D
μεθύοντας, ἡγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον· οἱ δ' ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθοὺς παρὰ θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσιν δικαιοσύνην· τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν, ἔτι τε ζῶντας εἰς κακὰς E
δόξας ἄγοντες, ἅπερ Γλαύκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων διῆλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγουσιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ ψόγος οὗτος ἑκατέρων.

VII. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκέψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ 364

363 D. *ἀποτίνουσιν q*, followed by Adam: but *μακροτέρους* is not *μείζους*.

κατόπισθε Π, but copyists had a notion that *ν ἐφελκυστικόν* preceded vowels only. Meisterhans (§ 42) shows that it was almost as common before consonants. Cf. Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 17.

ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον· ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν. λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι, καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσιν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν,
B οἳ ἄν πῃ ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἑτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ
C ἐπῳδαῖς, εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν, ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν, ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψειν ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶν καὶ καταδέσμοις, τοὺς θεούς, ὥς φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν. τούτοις δὲ πᾶσιν τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται, οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διδόντες, ὡς

364 A. *τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη* om. **A**+ through homoeoteleuton. *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον* (a gloss) **r**+.

364 C. The present text removes a comma after *πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ*.

βλάψειν q. *βλάψει* cett. *βλάψαι* Muretus. The accidental loss of the ν-sign, or a misconception, may be responsible for the error.

ᾄδοντες for *διδόντες* Muretus and Cobet, unnecessarily. Moreover it is the charlatans, and not the poets, who are the subject.

τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι
ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδὸς, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει· D
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν
ἔθηκαν

καί τινα ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὅμηρον μαρτύρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν

λιστοὶ δὲ [στρεπτοί] τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν
λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι E
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.

βίβλων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθ' ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν
ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς 365
καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.

VIII. Ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ

λείη MSS. ὀλίγη MSS of Hesiod. Qu. λιτή as the original in Hesiod, though not in Plato? See note.

364 D. καὶ τραχεῖαν add. A^2 mg. after ἀνάντη, a note to complete the Hesiodic description.

στρεπτοὶ δέ τε Π + M +, λιστοὶ στρεπτοί τε $Π^2$, λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοί τε A, λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοὶ δέ τε A^2. See note.

εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσι x, restoring the exact Homeric form. Cf. inf. 365 E.

364 E. ἐκγόνων Ast: but see note.

κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν, ποῖός
B τις ἂν ὢν καὶ πῇ πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὑτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβὰς καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ, ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανεράς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασαμένῳ θεσπέσιος
C βίος λέγεται. οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές,
D φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλ' ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων

365 A. ἐφιπτάμενοι a recent corrector in **A**. Schanz Plat. Vol. XII. Proleg. § 17 agrees with Cobet as to the prose forms. See note. ἐπισπόμενοι **DK**q, a misreading.

365 B. ποῖ $q\beta^1$+ for πῇ.

δίκαι (for δίκᾳ) most MSS. δικηι would have been written δίκῃ at once, but δίκαι suggests the plural. δίκαις **x**+. The δίκαιον of **r** is simply a misreading δικαὶ (where ̀ represents ον).

καὶ before ἐμαυτὸν om. **DK**. It can be spared, and there was a tendency to insert καὶ between participles, one dependent on the other.

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ **A**+Π+**M**+. ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ **x**+, a mistaken conjecture. See comment.

φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ
ἑταιρείας συνάξομεν, εἰσίν τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι
σοφίαν δημηγορικήν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν
τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες
δίκην μὴ διδόναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν
οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν
ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, <οὐδὲν> καὶ
ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν· εἰ δὲ εἰσί τε καὶ E
ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκη-
κόαμεν, ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων
ποιητῶν· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν, ὡς εἰσὶν οἷοι
θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσιν καὶ ἀναθή-
μασιν παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι· οἷς ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ
οὐδέτερα πειστέον· εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ
θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων. δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες 366
ἀζήμιοι μὲν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας
κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα· ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανοῦμέν τε καὶ
λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες πείθον-
τες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν
Ἅιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ
αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζό-
μενος, αἱ τελεταὶ αὖ μέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι
θεοί, ὡς αἱ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν B
παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἳ
ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν.

365 D. *καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον* **A**+Π+**M**+ *τί καὶ ἡμῖν μ.* **x**+. *οὐδ' ἡμῖν μ.* qβ[1]. *καὶ ἡμῖν οὐ μελ.* **D.** *καὶ ἡμῖν ἀμελητέον* Baiter. For the suggestion in the text see note.

365 E. *ἀγαναῖσι* **x**+. Cf. sup. 364 D.

366 A. *ἀζήμιοι μὲν* Muretus. *ἀζ. μόνον* Π+**M**+. *ἀζήμιοι* **A**+. Probably *μὲν* was mistaken for *μόν`*, or *μ`* so misread.

αὖ μέγα δύνανται om. **A**+**M**+Π[1] through homoeoteleuton. Cf. sup. 364 A. Hermann's *ἀλλ' ὠφελήσουσιν ἁγνιζομένους* is reckless.

IX. Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἱροίμεθ' ἄν; ἣν ἐὰν μετ' εὐσχημοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος. ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τίς
C μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ᾧ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ὡς δή τοι εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλήν που συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκοις, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι, πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται
D αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρως ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ' ᾖ. καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅθενπερ ἅπας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὥρμησεν καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Ὦ θαυμάσιε, πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι
E ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς

366 C. *ψυχῆς* **A**+Π[1]+. *τύχης* **A** mg. Π[2]**M**+. The confusion of *ψ* and *τ* is common.

366 D. *ὡς δέ, δῆλον* Π+**M**+**A**[2]. *ὡδε* (or *ὡ δὲ*) **A.** *ὧδε δὲ* **x**+. *εἶπεν* **A** (corrected to *εἰπεῖν*), through the frequency of *ἔφη* or *εἶπε* after a quotation has begun.

366 D—E. *ὑμῶν ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης* **A**+**M** (omitting *εἶναι*). *εἶναι* add. vulg. *ἡμῶν ὅσοι ἐπ. φαμεν τὲ* (*sic*) *δ. εἶναι* Π. The omission of *εἶναι* is remarkable, as is also the error in Π. *φατὲ* might be adscript, but is an unlikely one. Qu. e.g. *ὅσοι ἐπαινέται πέφανθε δικαιοσύνης* (though *πέφανθε* is not actually found).

ἡρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπῄνεσεν δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἑκάτερον τῇ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνὸν καὶ λανθάνον θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχὴ ἐν αὑτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν.
εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν 367
καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπείθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ξύνοικος ᾖ. ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἂν μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν, φορτικῶς, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐγώ,
οὐδὲν γάρ σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν B
ἀκοῦσαι τἀναντία, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὑτὴν ἡ μὲν κακόν, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἑκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον
εἶναι ψέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι C

367 A. *ἄριστος* is interpolated by some copies before or after *ἕκαστος*.

ξύνοικος ᾖ **A** + **M** +. *ξυνοικοίη* Π +. See note.

ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ **Π**x. *ὥς γέ μοι* **A** + **M** +.

367 C. *ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν* after *ψέγειν* om. **A**, suppl. **A**² mg. The

ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, ξυμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὑτῷ μὲν ξυμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀξύμφορον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὡμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἄξια κεκτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὑτῶν, οἷον ὁρᾶν,
D *ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή, καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὑτῶν φύσει ἀλλ' οὐ δόξῃ ἐστίν,— τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, ὃ αὐτὴ δι' αὑτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησιν καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει· μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν. ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύοις, διότι*
E *πάντα τὸν βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὑτήν, ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἡ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ κακόν ἐστι.*

X. *Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε* Γλαύκωνος *καὶ τοῦ* Ἀδειμάντου *ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν*
368 *καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἥσθην καὶ εἶπον· Οὐ κακῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν*

words might be understood, but they suit the conversational emphasis.

367 D. *ἀνασχοίμην* Ξ and apparently Ficinus (*sustinerem*). *ἀποδεχοίμην* Π + **A**² mg. *ἀποσχοίμην* **A** +. See note.

κελεύοις **A** + **M** +. *κελεύεις* vulg.

367 E. *κρείττων* Ξ**r** +.

αὑτὴν δι' αὑτήν **A** + Π +. *αὐτὴ δι' αὑτήν* **M** +.

ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμή-
σαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπὼν

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός.

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον
πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης
ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.
δοκεῖτε δή μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεῖσθαι· τεκμαίρομαι B
δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατά
γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἠπίστουν ἂν ὑμῖν· ὅσῳ δὲ
μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὅ τι
χρήσωμαι· οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γάρ
μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι· σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι ἃ πρὸς
Θρασύμαχον λέγων ᾤμην ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἄμεινον
δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου· οὔτ᾽ αὖ
ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω· δέδοικα γάρ, μὴ οὐδ᾽ ὅσιον ᾖ
παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνῃ κακηγορουμένῃ ἀπαγο- C
ρεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον
φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι
ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ. ὅ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν
λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον
καὶ περὶ τῆς ὠφελίας αὐτοῖν τἀληθὲς ποτέρως ἔχει.
εἶπον οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὅτι Τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχει-
ροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλ᾽ ὀξὺ βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ
φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ᾽ D

368 A. *τὴν ἐν Μεγαροῖ* **r**+. See note. The same copies have *ἐκείνου* for *κλεινοῦ*, partly from the preceding *'κείνου* and partly from misreading.

368 B. *ὅ τι χρήσωμαι* **ΑΠ**, *ὅ τι χρήσομαι* **A**^{2}Ξqβ. Both are possible. See comment.

ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἵανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὀξὺ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι· ἕρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη, οἶμαι, ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ
E Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσει καθορᾷς; Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ. δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν μεῖζον πόλις ἑνὸς ἀνδρός; Μεῖζον, ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι ἐνείη καὶ ῥᾴων
369 καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν· ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν; Τάχ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπὶς
B εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὃ ζητοῦμεν; Πολύ γε. Δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περαίνειν; οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι· σκοπεῖτε οὖν. Ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.


368 D. A comma only is usually read after *μείζονι*.
368 E. *μείζων* **A**[2]+. But *μεῖζον* is manifestly better here.
369 A. *ζητήσομεν* some Florentine copies.

NOTES.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ. The **Republic** was regularly known in antiquity under the name of Πολιτεία. Whether Plato himself gave it that title cannot be determined, but he must at least have recognised that such a name would befit the dialogue, since in Tim. 17 B he uses the expression *τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ῥηθέντων λόγων περὶ πολιτείας*. From Aristotle downwards it is so referred to, and Cicero, when he does not translate by *Respublica*, retains either the Greek Πολιτεία or transcribes as *Politia*. Cf. Epist. ad Att. IV. 16 *feci idem quod in* **Πολιτείᾳ** *deus ille noster Plato* and de Div. II. 27 *Platonis Politiam nuper apud me mures corroserunt*. Later the plural Πολιτεῖαι appears, and the chief MS of the Republic (Par. A) bears the inscription Πλάτωνος Πολιτεῖαι, ἢ περὶ δικαίου. This illogical plural refers (like the expression 'the Aeneids of Vergil') to the several books. Thus Πολιτειῶν πρώτη of the Aldine edition stands for Πολιτειῶν πρώτη πολιτεία (or βίβλος).

Diogenes Laertius (III. 60) has Πολιτεία, ἢ περὶ δικαίου· πολιτικός (sc. διάλογος or λόγος), quoting the secondary title and classification of Thrasylus (or Thrasyllus), a rhetorician of the age of Augustus and Tiberius, who gave similar designations to all the dialogues, e.g. Παρμενίδης, ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν, λογικός and Εὐθύφρων, ἢ περὶ ὁσίου, πειραστικός (v. Grote Plato Vol. I. c. iv. pp. 158 sqq.). The same Thrasylus also divided the dialogues into rather fanciful tetralogies based on the alleged share of each set in a common theme (κοινὴ ὑπόθεσις). In this, however, he had been preceded by an arrangement in trilogies (after the dramatic example) made by Aristophanes of Byzantium.

The term πολιτικός refers to the place of the dialogue in the following scheme of distribution made (or adopted) by Thrasylus—


DIALOGUES
Of search (ζητητικοί)
Of exposition (ὑφηγητικοί)
Of exercise (γυμναστικοί)
Of contention (ἀγωνιστικοί)
Of speculation (θεωρητικοί)
Of practice (πρακτικοί)
Of eliciting (obstetric) (μαιευτικοί) e.g. LACHES
Of testing (πειραστικοί) e.g. MENO
Of arraignment (ἐνδεικτικοί) The PROTAGORAS
Of refutation (ἀνατρεπτικοί) e.g. GORGIAS
Of nature (φυσικοί) TIMAEUS
Of reason (λογικοί) e.g. PARMENIDES
Of ethics (ἠθικοί) e.g. CRITO
Of politics (πολιτικοί) e.g. REPUBLIC LAWS

It has been pointed out (Introd. §§ 57 sqq.) that the first book of the REPUBLIC is separable as a dialogue 'of search,' and that the expository character belongs to the later portion.

BOOK I.

327 A. **κατέβην χθὲς κ.τ.λ.** There is a familiar story that a few of the opening words of the Republic were found written upon Plato's tablets in various arrangements. Dionysius Halicar. De Comp. Verb. v. p. 209 (Reiske) says that there was discovered a tablet containing *ποικίλως μετακειμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Πολιτείας τήνδε Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος.* Quintilian Inst. Or. VIII. 6. 64 says it was the first four words (*inventa sunt quattuor illa verba*), and rightly remarks that the various arrangements aimed at making the language rhythmical (*numerosum*). Diog. Laert. III. 25. 37 does not mention the number of words, but only that it was 'the beginning of the Republic.'

It is impossible to decide whether there is any truth in the story or not. What it points to is the recognition of the fact that Greek writers spared no pains in the elaboration of their style and its rhythm. For the care spent upon the latter see Aristotle Rhet. III. c. 8. Blass and others have done much for the appreciation of the style of Demosthenes by investigating its principles of rhythm and euphony.

εἰς Πειραιᾶ. Equally allowable is *εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ.*

Originally *ὁ Πειραιεὺς* was adjective, with **λιμὴν** expressed or understood. As a town grew and came to be thought of more than the harbour the article was dropped, although the older expression was too inveterate for the article to be omitted consistently. The same phenomenon of language is familiar in new countries. A river is called 'the Werribee' or 'the Thames'; a town grows beside it and is first called 'the Werribee' or 'Werribee,' 'the Thames' or 'Thames' indiscriminately; later the article gradually disappears.

From the middle of Athens to the middle of the Peiraeus was about five miles.

Πειραιᾶ. In Attic Greek of the 5th and early 4th century, in the declension of adjectives or nouns in -*εὺς* following iota, contraction always took place, where it was possible, in the last syllable, e.g. *Πειραιᾶ*, *Πειραιῶς*, &c. So *Δωριᾶ*, *Δωριᾶς*, *Δωριῶν*,

as against Φωκέα, Φωκέας, Φωκέων. See Meisterhans Gramm. Att. Insch. § 55 *b*) 9, who quotes Θεσπιᾶς, Παιανιῶν, Αἰγιλιῶς. Thomas Mag. 287 says Πειραιῶς Ἀττικόν· Πειραιέως κοινόν. The uncontracted forms came in with other innovations (e.g. -εῖς in nom. and acc.) later in the 4th cent.

Hence inf. 328 B we must write Παιανιᾶ and not -έα with most editors.

Γλαύκωνος. For the *personae* of the dialogue see Introduction § 3 *c*.

τῇ θεῷ. That the goddess was Bendis seems clear from 354 A, *ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἱστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδίοις*. Bendis was a Thracian goddess, often identified by the Greeks with Artemis.

Hesychius has Βένδις (Βενδῖς is a variant accentuation) ἡ Ἄρτεμις. Origen (adv. Cels. 631 E), with this passage in mind, writes *προσευξόμενοι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι*. Proclus (Tim. p. 9, Polit. p. 353) makes Bendis the Thracian name for Artemis and Selene, and places the Bendidia on the 19th of Thargelion (April—May). In Xen. Hell. II. 4. 11 τὸ Βενδίδειον is near the temple of the Greek Artemis on the promontory of Munychia at Peiraeus. The Peiraeus, being the port, and therefore full of Athenian sailors who had made acquaintance with foreign customs, as well as of foreign sailors and merchants who paid frequent visits or actually resided on business, was a natural place for the first establishment of foreign divinities.

Socrates, here as elsewhere, poses as ready to offer the same pious worship as any other average respectable Athenian.

θεῷ. *ἡ θεός*, not *ἡ θεά*, is the proper expression in Attic prose and comedy, except where an express opposition is desired between the masculine and feminine, e.g. in *μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς* (Symp. 219 C). [Cf. the necessity of forming the Latin *deabus* in distinction from *deis*.]

Inscriptions carry out this rule till after B.C. 300. Thus τὼ θεώ (=Demeter and Persephone), but τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ταῖς θεαῖς. See Meisterhans Gr. Att. Ins. § 47 *a*) 4.

It is probable, however, that in certain expressions, e.g. *αἱ σεμναὶ θεαί*, the feminine form alone was used, the instinct of analogy calling for a full correspondence when article is combined with adjective, while it might not do so with article alone. (So it is allowable to join *δύο* with either dual or plural, but *δυοῖν* regularly demands an accompanying dual because of its own pronounced dual shape.)

τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν. The order shews that the construction is not *θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσι τὴν ἑορτήν*, but the more idiomatic *θεάσασθαι τὴν ἑορτήν*,

(i.e.) *τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν (αὐτήν)*. Cf. inf. C *ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ὅσοι ἐσμέν;* 332 B *ᾐνίξατο τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ εἴη.* Soph. Aj. 118 *ὁρᾷς, Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχύν, ὅση;*

Both forms of expression are good Greek in themselves, and in e.g. Eur. Med. 451 *μὴ παύσῃ ποτὲ | λέγουσ' Ἰάσων ὡς κάκιστός ἐστ' ἀνήρ*, the only inducement to read *Ἰάσον'* lies in overpartiality for an idiom.

ποιήσουσιν. A difference deserves noting. *ἑορτὴν ποιεῖσθαι* = a resolved verb, viz. *ἑορτάζειν*, while *ἑορτὴν ποιεῖν* = 'conduct, or perform, a festival,' the action not being regarded in its reflexive bearing, but as done for the god or goddess (cf. *ἕρδειν θυσίαν* &c.).

ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες—sc. *αὐτήν*. The date of the first introduction of Bendis-worship is unknown, and, in any case, need not be the same as the date of the first public recognition of a festival in her honour.

καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπή. The function of **καὶ** would be expressed in English by emphasizing 'local.' In the ultimate analysis the sense is 'now the procession of the local people *also* (i.e. as well as that of the Thracians about to be mentioned) appeared to me to be a fine one.'

οὐ μέντοι... μέντοι answers to **μὲν** in a somewhat stronger way than *δέ*. Cf. 329 E *λέγουσι μέν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται.* 364 A *καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον.* Apol. 38 D *ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων.*

It was natural to avoid *οὐ δὲ*, but that difficulty might have been got over by writing *οὐχ ἧττον δέ*.
Riddell (Plato Apology, Digest of Idioms p. 188) sums up his collections with the conclusion that *μέντοι* is preferred to *δὲ* (1) when particular emphasis is to be given to the opposition, (2) where *δὲ* could not be conveniently used, (3) in opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by *δέ*.

327 B. **ὡρμημένους**—a frequent perfect-present. 'When we had started' = 'when we were on our way.'

μου...λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου—'taking hold of me by the cloak.' The partitive genitive is used of that part by which a man seizes, drags, holds or hangs a person or thing; e.g. *ἕλκειν τινὰ τοῦ ποδός, κρεμάσαι τινὰ τῶν σκελῶν, σπᾶν τινα τῆς κόμης.* Any such verb may take this construction, whether, like *λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅπτεσθαι* &c., it takes in its own right a genitive of the whole person or thing (here **μου**) as well as the genitive of the part, or whether its own regimen is an accusative.

For the situation Stallbaum quotes Terence Phorm. v. 6. 23 *puer ad me accurrit; pone adprendit pallio.*

ὅπου αὐτὸς εἴη. Besides the sense '(Polemarchus) himself,' *αὐτὸς* conveys, relatively to the slave, the implication 'his master.' Cf. the *αὐτὸς ἔφα* (*ipse dixit*) of the disciples of Pythagoras. Ar. Nub. 218

> ΣΤ. *φέρε τίς γὰρ οὗτος οὑπὶ τῆς κρεμάθρας ἀνήρ;*
> ΜΑΘ. *αὐτός.*
> ΣΤ. *τίς αὐτός;* ΜΑΘ. *Σωκράτης.*

Ar. Frag. 261 *ἀνοιγέτω τις δώματ'. αὐτὸς ἔρχεται.* Catullus III. 7 *suamque norat | ipsam tam bene quam puella matrem.* The same implication exists in Prot. 314 D *ἔα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ* ('my master'). Bosanquet ('Companion to Plato's Republic') compares a Scotch usage of 'himsel'' to indicate an important personage.

οὗτος προσέρχεται—'yonder he comes.' The deictic *οὗτος* and *ὅδε* are often thus used with verbs where we should employ an adverb. Cf. Hom. Il. x. 82 *τίς δ' οὗτος κατὰ νῆας...ἔρχεαι;* Eur. Phoen. 443, *καὶ μὴν Ἐτεοκλῆς...ὅδε χωρεῖ.*

ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. 'Αλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν: 'but (pray) wait.' 'Well, (but) we will wait.' For **ἀλλὰ** in urging and conceding cf. Ar. Ach. 407 ΕΥ. *ἀλλ' οὐ σχολή.* | ΔΙ. *ἀλλ' ἐκκυκλήθητ'·* ΕΥ. *ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον.* ΔΙ. *ἀλλ' ὅμως.* | ΕΥ. *ἀλλ' ἐκκυκλήσομαι*: and in the answer alone, e.g. Plat. Gorg. 449 A Γ. *ἀγαθόν γε, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι βούλει με καλεῖν.* Σ. *ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.*

For a different repetition of *ἀλλὰ* v. inf. 337 D.

ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Γλαύκων. The whole expression **ἦ δ' ὃς** is archaic. The verb *ἠμί* is found in Attic Greek only in the survivals *ἦν* and *ἦ*, and then only in conjunction with *δ' ἐγὼ* and *δ' ὃς* (*δ' ἥ*) respectively.

> **ὃς** is the old demonstrative pronoun (Hom. Od. I. 286 *ὃς γὰρ δεύτατος ἦλθεν*), which survived in this particular combination as in the expression *καὶ ὃς* 'and he.' The **δ'** is due to places in which the particle once actually connected sentences ('*and* I said'). The necessarily very frequent combination of *ἦ δ' ὃς*, in which the particle was connective, led, when *ἦ* and *ὃς* had both become archaic, to a fusion of the whole expression practically into one word ('quotha'), and the particle was incorporated even where it was meaningless. In conversation 'said he,' 'said I,' are used so perpetually by all classes that the old expression for these senses withstood the changes which time brought to less every-day parts of *ἠμί* and of the demonstrative.

ὁ Γλαύκων might appear to be grammatically exegetic of ὅς, but, as a fact, its addition shews that ἦ-δ'-ὅς has come to be simply the equivalent of ἔφη, as ἦν-δ'-ἐγώ of ἔφην.

327 C. ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς—either (1) 'to all appearance, from the procession,' i.e. one might conclude that they were coming from the ceremony: or (2) **ὡς** gives a *reason* for their being together for this lucky meeting, 'as was natural with people making a move after the procession.' The latter rendering has more point, and is properly given in Stallbaum's 'quippe qui pompae interfuissent.'

πρὸς ἄστυ. Above (B) we have **πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ.**

As with *τεῖχος*, *πόλις*, *ἀγρός*, &c., the article may be present or absent, though not indifferently. It is incorrect to say that the article is 'omitted.' Such combinations as *ἐν ἀγορᾷ*, *ἔξω τείχους*, *εἰς ἀγρόν*, *πρὸς ἄστυ* belong to a period before the article came into regular use, and, being familiar expressions of everyday occurrence, they were retained in a shape which was not only permissible but normal. When the article is added there is an appreciable difference in suggestion. Thus *ἔξω τείχους* (Phaedr. init.) is simply an adverb, 'out of walls,' the opposite of *ἔνδον*; *εἰς ἀγρόν* is 'up country,' the opposite of 'in town'; *πρὸς ἄστυ* is 'cityward,' i.e. 'inwards' as opposed to 'outwards.' The particular *τεῖχος*, *ἀγρός*, *ἄστυ* are not contemplated; the expression is generic. Cf. 'up stairs,' 'at home,' 'to market' &c. On the other hand *ἔξω τοῦ τείχους*='outside the wall (well-known)' or 'its wall'; *πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ*='towards the city (which lay near)': the wall or city being specific and individual to the consciousness of the speaker. The difference may be realised by comparing the delicate ways in which we use 'go to market' and 'go to the market,' 'go to town' and 'go to the town.'

οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις: 'yes, your surmise is not amiss': literally ('we *are* going townwards,) for your surmise' &c. Cf. Phaedr. 228 C *ὥς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν πρὶν ἂν εἴπω.* ΣΩ. *πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.* Sometimes *γὰρ* in assent is combined with other particles, e.g. Theaet. 170 A ΣΩ. *τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ;* ΘΕ. *φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.* The ellipse is sometimes actually supplied, e.g. inf. 329 E *ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται.*

For the playful threat of force cf. Phileb. 16 A *ἆρ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν;* Phaedr. 236 C *ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνω μὲν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, ἰσχυρότερος δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος.*

οὐκουν...ἔτι ἐλλείπεται τὸ ἢν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ. The evidence of MSS is in favour of **ἐλλείπεται**, though the margin of A has

ἓν λείπεται. **ἔτι ἐλλείπεται** = 'there is still left unstated.' *ἐλλείπειν τι* = 'to leave unpaid': cf. Dem. Timoc. 753 *ἐλλελοιπότες εἰσφοράν* (*al.* *τὰς εἰσφοράς*). Aristot. Ath. Pol. 48. 1 *κἄν τις ἐλλίπῃ καταβολήν.* Lucian Icarom. 24 *διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν ἐλλείποιεν τὰ Διάσια.* Hence in the passive, as here, Phileb. 18 D. Thus the meaning is that there is still a deficiency in the account. The pleonasm in *ἔτι ἐλλείπεται* is too slight and natural to cause offence.

With **τὸ** the place of a noun is taken by the following notion in the group of words *ἢν πείσωμεν κ.τ.λ.*; 'the alternative that we should persuade you': literally 'the (proposition), if we persuade you.' Cf. inf. 332 A. Xen. Cyr. v. 1. 21 *τὸ 'ἐὰν μένητε παρ' ἐμοί' ἀποδώσω.* Demosth. Aristocr. 693 *ὑπερβὰς τὸ 'καὶ ἁλῷ φόνου' καὶ τὸ 'δόξῃ ἀπεκτονέναι' κ.τ.λ.*

Whether we should read **οὔκουν, οὐκοῦν,** or **οὐκ οὖν,** is dubious, and cannot be settled positively by *a priori* arguments. The question here, however, appears naturally to involve the stress on the negative element *οὐκ*, which regularly corresponds to the sense *nonne*, whereas in e.g. inf. 338 D, 348 C, &c., Xen. Cyr. II. 4. 15 *οὐκοῦν σοι δοκεῖ σύμφορον εἶναι τὸ λεληθέναι ἡμᾶς ταῦτα βουλεύοντας*; the word *οὐκοῦν* is simply = *ἄρα*, *ergo*, the sentence being really an inference put in the *form* of a question. *οὐκοῦν* should mean '*then* there is left...is there not?' which is obviously away from the mark in our passage.

ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε—literally 'on the understanding that we shall not listen, so make up your minds.' For this form of expression (which is common enough) see Goodwin Moods and Tenses § 917 sq. Cf. Phaedr. 244 C *ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος...οὕτω νομίσαντες ἔθεντο,* Xen. Anab. I. 3. 6 *ὡς ἐμοῦ ἰόντος ὅπῃ ἂν καὶ ὑμεῖς, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε,* Cyr. II. 3. 15 *ὡς ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιουμένου, οὕτως γίγνωσκε.* With *accus.* absol. of the neuter impersonal Xen. Mem. IV. 2. 30 *ὡς πάνυ μοι δοκοῦν...οὕτως ἴσθι.* Without *οὕτω* Soph. Aj. 281 *ὡς ὧδ' ἐχόντων τῶνδ' ἐπίστασθαί σε χρή,* Eur. Med. 1311 *ὡς οὐκέτ' ὄντων σῶν τέκνων φρόντιζε δή.*

The redundant **οὕτω** sums up or emphasizes the *ὡς*-clause; conversely the *ὡς*-clause might be regarded as explanatory anticipation of *οὕτω*. So, in Latin, *sic* is frequently redundant with *iudico*, *sentio* &c.

μὴ with the participle is probably rather due to the imperative context than to any hypothetical tone in the *ὡς*-clause itself. The statement is of a fact, 'we will not listen,' not 'as if then you have to deal with people who will not listen...' So Thucyd. VII.

15 ὡς τῶν στρατιωτῶν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε.

328 A. **οὐδ' ἴστε**—'do you not so much as know?'='are you *actually* ignorant?'

οὐδὲ gives in negative statements and questions the same tone of surprised emphasis which belongs to *καὶ* in the positive. Thus *οὐδ' ἴστε;*=*καὶ ἀγνοεῖτε*: *δέδοικα μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ᾖ*, 'I am afraid it is actually wicked.'

λαμπάς, i.e. *λαμπαδηδρομία* or *λαμπαδηφορία*. Cf. *λαμπάδα δραμεῖν*, *νικᾶν*, &c.

The usual method of procedure was with competing chains of runners, each chain forming a 'side' in the game. For every chain there was a torch, which must be carried to the goal alight. Each runner handed on the torch to the next man in his line (Lucr. II. 79 *et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt* after Plato's *καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων* (Legg. 776 B)), and the winners are thus the whole winning chain and not the individuals. Hence the expression in Aesch. Ag. 314 *νικᾷ δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών*. The same fact is pointed to by the existence of rival *λαμπαδάρχαι* (like the rival *χορηγοί*), who would hardly be required unless each provided a set of runners and not merely an individual.

There seems also to have been a simpler form of the race, between single competitors (Pausan. I. 30. 2).

διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις here shews that the chain-match is meant. The diminutive **λαμπάδια** implies that the torches were small, and proportionately hard to keep alight.

τῇ θεῷ—the regular dative of the divinity honoured by sacrifice, dance, holiday &c. Cf. Xen. Ag. II. 15 *στεφανοῦσθαι τῷ θεῷ*, Arist. Ran. 445 *οὗ παννυχίζουσιν θεᾷ*.

Bendis (=Artemis, the moon-goddess) might be appropriately honoured with a *λαμπαδηφορία*, and, in a mystic Chthonian character (=Hecate-Artemis), with a *παννυχίς*.

καινόν: a 'novelty' or 'invention,' differing from *νέον* in implying 'new-fangled.' Xen. Mem. I. 1. 3 *οὐδὲν καινότερον ἐσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων*.

ἐξαναστησόμεθα: 'will rise and go out.'

μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον. The article implies 'the dinner of which you will, of course, first partake.'

ξυνεσόμεθα πολλοῖς τῶν νέων—a great temptation to Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 2. 33, where the tyrants Critias and Charicles forbid him *τοῖς νέοις διαλέγεσθαι*. Ibid. 35 *μηδὲ σὺ διαλέγου νεω-*

τέροις τριάκοντα ἐτῶν. It was the peculiar intellectual effect of his intercourse upon the youth of Athens that led to the specific charge *ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.*

328 B. μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε—'don't refuse.' Probably, however, apart from its obvious meaning 'otherwise (than we ask),' **ἄλλως** is here, as so frequently, a *ὑποκορισμός* for a blunter word. There is an implication that to act *ἄλλως* is to act otherwise than kindly or civilly. So *ἀγαθὰ ἢ θάτερα* and the Latin *sequius.* The expression used here is common. Cf. Ar. Av. 133 *μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιήσης.*

CHAPTER II.

328 B. εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου—'to Polemarchus's.' Cf. *εἰς Ἅιδου, εἰς διδασκάλου φοιτᾶν, ἐν διδασκάλων* (Alc. I. 110 A), *ἡ ἐν Διονύσου ἐκκλησία*, 'to St Paul's,' 'go to the schoolmaster's,' *ad Vestae* &c.

No specific noun should be supplied (e.g. *εἰς <τὸν> τοῦ Πολεμάρχου <οἶκον>*) any more than in *τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν*, where it is unintelligent to say that '*πράγματα* is understood,' inasmuch as the neuter plural article is in itself a complete object. When the same comprehensive *τὰ* is used in phrases like Arist. Vesp. 1440 *οὕτω δὲ καὶ σὺ παράτρεχ' ἐς τὰ Πιττάλου* i.e. 'to the doctor's,' or Lys. c. Eratosth. 121 *καὶ ἐρωτῶσιν ὅπῃ βαδίζοιμεν· ὁ δ' ἔφασκεν εἰς τὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἐμοῦ*, or Theoc. II. 76 *ᾇ τὰ Λύκωνος*, it is wrong to search for a particular neuter plural noun to fit the sense of 'the doctor's house, place, surgery, &c.' So, though *εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου* is, of course, practically 'Polemarchus' house,' the actual noun which *εἰς* would grammatically govern is any word which would suit the notion. But the Greek speaker was no more conscious of any definite omission than we are when we say 'run down to the grocer's.'

In the opposite expression Ar. *Δαιτ.* 48 *οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπεδίδρασκες ἐκ διδασκάλου*; Prot. 326 C *ἐκ διδασκάλων*, &c., *ἐκ* does not logically govern the following genitive any more than *εἰς* in the one before us.

[For Polemarchus and the persons about to be mentioned see Introduction § 3 *c*.]

καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον. 'And, in particular, Th.' This combination of particles often directs attention to a specially important case. The presence of the great Thrasymachus adds much to the interest of the gathering. Cf. inf. 329 B *ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμην.* Properly the first *καὶ* connects, *δὴ* is expletive, and the second *καὶ*

emphasizes the particular word 'and, we must not forget, also... Thrasymachus.'

τὸν Καλχηδόνιον. It is impossible to say decisively in what way Plato chose to spell this word. The proper name of the town, as given on its coins, was *Καλχηδών*, but Meisterhans (Att. Inscr. § 38. 1) shews that, as early as the middle of the 5th century B.C., such spellings as *Χαλχηδόνιοι* (*sic*) existed in Attica side by side with *Καλχηδόνιοι*. This was partly due to the 'cockneyism' of Athenian speech, which tended to aspirate illegitimately (e.g. *ὁμίχλη*, *ἁθρόος* &c.), and partly to the natural association of the word with *χαλκός*. From the latter cause (probably) the pronunciation *Χαλκηδών* became prevalent in later Greece and is almost the rule in MSS, even when the author may not himself be responsible for it. There is moreover in all languages a danger of metathesis of similar vowels or consonants in adjoining syllables, and for this reason *Μιτυλήνη* came to be written for *Μυτιλήνη*, like *Χαλκηδών* for *Καλχηδών*. Plato may or may not have fallen in with the popular error.

Παιανιᾶ—not **Παιανιέα.** See note on *Πειραιᾶ*, 327 init. Paiania is an Attic deme, to which the orator Demosthenes gave renown later.

328 C. διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἑωράκη αὐτόν. 'For it was some time since I had *so much as* seen him': lit. 'for after an interval of time had I even seen him.' The **καὶ** implies that it is possible to see a man without holding conversation with him, but that Socrates had not even done the former. **γὰρ** explains why Cephalus seemed so much older than Socrates had pictured him.

διὰ χρόνου. Cf. Lys. Or. I. § 12 *ἀσμένη με ἑωρακυῖα ἥκοντα διὰ χρόνου.* Soph. Phil. 758 *ἥκει γὰρ αὕτη διὰ χρόνου.* Xen. Cyr. V. 5. 41 *διὰ χρόνου ἰδόντα αὐτόν.*

The sense implied, though not expressed, is that the time has been a long one. Frequently the full *διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου* is found, e.g. Ar. Plut. 1045 *ἔοικε διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου σ' ἑορακέναι.* This implication is not confined to the combination with *διὰ*, for the same notion of protracted time is often involved in the use of *χρόνῳ*, 'at last,' *χρόνον ἐμποιεῖν* &c. So in colloquial English, 'it is quite a *time* since I saw you.'

ἑωράκη. The proper termination of the pluperfect persons in classical Attic is discussed by Rutherford New Phrynichus Art. CXXVI. That *-η*, *-ης*, *-ει(ν)* were the true endings of the singular is shewn by metrical evidence, as well as by that of the best MSS and of grammarians (Eustath. 1946. 22 &c.). The tendency of copyists to substitute a first person ending *-ειν* for *-η* is proved by Dawes from the MSS of Ar. Av. 511 *τουτὶ τοίνυν οὐκ ᾔδη 'γώ*, where MSS

(except Vat. and Rav.) actually have ᾔδειν 'γώ. It may be added that the 3rd person plural in -εσαν, not -εισαν, is further demonstrated by Attic Inscriptions (v. Meisterhans § 61 *a*) 3). Originally the pluperfects were aorist formations and the endings were -ε(σ)α, -ε(σ)ας, -ε(σ)ε(ν), which were duly contracted -η, -ης, -ει(ν).

That **ἑόρακα** and **ἑώρακα** were both in use in the best Attic times is highly probable. Comedy no doubt often requires, and always allows, a scansion equal to ἑŏρακα (see the passage quoted in last note from Ar. Plut. 1045). Sometimes the scansion actually proves ἑο-, as in the second foot of Ar. Nub. 768 ταύτην ἑόρακας. But in other places it has not been shewn (1) that ἑώρακα cannot be scanned ἑ͡ώρακα, (2) that, if ἑόρακα is a correct form, it is the *only* one which is correct. Whenever the method of augmenting was away from the usual pattern there was a tendency to diversity (e.g. ἀνεσχόμην, ἠνεσχόμην: ἐνεγύησα, ἠγγύησα; and see Rutherford N. P. Art. xx.). So, in the next sentence, **καθῆστο**, (καθῆτο) or ἐκάθητο would be equally authenticated forms.

ἐστεφανωμένος. A wreath was regularly worn by the person sacrificing. Cf. Ar. Plut. 819

> καὶ νῦν ὁ δεσπότης μὲν ἔνδον βουθυτεῖ
> ὗν καὶ τράγον καὶ κριὸν ἐστεφανωμένος.

Xen. Anab. VII. 1. 40 τὰ μὲν ἱερεῖα εἱστήκει παρὰ τὸν βωμὸν καὶ Κοιρατάδης ἐστεφανωμένος ὡς θύσων. Similarly a στέφανος was worn by many magistrates as a mark of office, investing them with respect. Dem. 802. 5 πέπαυνται ἄρχοντες καὶ τοὺς στεφάνους περιῄρηνται. Cf. the judge's wig and gown.

ἐπί τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου. The point of **τινος** is a little obscure. Viewed along with the **τε καὶ** following it may be taken to imply that, for this very aged man, and as a mark of honour, a special kind of cushioned chair had to be provided. 'On a sort of combination of cushion and chair' = 'a sort of easy chair.' In Prot. 315 D Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κῳδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασι καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς there is a similar suggestion that Prodicus had made himself unusually snug.

It may be assumed that the use of cushions in household chairs was not frequent with Athenians of the time, and would be considered effeminate for younger men. Cf. Xen. Hell. IV. 1. 30 ῥαπτὰ ('cushions') ἐφ' ὧν καθίζουσιν οἱ Πέρσαι μαλακῶς, a remark which would otherwise have been pointless. That προσκεφάλαια were used in boats or in theatres, where the seats were hard and often wet or cold, is no argument for their domestic use.

In keeping with ἐστεφανωμένος is also the implication that (like Latin *pulvinus* and *pulvinar*) the seat was a seat of honour. Cf. Cic.

ad Fam. IX. 18 *sella tibi erit in ludo*: *eam pulvinus sequetur*; i.e. 'you shall be promoted later.'

τεθνκὼς...ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ—i.e. at the altar of Zeus Ἑρκεῖος (who corresponded in a measure to the Latin Penates).

The altar stood in the middle of the open court which occupied the central part of the ἀνδρωνῖτις. A colonnade ran round it, out of which the men's rooms opened. This was *the* αὐλή. Another in the γυναικωνῖτις would want special definition, and had nothing to do with the present visitors. Domestic sacrifices were the mark of a religious man. Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 1. 2 θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν.

παρ' αὐτόν. The accusative implies 'we *went and* sat beside him.' **ἔκειντο** = ἐτέθειντο, 'had been placed.' So ἀνάκειται, περίκειται &c. are the recognised passive perfects of ἀνατίθημι, περιτίθημι &c. τιθέναι νόμον has for its counterpart κεῖται ὁ νόμος.

Where τέθειμαι is found in the best period of Attic Greek it is middle. In later Greek however (after Macedonian times) such expressions as προτέθειται ὁ νεκρός, εὖ διατέθειμαι &c., were gradually accepted into literary language. See Cobet Var. Lect. p. 311.

αὐτόθι—i.e. there was no need to move to another room. The chairs were ready 'on the spot.' With κύκλῳ cf. the social sense of *circulus*.

οὐδὲ θαμίζεις. The expression is difficult, whether we read **οὐδὲ** or **οὐ δέ**. An exact parallel does not appear to exist. Jowett and Campbell (with οὐ δὲ) say that δὲ is adversative to the idea contained in ἠσπάζετο, i.e. 'you are welcome, *but* you do not come often enough.' For this we have to assume that Cephalus thinks (though he does not utter) words like ἀσπάζομαι μέν σε before οὐ δὲ θαμίζεις. This seems somewhat far-fetched, and one instinctively expects the order οὐ θαμίζεις δὲ, or else the words ἀλλ' οὐ θαμίζεις. **οὐδέ**, if correct, must be regarded as one of those colloquial idioms which, logical enough in their origin, imperceptibly shift their application till they defy strict analysis. Thus it is possible to meet with the expression 'Socrates, you are not very frequent *either* in your visits,' and to feel that, while the idiomatic 'either' is explainable, more or less subtly, in some settings, its precise application eludes the grasp in this particular case. Nevertheless both such an English and such a Greek phrase are conceivable.

Some editors (after Ast) would read **οὔτι** from Il. XVIII. 385

— *τίπτε, Θέτι τανύπεπλε, ἱκάνεις ἡμέτερον δῶ,*
αἰδοίη τε φίλη τε; πάρος γε μὲν οὔ τι θαμίζεις—

and Od. V. 87

τίπτε μοι, Ἑρμεία χρυσόρραπι, εἰλήλουθας
αἰδοῖος τε φίλος τε; πάρος γε μὲν οὔ τι θαμίζεις.

It is quite possible, and not wholly improbable, that the similarity of circumstances may have led Plato's Cephalus to quote Homer, or at least hint at him in a way which would be readily understood by Socrates without further elaboration. On the other hand there is nothing specially Homeric about the word *θαμίζειν* itself, and we are not, by the mere guess that a quotation is intended, justified in altering a reading which may be quite sound, however curiously idiomatic.

If any alteration were necessary, one might suggest **οὐ δή**; but probably *οὐδὲ* was really written by Plato.

θαμίζεις—cf. Hipp. Ma. 281 B *οὐ θαμίζω εἰς τούσδε τοὺς τόπους.*

χρῆν μέντοι—lit. 'yet it was your duty (to do so)' = 'yet you ought to have done so.' As **ἔδει** follows, and **χρή** shortly after, it may be well to emphasize the doctrine that properly *χρὴ* is used of moral obligation ('I ought') and *δεῖ* of physical or logical compulsion ('I must'). So inf. E *χρῆναι...δεήσει*, where the same distinction exists.

The distinction is something (though not wholly) like that of *je devrais* from *je dois*. No doubt some Greek writers and speakers occasionally confuse the uses of the two words, especially where the meanings are apt to overlap each other. Language cannot be precise and clear-cut without the thought being precise and clear-cut. Nevertheless the distinction was, in the best prose authors, a real one.

'You should (morally, *χρῆν*) have been coming to see us. For, if I had still been capable of making the journey to the city, there would have been no compulsion (*ἔδει*) for you to come to us....But, as it is, you should (*χρή*) come here more frequently.'

ἐν δυνάμει ἦ. The correct form for the first person in the best period of Attic is **ἦ**, not **ἦν**. The derivation is from *η(σ)α* contracted. [The form *ἦν* is probably due to the analogy of other past tenses e.g. *ἔφην*, *ἐτίθην*, &c.] See Rutherford New Phrynichus, Art. CXXX., where the grammarian Porphyrius is quoted for this very passage, after saying *τὸ ἦν ἐπιπολάζει νῦν, τῶν δὲ Ἀττικῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι μονογράμματον αὐτὸ προεφέροντο.* Hence it seems best to restore *ἦ* here, although it cannot be denied that *ἦν* had begun to appear in Euripides and Aristophanes, at least where it was metrically convenient. MSS are inconsistent, but they not in-

frequently shew an earlier ᾖ turned into a later ἦν. Dr Rutherford says 'this is simply an indication of what has happened in every case.' 'Every' is no doubt too strong, but the evidence for Plato is all in favour of ᾖ, παρῇ &c.

ἡμεῖς. There is no necessity to take this as plural for singular with Jowett and Campbell, though such a use is frequent enough in some cases, e.g. that of writers speaking of themselves, or of persons professing modesty. The word includes both Cephalus and his family (the *νεανίαι* mentioned below). Cephalus is particularly desirous for the young men's sake that Socrates should come. Cf. 368 D.

328 D. αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναί. For the thought cf. Aristot. Eth. N. VII. 11. 4 *ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί.*

νεανίαις. As a matter of fact Polemarchus, Lysias and Euthydemus are middle-aged men, but it is quite in character for the aged father to style them 'these young fellows.' Even the reading of some inferior MSS **νεανίσκοις** is sufficiently natural, and perhaps carries more point. Cephalus would be speaking humorously: 'these boys.'

καὶ μὴν...χαίρω γε. It is well to take the particles as an intimate group, although of course the word coming between them is strongly emphasized. So Aesch. P. V. 984

ΕΡ. *ἐρεῖν ἔοικας οὐδὲν ὧν χρῄζει πατήρ.*

ΠΡ. *καὶ μὴν ὀφείλων γ' ἂν τίνοιμ' αὐτῷ χάριν.*

The force of **καὶ μὴν** is ultimately '(aye) indeed' or 'and, more by token,' while that of **γε** is to add a tone of emphasis, serious or ironical. Here the sense is '(I recognise the force of what you say) and, indeed, it is my *pleasure* to....' This may all be expressed in English by 'Nay, Cephalus, it is a positive pleasure to me....'

328 E. χρῆναι...δεήσει—v. sup. C on *χρῆν μέντοι.*

ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν—τινὰ qualifies the simile: 'because, as it were, they have preceded us over what one may call a road.' So *quidam* in Latin.

ἴσως—either (1) 'equally' (=*ὁμοίως*), or, better, (2) 'probably.' There is no certainty that we shall all grow old, and the latter rendering is therefore demanded.

τραχεῖα...ἢ ῥᾳδία—Plato not seldom omits *πότερον* in the first member of dependent questions, e.g. Theaet. 161 D *τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἑτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής.* Legg. 670 B &c.

There is a slight chiasmus, a figure of which Plato is fond, in the order of the epithets; **τραχεῖα** rather answers to **εὔπορος**, **χαλεπὴ** to **ῥᾳδία**. Cf. inf. 348 E *κακίαν...ἢ αἰσχρὸν* is answered by *καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν*. 350 C *ἔοικεν...ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ*. For a doubly chiastic arrangement cf. Crit. 47 C *περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν*. The fact that so many instances can be collected shews that Plato was deliberate in avoiding an obtrusively obvious antithesis.

καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ κ.τ.λ.—'and particularly from you I should like to hear....' For **καὶ δὴ καί**, v. sup. B.

ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο...ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ φασὶν εἶναι. Grammatically these words might be rendered either (1) 'what you think of that which the poets say lies on old age's threshold,' or (2) 'what you think of that condition which the poets call being upon the threshold of old age.' The latter is the more natural in point of meaning. *τί ἐστι* (*τὸ*) "*εἶναι ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ*"; *τί ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ φασιν* "*ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ εἶναι*"; where *φασιν* practically = *καλοῦσιν*. Lit. "what is that with regard to which they use the expression 'to be on the threshold of eld'?"

The phrase **ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ** occurs Il. XXII. 60, XXIV. 487, Od. XV. 348, while in Od. XV. 246 and XXIII. 212 we have *γήραος οὐδὸν ἱκέσθαι*. 'The poets' are not merely Homer, but his imitators also, e.g. Hymn. Aphrod. 106 (*γηρ. οὐδὸν ἱκέσθαι*). Hes. op. 331 *κακῷ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ* and, as often, Herodotus borrows the poetical expression (III. 14) *ἐς πτωχηίην ἀπῖκται ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ*.
The interpretation 'upon the threshold of old age,' in the sense of the 'entrance to old age,' does not suit the passages in the Iliad, nor would it suit the present place, if Plato had so interpreted it. Dr Leaf is for taking *οὐδῷ* as = *ὁδῷ* 'upon the path of old age' (see his note Iliad XXII. 60). It is, however, quite simple to understand it of the threshold over which the aged man passes *out*, and on which he stands ready to depart. This is the explanation of the scholiast on Il. XXII. 60. Nevertheless I would suggest that *γήραος* is a defining genitive and *οὐδός the threshold of death*: lit. 'upon the threshold (which consists) of old age.' Cf. Verg. Aen. IV. 480 *Oceani finem iuxta* ('the end of the world which consists in Ocean').

The words **ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἶ τῆς ἡλικίας** are thus parenthetical.

The view of the Jowett-Campbell edition, however, is that *τοῦτο* refers to what has preceded, and that *ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα εἶ τῆς ἡλικίας, ὃ δὴ...φασὶν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταὶ* should be taken together, *ὅ* apparently following *ἐνταῦθα* for its antecedent, just as it might have followed the equivalent *ἐν τούτῳ*. This makes *ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο* weak,

is rather strained in regard to the relative ὅ, and does not, perhaps, give any particular sense to **δή**. Moreover it leaves *πότερον χαλεπὸν ...ἐξαγγέλλεις* awkwardly attached. With **τοῦτο ὃ δή...φασιν...** the sense is 'that which, whatever they mean by it, they call....' No difficulty is then offered by *πότερον χαλεπόν*, with which *φαίνεται* is naturally supplied. 'How that appears to you...which they call &c....(viz.) whether it (appears to you) disagreeable...or how....'

χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου. It is not easy to understand how Jowett and Campbell write that "*τοῦ βίου* is a partitive genitive depending on *χαλεπόν*, 'a harsh part of life.'" Indeed (*pace tantorum virorum*) the expression is a confusion. If the genitive 'depends' on *χαλεπὸν* it cannot be partitive; it would require rather to depend on *τοῦτο*, or on an indispensable *τι* in *χαλεπόν τι τοῦ βίου*. Rather render 'disagreeable in respect of the sort of life,' the genitive being the 'genitive of relation,' of which one large department is conveniently labelled 'causal.' Cf. Phaedo 58 E *εὐδαίμων ἐφαίνετο καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων*; Theaet. 175 A *ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας*; Apol. 41 C *οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι ...ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας.* A gen., familiar with *μακάριος*, is no less natural with its opposite *χαλεπός*, *σχέτλιος* &c.

For **χαλεπὸν** applied to old age cf. Hom. Il. VIII. 103 *χαλεπὸν δέ σε γῆρας ὀπάζει.*

ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις; Though these words may depend on **πυθοίμην ἄν** (indirect question), it is equally in keeping with Plato's style, and is much more vivacious, to treat them as reverting to the direct. 'I should like to know how it strikes you ...whether as disagreeable...or how do *you* report of it?'

ἐξαγγέλλεις is properly used of one who is in the secret reporting to one who is not.

CHAPTER III.

οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται—'what it *does* seem like to me.' The *γε* with *οἷον* gives something of the sense 'just what.' The same colloquial effect is obtained in English by 'I'll tell you *what* it seems like.'

329 A. πολλάκις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. *γὰρ* regularly introduces a promised account or narrative. 'You must know.'

διασῴζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν—cf. Arist. Rhet. I. 11 § 25 *πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέῳ. ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται ὡς ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ*

θῆρα, καὶ ἀεὶ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα (where see Cope's notes).

Such kindred proverbs about 'birds of a feather' were very numerous. The particular byword thought of here is *ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει*, as we may gather from Phaedr. 240 C *ἥλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα*, and the scholiast at that place completes the line in a manner very apposite to the present passage, viz. *ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπε, γέρων δέ τε τέρπε γέροντα.* Cf. Gorg. 510 B *φίλος...ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ.* The whole of the context here is practically quoted by Cicero de Senect. 3 without acknowledgment. See Introd. § 5 *a.*

ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι—reciprocal-reflexive: 'reminding one another.'
ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται—'which belong to that class.' Cf. 362 A *ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον*, 363 B *καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα*, Meno 93 D, 94 B (*ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται*).

The sense of *ἔχεσθαι* is 'to be closely attached to,' and this may mean 'to cling to,' 'pertain to the same class,' 'follow,' or 'adjoin,' according to the precise nature of the context. In Herodotus the present use of *ἔχεσθαι* is particularly frequent, e.g. I. 120 *τὰ τῶν ὀνειράτων ἐχόμενα ἐς ἀσθενὲς ἔρχεται*, 'everything in the shape of dreams': Stein there quotes Hippocrates (*περὶ παθῶν* p. 185) *ὅσα μὲν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐχόμενά ἐστι.*

καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες—i.e. *καὶ* (*ὡς*) *τότε κ.τ.λ.* The first **ζῶντες** is imperfect in tense: 'As if at that time they used to live well, while now they do not even *live.*' For the antithesis cf. Arist. Pol. I. 2 *πόλις...γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκα, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.*

329 B. τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως—a double genitive—subjective and objective. 'The insults to old age on the part of one's own people.' Cf. Thuc. VII. 34 *διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνέμου ἄπωσιν τῶν ναυαγίων.* Phaedr. 244 C *τήν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων ζήτησιν τοῦ μέλλοντος.* Hdt. VI. 2 *Ἱστιαῖος ὑπέδυνε τῶν Ἰώνων τὴν ἡγεμονίην τοῦ πρὸς Δαρεῖον πολέμου.*

προπηλακισμός is defined by Aristot. (Top. VI. 6) as *ὕβρις μετὰ χλευασίας*, i.e. 'insult combined with mockery.'
καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ—'and on this alleged ground.' *δὴ* contains some irony. 'They give *that* as a sufficient reason for bewailing old age.' Caecilius ap. Cic. de Senect. 8 *Tum etiam in senecta hoc deputo miserrimum | sentire ea aetate esse se odiosum alteri.*
ὑμνεῖν = 'to harp upon,' the suggestion being that the complaints are unthinking 'cant' (*cantare*) to the same old tune. Cf. 549 D *καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν.*

364 A *πάντες ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη κ.τ.λ.* Prot. 343 B *ταῦτα ἃ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, Γνῶθι σαυτὸν καὶ Μηδὲν ἄγαν.* Soph. Aj. 292 *ὁ δ' εἶπε πρός με βαί', ἀεὶ δ' ὑμνούμενα.* Ter. Phor. III. 2. 10 *cantilenam eandem canis.* Hor. Ep. I. 1. 64 *et maribus Curiis et decantata Camillis.*

κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη—'I myself should have been *in the same state* (of mind).' The perfect *πέπονθά τι* is often a present in meaning, i.e. 'I have been affected into (=am in) a certain state of mind.'

Cf. 345 B *ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπονθεν.* 368 A *πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε.* 488 A. Apol. (init.) *ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς..πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα* (='in what temper you are, thanks to my accusers'). Meno, 95 C *καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.* So *τί πέπονθας;*='what is the matter with you?'

This differs from *τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπασχον*, which would mean '*I should have been undergoing the same treatment.*'

For the form **ἐπεπόνθη** (which a corrector would here make into **ἐπεπόνθειν**) v. sup. on *ἑωράκη* 328 C.

ἕνεκά γε γήρως—i.e. if old age had been responsible for such troubles, whereas it is really a man's disposition (*τρόπος* inf. D).

ὅσοι...ἦλθον. The idiom of the tense should be observed. It is not *ἐληλύθασιν* nor *ἔρχονται*, either of which would have been simple enough. The relative clause *ὅσοι ἦλθον* is contained in a conditional sentence, concerning which it is implied that the condition is not or has not been fulfilled, the apodosis being a past tense with *ἄν*. In such a setting the relative clause has its verb in a past tense of the indicative (Goodwin, M. and T. § 528). Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. I. 16 *εἰ δὲ οἴκοι εἶχον ἕκαστοι τὰς δίκας, τούτους ἂν ἀπώλλυσαν οἵτινες φίλοι μάλιστα ἦσαν Ἀθηναίων τῷ δήμῳ.*

The instance in our passage differs slightly from most of those quoted by Goodwin, since the thing 'would have happened' in the case of men who do come to old age. Nevertheless the conception is of circumstances wholly imaginary—'if this case had been the true one (which it is not) I should have been in the same state, and so would every one else who (in the supposed unfulfilled case) had come to old age'; i.e. = *ἐγὼ ταὐτὰ ἐπεπόνθη καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἴ τινες ἦλθον..., ἐπεπόνθεσαν ἄν.*

We may if we choose call this a use of moods and tenses by assimilation or association. This use of the aorist must be distinguished from that which would have been the case if *ὅσοι ποτὲ*

ἦλθον or *ὅσοι ἤδη ἦλθον* had been written. (Goodwin M. and T. § 156.)

καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ...παρεγενόμην—v. sup. 328 B. Sophocles (ob. 406 B.C.) was noted for his amiable character. Ar. Ran. 82 *ὁ δ' εὔκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ', εὔκολος δ' ἐκεῖ.* For the following story cf. Athen. XII. 510 and Cicero De Senect. c. 14. It is told also by Valerius Maximus (IV. 3. 2), and three times by Plutarch.

πῶς, ἔφη,...ἔχεις;—**ἔφη** is of course redundant after **ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπό τινος**, but its insertion is very common, even when *εἶπε* or its equivalent has preceded. The effect is to give naturalness to the conversational style (cf. *οὐδὲ θαμίζεις* 328 C). In origin it springs from the almost universal colloquial habit of repeating and insisting upon the verb of saying, 'said I,' 'says he.'

The usage is particularly common in Xenophon, e.g. Anab. VII. 6. 41 *Πολυκράτης δὲ εἶπεν ἀναστὰς ὑπὲρ Ξενοφῶντος· ὁρῶ γε μήν, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες κ.τ.λ.*, and for the same in Plato, v. inf. 337 A.
With *πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τἀφροδίσια*; cf. Prot. 352 B *πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην*; Symp. 174 B *'Αριστόδημε, πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν ἂν ἰέναι ἄκλητος ἐπὶ δεῖπνον*;

329 C. Εὐφήμει—'Hush'; *bona verba quaeso*, cf. Prot. 330 E *εὐφήμει ὦ ἄνθρωπε*, where *ὦ ἄνθρωπε* adds the same touch of reproach. Sophocles treats the suggestion as a thing to shrink from, as from an evil omen. Hence *εὐφήμει*, as in Euthyd. 301 A *ἐὰν οὖν παραγένηταί σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ; Εὐφήμει τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.* Meno 91 B, Gorg. 469 A.
μέντοι—here not adversative but asseverating (*μέν τοι*), 'I assure you.' [V. Liddell and Scott, *μὲν* B. II. 4 *b*.]

In this sense it is used freely in either affirmative or negative sentences. We may compare to some extent the protesting use of English 'nay.' So in answers in the affirmative, as inf. 332 A *ἄλλο μέντοι νὴ Δία.*

δεσπότην—Cf. Xen. Oec. I. § 20 *δέσποιναι...ἡδοναί*, ibid. § 23, Cic. Off. II. 10. 37 *voluptates, blandissimae dominae* (Ast).
παντάπασι γὰρ...γίγνεται..., ἐπειδὰν...χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι... γίγνεται. If this (without **γὰρ** after *ἐπειδὰν*) is the true reading, we must take the clause *παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται* as a repetition in another form of the opening words *παντάπασι... ἐλευθερία.* 'For most certainly there is great peace and freedom from such things in old age, when the desires have ceased from racking us and have relaxed their strain,—(yes) it most certainly

becomes as Sophocles said,—it is riddance from a multitude of mad masters.'

It cannot be said that there is anything impossible about the two asyndeta *παντάπασι..γίγνεται*, and *δεσποτῶν..ἀπηλλάχθαι*. They may even have been adopted with some deliberation by Plato for the sake of arresting attention. Nevertheless with the same words it is doubtful whether we should not rather punctuate—*παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία· ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι..χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται.* The asyndeton is then in the clause with *ἐπειδὰν*, and this appears on the whole less abrupt.

For the rest, the clause *δεσποτῶν..ἀπηλλάχθαι*, apart from its asyndeton, contains a rare use of *ἔστι* and a form of expression which comes in rather awkwardly after *γίγνεται*. One of the features of Plato's style is its fluent ease, and there appears in all this passage to be a lack of that quality. The omission of *ἔστι* (proposed by Stallbaum and accepted by some editors) makes a perfectly natural and neat idiomatic sentence, viz. *παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι*, where the infinitive clause is exegetical of *τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους*.

MSS other than the best (Par. A) and the first hand in two of less weight add *γὰρ* after *ἐπειδὰν*. This of course clears away the difficulty of the first asyndeton, but looks too much like a piece of early 'editing,' inasmuch as the loss of *γὰρ* is somewhat improbable.

τῶν...τοιούτων...εἰρήνη κ.τ.λ. The genitive is that of emptiness = 'absence of,' as with *ἔνδεια, ἀπορία, ἐρημία τινός*. Cf. inf. 370 C *σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων* (and with a verb 371 C *ἀργήσει τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας*): Hdt. VI. 135 *ἡσυχίη τῆς πολιορκίης*, Eur. Iph. Aul. 547 *γαλανείᾳ χρησάμενοι μαινομένων οἴστρων*.

κατατείνουσαι. The metaphor, as in *χαλάσωσι*, is from the rack. Cf. Dem. Olympiod. 1172. 14 *κατατεινόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς βασάνου*, and for mental torture Soph. O. T. 153 *ἐκτέταμαι φοβερὰν φρένα δείματι πάλλων*, Plato Lys. 204 C *παραταθήσεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων θαμὰ λέγοντος*.

χαλάσωσι may be equally transitive or intransitive here, as in many other places.

329 D. δεσποτῶν...ἔστι...ἀπηλλάχθαι. If **ἔστι** is correct the rendering is 'it (the state of things) is (means) being rid of.' There is, of course, no relevance here in the usual sense of *ἔστι* with infin. 'it is possible.'

Jowett and Campbell quote Arist. Ath. Pol. c. 55 *ἔστι δὲ ψηφίζεσθαι*, 'the case is one of voting.' It is probable, however, as

stated above, that *ἔστι* is an interpolation, due to some Greek editor before the date of our MSS, who failed to catch the exegetical construction of *ἀπηλλάχθαι* after *τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους*, for which cf. inf. 332 C *διενοεῖτο..ὅτι τοῦτ' εἴη δίκαιον, τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι*, Hom. Od. I. 82 *εἰ μὲν δὴ νῦν τοῦτο φίλον μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι, νοστῆσαι Ὀδυσῆα.*

Stallbaum notes that the position of *ἔστι* varies in the MSS, a fact which makes its claims suspicious, but does not by any means dispose of them, since transpositions of words are not rare in MSS even where all the words are certain.

τούτων πέρι...μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν—cf. Phaed. 97 C *εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου*, and 98 D *καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι*, &c.

It must not however be supposed that *αἰτία περί τινος* can be simply the equivalent of *αἰτία τινός.* The words do not occur in immediate juxtaposition, and the analysis of the present sentence for example is 'in regard to these things' (*περί*=*quod attinet ad*)...there 'is one and only one cause.'

[**περὶ** and *ἕνεκα* are the only prepositions which good Attic prose allows to follow their cases.]

ὁ τρόπος—'the disposition,' 'temper.' Cf. Aeschin. in Ctes. 65. 1 *μεταλλάττει οὐ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸν τόπον*=*caelum non animum mutat.*

καὶ τὸ γῆρας—'then old age too (for its part).'

καὶ γῆρας...καὶ νεότης χαλεπή—'not only age, but youth also is unpleasant.' **νεότης** thus becomes the more emphatic subject, or practically *the* subject; hence the singular **ξυμβαίνει** and the position and gender of the adjective. V. inf. 332 B *ἐάνπερ ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λῆψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται.*

τῷ τοιούτῳ—sc. *τῷ μὴ κοσμίῳ καὶ εὐκόλῳ.*

CHAPTER IV.

ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα. Besides the common constructions corresponding to those of *θαυμάζω*, viz. *ἄγαμαί τινά τινος* and *ἄγαμαί τινός τι*, the verb *ἄγασθαι* may (probably from the influence of the latter) take a genitive of the person alone, as here. Cf. Xen. Oec. IV. 21 *ἄγαμαι τοῦ καταμετρήσαντός σοι*, Herod. VI. 76 *ἄγασθαι μὲν ἔφη τοῦ Ἐρασίνου οὐ προδιδόντος τοὺς πολιήτας.* The position of *αὐτοῦ* would itself shew that the genitive is not 'absolute.'

For the more familiar construction, cf. Rep. 426 D *τοὺς ἐθέλοντας θεραπεύειν οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας*; Plato might here have written *ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ ταῦτα*, but *ταῦτα* here, of course, depends on *εἰπόντος*.

βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν. The expressed **αὐτόν** belongs by position to **λέγειν**, with which it is absolutely required by the sense; but another *αὐτὸν* remains to be supplied with *ἐκίνουν*. It is usual to express this by saying that *αὐτὸν* is constructed *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* with both words. Stallbaum's note *αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν*, 'eum commovebam,' is misleading. It is not of course Socrates who 'wishes still to speak,' and 'to carry on the conversation' would require *διαλέγεσθαι*.

ἐκίνουν. The imperfect of the attempt. For the use of the word itself, cf. Charmid. 162 D *βουλόμενος μὴ αὐτὸς ὑπέχειν λόγον ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον*, Lys. 223 A *ἐν νῷ εἶχον ἄλλον ἤδη τινὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων κινεῖν*, Xen. Mem. IV. 2. 2 *βουλόμενος κινεῖν τὸν Εὐθύδημον*. The procedure implied in **κινεῖν** is eminently Socratic (see Introduction § 7 *c*).

329 E. τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις...φασιν εἶναι—φασιν (*on dit*) suggests that there was a well-known proverb to this effect. It has for its subject, not *οἱ πολλοὶ* of the previous sentence, but 'they' = people at large, mankind.

There is little use in reconstructing with Muretus any hypothetical verse-proverb (*γνώμη*) out of these words.

λέγουσι μέν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται—'There is something in what they say, but by no means so much as they think.' **λέγειν τι** is opposed to *οὐδὲν λέγειν* (*nugari* or *mentiri*), cf. Crat. 404 A *κινδυνεύεις τι λέγειν*, with which contrast Symp. 205 D *κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν*. Euthyd. 305 E *δοκοῦσί σοί τι, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν;* Lach. 195 C *καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε.* Soph. O. T. 1475 ΟΙ. *λέγω τι;* ΚΡ. *λέγεις.*

[As there is a distinct stress on *τι* in the present passage, some editors write *λέγουσι μὲν τί*. There appears to be no certainty as to a Greek rule on the subject.]

For **οὐ μέντοι** in answer to **μέν** v. sup. 327 A. **γε** serves to throw further emphasis, 'but not, be sure,...'

τῷ Σεριφίῳ. The article implies that the story was well known: 'the Seriphian' (who has become historical).

Seriphos is an inconsiderable island in the Cyclades between Attica and Paros. Like Belbina, Cythnos and other out-of-the-way islands (v. Stob. Flor. XI. 8), it became proverbial as a 'Little Peddlington'

or 'Hole-and-Corner,' in which no one would be condemned to live. Cf. Seneca Consol. ad Helviam 6 § 4 *deserta loca asperrimas insulas Sciathum et Seriphum.* Juv. 6. 564

....Cui vix in Cyclada mitti
Contigit et parva tandem caruisse Seripho

(referring to a time when banishment took the shape in which it was experienced by Napoleon I. at St Helena). A similar story appears in Herod. VIII. 125 of a certain Timodemus of Aphidnae, to whom Themistocles said *οὕτω ἔχει τοι· οὔτ' ἂν ἐγώ, ἐὼν Βελβινίτης, ἐτιμήθην οὕτω πρὸς Σπαρτιητέων, οὔτ' ἂν σύ, ὦνθρωπε, ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος*, where the commentators seem to think the retort is the same as here. Examination however will shew that, while the repartee here is sharp and double-barrelled, in Herodotus its force is much weaker, inasmuch as Timodemus was an Athenian and was *not* a Belbinite (*ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος* = 'though you are an Athenian'). The story had improved with use. It is told again by Plutarch (Themist. 121 A).

330 A. εὐδοκιμοίη. That this, and not **εὐδοκιμοῖ**, is the classical Attic prose form of optatives of *-έω* and *-όω* verbs (*-άω* verbs in *ῴη*) is acknowledged by grammarians. Cf. Meisterhans § 61. 8, and a full discussion in Rutherford New Phryn. pp. 442 sqq. The MSS of Plato naturally exhibit the proper forms in the 1st person singular, where the step from *-οίην, -ῴην* to *-οῖμι, -ῷμι* is palaeographically considerable (e.g. *ὁμολογοίην* Apol. 17 B, *καλοίην* ibid. 40 A, *συνδιασκοποίην* Prot. 361 D, *ἀγαπῴην* Meno 75 B and C), but in *-οίης -οίη* the corruption was easier and is frequently made.

καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις—'so, in the case of the said (supposed) class who are not rich and....' **καὶ** (as more frequently after a comparison introduced by *ὡς* &c.) gives the application. **δὴ** throws into the sentence a tone very much like that imparted in English by the use of the ironical 'your'—'so with your poor people who....'

πάνυ τι—to be connected with the negative, without which it does not occur. Cf. 419 A *ἐάν τίς σε φῇ μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας.* Dem. in Neaer. 14 *ἡ οὐσία οὐδὲ τριῶν ταλάντων πάνυ τι ἦν.* Whereas *οὐ πάνυ* may also = 'not at all' (*omnino non*), *οὐ πάνυ τι* has only the meaning *non omnino*, 'not altogether,' lit. 'not wholly, so to speak.' **τι** is frequent with adverbs, e.g. *σχεδόν τι, μᾶλλόν τι*, &c.

γῆρας μετὰ πενίας. These words should be closely joined (cf. 'peace with honour'). So 372 D *διάγοντες ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας*, 591 B *ψυχὴ σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένη*)(*σῶμα ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ὑγιείας λαμβάνον.*

τὰ πλείω. Since the texts vary between **πλέω** and **πλείω** it is well to refer to Meisterhans § 58. 17 (p. 120), where it is stated that in the declension of *πλείων* in the classical time *ει* alone precedes the long vowels, and either *ει* or *ε* the short vowels (except *πλέον*, which is the only form).

330 B. ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην; MSS vary between *ποῖ'* and *ποῖ*. Palaeographically the two readings may be put on an equality, but neither affords an altogether satisfactory sense.

(1) **ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην;** The regular implication of *ποῖος* in retorting upon the last speaker is one of surprised expostulation or even ridicule. Cf. Ar. Nub. 366

ΣΤ. *ὁ Ζεὺς δ' ἡμῖν, φέρε, πρὸς τῆς γῆς, Οὑλύμπιος οὐ θεός ἐστιν;*
ΣΩ. *ποῖος Ζεύς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις; οὐδ' ἔστι Ζεύς.*

Plat. Euthyd. 291 A ΣΩ. *μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ τοιαῦτ' εἰπών;* ΚΡ. *ποῖος Κτήσιππος;* 'You and your Zeus!' 'You and your Ktesippus!' Charmid. 174 B *ποῖον, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεττευτικόν;* Theaet. 180 B *ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε;* Euthyd. 304 E &c. The use is very common (see Blaydes' note on Aristoph. loc. cit.), but only so in connexion with nouns and adjectives, whereas here it attaches to a verb. Nevertheless, so far as the construction is concerned, there seems to be no *a priori* objection to the present combination. There is, however, nothing in Socrates' question to call forth a contemptuous "acquired! You and your 'acquired'!" In fact Cephalus, as he proceeds to state, actually had acquired in some degree. If we could find authority for *ποῖος* without derision, the expostulatory force might perhaps be weakened into "'Acquired'! Don't talk of 'acquired'! It has been so little"; and, though this is rather strained, it might pass. Jowett and Campbell indeed go so far as to observe that the use of *ποῖος* "is not necessarily derisive or ironical, but implies a humorous feeling of contrast between the suggestion and the fact," but they do not support this *obiter dictum* by examples.

(2) **ποῖ ἐπεκτησάμην;** There are uses of *ποῖ* (*quorsum*), as of *πόθεν* and *πῶς*, which correspond to the above ironical use of *ποῖος*. Thus Ar. Lys. 192

ΚΑ. *εἰ λευκόν ποθεν*
ἵππον λαβοῦσαι τόμιον ἐντεμοίμεθα.
ΛΥ. *ποῖ λευκὸν ἵππον;*

ibid. 383

ΧΟ. Α. *μῶν θερμὸν ἦν;* ΧΟ. Β. *ποῖ θερμόν;*

and in Eur. Phoen. 712 *ἐξοιστέον τἄρ' ὅπλα* is answered by

ποῖ; μῶν νεάζων οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἃ χρή σ' ὁρᾶν;

But here again we find no use of a verb with this *ποῖ*, and even if we write *divisim ποῖ; ἐπεκτησάμην;* the irony is as misplaced as in the previous reading.

We may, perhaps, venture to suggest the emendation **ὁποῖ'** *ἐπεκτησάμην* and unite with these words the following clause,

which is at present left with asyndeton; i.e. ὁποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην, μέσος τις γέγονα χρηματιστής, 'in regard to any little I may have acquired, I have stood about midway...' Cephalus would thus not deny having made some acquisition, while he would speak of it modestly in the word ὁποῖα (*quantacumque*, *quanta quanta*). The initial O might easily be lost after Ω.

μέσος...τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. **μέσος** with genitive is frequent enough. Cf. Polit. 303 A *ἑνὸς καὶ πλήθους τὸ ὀλίγον μέσον*, and in Latin, Hor. Od. II. 19. 27 *pacis eras mediusque belli* (though not in the same sense). More deserving of remark, however, is the use of **τε...καὶ** in such contrasts (='on the one side...on the other'). Cf. 360 E *ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον*. Aesch. P. V. 927 *ὅσον τό τ' ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ δουλεύειν δίχα*. There is something of the sort, but otherwise expressed, in Latin in e.g. Hor. Sat. I. 7. 11 *inter...Priamiden animosum atque inter Achillem | Ira fuit.*

πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοί. That it was almost the rule for Greek names to alternate thus in a family is well known. Among familiar instances are Niceratus—Nicias—Niceratus, Nicomachus—Aristotle—Nicomachus, Sophocles—Iophon—Sophocles, Xanthippus—Pericles—Xanthippus. Cf. Lach. 179 A *ἡμῖν εἰσὶν υἱεῖς οὑτοιί, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε, πάππου ἔχων ὄνομα Θουκυδίδης, ἐμὸς δὲ αὖ ὅδε· παππῷον δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὄνομ' ἔχει τοὐμοῦ πατρός· Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν* (i.e. Thucydides—Melesias—Thucydides, and Aristides—Lysimachus—Aristides). The same custom is more than hinted at in Aesch. Eum. 8, where it is said of Phoebe, grandmother of Phoebus,

δίδωσι δ' ἣ γενέθλιον δόσιν
Φοίβῳ· τὸ Φοίβης δ' ὄνομ' ἔχει παρώνυμον.

There is consequently much in Van Prinsterer's suggestion that the name **Λυσανίας** immediately following ought to be **Λυσίας.** This would give the alternation Cephalus—Lysias—Cephalus—Lysias.

ἐλάττω...πλείω—neuter plural. If *τὴν οὐσίαν* were understood, *αὐτὴν* would be almost indispensable, and *πλείω* would rather be *μείζω*.

οὗ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην...ὅτι. A frequent idiom. 'Why I asked you (*was this*, *τοῦτο ἦν*)...because.' Cf. 491 B *ὃ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἓν ἕκαστον...ἀπόλλυσι*, Phaedr. 248 B *οὗ δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ σπουδή,...ἥ τε δὴ...νομὴ κ.τ.λ.* Lach. 184 B, &c.

330 C. **διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι**—'in a twofold way as compared with other people,' **διπλῇ** being explained later by (1) **ταύτῃ τε**

(sc. as creators love their own creations, summing up *ὥσπερ... ἀγαπῶσι*) (2) **καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν** (for their practical utility). *ἢ* follows *διπλῇ* or *διπλάσιος* &c. as it follows comparatives, *πλέον*, *μᾶλλον* &c.

For the thought cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV. 1. 20 *ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν, ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί*, and ibid IX. 7. 3 *ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα.*

CHAPTER V.

330 D. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι. γὰρ is introductory. 'You must know...'

ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν—'when a man gets near thinking he is going to die.' Apparently there is some confusion between the thoughts *ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ τελευτᾶν* and *οἴηται ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοῦ τελευτᾶν.*

δέος καὶ φροντὶς—the two words form one notion: 'fear and anxiety' = 'anxious fear'; hence the sing. **εἰσέρχεται.**

περὶ ὧν = *περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν.* Note imperf. **εἰσῄει**, 'concerning which it used not to occur to him.'

ἐνθάδε...ἐκεῖ: The euphemism **ἐκεῖ**, 'in the other world,' answered by **ἐνθάδε**, 'in this world,' is almost too common to require remark. Yet cf. Eur. Med. 1073 *εὐδαιμονοίτην, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ*, Soph. Ant. 75 *πλείων χρόνος | ὃν δεῖ μ' ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω τῶν ἐνθάδε*, Aj. 855, Ar. Ran. 82 (where, the scene being in Hades, the two worlds are reversed) *ὁ δ' εὔκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ', εὔκολος δ' ἐκεῖ.* Inf. 365 A *αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς.*

καταγελώμενοι τέως = *οἳ πρότερον κατεγελῶντο.* Besides possessing the meaning 'for a time' **τέως** is demonstrative, 'up to that time,' 'formerly.' Cf. Aesch. Cho. 993 *τέως φίλον, νῦν δ' ἐχθρόν.* Lysias in Epicr. 16 *ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ τέως χρόνῳ εἰθισμένοι ἐστέ* (= *adhuc*).

τότε δὴ—'then, if not before.'

στρέφουσιν—'Make him uneasy.' Cf. *versare*, and the use of *στρόφος* and the impersonal *στρέφει* of the colic.

μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσι—'For fear they may prove true.' The words **στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν** imply fear; indeed the line which separates implication from actual expression is perhaps passed. Hence the construction is as if *δέδοικε* had preceded. See Goodwin M. and T. § 365 (and also § 92). Cf. Soph. O. T. 747

δεινῶς ἀθυμῶ· μὴ βλέπων ὁ μάντις ᾖ. The same construction occurs in Latin in e.g. Hor. Od. I. 2. 5 *Terruit gentes, grave ne rediret saeculum Pyrrhae* (i.e. ita ut timerent ne...).

330 E. **καὶ αὐτὸς**—(1) with colon at **ὦσι** 'and instinctively (of his own accord)' i.e. apart from the extraneous influence of *μῦθοι*; or (2) with comma at *ὦσι*, the 'legends commonly told torment him...and, on his own part (i.e. applying the reflection to himself), he...' The latter seems the more compact and natural in sense, and, if the other rendering appears to give the clearer force to **οἵ τε...μῦθοι...καὶ αὐτός...**, it may be pointed out that proper values of **τε...καὶ** are sufficiently represented in the rendering 'for *not only* do the legends...make him uneasy... *but* he personally applies them.'

καὶ αὐτὸς ἤτοι...καθορᾷ αὐτά, ὑποψίας δ' οὖν...

The passage as usually read and punctuated is lax and difficult. If we write **καὶ αὐτὸς ἤτοι...καθορᾷ αὐτά** as an independent sentence ending with a full stop or colon (and with **δ' οὖν** following in the sense 'however that may be'), we shall be obliged to render 'he gets a better view of things in Hades either through the weakness of old age or else because he has got, so to speak, nearer to them.' But though the weakness of old age may be conducive to alarm, it can hardly be conducive to clearer sight.

If, on the other hand, we place a comma after **αὐτά**, the passage becomes harshly anacoluthic, **καθορᾷ** being an error for *καθορῶν* of a sort which it would be hard to parallel in Plato, 'And, either through the weakness of old age, or else being, as it were (**ὥσπερ**, not *ὡς* or *ἅτε*), nearer to things in Hades and so getting a better sight of them (*καθορῶν*), he (whatever the real case may be, **δ' οὖν**) becomes full of suspicion.' Stallbaum, followed by Jowett and Campbell, accepts this confusion and quotes for *δ' οὖν* Tim. 28 B *ὁ δὴ πᾶς οὐρανὸς ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι ποτὲ ὀνομαζόμενος... σκεπτέον δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον.* That nominativus pendens, however, is common enough in Greek, and there cannot arise in regard to the meaning any such ambiguity as is entailed in the present passage. Nevertheless, whether a particular anacoluthon (resulting in or produced by a confusion of thought) is probable or improbable, is one of those matters about which opinions of competent scholars will differ without hope of definite settlement.

The whole passage is rendered both grammatical and logical if we insert **εἰ** after *ὥσπερ* and before *ἤδη* (*εἰ* after *ερ* and before *η*, with which its pronunciation became almost identical). Thus *ἤτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ* **ὥσπερ** <**εἰ**> **ἤδη** *ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ αὐτά, ὑποψίας δ' οὖν*...'either through the weak-

ness of old age, or else *as if*, being nearer..., he catches a better glimpse..., *no matter how* it is, he...' Indeed it is a question whether for **ἤδη** itself we should not read **εἰ δὴ** (*ὥσπερ εἰ δή*). The **δὴ** would qualify the rather quaint notion. But *ἤδη* has a point worth retaining.

For **δ' οὖν** resumptive (*sed*), after the quasi-parenthesis *ἤτοι...αὐτά*, cf. Apol. 34 D *εἰ δή τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν*..., and frequently.

δείματος—a word used by Thucydides, but otherwise in Attic mainly confined to poetry. So Plato uses *ὄμμα* for *ὀφθαλμός*, with other old-fashioned terms and phrases.

μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος—**ἐλπὶς** originally signifies 'expectation,' whether good or bad. (Cf. *δόξα*, *fama*, *dolus* with meanings *ἐπ' ἀμφότερα*.) Plato himself writes, Legg. 644 C, *πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δὲ φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου.* Hence, though *ψεύδειν τινὰ ἐλπίδος* is usually 'to cheat one of his hope,' in Soph. Aj. 1382 *καί μ' ἔψευσας ἐλπίδος πολύ*='you have (agreeably) disappointed me.' *Spes* and *sperare* are similarly used in Latin, e.g. Livy II. 3. 1 *id (bellum) spe omnium serius fuit.* The opposite *μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος* occurs in 496 E.

331 A. **ἡδεῖα ἐλπὶς ἀεὶ πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος**—'Hope is always with him to gladden him (**ἡδεῖα**) and to be a kindly nurse of his old age.' [The order is altogether against construing as if it were *ἡδεῖα καὶ ἀγαθὴ ἐλπὶς ἀεὶ πάρεστι γηροτρόφος*.] **Ἐλπὶς** is personified. The *γηροτρόφοι* (or *γηροβόσκοι*) were usually the sons or daughters.

ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος λέγει—'as *Pindar* says.' Closely pressed, **καὶ** has the sense '(I am not the first to say it, but in particular) Pindar as well.'

δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως. The usual order, at least in the formula *τὰ ὅσια καὶ δίκαια*, is the reverse. The present order occurs in Gorg. 507 B &c., and in a negative sentence Legg. 86. 1 D *οὐ γὰρ ἂν νόμιμον οὐδ' ὅσιον ἂν εἴη. τὸ ὅσιον*=*fas*, *τὸ δίκαιον* (or *νόμιμον*)=*ius*. Antiphon (114. 9) has the full expression *πρὸς θεῶν ὅσιον καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων δίκαιον*. Similarly Polyb. XXIII. 10. 8. See also Cobet Var. Lect. p. 359. Cf. Gorg. 507 B *περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια.* Ibid. 523 A, B *δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως* is answered by *ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως*.

γλυκεῖά οἱ κ.τ.λ. Pindar, Frag. 233.

συναορεῖ. Cf. Pind. N. IV. 5 *εὐλογία φόρμιγγι συνάορος.*

πολύστροφον γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ. The human *γνώμη* is regarded as a ship, whose head is kept right whenever it would swerve aside. **γνώμη** means 'thought' or 'mood,' which is variable and erratic (*πολύστροφος*) unless there is some steadying influence at the helm.

εὖ οὖν κ.τ.λ. **οὖν** resumes after the quotation.

πρὸς...τοῦτο...πλείστου ἀξίαν—'most valuable to this end.' Cf. *χρήσιμος, ἱκανὸς,* &c., *πρός τι.*

331 B. **τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ...ἀπιέναι δεδιότα.** A nominativus pendens. The sentence begins as if it would run somewhat thus, *τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ...δεδιότα, (τοῦτο) οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐκ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων κτήσεως συμβαίνει.* It actually ends as if it had begun *εἰς γὰρ τὸ μηδὲ... δεδιότα.* 'For that one should not even unintentionally cheat or deceive anybody, nor yet, through owing either sacrifices to a god or money to a man, *therefore* (consequently, *ἔπειτα*) depart to Hades in fear—to this end the possession of money greatly contributes.' The force of **ἔπειτα** is simply 'thereafter,' and this may mean, according to context, (1) 'consequently,' (2) 'nevertheless.' With its value here cf. Lach. 192 B *πειρῶ δὴ εἰπεῖν, τίς οὖσα δύναμις...ἔπειτα...ἀνδρεία κέκληται.*

ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον...θείην ἂν...πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι. The simple combination **ἀλλά γε** without either a separating word or another particle following is very dubious, and editors mostly follow Stobaeus (Serm. 92, p. 512), who quotes the passage with *ἀλλ' ἕν γε ἀνθ' ἑνός.*

The combination *ἀλλά γε δὴ* (Phaedr. 262 A), as Stallbaum argues, cannot warrant *ἀλλά γε* alone, inasmuch as in *γε δή, γέ τοι, γε μὴν* &c., the particles are in such frequent association that they may almost be regarded as compounded (cf. Liddell and Scott Lex. *γε* I. 5). No sure example of the unqualified *ἀλλά γε* seems to be forthcoming.

ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς—adverbially. So *ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος, γῆν πρὸ γῆς* &c. Cf. Legg. 647 B *τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νίκην ἓν πρὸς ἓν οὐδὲν οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται.*

Primarily, however, the grammar grew out of an appositional construction: *θείην ἄν, (τιθεὶς) ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς* i.e. 'I should put down (putting it, that is to say, as) one thing against any other one thing.' In Legg. 705 B the order *ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἓν* occurs.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον. It is usual to take **οὐκ ἐλάχιστον χρησιμώτατον** together, and to assume a confusion of the thought *οὐκ ἐλάχιστα χρήσιμον* (=*μάλιστα χρήσιμον*) with the simple *χρησιμώτατον.*

But *ἐλάχιστον* is not *ἐλάχιστα*, nor is *ἐλάχιστα* the equivalent of *ἥκιστα.* *οὐκ ἐλάχιστον* might=*μέγιστον*, but *μέγιστον χρησι-*

> μώτατον is not the Greek of prose, and obtains little support from double superlatives like τῶν μάλιστα ἀνοητοτάτων καὶ ἀμαθεστάτων (Tim. 92 A). The singulars πλεῖστον and μέγιστον are indeed found with superlatives a few times in tragedy, e.g. Eur. Med. 1323 ὦ μέγιστον ἐχθίστη. Soph. Phil. 631 τῆς πλεῖστον ἐχθίστης, O. C. 743 πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων ἔφυν κάκιστος. Yet Plato would almost certainly not have written the singular either in οὐκ ἐλάχιστον χρήσιμον or in οὐκ ἐλάχιστον χρησιμώτατον, even if he might have written the plural οὐκ ἐλάχιστα. He would not, therefore, in either case have got so far as writing οὐκ ἐλάχιστον at all.

It is rather to be presumed, either (1) that when writing *οὐκ ἐλάχιστον* he intended to continue in some such way as *οὐκ ἐλάχιστον...θείην ἂν...εἰς τοῦτο...πλοῦτον συμβάλλεσθαι*, or (2) that in the grammatical construction *οὐκ ἐλάχιστον* is attributive to *ἕν*. 'I should set down,—setting down, that is to say, one thing against one thing as not least important—that wealth is most helpful for this purpose.' There seems to be no real objection to dispensing by this rendering with the hypothesis of a confusion of thought.

331 C. τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην. See Introd. on this place.

πότερα φήσομεν. Cf. 397 D *τί οὖν ποιήσομεν;*

> The tone and implication of the future and those of the deliberative subjunctive are different. *τί φῶμεν* = 'what *ought* we to say?' *τί φήσομεν* = 'what *are we going* to say?' The distinction should be apprehended even in places where the two uses occur together and are often spoken of as identical, e.g. Eur. Ion 758 *εἴπωμεν; ἢ σιγῶμεν; ἢ τί δράσομεν;*

ἁπλῶς οὕτως. These words, as in 386 B, Meno 73 E *στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε, ὅτι σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα*, and Prot. 351 C *οὐκ οἶδα...ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς*, may be translated in two ways, according as the stress is laid on one or on the other.

(1) With the stress rather on **οὕτως** (i.e. with *οὕτως* qualified by *ἁπλῶς*), 'simply *so*' i.e. 'so, without qualification,' in which case *οὕτως* would be explained by *τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι κ.τ.λ.* 'Shall we say that it is truth—speaking just in that way, without qualification—and the restitution of something received?'

> The position of the words, however, in the middle of the explanatory terms makes against this interpretation.

(2) With the stress rather on **ἁπλῶς** (i.e. with *οὕτως* qualifying *ἁπλῶς*) 'just absolutely' (= 'neither more nor less').

Both position and usage are in favour of this rendering of *οὕτως*. Cf. Gorg. 464 B *τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω*, ibid. 494 E *ἀνέδην οὕτω*, 503 D *οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα*, Phaedr. 235 C *νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν*, Symp. 176 E *οὕτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν*, Soph. Aj. 1206 *κεῖμαι δ' ἀμέριμνος οὕτως*, the *sic temere iacentes* of Horace, and such phrases as *οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι*. Compare also inf. 340 D *ἀλλ', οἶμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως*.

αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιεῖν—sc. *ἀληθεύειν καὶ ἀποδιδόναι*. The point of **αὐτὰ** is 'even these things,' i.e. unlikely as it may appear that truth and restitution could ever be unjust.

εἴ τις λάβοι...εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοίη. For a similar (somewhat awkward) combination of clauses with *εἰ* cf. Meno 74 B (where there are three), Theaet. 147 A. Cicero borrows the illustration in De Offic. III. 25.

οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη...τἀληθῆ λέγειν—i.e. 'nor would the man who did so restore it (**ὁ ἀποδιδοὺς**) be just, nor yet (would he be so) *if* he consented (**ἐθέλων** without article) to tell the man who was in such a state the whole truth and nothing but the truth' (**πάντα τἀληθῆ** has either or both these meanings).

331 D. ὅρος—a definition.' Cf. Aristot. Met. XIII. 1078 b *δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἅ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου* ('inductive reasoning and the definition of general terms').

Of the cardinal virtues, as the Republic is concerned with justice, so the Laches turns upon the definition of courage, and the Charmides upon that of temperance. See more on the subject in Introduction § 7.

Σιμωνίδῃ—i.e. the lyric poet Simonides of Ceos (not of Amorgos), who lived B.C. 556—467.

Other allusions (apparently) to the same gnomic sage occur in 365 C, and 489 B, and in the Protagoras 339 A he again supplies a text in the well-known lines *ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον*.

καὶ μέντοι...καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν. The first **καὶ** implies the thought ('well, you have joined in) and...' The second is attached to *παραδίδωμι* in the sense 'I do (*indeed, as a matter of fact*) hand over the discussion to you (*ὑμῖν*, the rest of the company).' **μέντοι** as in 329 C. The whole thus = 'nay (it is well you speak as if the discussion were in your hands), and I *do* resign it to you.' For the graceful retirement of Cephalus see Introduction § 8 *c*.

τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος. The words contain a double meaning: (1) 'P. is heir to your share in the discussion,' (2) playfully = 'then you give us to understand that P. is to be your heir (at your death).' Socrates pretends that in his remark to Polemarchus Cephalus has shewn how he has made his will, since he has thus formally recognised him. Hence **γελάσας** in the next sentence, "'Oh, of course,' said he, with a laugh." In **τῶν γε σῶν** the particle supplies the same force as the tone in, 'then we know who *your* heir is.'

γελάσας. Though this aorist participle literally = 'having broken into a laugh,' it is best rendered in English by 'with a laugh.'

Certain aorists, e.g. *ἐπῄνεσα, ἀπέπτυσα, ξυνῆκα, ἐδεξάμην τὸ ῥηθέν, ἐγέλασα, ἥσθην*, are used idiomatically in positions where English requires the present. Cf. Ar. Eq. 696 *ἥσθην ἀπειλαῖς, ἐγέλασα ψυλοκομπίαις*. Inf. 339 A *νῦν...ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις*. 348 E *ἐθαύμασα*. Goodwin M. and T. § 60 says that 'a sudden action, which is just taking place, is spoken of as if it had already happened.' It is, however, difficult to feel satisfied with that account of the matter. Rather the sense was originally explainable on strict principle. 'I approved (as soon as you spoke),' 'I understood you (before you had finished),' 'I was delighted (when I heard you)' &c. That the feeling or demonstration continues into the present, and that, therefore, *ἐπαινῶ, ξυνίημι, δέχομαι, γελῶ, ἥδομαι*, might stand where the aorists stand, is no proof that the tense-suggestion did not exist in the aorist.

CHAPTER VI.

331 E. **ἀλλὰ μέντοι**—'nay but (indeed)...' Cf. Xen. Anab. IV. 6. 16.

σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ. **σοφὸς** (*doctus*) was a standing epithet of poets, but the term is used with a special significance in speaking of Simonides. Cf. Cic. Nat. Deor. I. 22 *Simonides non solum poeta suavis, sed etiam ceteroquin doctus sapiensque traditur.* For the combination of adjectives cf. Protag. 315 E *πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος* (of Prodicus), and very similarly, after mention of the same person, Theaet. 151 B *ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι.*

The reading **ὁ ἀνὴρ** is apparently given by MSS of less authority, **ἀνὴρ** by those of greater. The common source is almost certainly **ἀνὴρ**. Where metre absolutely requires *ἀνὴρ* MSS often have *ἀνήρ*. *ἀνὴρ* itself is of course translateable enough: 'for he is a wise and extraordinary man'; but, since palaeographically *ἀνὴρ* and *ἀνὴρ* are

equally probable, it is usage and environment which must decide when the MSS differ. Usage is rather in favour of '*the* man is wise and admirable.' See however Ar. Ran. 968 *Θηραμένης; σοφός γ' ἀνὴρ καὶ δεινὸς ἐς τὰ πάντα.*

θεῖος = 'extraordinary,' often with an implication of inspiration (*ἐνθουσιασμός*).

Cf. Meno 81 B *Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσι.* Phaedr. 234 D *συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.* Meno 99 C *οὐκοῦν...ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι;* and ibid. D *καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα 'θεῖος* (really *σεῖος*) *ἀνήρ,' φασίν, 'οὗτος.'* Cf. inf. 335 E *τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν.*

γιγνώσκεις—not *ἔγνωκας*, but 'you can make out,' 'you perceive.'

ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ. For the Socratic irony see Introduction § 22 *a*.

παρακαταθεμένου. In the comparative rarity of large and trustworthy banks, strong-rooms, or opportunities for profitable and safe investments, it was not uncommon with Greeks and Romans (when about to travel &c.) to entrust money or articles of value to the safe keeping of friends or persons of known probity. Such *παρακαταθῆκαι* (*fideicommissa*) were evidently often very much at the mercy of their temporary holder, and a special *bona fides* was expected of him. For an instance of such depositing in its crudest form see the story in Hdt. VI. 86, and the allusions to it in Juv. XIII. 174 sqq.

ὁτῳοῦν—after **παρακαταθεμένου.** The word is more emphatic than if it had been (*τινος παρακ. τί*) *τινι*, and = 'where a man has deposited a thing with anyone whatever,' i.e. 'in any case whatever where a man receives a deposit.'

μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι—i.e. *εἰ ἀπαιτεῖ αὐτὸ μὴ σωφρονῶν.*

The use of the adverb is exceptional in reference to 'the condition of the agent and not to the mode of action' (Jowett and Campbell). *μὴ σωφρονοῦντι ἀπαιτοῦντι* would be an intolerable cacophony. We may compare Shakspere Henry V. IV. 1 'If a son do *sinfully* miscarry upon the sea' (i.e. in his sins).

332 A. ἀποδοτέον δὲ...ὁπότε τις...ἀπαιτοίη. It is an error to call this the optative of 'indefinite frequency,' inasmuch as in the technical acceptation of the term that optative is only used in past connexions. On the other hand it is in no way necessary, but shews a want of appreciation of Greek idiom, to alter with Madvig into the obvious *ἀπαιτεῖ*. Cf. inf. 361 C *ἄδηλον οὖν* (sc. *ἐστὶν*) *εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη,* Gorg. 482 C *ἔγωγε*

οἶμαι καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην, Soph. O. T. 979 *εἰκῇ κράτιστον* (sc. *ἐστι*) *ζῆν ὅπως δύναιτό τις* (where see Jebb's note), Antig. 666 *ἀλλ' ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν*, El. 1344, O. T. 315, Xen. Cyr. I. 6. 19 *τοῦ λέγειν ἃ μὴ σαφῶς εἰδείη φείδεσθαι δεῖ.* Thuc. I. 120 *σωφρόνων ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἡσυχάζειν.* Goodwin M. and T. § 555. See also Jelf § 831.

Such sentences belong to the class of 'mixed conditionals,' which become exceedingly frequent in late Greek writers, e.g. Lucian. It would, for instance, be possible to write here with formal correctness (1) *ἀποδοτέον* (*ἐστὶν*)...*ὁπότε* (=*εἴ ποτε*) *ἀπαιτεῖ*, (2) *ἀποδοτέον* (*ἐστὶν*)...*ὁπόταν* (=*ἐάν ποτε*) *ἀπαιτῇ*, (3) *ἀποδοτέον ἂν εἴη* ...*ὁπότε* (=*εἴ ποτε*) *ἀπαιτοίη*. In the present example, as in the others quoted, it is a matter of indifference whether we speak of the apodosis or the protasis as the 'irregular clause.' Each is formally 'irregular' relatively to the other. It is worth noting, with Goodwin, that this construction occurs almost only when the apodosis states an 'obligation, propriety, possibility &c.'

λέγει τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι—"means by his saying (**τὸ**) that 'it is just to make restitution of what is due.'" **τὸ** belongs to all that follows, as if the words *τὰ...ἀποδιδόναι* were beneath quotation marks. Cf. 338 E *τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν...ὃ λέγω... ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον* for the use of **λέγω**='I mean by saying...'

ἄλλο μέντοι—'nay, something else certainly': v. sup. 329 C. *μέντοι.* The combination **μέντοι νὴ Δία** occurs 469 E. Cf. Phaedo 65 D, 68 B, 73 D &c.

μανθάνω· ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι... It is best to make **ὅτι** independent of *μανθάνω* and =*διότι*, 'because.'

332 B. βλαβερὰ γίγνηται. The singular not so much because **ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λῆψις** form one notion (each action necessarily implying the other), as because the real subject is felt to be **ἡ λῆψις.** Cf. sup. 329 D *καὶ γῆρας καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ ξυμβαίνει.*

ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει—as an impersonal verb **προσήκει** differs from *δεῖ* and *χρὴ* in expressing that which befits, or is called for by, a particular set of relations. Here, of course, it is not impersonal, but the connotation remains the same. 'What, you know, suits their relationship.' It is this expression which prompts the correction made below (C) by Socrates (*προσῆκον*).

The **γε** after **παρά** and the explanatory **καὶ** indicate a certain amount of scruple in pleading for the doing of injury to anyone. For the scruple and the half-excusing tone contained in *γε* cf.

335 B *ἔστιν ἄρα δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καὶ ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων; Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη, τούς γε πονηρούς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν.*

Nevertheless popular Greek ethics entertained no charity towards enemies. Cf. Aesch. P. V. 972 *χλιδῶ; χλιδῶντας ὧδε τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἐγὼ | ἐχθροὺς ἴδοιμι.* Xen. Mem. II. 3. 14 *καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὃς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν.* Solon Frag. 13. 4 *εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν*, Eur. Med. 809 ('let people think me') *βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοισιν εὐμενῆ.*

CHAPTER VII.

ᾐνίξατο...ποιητικῶς—'spoke darkly (in riddles) as poets do.' Cf. Theaet. 152 C *τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ᾐνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;*
The construction is *ᾐνίξατο τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ εἴη.* See on 327 A *τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι κ.τ.λ.*
διενοεῖτο—'meant,' not 'thought.'

332 C. τοῦτ'...ἀποδιδόναι. The infinitive is exegetical of *τοῦτο.* (The article **τὸ** of course belongs to *προσῆκον.*) See on 329 D (init.) and cf. Gorg. 491 D *καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων.*
τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον—not = *τὸ ὀφειλόμενον*, but = 'and for this he used the word *ὀφειλόμενον.*'
ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; ἔφη—"'Well, and what have you to say of it?' said Polemarchus."

It is hard to understand what the difficulty is which editors have found in these words, and which has caused some (after Madvig) to treat **ἀλλὰ τί οἴει;** as part of Socrates' speech, and then to continue with **Ἔφη** (= *ξυνέφη* sc. Polemarchus), while others have boldly omitted *ἔφη* and run on **ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,** thus creating a sentence in which *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* is both superfluous and badly placed.
It is usual to say with Stallbaum that *ἀλλὰ τί οἴει;* = *ἀλλὰ τί (ἄλλο) οἴει;* and to compare e.g. Gorg. 480 B *τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν;* (= *τί γὰρ δὴ ἄλλο φῶμεν;*). But as a matter of fact the words convey no implication that Polemarchus confirms Socrates' statement of the case. He simply asks, 'Well, what then is your opinion?'

ὦ πρὸς Διός. These words belong to the question which continues with **ὦ Σιμωνίδη.** They are supposed to be uttered by the person (**τις**) who interrogates, not by Socrates. "I replied, 'If any one had asked him, "In the name of Zeus, Simonides..."'"

ὦ πρὸς Διὸς is a common expletive in appeals of remonstrance. Cf. Apol. 25 C *ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, κ.τ.λ.* Meno 71 D *σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι;* That **ὦ** does not belong to the vocative, but forms an integral part of the expletive, is clear from e.g. Soph. Aj. 371 *ὦ πρὸς θεῶν ὕπεικε καὶ φρόνησον εὖ.* Inf. 459 A *ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ πρὸς Διός, προσέσχηκάς τι τοῖς τούτων γάμοις;* &c. In Protag. 309 D *ὦ, τί λέγεις;* simply. [The accentuation, *ὦ* or *ὧ*, is doubtful.]

ἀποδιδοῦσα. Though the sense in which the word is here applied is very common, it has somewhat shifted from the meaning of *ἀποδιδόναι* just above. It is no longer a case of 'restoring' what has been lent or entrusted, but of giving what is due—what one ought to give—in a certain relation.

Cf. *reddere*, and the opposite *ἀποστερεῖν* ('withhold'). Cope on Aristot. Rhet. I. 1. 17 amply illustrates various uses of the verb arising out of the general sense of 'assigning something due.' Similar to the present case is 456 B *τὰ δὲ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέα ταῖς αὐταῖς φύσεσιν;*

ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον—the **καὶ** is corrective: 'due, that is to say, fitting.'

332 D. **ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις.** Cf. 365 D *ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει*, 394 D *ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ, ταύτῃ ἰτέον.*

τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς. The addition of *τοῖς* before *ἐχθροῖς* would be impossible with the words which follow, since it would then be stated that *each* class should receive *both* benefits and injuries. **τίσι** is answered by *τοῖς φίλοις-τε-καὶ-ἐχθροῖς*, i.e. the recipients are persons who are comprehended in the term 'friends and enemies.'

One article is used by Plato when two substantives or adjectives denoting contrasted things are used together in such a way as to form a unity for purposes of discussion; the connecting *καὶ* or *τε καὶ* may in such cases often be rendered 'as the case may be,' or 'and...respectively.' Cf. Euthyph. 7 C *τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος.* Symp. 186 C *ὁ διαγιγνώσκων...τὸν καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔρωτα.* Prot. 355 E *τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρόν.* Euthyph. 15 E *τό τε ὅσιον καὶ μή.* Apol. 23 B *τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων.* Crito 48 A *περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων.* Prot. 313 D *ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος*, &c.

πλέοντας—sc. *φίλους*; 'when they are on a voyage'; not = *τοὺς πλέοντας.*

332 E. **τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος;** No special verb is to be supplied, though the sense implies an ellipse of e.g. *ποιήσει* or *δυνατὸς*

ἔστι ποιεῖν. Similarly in the English, 'And what about the just man?' The speaker has no fuller formula present to his mind.

For the Greek idiom cf. 341 C *τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; ναυτῶν ἄρχων ἐστὶν ἢ ναύτης;* Gorg. 502 A *τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν;* The last instance helps to shew that the proper punctuation here is *τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει...* and not *τί δέ; ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τίνι πράξει κ.τ.λ.*

πράξει—not 'action,' but 'state of his affairs,' 'plight' (cf. *πράττειν εὖ* or *κακῶς*), circumstances such as are specified in *κάμνοντας* and *πλέοντας* above. Cf. Soph. Aj. 790 *ἥκει φέρων | Αἴαντος ἡμῖν πρᾶξιν ἣν ἤλγησ' ἐγώ*, Aesch. P. V. 695 *πέφρικ' εἰσιδοῦσα πρᾶξιν Ἰοῦς*. v. note on *τῆς δικαίας πράξεως*, 349 B.

πρὸς τί ἔργον; 'in regard to what object (to be achieved)?'

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν. 'In making war against or for' ('as the case may be' or 'respectively'). Literally 'in the department of making war for and against.' Cf. sup. D *τοῖς φιλοῖς τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς*, 'friends or enemies respectively.'

The addition of **ἐν τῷ** before **ξυμμαχεῖν** in good MSS is due to some early reader who, failing to grasp this sense, was naturally puzzled at the notion 'making war against and with' the same persons.

333 A. καὶ γὰρ γεωργία—sc. *χρήσιμόν ἐστι*, 'and so is agriculture for example.' Lit. 'Yes, for agriculture also...'

χρείαν ἢ κτῆσιν. Cf. 451 C *παίδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτῆσίς τε καὶ χρεία.*

Sometimes the antithesis is emphasized by a jingle, e.g. Menex. 238 B *ὅπλων κτῆσιν τε καὶ χρῆσιν διδαξάμενοι.*

ξυμβόλαια—in the wide sense of 'bargains,' 'contracts,' or 'engagements.' Cf. Dem. de Cor. 3 *τὰ τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίου ξυμβόλαια.* Legg. 738 A *εἴς τε πόλεμον καὶ ὅσα κατ' εἰρήνην πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ ξυμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα.*

ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα. The grammar is not the same as if *τὰ κοινωνήματα* had been written. 'In saying *ξυμβόλαια* you say *κοινωνήματα*,' or 'you use *ξυμβόλαια* in the sense *κοινωνήματα*.' This might have been more fully expressed '*ξυμβόλαια*' *δὲ λέγων, λέγεις* '*κοινωνήματα*' (i.e. 'joint enterprises').

333 B. πεττῶν θέσιν. There are constant references in Greek literature to the game (or games) of *πεττοί* from Homer downwards, e.g. Od. I. 107, Pind. Fr. 95. 4, Hdt. I. 94, Eur. Med. 68 and Suppl. 409, Aristot. Pol. I. 2. 10 &c. Nevertheless it is not satisfactorily known how many varieties of the game there

were, or in what precise manner any one of them was played. The feature apparently common to all games of πεττοὶ was a board marked with lines and occupied by pieces to be moved, as in chess or draughts, or else as in backgammon.

From Aristot. Pol. I. 2. 10 ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς, and an epigram by Agathias (Anth. Pal. IX. 482) it appears that one well-known form of πεττοὶ was almost the same as the Roman *ludus duodecim scriptorum*, and very much like backgammon. To this game may very well refer the words inf. 487 B ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλῄονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι φέρωσιν (cf. Polyb. I. 84), though these are usually taken as applying to another familiar form of πεττεία closely resembling draughts. The latter is described by Pollux (IX. 97) as a game in which πέντε (sc. πεσσοὺς) ἑκάτερος εἶχε τῶν παιζόντων ἐπὶ πέντε γραμμῶν, but as to exactly how it was played, we have no information.

For the present passage it would be obviously quite irrelevant to inquire further into details. In πεττῶν Plato is thinking of any and every kind of chess, draughts or backgammon playing.

θέσις is the technical name for a move (θέσθαι τὴν ψῆφον). Thus in the epigram of Agathias (Ζήνωνα) τοίη ποικιλότευκτος ἕλεν θέσις.

That the πεττευτικός might have almost a professional character appears from inf. 374 C πεττευτικὸς δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος.

εἰς κρουμάτων—sc. *κοινωνίαν*.

333 C. ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι. The implied subject of εἶναι (viz. αὐτὸ) is the object of **παρακαταθέσθαι**. The next sentence contains a similar change of subject, viz. ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ (ἡμᾶς) αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ (δέῃ αὐτὸ) κεῖσθαι. Cf. 343 E and 360 A (φασὶν) ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις καὶ διαλέγεσθαι (sc. αὐτοὺς) ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου.

σῶν is a word frequently used of money, e.g. Ar. Lys. 488 τἀργύριον σῶν παρέχειν. Cf. Plaut. Pers. II. 5. 23 *argentum hoc actutum incolume redigere.*

κεῖσθαι—'be idle.' Cf. Hom. Il. II. 688 κεῖτο γὰρ ἐν νήεσσι (sc. Achilles).

ἐπ' αὐτῷ—'in dealing with it,' or 'in charge of it.'

333 D. καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ—i.e. whether it be kept jointly (as belonging to partners), or where an individual only is concerned.

Jowett's 'to the individual and *to the state*' makes κοινῇ = δημοσίᾳ. But what has the state to do with a pruning-hook?

φήσεις—(=*ξυμφήσεις*) 'you will admit.' Cf. Prot. 360 D *τί δή... οὔτε σὺ φῂς ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης;* Theaet. 165 A *φάναι τε καὶ καταρνεῖσθαι.* Soph. O. C. 317 *καὶ φημὶ κἀπόφημι.* Antig. 442 *φῂς ἢ καταρνεῖ;* &c.

CHAPTER VIII.

333 E. εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὂν τυγχάνει. The participle is assimilated to the gender of **χρήσιμον.**

The neuter adjective with masculine or feminine noun is common as a predicate, and a feminine participle following immediately would naturally sound awkward. Cf. 420 C *οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοί, κάλλιστον ὄν, κ.τ.λ.* In 336 A *ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὂν* the attraction is less called for, and is due to a confusion of subject with predicate. So 351 A *ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν δικαιοσύνη.* The reverse assimilation, from neuter to feminine, appears in 354 C *ὁπότε τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστι, σχολῇ εἴσομαι, εἴτε ἀρετή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα.* For attraction of participles generally see Jelf (§ 389), who quotes, among other passages, Legg. 735 E *τοὺς μέγιστα ἐξημαρτηκότας ἀνιάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ οὖσαν βλάβην πόλεως κ.τ.λ.*

The sense 'only' is obtained by emphasis on *ἄχρηστα.* See note on *ἀδικίᾳ ἡμιμόχθηροι* 352 C.

That *μόνον* can be dispensed with is clear also from e.g. 357 A *τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον* (sc. *μόνον*). Cf. Herod. II. 123 *τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπ' ἑκάστων ἀκοῇ* (sc. *μόνον*) *γράφω.* Moreover the emphatic juxtaposition of *ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον* is sufficient for the point; 'if it comes to being useful for the useless.'

εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ. The proper Attic order (not *εἴτε καί τινι ἄλλῃ*). Lit. 'and (it holds good) in one of another kind as well.'

ἆρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι; The best MSS give this unsatisfactory reading; two inferior copies substitute **καὶ μὴ παθεῖν** for **καὶ λαθεῖν**; some have **καὶ** before **ἐμποιῆσαι.**

(1) Taking the reading which is best authenticated, we have first to consider the punctuation, determining to which clause **καὶ λαθεῖν** belongs. (*a*) *ἆρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι;* is favoured by some editors. Yet *καὶ λαθεῖν* is surely meaningless, nor can *λαθεῖν* be joined with an accusative of the thing. If, on the other hand, we were to personify *νόσον* (with Jowett), it would be necessary to keep up the personification in the following clause, and that device is impossible with *ἐμποιῆσαι.* If, again, *φυλάξασθαι-καὶ-λαθεῖν* be taken as =*φυλάξ-*

ασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν (οὕτω ποιῶν), the expression is absurd. There can be no point about 'secrecy in avoiding disease.'

(*b*) ἆρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι; is, of course, impossible Greek. It is obvious to conjecture either λαθὼν or else ἐμποιήσας (with Schneider, Stallbaum &c.). Of these suggestions λαθὼν would perhaps be the better, since ἐμποιῆσαι should be the prominent verb in antithesis to φυλάξασθαι, and because the combination φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθὼν would lend itself readily, under a misapprehension, to a corruption into φ. καὶ λαθεῖν. If we allow either of these changes, the point of λαθεῖν must be an anticipation of the notion expressed by κλέψαι in the following sentence, i.e. 'as he can watch *against* disease, so he can *escape* a watch and implant it.' This is forced, however, and ἀλλὰ μὴν rather shews that the point contained in κλέψαι of the next question is a new one.

(2) As regards the variants, the **καὶ μὴ παθεῖν** of the inferior MSS is (at least in its **καὶ**) very feeble, and reads like a gloss from e.g. Meno 71 E καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν (where the sense of the context is similar to this). φυλάξασθαι μὴ παθεῖν (sc. τὴν νόσον) might have been written by Plato, but we should have expected better warrant in the MSS.

καὶ before ἐμποιῆσαι is good in itself, if no καὶ has already occurred in the clause. Whatever may be the real state of the case, enough suspicion attaches to both the purpose and the construction of καὶ λαθεῖν to justify us in obelising it.

[The text being regarded as unsound, we may advance various theories as to its original and correct shape. Unfortunately they can only be guesses. A new guess, which may be hazarded as such, is that λαθεῖν should be μαθεῖν (i.e. καὶ μαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι, 'clever at learning how to implant'); yet another possible suggestion is that φυλάξασθαι is itself a gloss on e.g. ἀμυναθεῖν, a form supported by διωκαθεῖν Euthyph. 15 D, ὑπεικαθεῖν Apol. 32 A. But see crit. note.]

334 A. **ὅσπερ...κλέψαι**—sc. ἀγαθός ἐστι. Cf. Xen. Mem. III. 1. 6 τὸν στρατηγὸν εἶναι χρὴ...ἐπίβουλον καὶ φυλακτικόν τε καὶ κλέπτην καὶ προσεκτικὸν καὶ ἅρπαγα. Hipparch. v. 2 χρὴ δὴ μηχανητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ μὴ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων μόνον κλέπτειν ἐπίστασθαι. The notion here is of 'getting secret possession' combined with that of 'forestalling.'

κλέπτειν is often difficult to render in English, but can mostly be resolved into a verb supplemented by the adverb 'by stealth.' Xen. Anab. v. 6. 9 κλέπτειν τὰ ὄρη = 'occupy by stealth' (= λάθρᾳ καταλαμβάνειν); κλέπτειν φυγήν = 'flee by stealth' (λάθρᾳ φεύγειν). Frequently, however (as is seen in the examples given), the notion of forestalling is also present, the sense being that of snatching

what another was on the point of obtaining. Cf. 'to steal a march.'

ὅτου τις ἄρα κ.τ.λ. This generalization from a few dubious instances is obviously quite unjustifiable. For the argument altogether, see Introd. § 14 *a*, *b*, *c*.

σημαίνει—not 'proves,' but 'indicates.' Cf. the use of *σημεῖον* in logic. Polemarchus is obviously not satisfied, though he cannot detect the quibble.

κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὁμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό. With his usual ironical humour Socrates would make out that the idea was not put into Polemarchus' head by the Socratic dialectic, but that he was always familiar with it from his Homer.

334 B. Αὐτολύκον. Hom. Od. XIX. 395

μητρὸς ἑῆς πατέρ' ἐσθλόν, ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο
κλεπτοσύνῃ θ' ὅρκῳ τε.

The title *ἐσθλὸν* justifies the word **ἀγαπᾷ** used by Socrates, but it does not justify him in quoting Autolycus as a type of the *δίκαιος*, even in what Mr Merry calls 'the society of low morality' represented in the Odyssey. The **ὅρκος** was a cunning use of oaths to cover his thefts while sailing short of absolute perjury, or an equally cunning evasion of oaths when made. The character of Autolycus is given in Ovid Met. XI. 312

alipedis de stirpe dei versuta propago
nascitur Autolycus, furtum ingeniosus ad omne:
qui facere adsuerat, patriae non degener artis,
candida de nigris et de candentibus atra.

ἀγαπᾷ—'is fond of,' 'makes much of.' Cf. Phaedo 110 D *τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια...ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα.*

καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον κ.τ.λ. With ironical politeness Socrates puts the reluctant admission which he has drawn from Polemarchus on a level with the deliberate opinion of a Homer or a Simonides.

The trick is frequent with the Platonic Socrates. Jowett and Campbell quote Gorg. 470 B, 503 C, &c.

ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅ τι ἔλεγον. So Alcib. I. 127 D *ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς οἶδα ὅ τι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἴσχιστα ἔχων.*

τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ. The familiar construction with **δοκεῖ** being personal rather than impersonal, the Greek, which might have been expected

to proceed grammatically with τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὠφελεῖν μὲν...τὴν δικαιοσύνην, substitutes for the accusative of the infinitive clause (exegetical of τοῦτο) another nominative to the verb δοκεῖ, i.e. τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, (viz.) ὠφελεῖν μὲν (δοκεῖ).. ἡ δικαιοσύνη.

The same construction is found in Theaet. 189 E τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται, διανοουμένη (sc. ἡ ψυχὴ) οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, and (without τοῦτο, but with its equivalent) Apol. 25 B ἦ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; Meno 72 D πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ...ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός;

334 C. καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως;—i.e. καὶ ἐχθροὺς (λέγεις εἶναί τινας) ὡσαύτως, "and do you term men 'enemies' on the same principle?"

εἰκὸς μέν, ἔφη κ.τ.λ.—**μὲν** does not, of course, answer to **δ'** in οὓς δ' ἂν πονηρούς. For this the order οὓς μὲν ἄν τις κ.τ.λ. would be required. The answering δὲ really belongs to a suppressed clause, e.g. 'it is natural (but I will not speak positively).'

Cf. Eur. Or. 8 ὡς μὲν λέγουσι... Apol. 21 D τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι ('whatever may be the case with others'). Meno 82 B Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι; So frequently in the combinations ἐγὼ μὲν (inf. 358 A), οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι &c. In these settings the force of **μὲν** comes to be not materially different from that of γε. Cf. 339 B.

334 D. οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν—lit. 'of a character to do no wrong,' i.e. τοιοῦτοι οἷοι... (a full expression regularly found at the beginning of a 'character' of Theophrastus). Cf. 365 E λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἷοι θυσίαις παράγεσθαι, Xen. Anab. II. 3. 13 οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὥρα οἵα τὸ πεδίον ἄρδειν.

κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον—**δὴ** brings us again to the vital point, here a conclusion.

μηδαμῶς—deprecatory; sc. γένοιτο, or τοῦτο λέγε (λέγωμεν). This usage is common. Cf. Gorg. 497 B, where, in answer to οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγεις, Socrates answers μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

ξυμβήσεται—i.e. as a logical consequence. So ξυμβαίνει inf. E (where the sense 'happen' would have required the future).

Cf. Aristot. Top. VIII. 1. 17 ξυμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν κειμένων. Phaedo 74 A ἆρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ξυμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἀφ' ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ.

334 E. πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσί—'For they have bad ones.'

Stallbaum and others, attending too much to the words and too little to the thought, make the easy slip of rendering 'for in their opinion they are bad,' a use of the dative familiar enough (e.g.

Soph. Ant. 904 *καίτοι σ' ἐγὼ 'τίμησα τοῖς φρονοῦσιν εὖ.* O. C. 1446 &c.), but quite away from the sense required here. The position is no longer that it is just to injure those who *seem* *πονηροί*, but those who *are* so. A man may make a mistake and accept as his friends persons who are *ἄδικοι* (= *πονηροί*). Yet, though his friends, he is bound to injure them, *πονηροὶ γάρ εἰσι*, not indeed in his opinion, but in reality.

οὐκ ὀρθῶς—the two words must be closely joined. **οὐκ** negatives the one word = ('improperly'), not the sentence; otherwise *μὴ* would be needed.

τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρόν. For the one article see 332 D and E; 'our friend and enemy (as the case may be).'

τὸν δοκοῦντά τε...καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν φίλον—sc. *εἶναι μεταθώμεθα.* 'The man who both seems and is good let us put down as our friend.'

The position of **τε**, combined with the fact that the participles refer to the same person, would make it natural to expect no article with **ὄντα**. Its repetition is difficult to explain. Possibly, as the words form part of a definition, we may understand inverted commas, so to speak, i.e. 'let us change the words, and not be satisfied with '*τὸν δοκοῦντα*,' but rather demand '*τὸν ὄντα*,' "not merely him 'who seems' but him 'who is.'"

335 A. **καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ**—**δὲ** is connective of the sentences, while **καὶ** = *etiam* and belongs to *περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ*, 'And concerning the enemy also...'

In *καὶ...δὲ* the particles are separated by such words as *καὶ* is intended to emphasize: usually there is but one; here *περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ* is of course incapable of division.

προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς κ.τ.λ. "To qualify our previous statement as to what is 'just.'" Literally 'to add to our (explanation of) *δίκαιον* (and make it otherwise, ampler,) than the way in which we gave it at first.' The **ἢ** follows the sense *ὥστε μακρότερον* (or *ἄλλο*) *εἶναι* implied in *προσθεῖναι*. Cf. *αἱρεῖσθαι* and even *βούλομαι ἤ...*, *διάφορος ἤ*, and Gorg. 481 C *ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι.*

For **προσθεῖναι** used absolutely cf. Aristot. Eth. II. 6. 9 *τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι* and inf. 339 B *σὺ δὲ προστίθης.*

νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν—sc. *κελεύεις*, 'to this, I say, do you bid us now add...?' *λέγειν κ.τ.λ.* is resumptive, and exegetic of *προσθεῖναι κ.τ.λ.*

CHAPTER IX.

335 B. τούς γε πονηρούς. The **γε** is apologetic (cf. 332 B); also note that **δεῖ** and not *χρὴ* is used (v. note on 328 c).

εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετήν. The **ἀρετὴ** of a thing is the peculiar excellence by virtue of which it fulfils its special function (*ἔργον*), or is most perfectly what it claims to be.

V. inf. 353 B. Cf. Aristot. Eth. II. 6. 2 *ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσι.*

335 C. ἀνθρώπους δὲ...μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν βλαπτομένους...χείρους γίγνεσθαι; For **μὴ φῶμεν** 'are we not to say?' cf. 337 B *μη ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπας μηδέν;* 'am I to make none of the answers you warned me against?'

With the deliberative subjunctive *οὐ* has no place, and *μή*, which with the indicative expects 'no' for an answer, is used with the subjunctive when the answer, as here, is 'yes.' So Xen. Mem. I. 2. 36 *μηδ' ἀποκρίνωμαι οὖν, ἄν τίς με ἐρωτᾷ νέος, ἐὰν εἰδῶ;* See Goodwin M. and T. §§ 287 and 293.

Of the construction of the sentence as a whole it is possible to take two views: (1) that **οὕτω** = 'in the same (above) way,' and that the order is *μὴ φῶμεν ἀνθρώπους βλαπτομένους χείρους γίγνεσθαι*: or (2), less probably, that *οὕτω* = 'thus' (viz. 'as follows'), the words *βλαπτομένους...γίγνεσθα* (depending on *φῶμεν*) being exegetic of *οὕτω*, while the sentence which began with *ἀνθρώπους* is grammatically incomplete, the accusative being left suspended, i.e. 'of mankind are we not to speak thus...that they are made worse by injury?'

φημὶ does not take as a legitimate construction this, which would be familiar to *λέγειν*. Xen. Hell. III. 5. 12 has *Κορινθίους δὲ καὶ Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς τί φῶμεν*; but the *τί* makes a difference, and the sentence is elliptical (an infinitive being understood).

For the notion that men grow worse (*μοχθηροὶ* morally) when they are hurt or made miserable (*μοχθηροὶ* physically or in circumstances) cf. Simonid. Frag. 5. 10—13 *ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, ὃν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.*

ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή; The somewhat unusual position of the interrogative **οὐκ** is due to a desire to emphasize *ἡ δικαιοσύνη*. 'But, justice—is it not a human excellence?'

ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι. For the logical veracity of the argument see Introd. at this place.

ἀδικωτέρους = 'less just.' It is frequently necessary to render Greek comparatives in this negative manner.

ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δή—**δή** intimates that the speaker has now come to the point or application. 'Well then, to come to the case of *justice*.' So *οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* (inf. D).

335 D. θερμότητος...ἔργον. For the meaning of **ἔργον** cf. 352 E *ἆρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ᾖ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα;*

335 E. τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ—either (1) **τοῦτο** is subject to **νοεῖ** and **αὐτῷ** is 'ethic': 'and this means, to his mind...' = 'and by this he means':

> Cf. Euthyd. 287 E *τί οὖν ἄρτι ἤρου, ὅ τί μοι νοοίη τὸ ῥῆμα;* Cratyl. 407 E *πειρώμεθα τὸν Ἑρμῆν σκέψασθαι τί καὶ νοεῖ τὸ ὄνομα.* Ar. Plut. 55 *πυθοίμεθ' ἂν τὸν χρησμὸν ἡμῶν ὅ τι νοεῖ.* Similarly Lucian Necyom. 1 *τί οὖν αὐτῷ βούλεται τὸ ἀλλόκοτον τοῦ σχήματος;*

or (2) **τοῦτο** is object to **νοεῖ** 'and he means this by it.'

> The latter might seem at first sight too much like the English idiom to be unquestionable Greek, but the instrumental dative may stand very well in the sense 'and he intends to convey by it (viz. *τῷ φάναι αὐτό*) this, viz...' There is nothing to shew that Greek could not say *τί νοεῖς τῷ ὀνόματι;* as readily as *τί σοι νοεῖ τὸ ὄνομα;*

δή perhaps gets a better force with this rendering, 'and if what he means by it is *this*.' With the other view *δή* belongs to the whole clause, 'and if this, *as we are to think*, means &c.'

οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών—i.e. The man who so spoke (and still speaks in our current proverbial philosophy, **φησίν**,) was no true sage. The saying lives, though its author is long dead. Hence the imperfect **ἦν**, despite **φησί** preceding.

> Otherwise, though much less naturally, it is possible to regard *ἦν* as the idiomatic imperfect (habitually combined, however, with *ἄρα*) of 'a fact which is just recognised...having previously been denied, overlooked, or not understood' (Goodwin M. and T. § 39). The usual *ἄρα* may then be in a measure understood from *εἰ ἄρα* at the opening of the sentence.

ἐάν τις...φῇ...Σιμωνίδην. It is not likely that Socrates doubted the authenticity of the proverb. Ironically championing the reputation of Simonides, he covertly hints at the imperfections of the sages and the shallowness of gnomic ethics. Homer,

Hesiod and Simonides are spoken of by Protagoras as Sophists under the disguise of poets, Prot. 316 D.

Βίαντα ἢ Πιττακόν. Bias of Priene and Pittacus of Mitylene are two of those four sages (the others being Thales and Solon) whose names are invariably included in the various lists of Seven. In Prot. 343 A they are given as *Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς, καὶ...Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων.* Plutarch (de EI apud Delph. 385 E) gives a tradition that there were five sages, Chilon, Thales, Solon, Bias and Pittacus, and that Cleobulus and Periander forced their way into the list.

The date of **Bias** is approximately 570 B.C. For his sayings see Diog. Laert. I. 82—88. The date of **Pittacus** is 652—569 B.C. For his character and wisdom see Diog. Laert. I. 74—81. Though he was *αἰσυμνήτης* of Mitylene, that position was *αἱρετὴ τυραννίς* (Aristot. Pol. III. 14. 8), and his behaviour in it places him in a different list altogether from the *τύραννοι* mentioned in 336 A.

There was, of course, a tendency to fasten old and anonymous sentences of gnomic wisdom upon some particular authority, and Bias and Pittacus were especially favoured in this way. The ascription of such *γνῶμαι* was naturally inconsistent, and the discrepancy mentioned by Herodotus (I. 27 *οἱ μὲν Βίαντα λέγουσι τὸν Πριηνέα...οἱ δὲ Πιττακὸν τὸν Μυτιληναῖον*) must have been frequent.

τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. Cf. 331 E *σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ.* **μακαρίων** = 'wonderfully gifted.' Cf. *ὦ μακάριε* (inf. 432 D) =*ὦ θαυμάσιε.* Menex. 249 D *νὴ Δία, ...μακαρίαν γε λέγεις τὴν Ἀσπασίαν, εἰ γυνὴ οὖσα τοιούτους λόγους οἵα τε ἐστὶ συντιθέναι.* Meno 71 A *κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός τις εἶναι, ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ' ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι.*

Though *μακάριος* and its cognates are often used in reference to the 'blessed' dead, that implication need not be assumed here.

336 A. τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι. τὸ φάναι, which is grammatically not required, is exegetical and in apposition. 'Do you know from whom I think came the maxim—I mean the assertion that.' Cf. Legg. 838 B *οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν ῥῆμα κατασβέννυσι πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονάς; ΜΕ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις; ΑΘ. τὸ ταῦτα εἶναι φάναι μηδαμῶς ὅσια.*

A **ῥῆμα** is a compact saying, a maxim or *mot*.

Cf. Prot. 343 B *καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα...τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι*—a passage which might en-

courage a certain school of critics in declaring *φάναι* to be an adscript.

Περιάνδρου. The tyrant of Corinth (circ. 625 B.C.).

He is mentioned first as being himself commonly included in the list of Seven Sages, and as the author of gnomic verse (*ὑποθῆκαι*). Despite these claims to sageship, however, he is regarded as the very type of a *τύραννος*, practising the Machiavellian cunning and cruelty associated with Greek despotism.

Περδίκκου—i.e. (presumably) Perdiccas II., King of Macedonia, who was frequently at war with Athens, particularly B.C. 432—431, and who died B.C. 413.

Beyond the fact that he was a *τύραννος* and availed himself of any form of diplomacy to increase his power, there seems to be no special appositeness in quoting him. Perdiccas is mentioned again in Gorg. 470 D as the father of Archelaus, and there, after asking if Archelaus is to be considered *εὐδαίμων*, Polus proceeds to ask if the 'Great King' (cf. Xerxes here) is to be so considered.

Ἰσμηνίου. A Theban who (in 393 B.C.) accepted bribes in the interests of Persia against the Lacedaemonians. Paus. III. 9. 4, Xen. Hell. III. 5. 1.

He was put to death by the Spartans B.C. 382 (ibid. v. 2. 36). Plato mentions Ismenias as a *πλούσιος* again in Meno 90 A *ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος.*

πλουσίου—implying, as often, not merely 'rich' but 'prosperous,' strong in both wealth and position. Cf. Soph. O. T. 1070 *πλουσίῳ χαίρειν γένει* (='of wealth and power'). Hor. Od. IV. 7. 15 *nos ubi decidimus...quo Tullus dives et Ancus.*

οὐδὲ τοῦτο—'not this either,' any more than the previous definition.

ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὄν. For the attraction of the participle to gender of *τοῦτο* v. sup. 333 E. **ἡ δικαιοσύνη** is the abstract quality, the virtue in theory: **τὸ δίκαιον** is the concrete embodiment in practice.

CHAPTER X.

336 B. Θρασύμαχος—upon his standing and personality see Introd. § 3 *c* and § 21 *a*.

καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὥρμα κ.τ.λ. Though **μεταξὺ** (preceding) is frequently joined with participles, the position here

(especially with **ἡμῶν** intervening) is in favour of relating it quite as much to **ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.**

Perhaps it would be best to say that it belongs to the general sense (*ἀπὸ κοινοῦ*). In Apol. 40 B *καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ* the force of the adverb is probably not precisely the same as if *μεταξὺ λέγοντα* had been written. The latter = 'it checked me in the middle of my speech'; the former = 'it checked me when I was speaking, right in the middle.' In other words, *μεταξὺ* is made more prominent and emphatic. But, if so, it belongs to the whole act and mainly to the verb.

ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. The meaning of this word depends upon the context: (1) 'take a hand in' or 'get a hold upon'; (2) 'take objection to.' The former is obviously in point here. Cf. inf. 534 D *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς παιδείας* (= 'take in hand'), Thuc. II. 8 *ἀρχόμενοι γὰρ πάντες ὀξύτερον ἀντιλαμβάνονται* (sc. *πολέμου*).

ἔπειτα—for *ἔπειτα δὲ* or *καὶ ἔπειτα*, is common enough, but the present use as almost = *ἀλλὰ* is rare. Cf. Prot. 310 C *καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἰέναι, ἔπειτά μοι λίαν πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν.* There is an antithesis between what was first intended, and the subsequent fact. Lit. 'he shewed eagerness to join in; afterwards (= but *thereupon*) was in each case prevented.'

διεπαυσάμεθα—'had made a pause for a while.' **δια-** expresses the 'break' in the conversation. Cf. *διαλείπειν ἡμέραν, διαιρεῖν τοῦ τείχους, &c.* So *διαναπαύεσθαι.*

συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν—'gathering himself together (for the spring).' Cf. Hom. Il. XX. 168 (of the lion) *ἑάλη τε χανών*, where the Schol. Ven. 2 has the explanation *συνεστράφη πρὸς τὸ πηδῆσαι.* Arist. Hist. An. IX. 48. 631ᵃ 27 *συστρέψαντες ἑαυτοὺς φέρονται ὥσπερ τόξευμα.*

Some commentators render '*se colligens*,' but it does not appear that *se colligere* is used in such a sense.

Ast quotes Cicero in Vatin. § 4 *repente enim te, tamquam serpens e latibulis, oculis eminentibus, inflato collo, tumidis cervicibus, intulisti.*

ἧκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς—'was upon us.'

Jowett and Campbell prefer to take **ἧκεν** as the aorist of *ἵημι.* This seems needlessly far-fetched, especially as the intransitive *ἧκεν* should mean 'let fly at us,' and would result in mixed metaphor. Nevertheless, see the quotation from Aristotle (*ὥσπερ τόξευμα*) in the last note.

διαρπασόμενος. Cf. Hom. Il. XVI. 354 *οἱ δὲ* (sc. *λύκοι*) *ἰδόντες | αἶψα διαρπάζουσιν* (sc. *τὰς ἄρνας*). Plat. Polit. 274 B *τῶν πολλῶν αὖ*

θηρίων, ὅσα χαλεπὰ τὰς φύσεις ἦν, ἀπαγριωθέντων, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀφύλακτοι γεγονότες, διηρπάζοντο ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

The middle future of *ἁρπάζω* is better Attic than the active.

εἰς τὸ μέσον—'For the benefit of the company.' Cf. Legg. 664 C *τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ μέσον ᾀσόμενος.* Hdt. VI. 129 *ἔριν εἶχον ἀμφί τε μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἐς τὸ μέσον.* Add the Homeric *ἐς μέσον τιθέναι* (of a prize) and the Latin *in medium.*

φθεγξάμενος should not be translated by 'roaring,' nor by *increpans.* There is no need to make Thrasymachus out worse than he is. He simply *φθέγγεται* 'gives voice.'

336 C. εὐηθίζεσθε—'play the (good-natured) fool.' Cf. the senses of 'silly.'

ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς—a metaphor from wrestling. The notion is of shirking, refusing to stand up and try honest conclusions. The word is also used of taking a lower seat at table.

Plutarch (II. 58 F) is quoted for the application of the word to a wrestler who permits himself to be thrown. Cf. Dion. Hal. VI. 24. 71 *ὑποκατακλίνεσθαί τινι τῆς γνώμης.*

ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς. Goodwin M. and T. §§ 271—277.

336 D. τὸ δέον κ.τ.λ.—apparently a series of definitions attempted in some quarters. The several terms are practically synonymous. **τὸ δέον** implies no moral obligation, but only a practical one.

σαφῶς...καὶ ἀκριβῶς—'clearly (i.e. intelligibly) and with precision.' The two words are opposed to obscurity and vagueness respectively. Cf. Arist. Eth. N. II. 2. 3 *πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι.*

ὕθλους. Cf. the proverbial *γραῶν ὕθλος* (Theaet. 176 B).

εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἑωράκη αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ. The allusion is to the common superstition that, when man and wolf met, the man was struck temporarily dumb if, of the two, the wolf was the first to see the other, Plin. H. N. VIII. 34 *Sed in Italia quoque creditur luporum visus esse noxius, vocemque homini, quem priores contemplentur, adimere ad praesens.* Cf. Verg. Ecl. IX. 53 *Vox quoque Moerim | Iam fugit ipsa: lupi Moerim videre priores.* Theoc. XIV. 22 *οὐ φθεγξῇ; λύκον εἶδες;*

[The words **ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ** are unnecessary, and perhaps a gloss. The grammar itself (for *πρότερον...ἢ*) is not above suspicion. Gorg. 523 E *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς* is obviously different.]

νῦν δὲ—'but as things were.' In this combination *νῦν* loses the temporal sense 'now,' and becomes almost = *τῷ ὄντι*: hence its use with a past verb.

336 E. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου κ.τ.λ. The **ἂν** with **ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι** is not to be repeated with **ὑπείκειν**. Lit. 'Pray do not think that whereas, if we had been searching for a piece of money, we should not, at least knowingly, have been shewing complaisance to each other in the search and thereby spoiling the discovery of it, yet, now that we are searching for justice,...we *are* yielding in that senseless way...'; i.e. briefly 'that whereas we *should not* shew such foolishness in searching for money, we *are* shewing it in the search for justice.'

διαφθείρειν—combines the notion of corrupting the method of search (i.e. carrying it on disingenuously) with that of spoiling the result of it (i.e. ruining the chances of discovering the truth). 'Spoil by improper practices.'

ἔπειθ'—'Nevertheless' (i.e. despite its superior value). See 331 B. Cf. Prot. 319 D *οὐδαμόθεν μαθὼν οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ.* Phaedo 70 E, Aesch. Eum. 653 sqq.

οὕτως—viz. as you accuse us of doing.

αὐτὸ—referring to **δικαιοσύνην**.

Cf. 358 C *καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν.* Meno 86 D *οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅ τι ἐστὶ πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό.* Phaedo 88 A (*αὐτὸ* in reference to *ψυχή*).

οἴου γε σύ—Bekker's reading for **οἷόν τε σύ** of most MSS. It cannot however be called quite satisfactory. With it we must supply *σπουδάζειν ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό* from the preceding negative, which he is *not* to think. 'Do think so, my friend.'

Jowett and Campbell quote Phaedo 68 B *οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαί γε χρή*, and Crito 53 D *οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή.* Cf. Crito 54 A, Prot. 325 C. These passages, however, are manifestly easier, being questions to which the answer 'yes' is expected. In other words, the negative there is not a real negative, but the sign of an interrogation (= *nonne*, not *non*). So here a question *οὐ σπουδάζομεν φανῆναι αὐτό*; might have been followed naturally enough by *οἴου γε σύ.*

οὐ δυνάμεθα—i.e. 'we are incapable,' 'we lack the power.' There is no need to supply e.g. *εὑρεῖν αὐτό.*

337 A. ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν. Thrasymachus is a recognised sophist, one of the professors of instruction, and both *δεινὸς* and *σοφὸς* are specially used of sophists, in Plato, of course, ironically. Cf. Theaet. 173 B *δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται.* Protag. 341 A *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με οὑτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινός ἐστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τἀγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν.*

In Phaedr. 245 C **δεινὸς** is opposed to *σοφός* as shrewdness or practical ability is opposed to wisdom (*ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή*). Arist. Eth. VI. 13. 2 opposes *δεινότης* to *φρόνησις*, the *δεινὸς* being a person of natural ability who may become *φρόνιμος* by good training and *πανοῦργος* by bad.

The sense of *δεινὸς* here is that of 'expert,' 'past-master.'

χαλεπαίνεσθαι—this peculiar passive of the intransitive verb is adopted in order to balance the sentence.

Nevertheless there are abundant instances of verbs which 'govern' the dative in their active form turning that dative into the subject of a passive form. Cf. Thuc. IV. 61 *ξύμπαντες ἐπιβουλευόμεθα.* Xen. Symp. IV. 29 *κρεῖττόν ἐστι πιστεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος ἢ ἀπιστεῖσθαι.* A curious example of the freedom of Greek passives is to be found in Legg. 877 E *ὅταν τις ἅμα δυστυχηθῇ καὶ ἀσεβηθῇ τῶν οἴκων* 'when calamity and sin have been wrought upon it.' For more see Jowett and Campbell Republic Vol. II. p. 180.

CHAPTER XI.

ἀνεκάγχασε—'burst into a guffaw.' Cf. Euthyd. 300 D *μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας.* Hesychius explains by *ἀτάκτως* or *ἀπαιδεύτως γελᾶν.* Cf. *cachinnari* and 'cackle' (an onomatopoetic word and therefore no violation of Grimm's law).

The verb is variously given in MSS as **καχάζω** or **καγχάζω**, and it is usual to speak of the nasalised form as belonging to the later Greek. It is in keeping with this statement, that in Ar. Eccl. 849 *ἔχων, καχάζων μεθ' ἑτέρου νεανίου* the short syllable is required, while in Babrius XCIX. 8 *λύκος δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ καγχάσας* it is the long. Where metre offers no assistance the evidence of MSS is too inconsistent to be trusted. Since, however, Homer always uses *καγχαλάω*, and since the word is onomatopoetic, it is possible that both forms existed together, *καχάζω* prevailing in earlier times and *καγχάζω* in later. The reading and metre in Soph. Aj. 198 are both doubtful.

σαρδάνιον—'a bitter laugh.' Cf. Hom. Od. xx. 301 *μείδησε δὲ θυμῷ | σαρδάνιον μάλα τοῖον.* Cic. ad Fam. VII. 25. 1 *ridere γέλωτα σαρδάνιον.*

The forms **σαρδόνιον, Σαρδώνιον** are due to the notion that the word was derived from the effects of the acrid *ranunculus Sardous* on the faces of those who ate that plant. Cf. Verg. Ecl. VII. 41 *Immo ego Sardoniis videar tibi amarior herbis.* Paus. x. 17. 13 *ἡ πόα δὲ ἡ ὀλέθριος σελίνῳ μέν ἐστιν ἐμφερής, τοῖς φαγοῦσι δὲ γελῶσιν ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὴν τελευτὴν λέγουσιν· ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ Ὅμηρός τε καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα ἄνθρωποι τὸν ἐπὶ οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ Σαρδάνιον γέλωτα ὀνομάζουσι.* This explanation represents a 'popular etymology.' The true derivation is doubtful, the connexion with *σαίρω, σεσηρώς* being hardly convincing.

καὶ εἶπεν...ἔφη: cf. 329 B *ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπό τινος Πῶς, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.* and note.

αὕτη 'κείνη—'here is (an instance of) that celebrated...' Cf. Soph. El. 1115 *οἲ 'γὼ τάλαινα, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖν' ἤδη σαφές.* Tac. Ann. XIV. 22 *hunc illum numine deum destinari credebant.* Luc. Somn. 11 *δείξει σε τῷ δακτύλῳ, οὗτος ἐκεῖνος λέγων.*

εἰρωνεία—'mock-modesty.' Cf. Aristot. Eth. IV. 7. 2 *δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν...* § 14 *οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται. οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν...οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει.* Cf. ibid. II. 7. 12.

Theophrastus has a 'character' of the *εἴρων* (Char. 1) in which he defines *εἰρωνεία* 'roughly' as *προσποίησις ἐπὶ χεῖρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων.* His *εἴρων*, however, proves to be a very different person from Socrates, although pretended ignorance is a point in common (cf. Symp. 216 D sqq.). See also Cic. Brut. § 292 *Ego, inquit, ironiam illam quam in Socrate dicunt fuisse, qua ille in Platonis et Xenophontis et Aeschinis libris utitur, facetam et elegantem puto. Est enim et minime inepti hominis et eiusdem etiam faceti, cum de sapientia disceptatur, hanc sibi ipsum detrahere, eis tribuere illudentem, qui eam sibi arrogant, ut apud Platonem Socrates in caelum effert laudibus Protagoram Hippiam Prodicum Gorgiam ceteros, se autem omnium rerum inscium fingit et rudem.* See Introduction § 22 *a*.

ἀποκρίνασθαι...οὐκ ἐθελήσοις—a common accusation against Socrates.

Cf. Theaet. 150 C *ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι*

περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσιν. Xen. Mem. IV. 4. 9 ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷς ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δ' οὐδενὶ ἐθέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενός.

οὐκ ἐθελήσοις κ.τ.λ.—the 'indirect' equivalent, after a past tense, of the fut. indic. Thrasymachus would say *οὐκ ἐθελήσει*: 'he will refuse': v. Goodwin M. and T. §§ 669. 2, and 670 (*b*).

εἴ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ—not '*if* anyone *were* to ask you a question (*εἰ...ἐρωτῴη*),' but '*whenever* anybody asks you.' Thus it is not the oblique for *ἐάν τίς τι αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷ*, but for *εἴ τις...ἐρωτᾷ* (=*ὅτε τις...ἐρωτᾷ*).

σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ—i.e. 'No, (you knew I couldn't answer) because you are a man of understanding (and can see the difficulty you place me in).'

εὖ οὖν ᾔδησθα ὅτι...δῆλον, οἶμαι, σοὶ ἦν ὅτι... The sentence is in danger of becoming entangled through the length of the protasis and its attachments (**εἰ...φλυαρῇς**). The opening words are therefore resumed under another form in a manner which is entirely natural to conversation. **οἶμαι** becomes practically equivalent to *δ' οὖν*. 'You knew well that...it was clear to you, I take it, that...'

337 B. **ἀποκρινοῖτο**—the fut. opt. as above (§ A), *οὐκ ἐθελήσοις*. It follows, not the literal *δῆλον ἦν*, but its sense, as=*ᾔδησθα*, the verb *sentiendi*.

εἴ σοι εἶπεν—not *εἴποι*. 'If (in the supposed case which did not occur) he had said...'

μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι. For **μὴ** v. sup. 335 C *μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν;*

μηδ' εἰ τούτων τί τυγχάνει ὄν—(1) with **τούτων τι** in predicate, 'not even if it (sc. the thing in question) happens to be one of these,' or (2) with **τι** as subject, 'not even if one of these things happens to be the fact.' The latter plainly makes too great a demand upon the participle *ὄν*.

337 C. **ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ**—ironically. Lit. 'because, of course, this is like that!' i.e. 'as if the two cases were alike!'

Grammatically **ὡς**=*ἐπεὶ* and a previous clause is understood, e.g. '(your illustration is excellent), *seeing that* the cases are so very similar!' This appears also from Charmid. 170 A *ὅ τι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταὐτόν ἐστι τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ.* Cf. Gorg. 468 E *ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅ τι δοκεῖ σοι.* Aesch. Ag. 1633 *ὡς δὴ σύ μοι τύραννος Ἀργείων ἔσει.* Eur. Andr. 235 (without verb, as here) *ὡς δὴ σὺ σώφρων, τἀμὰ δ' οὐχὶ σώφρονα.* The ironical

force lies in **δή**: cf. Xen. Hell. v. 4. 6 *εἰσήγαγε τὰς ἑταιρίδας δή* ('the pretended'). Eur. Bacch. 224 *πρόφασιν μὲν ὡς δὴ Μαινάδας θυοσκόους.*

οὐδέν γε κωλύει. Jowett and Campbell render 'there is nothing to prevent it,' and compare the remark (inf.) *οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι κ.τ.λ.* But that answer here is more peremptory and lacks the suavity of Socrates. The passage cited from Charm. 164 A *καὶ οὐδέν γέ σε ἴσως κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν* is evidently quite different, being concessive. Rather *οὐδέν γε κωλύει* is a formula of polite concession, or waiving the point: 'be it so, if you like.' Cf. Euthyd. 272 D *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν γε σοὶ δοκῇ.* Ar. Eq. 972 &c. So *τό γε ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει* (*per me licet*), Gorg. 458 D, Lach. 188 C, and *τί γὰρ κωλύει;* Euthyph. 9 D, &c. It is doubtful whether *οὐδὲν* is the subject of *κωλύει* or adverb with the verb impersonal.

εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μή—'be that as it may (**δ' οὖν**), if it is *not* (**καὶ** emphasizes **μή**) similar.'

φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον—'if to the person asked, it (viz. the thing in question) appears to be some such thing (as you have forbidden, viz. *δὶς ἕξ* &c.).' **τοιοῦτον** is predicate, like *τούτων τι* (sup. B).

τὸ φαινόμενον—perhaps = 'the best so far as he can see,' and so slightly different from *τὸ δοκοῦν.*

In the unemphatic senses of 'seems' or 'is thought' the regular participle is *τὸ δοκοῦν*, even when the verb is *φαίνεσθαι.* Cf. 487 D *ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. Σ. ἀκούοις ἂν ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τἀληθῆ λέγειν. φαινόμενον* is rather used in special oppositions, e.g.)(*τὸ ὂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* (596 E). Here, however, it is enough to suppose that, the verb **φαίνεται** having preceded, the participle is used deliberately to recall it. 'If it so *appears*—don't you think he will give the answer which *does* so appear?'

ἡμεῖς—ironically inculpating himself with Thrasymachus. Cf. inf. 350 D *ἔφαμεν.*

ἄλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις—'you mean, of course, that *you* are going to do so?'

Though it may pass to say that either **ἄλλο τι** or **ἄλλο τι ἢ** can be used in sentences expecting an affirmative answer, it can hardly be correct to say that with *ἄλλο τι* there is an understood omission of *ἤ.* For *ἄλλο τι* itself cf. inf. 369 D, Gorg. 495 C, Symp. 201 A and, combined with *οὖν*, inf. 342 D, Euthyd. 276 A, Gorg. 467 D. The two expressions correspond to *οὐκ* and *οὔκουν* in the sense *nonne.*

From positions in which the ἄλλο τι possessed a strict grammatical regimen in the sentence (e.g. ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ ὅτι... or τί λέγεις; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι...; or finally the simple ἄλλο τι λέγεις; ='surely it is so') the combinations ἄλλο τι ἤ and ἄλλο τι each came, by an irrational brachylogy, to be regarded as introducing a question, while intimating an assurance that the thing *is* so.

οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι...εἴ μοι...δόξειεν—either (1) 'I should not be surprised if I were to see fit to do so,' or (2) 'I should not be surprised (*to give such an answer*), if on consideration I thought it so.'

The latter appears to be chosen by Jowett, and by Davies and Vaughan, and grammatically might be supported by Euthyph. 6 c ΕΥ. *διηγήσομαι ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.* ΣΩ. *οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, ἀλλά, κ.τ.λ.*, but is much less natural. Its adoption seems to be due in the first instance to a misapprehension of the sense of *εἴ μοι οὕτω δόξειεν*, which does not mean 'if it seemed to me to be so,' but 'if I thought well to do so.'

337 D. **τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν**—'what do you think you deserve to have done to you?' This is the first part of a judicial formula, the completion of which is hinted at in **ἀπότεισον** immediately below.

In full it is found in Apol. 36 B *τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου· εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι;* Cf. Polit. 299 A *τιμᾶν ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν αὐτῶν τινὰς ἢ ἀποτίνειν.* Xen. Mem. II. 9. 5, Leg. ap. Dem. (Meid.) 529.

The two words embraced punishment of the person (death, imprisonment, ἀτιμία &c.), and pecuniary penalty.

ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ—'yes! you are a sweet innocent!' Cf. inf. 527 D, Gorg. 491 E ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ, inf. 348 C ὦ ἥδιστε. Similarly Hipp. Mai. 288 B ὡς γλυκὺς εἶ. Or 'you are pleased to be facetious.'

For **γὰρ**—v. on 338 D βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ.

ἀπότεισον.

That this was the correct spelling in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. is certain from Meisterhans, §§ 15. 28 and 64. 6. The present is *τίνω*, but the forms *τείσω, ἔτεισα, ἐτείσθην* alone are warranted.

Socrates and Plato cherished a genuine and vehement repugnance to receiving pay for teaching. Cf. Apol. 19 D, 31 C, Xen. Mem. I. 2. 60, 6. 11, 6. 13 (*τὴν σοφίαν...τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν*). Jowett and Campbell fully illustrate from Plato Socrates' habit of bantering the sophists on their money-making. See also Introduction § 23.

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδάν μοι γένηται. οὐκοῦν = 'yes,' is conversational. Cf. Ar. Pax 364 ΕΡ. *ἀπόλωλας, ὦ κακόδαιμον.* ΤΡ. *οὐκοῦν, ἢν λάχω*, and somewhat similarly Polit. 289 D ΞΕ. *ἴθι δὴ σκεψώμεθα...* ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *οὐκοῦν χρή.* Perhaps originally 'will it not, then, be when...?'

For the poverty of Socrates cf. Apol. 23 B *ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμί*, 37 C, 38 B *ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου.* In Xen. Oec. II. 3 he assesses his total property at 5 minae.

ἀλλ' ἔστιν...ἀλλ' ἕνεκα ἀργυρίου κ.τ.λ.—for reiterated *ἀλλὰ* cf. 327 B. Here, however, each = 'nay,' and one repeats the other.

εἰσοίσομεν—'we will club together.' The word is especially common as applied to *ἔρανοι* (friendly loans by contribution). Cf. Symp. 177 C *ἐπιθυμῶ τούτῳ ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν.*

The *locus* for *ἔρανοι* is Dem. Meid. 547 (101) where both *εἰσφέρειν* and *φέρειν* are used. The latter occurs again ibid. 573 (184), followed by *εἰσενήνοχε*.

337 E. λαμβάνῃ λόγον—not = λ. *τὸν λόγον*, but a current phrase 'begin to argue' ('against' being implied). Cf. Meno 75 D *εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν.* Compare 'to take objection.'

πῶς γὰρ ἂν...ἀπειρημένον εἴη. The sense itself is clear: 'how could a man answer if, in the first place, he had no knowledge and did not pretend to any, and (if), in the second, it had been forbidden him to say anything he *thought*?' The first 'if,' however, according to the MSS, is only expressed in the participle, while the second (with the reading *ἀπειρημένον εἴη*) is not expressed at all.

The sentence being thus ungrammatical, it is possible to take divers views of its evolution.

(A) If the reading of MSS is as Plato left it, he may have written *ἀπειρημένον εἴη* either (1) under the impression that he had said *εἰ πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδείη μηδὲ φάσκοι*, the sense 'if' being present to his mind, though not the actual manner in which he had expressed it. We may compare Prot. 327 D *εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια...ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες.* Or (2) in consequence of a confusion, the use of *εἰ* in the subordinate clause *εἴ τι καὶ οἴεται* leaving the impression that the 'if' of the main clause had actually been expressed (in other words, *εἰ* is made to do double duty).

(B) If the reading is incorrect we may emend (1) by omitting **εἴη** with Stallbaum. **ἀπειρημένον** then stands absolutely (like *ἐξόν, παρέχον, δόξαν, προσταχθέν, εἰρημένον* &c., Goodwin M. and T. 851)

and = *εἰ ἀπείρηται*, the participle containing the same hypothetical force as *εἰδὼς* and *φάσκων* just above. We should then have to assume that an early copyist or editor missed the construction and inserted *εἴη*, though this would involve the further assumption that a person so solicitous about making Plato grammatical himself failed to see that his own *εἴη* had no regimen. A reader who missed the grammar of the 'absolute' participle would perhaps be quite capable of the other blunder; (2) as in the present text, **ἔπειτα εἰ, <ὅ> τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων**, *ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη, κ.τ.λ.*: 'and in the second place if, in regard to whatever he *thinks* about them, it were forbidden...'

φάσκων—with the frequent implication of pretence. Cf. inf. 538 A *οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων.*

<ὅ> τι καὶ οἴεται. **καὶ** emphasizes the contrast of thinking with knowing (*δόξα* with *ἐπιστήμη*). 'If he goes so far as to *think*...'

ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ. Properly **ὅπως** and **ὅπως μὴ** with fut. indic. are used only after verbs of planning or considering (*φροντίζω, ἐπιμελοῦμαι, σκοπεῖν, βουλεύομαι* &c.). Thence by brachylogy came an imperative use (*σκόπει*) *ὅπως μὴ ἐρεῖς* &c. This was taken as a normal way of expressing a direct command without the association of any verb of precaution. Thence, as a command in indirect discourse, it becomes naturally attached to verbs like *παραγγέλλειν, ἀπαγορεύω* &c. Cf. inf. 415 B *παραγγέλλει ὅπως μὴ ἔσονται*, 549 E *διακελεύονται ὅπως τιμωρήσεται πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους.*

338 A. **χαρίζου**—not merely 'do me the favour,' but='be liberal.' Cf. the Homeric *χαρίζεσθαι παρεόντων* &c. Reference has already been made to the commercial spirit of the sophists. Note also **μὴ φθονήσῃς** following, and cf. Protag. 327 A *εἰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου κ.τ.λ.*

Γλαύκωνα τόνδε—though *οὑτοσί*, and not *οὗτος*, is necessary with proper names when the article is absent, *ὅδε* (deictic) is used freely without article. Cf. Prot. 316 B, 318 A, 329 B, 340 C, 341 C, Lach. 178 A, 180 A, 187 C (*bis*), Ap. 33 D, E, 38 B, Meno 89 E &c.

CHAPTER XII.

παγκάλην. Of three terminations in Plato (Phaedr. 276 E, Legg. 722 C), but in Ar. Plut. 1018 (*χεῖρας παγκάλους*) of two. Cf. Ar. Lys. 969 sq. *ἡ παμβδελυρὰ καὶ παμμυσαρά...καὶ παγγλυκερά.* So *παναγάθη, πανημερία, πανυστάτη* were in use.

φιλονικεῖν. It seems probable that in later Greek the spelling (and implication) **φιλονεικεῖν** prevailed over an earlier **φιλονικεῖν**. Both words can be accounted for in point of sense, and naturally overlap each other in that respect. 'To be contentious' and 'to be eager for victory' amount to much the same thing.

Though the MSS of Plato shew *-ει-* everywhere except in Legg. 935 B (Par. A there has *φιλονικήσῃ*), other MSS often vary in the form given, and the decision must rest with such other evidence as is obtainable. Inf. 581 B *φιλόνικον καὶ φιλότιμον* answer to *νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν* in the previous sentence; 582 E *φιλότιμός τε καὶ φιλόνικος* correspond to *τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ*; 586 C *φιλοτιμίαν ἢ φιλονικίαν* is followed by *τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης*. In none of these cases, it is true, is it explicitly stated that the relevant parts of the words are etymologically identical, but it is clear that Plato did so associate them. It is moreover to be remembered that, whereas in later Greek the pronunciation of *ει* and *ι* became identical, and in MSS one is indiscriminately substituted for the other, no such confusion existed in Plato's time. Arist. (Rhet. II. 12. 6) has more unmistakably *καὶ φιλότιμοι μέν εἰσι, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις*, and ibid. I. 10. 4 *ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμήν, ὁ δ' ὀξύθυμος δι' ὀργήν, ὁ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ νίκην*. These passages prove *φιλόνικος*, though they do not disprove a *φιλόνεικος* beside it. Cobet (Nov. Lect. p. 692) points out, indeed, that an adjective compounded with *νεῖκος* would result in a form in *-νεικής* (cf. *ἀκλεής, ἀδεής, Πολυνείκης*). He overlooks, however, the fact that a *νείκη* = *νεῖκος* has good authority. All that can be said is that the forms *φιλόνικος, -νικεῖν, -νικία* are the more probable for Plato.

φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι κ.τ.λ. **πρὸς**, as after *σπουδάζειν, ἁμιλλᾶσθαι* &c., of the object aimed at.

[In Protag. 360 E *φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον*, there is no need to suspect a loss of *πρός*. V. Goodwin M. and T. § 791.]

338 B. **αὕτη δὴ...ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία**: 'here is the wisdom of Socrates, with a vengeance': i.e. it consists in being shrewd enough to get what he can for nothing.

παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ. The whole tone of the passage shews that Thrasymachus, regarding Socrates as a sophist, though a peculiar one, means 'Socrates, for all his reputed wisdom, is one who won't himself teach, but goes the round (sc. of the schools of the sophists, the *στοαί* &c.) and learns from the rest (sc. *τῶν ἄλλων διδασκάλων* = *σοφιστῶν*) without even so much as paying them a thank-you, much less a fee.'

This is more pointed than to take **τῶν ἄλλων** as simply = 'other people' and **περιιόντα** as simply = 'going about.' In the latter case there would be no occasion for money-payment, nor (in most cases) even for *ἔπαινος*. These things belong rather to the formal instructors, e.g. Prodicus.

The expression **χάριν ἀποδιδόναι** also should be noted. The ordinary terms are *χάριν ἔχειν*, *εἰδέναι*, and *ἀποδιδόναι* is only combined with *χάριν* in order to allude pointedly to the propriety of a 'payment.'

ἐκτίνειν...ἐκτίνω. Thrasymachus had said *ἀποδιδόναι*. Socrates uses another and stronger word: 'I do pay *a full* return, of as great a sort as I can.'

ψεύδει—'you are in error.'

οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ εὖ ἐρεῖν. Editors regularly print **γάρ σε**. Yet the emphatic pronoun seems demanded. The sense is 'I praise zealously when I think a man speaks well. You will find that out at once when you answer. For I think *you* will speak well.' The compliment is in the style of Socrates.

338 C. **τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον.** See Introd. at this place.

τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς;—*quin laudas?* = 'come now, praise me!' The expression is quasi-imperative, and hence there is no difficulty in the following future. 'Praise me! Nay, (I know) you will not.' Cf. Protag. 310 E *ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν;*

καὶ τοῦτο...τί ποτε λέγεις; **καὶ** looks forward to **τί**, with the same implication of surprise, or slowness to understand, as in a closely combined **καὶ τί**.

Πουλυδάμας. Of Scotoussa (Scotoessa) in Thessaly, victor in the pancratium at the Olympic games B.C. 408.

Pausanias VII. 27. 6 speaks of his statue standing at Olympia in his own day (circ. 180 A.D.). He remains the traditional type of invincible athlete as late as the literature of Lucian (Quom. Hist. Con. 35). The scholiast on the present passage tells of his great stature and of his killing lions &c. while on a visit to Dareius Ochus. The name is variously quoted as *Πουλυδάμας* or *Πολυδάμας*. The latter is plainly only the atticised pronunciation of the former, which is genuine Thessalian.

ὁ παγκρατιαστής. The *παγκράτιον* was a combination of wrestling and boxing. Plut. Symp. II. 4 *ὅτι γὰρ μέμικται τὸ παγκράτιον ἔκ τε πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης δῆλον.* Aristot. Rhet. I. 5. 14 *ὁ δὲ θλίβειν (δυνάμενος) καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὦσαι τῇ πληγῇ πυκτικός, ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις παγκρατιαστικός.*

τὰ βόεια κρέα. '*His* beef diet' or '*the regulation* beef diet' (of an athlete).

338 D. ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον. This is misrepresenting Thrasymachus. See Introduction.

βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ. 'That's just like your gross behaviour.' Lit. '(Of course you must garble things) because you are shameless.' Cf. 340 D *συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ.* Sup. 337 D *ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ.*

Theophrastus has a character (No. 11) of the **βδελυρός,** in which the prevailing feature is *παιδιὰ ἐπιφανὴς καὶ ἐπονείδιστος* ('obtrusive and objectionable pleasantry' Jebb). This is the charge intended here. Apposite also is Ar. Ach. 289 *τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς; ἀναίσχυντος εἶ καὶ βδελυρός.*

ταύτῃ ὑπολαμβάνεις:—either (1) 'you understand (take) things in such a way,' or (2) 'you catch one up in such a way.' See lexicons for both meanings. The former appears the better: 'you put such a construction on (things).' It is possible, but not necessary, to understand *τὸν λόγον* also with *ὑπολαμβάνεις* (i.e. *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ*).

ἂν κακουργήσαις.

[Above (A) we have the form *εὐδοκιμήσειεν.* The metrical evidence of Aristophanes and the other comedians is all in favour of making *-ειας, -ειε* the proper terminations of the first aor. opt. 2nd and 3rd persons in Attic conversation. They use *-αις, -αι* only in poetic quotation or paratragedy. These forms were therefore literary. As, however, they existed, and as MSS shew no variation here, it appears safest to retain *κακουργήσαις* in the text, with a hint that Plato probably wrote *κακουργήσειας.* For a full discussion see Rutherford New Phryn. pp. 433 sqq.; where it appears that the 2nd person in *-αις* must have been more familiar to the Athenians than the 3rd person in *-αι*, but that it was hardly conversational.]

For **κακουργεῖν** in reference to argument cf. Gorg. 483 A *ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου.* Aristot. Rhet. III. 2. 7 *τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ).* Cope on Aristot. Rhet. I. 1. 10 (*ἧττον κακοῦργον ἡ δημηγορία*) explains that the word is used 'of the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectic reasoning.' So Dem. Lept. 491 *ἐπειδάν τις κακουργῶν ἐπὶ μὴ προσήκοντα πράγματα τοὺς λόγους μεταφέρῃ.*

εἶτ'—expressing impatience, as often. Eur. Andr. 666 &c.

τοῦτο κρατεῖ...τὸ ἄρχον. κρατεῖ here, as in 339 A, is correctly treated as the verb corresponding to the adjective *κρείττων* in the

definition of 'Justice.' Thrasymachus is pointing out what the *κρεῖττον* in each case is. "This then is the 'stronger' in each state."

τοῦτο is not=*τόδε*, nor used in anticipation of *τὸ ἄρχον*. Grammatically **τὸ ἄρχον** is an afterthought, exegetic of *τοῦτο*, which itself refers to something implied in a previous expression. The speaker is not satisfied, after saying *τοῦτο*, that the hearer will grasp exactly what it imports, and therefore adds an explanation. Thus "some states are under despotisms, some democratic, some under aristocracies:...Well then, *that* is the 'stronger' in each state—, I mean the governing power." In the same way inf. 583 D *τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία* (the previous sentence having said *τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν*). Cf. Gorg. 478 C.

[For different forms of government and the *ἄρχον* (or *κύριον*) in each case, cf. Aristot. Pol. III. 6. 1, 7. 2. In the latter place he remarks *ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς· ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις.*]

τίθεται. A distinction frequently imagined between *θεῖναι νόμους* (of an autocrat) and *θέσθαι νόμους* (of a republican legislator) is not sound. A republican legislator may *τιθέναι νόμους* when regarded simply as *framer* of laws for a community which has appointed him to the task. On the other hand an autocrat may *τίθεσθαι νόμους* when the notion of self-interest is emphasized. The middle here and in 339 C differs from the active (339 C) only in the greater prominence of that notion.

It would be better to say that (1) **θεῖναι νόμους** has reference to the mere act of legislating for a state (whether, as with a republican like Draco, the legislator must obey the laws himself, or, as with a despot, he need not), (2) **θέσθαι νόμους** has reference to the effect upon oneself of the legislation (whether, as with republican states, it be for their own obedience as well as interest, or, as with a despot, for his own interest only). The natural result is of course that *θεῖναι νόμον* is the *usual* expression of either a despot or a constitutionally appointed framer of laws, while *θέσθαι νόμον* is the *usual* expression of a people legislating for itself. In other words, the middle does not imply the binding of the legislator but the serving of his interests.

338 E. **ἑκάστῃ**—

Par. A has **ἑκάστῃ**, of which Jowett and Campbell remark that it is 'a manifest error.' But it is hard to see why *ἡ ἀρχὴ τίθεται τοὺς νόμους ἑκάστῃ* (*πόλει*) could not be right, if the middle *τίθεται* be explained as in the last note. On general principles it is more likely that *ἑκάστῃ* should be altered to *ἑκάστη* than *vice versa*. In point of sense, however, *ἑκάστη* is more natural, and the dative may be due to the dative in the previous line.

οὕτως—very frequently = *ὡσαύτως* in Plato. Cf. Prot. 319 C.

ἀπέφηναν...**εἶναι**—'declare it to be,' 'make it into.' The aorist is gnomic. Goodwin M. and T. § 155. Joined with present in Symp. 188 A *ὅταν ὁ Ἔρως ἐγκρατέστερος γένηται, διαφθείρει τε πολλὰ καὶ ἠ δ ί κ η σ ε ν*, and with perfect Prot. 328 B, C.

τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα. One MS only has **τοῦτο**. Both cases are allowable, according to the shade of meaning attaching to the verb.

In *ἐκβαίνειν τούτου* the thought is literally 'depart from,' cf. Prot. 326 D *ὃς δ' ἂν ἐ κ τ ὸ ς β α ί ν ῃ τούτων κολάζει*, while in *ἐκβαίνειν τοῦτο* the verb has come to be treated as if it were like e.g. *παραβαίνειν* ('transgress'). Contrast 380 D *τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν*, 404 A *ἐὰν ἐκβῶσι τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης* with Symp. 183 B *ἐκβαίνειν τὸν ὅρκον*, and also compare the uses of *ἐξίσταμαί τι* = 'avoid,' 'shirk' (*κίνδυνον*, Dem. Lept. 460), and *ἐξίσταμαί τινος* 'depart from,' inf. 380 D (*ἐξίσταιτο τῆς ἰδέας*).

Often of course it is equally possible to use either, as in the present instance.

τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν...**ὃ λέγω**...**ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον**. "It is in this sense, then, that I use the expression that 'the same thing is just.'" = 'This, then, is what I mean by the same thing being just.' Cf. 332 A. Davies and Vaughan mistranslate 'therefore my meaning is *that* in all cities &c.'

339 A. **κρατεῖ** = *κρεῖττόν ἐστι*, v. sup. 338 D (ad fin.).

ξυμβαίνει—i.e. logically. Cf. sup. 334 D.

νῦν...**ἔμαθον**. The aorist for English present, as in *ἤκουσα, ξυνῆκα, ἐδεξάμην τὸ ῥηθέν* &c. V. note on *γελάσας* sup. 331 D.

τὸ ξυμφέρον...**ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι**—which, plainly, is not the same as saying that *τὸ δίκαιον* is *τὸ ξυμφέρον*. See Introduction.

A strictly logical antagonist would have reversed the subject and predicate of *εἶναι* and said e.g. *ξυμφέρον μέν τι καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι*...*πρόσεστι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Plato, however, is far from logical (see Introduction §§ 9 *a*, 14, 15 *b* and *c*).

ἀποκρινοίμην—future. V. sup. 337 E.

πρόσεστι δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι κ.τ.λ. "It is true that in this case (i.e. in

your definition) there is added *the phrase* 'of the stronger.'" Cf. Meno 73 D *οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως;*

Since *τὸ ξυμφέρον* has preceded, it is better not to supply *ξυμφέρον* with *τὸ*, which simply introduces the quotation. In other words the substantive belonging to **τὸ** is the expression *τοῦ κρείττονος*.

339 B. **ἴσως**—sarcastically: 'I daresay.'

οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη. 'It is not yet shewn, on the other hand, whether it is a *great* one,' or 'whether it is a great one, either.'

ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον κ.τ.λ. No *δὲ*-clause follows. **μὲν** almost $=$ *γε*. See note on 334 C.

προστίθῃς—used absolutely, 'make an addition.' V. sup. 335 A.

σκεπτέον δή. Σκόπει—cf. inf. 342 A *σκέψεται...σκοπουμένῃ*, 369 A *οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα...ἐπισκοποῦντες*, ibid. B *σκοπεῖτε οὖν. Ἔσκεπται.*

[The Attic paradigm is *σκοπεῖν* (*σκοποῦμαι*), *ἐσκόπουν* (*ἐσκοπούμην*), *σκέψομαι*, *ἐσκεψάμην*, *ἔσκεμμαι*, *σκεπτέον*. The 'regular' forms *σκοπήσω*, *ἐσκόπησα* &c. begin from Aristotle. In Lach. 185 B *περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα καὶ σκεπτόμεθα* the form is probably deliberately chosen for the sound with *βουλευόμεθα*, while known to be unusual. That *σκοποῦμαι* and *σκοπῶ* are absolutely indistinguishable may be seen from Lach. 185 D, where *σκοπῆται*, *σκοπῇ*, *ἐσκόπει*, *σκοπούμενοι*, *σκοποῦμεν* follow each other without any shade of difference in the meaning. Rhythm may have had something to do with the choice.]

CHAPTER XIII.

οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι κ.τ.λ.—**καὶ** belongs principally to **πείθεσθαι**, while **οὐ...μέντοι** introduces a question, to which the anticipated answer is 'yes' (in virtue of **οὐ**), and which suggests a new point likely to have some qualifying effect (in virtue of **μέντοι**). Lit. 'don't you, *however*, say that it is just, *further*, to obey the rulers?' Cf. inf. 346 A *ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε εἰπέ· οὐχὶ ἑκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*; 521 D, 602 C &c. Theaet. 163 E, and elsewhere, very frequently. In Prot. 309 A *εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ;* the qualifying force of *μέντοι* is that of exculpation.

339 C. **ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκάσταις**—'In the several (or respective) states.' **ἑκάσταις** is less emphatic in this position than in *ἐν ἑκάσταις ταῖς πόλεσιν* = 'in each and all the states.' So

Phaedr. 248 E *εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἥκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστη* ('the several souls') *οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων.*

οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν—For **οἷοι** with inf. v. sup. 334 D. **καὶ** throws a stress upon **ἁμαρτεῖν**: 'they are capable of a *mistake* occasionally.'

τοὺς δέ τινας—the addition of **τινας** is not without point. 'Some rightly, and some (i.e. perhaps only few, but still some) wrongly.' The force of **τι** in *οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν* is similar.

[There are, of course, other uses of *οἱ δέ τινες*, where *τινες* has no such implication as here.]

τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς—sc. *τιθέναι*. That this is the grammar, and not *τὸ* "*ὀρθῶς*" ("the term 'rightly'"), is shewn by the following **μὴ** *ὀρθῶς*. "The term 'wrongly'" would have required *τὸ* **οὐκ** *ὀρθῶς*. V. sup. 334 E.

ἑαυτοῖς—with **ξυμφέροντα**. The self-regarding middle **τίθεσθαι** could not properly be used with a reflexive pronoun.

339 D. **τί λέγεις σύ;**—**σύ**, though in the best, is not in all, MSS, but it (1) is more characteristic of Thrasymachus, as it adds a tone of impatience or asperity, (2) lends additional point to the *σὺ* in Socrates' answer. For the tone 'acriter contradicentium' of *τί λέγεις σύ;* see Blaydes on Ar. Nub. 1172 sqq.

νῦν μέν γ' ἰδεῖν εἶ πρῶτον ἐξαρνητικὸς
κἀντιλογικός, καὶ τοῦτο τοὐπιχώριον
ἀτεχνῶς ἐπανθεῖ, τὸ τί λέγεις σύ;

οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οἴου τοίνυν...καὶ...: 'I believe so.... Then believe also....' Jowett and Campbell compare 430 C, where *ἀποδέχομαι* is followed by the reply *καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου κ.τ.λ.* Thrasymachus' answer is a grudging one, and Socrates, ironically taking up his word **οἶμαι**, instead of replying with e.g. 'then it must be clear to you,' says 'if you believe so (go a step further with your believing and) believe....'

Plato enters into the feelings of his refuted sophists, and graduates their terms of assent from the ready and cheerful to the impatient and sullen. Cf. Prot. 360 C sqq. *πάνυ γε...συνέφη,...ἐπένευσεν... πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθ' ἐπένευσεν...αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.*

339 E. **τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῄς**—a condensation for *τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον ᾖ, ὡς σὺ φῄς*: 'and when (nevertheless) it is, according to your account, just....'

οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὑτωσὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοὐναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις;—(1) 'must it not of necessity *follow* that, in

such case, it is just to do exactly the opposite of what you contend for?'

This punctuation was first given by Madvig, the earlier editors being misled by the unusually wide separation of **αὐτὸ** from **τοὐναντίον**. The position of *αὐτὸ* is due to strong emphasis. The sense of **συμβαίνειν** is as in 339 A.

Otherwise (2) it is possible to place a comma after **οὑτωσὶ**, and to render 'must *it* (*αὐτὸ*) not *turn out* thus, (viz.) that it is just to do the opposite of what you contend for?' **αὐτὸ** then = 'the case' (with which we are dealing).

340 A. **Κλειτοφῶν**—v. 328 B and Introd. § 3 *c*. He supports his master Thrasymachus, and his observation is not particularly polite.

δεῖται—sc. *Σωκράτης*, to be supplied from *αὐτῷ* preceding.

The rendering 'what need is there of a witness?' answers rather to a *τί δεῖ...*; but is not out of the question. Cf. Meno 79 C *δεῖ οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως...ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως;* Soph. O. C. 570 *ὥστε βραχέ' ἐμοὶ δεῖσθαι φράσαι.*

'There is need' = *δεῖ*. 'It (the thing in question) needs' = *δεῖται*. But the latter is very rare and not entirely above suspicion.

τὸ...τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ.—Thrasymachus admitted this 339 B (fin.).

τὸ γάρ...καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος κ.τ.λ.—Both instances of **γάρ**, belonging as they do to the vivacity of conversational retort, are somewhat elusive of precise interpretation. The ellipses however can be roughly supplied as follows. 'Yes,' says Cleitophon, '(but there is no overthrow of Thrasymachus in that) for what he laid down as just was the doing what was *bidden* by the rulers.' 'Nay,' replies Polemarchus, '(that is not all) for he also laid it down &c.' In English we say 'yes, but,' followed by 'nay, but he also....'

The unusual separation of **κελευόμενα** from **ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων**—a hyperbaton certain to be felt by a Greek reader—throws an emphasis upon *κελευόμενα*. Cleitophon wishes to shift the definition from a doing of *τὸ ξυμφέρον τοῦ ἄρχοντος* to a doing of his commands.

340 B. **ὃ ἡγοῖτο**—some MSS have **ἡγεῖτο.** The imperfect indicative is out of place, and what is required is the oblique of either *ὃ ἡγεῖται* or *ὃ ἂν ἡγῆται* after the past tense. *ὃ ἡγοῖτο* would

represent either, or the present ὁ ἡγεῖται must remain for the former. Goodwin M. and T. § 669. 2.

τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι—sc. *ἔλεγεν* (from the previous sentence).

CHAPTER XIV.

340 D. συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ—for **γὰρ** cf. 338 D.

For *συκοφαντία ἐν λόγοις* in the sense of sophistical quibbling or logical cheating cf. Arist. Rhet. II. 24 § 10 *ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρός τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν*, and Soph. Elench. 15. 5 *σοφιστικὸν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτώντων.*

αὐτίκα—'for instance' (i.e. not to linger over the matter, but take the first example to hand). The use is very frequent, e.g. Protag. 359 E, Phaedr. 235 E. In Gorg. 472 C more fully *αὐτίκα πρῶτον.* Similarly *εὐθύς* in Aristot. Pol. III. 4 § 6 *ὥσπερ ζῷον εὐθύς.*

καλεῖς σὺ—the **σὺ** of impatience, which we rather express in the verb, 'now, *do* you call...?' Cf. 339 D *τί λέγεις σύ;* 'what *are* you saying?'

λογιστικόν—'accountant' or 'arithmetician' (not 'reasoner,' since Plato is speaking of professional occupations). Cf. *λογιστής* (inf.) = 'auditor' and 'teacher of arithmetic.' Gorg. 451 C *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητική, ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει* (and context).

λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως—For two manners of rendering **οὕτως** v. 331 C (*ἁπλῶς οὕτως*). The better here, as there, is 'just,' 'offhand,' i.e. 'we do say loosely in so many words.' Cf. Gorg. 450 E *οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι*...'not but what you did, so far as that goes, make use of the form of words, that....' There is an emphasis on **τῷ ῥήματι**, 'so far as the *form of words* goes.' Cf. Theaet. 166 D *τὸν δὲ λόγον μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίωκε.*

ὁ γραμματιστής—'the writing-master' (Prot. 326 D) or 'teacher of reading and writing.'

He is to be distinguished from the *γραμματικός*, who was a critic and man of letters. Cf. *litterator*)(*litteratus.*

τὸ δ' = 'whereas in point of fact.' Cf. inf. 357 A *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον*, 443 C, Prot. 344 E, *σὺ δὲ φῄς, ὦ Πίττακε, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι· τὸ δέ ἐστι γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δὲ ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον.* Apol. 23 A *τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι*, &c. So later, in e.g. Lucian Alex. 17 *τὸ δ' οὖν πᾶν ψεῦδός ἐστι.*

The use originated in an antithesis of *τὸ μὲν...τὸ δὲ* (like *τοῦτο μὲν ...τοῦτο δὲ* Hdt. I. 161 &c.) = 'on the one hand...on the other....'

The τὸ μὲν of the first member is then omitted, or rather τὸ δὲ comes to have the meaning 'on the other hand' without the assistance of a preceding τὸ μὲν. Grammatically τὸ δὲ is in apposition to its sentence.

340 E. δημιουργῶν. The width of application of the word *δημιουργὸς* is perhaps best illustrated by Hom. Od. XVII. 383

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἳ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασι,
μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων
ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἀείδων;

It includes all those who practise a skilled calling which brings them into service to the public, e.g. sculptors (inf. 529 E), physicians (Symp. 186 D), confectioners (Hdt. VII. 31); and therefore embraces both trades and professions. Its use as = *χειροτέχναι* alone is narrower.

For the *ἰατρός* as *δημιουργός* cf. Aristot. Pol. III. 11 § 11 *ἰατρὸς δὲ ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην.*

ἢ σοφός—in the mouth of Thrasymachus, and in the context, *σοφός*, used as a noun, implies that there is such a thing as a professional *σοφός* with a recognised standing as an expert in wisdom. The *σοφοί* (among whom, as a sophist, Thrasymachus would include himself) would be authoritative guides to right views in general. Cf. Xen. Mem. II. 1. 20 *Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός*, Euthyph. 2 C *κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι*, Meno 75 C, &c.

ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ—put loosely for *ὅταν δημιουργὸς ᾖ σοφὸς ᾖ ἄρχων ᾖ.*

τοιοῦτον οὖν...νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι—'well then, take it that I also just now answered you to the same purpose,' or, in other words, 'take it that the answer which I just now gave was meant in the same way.'

νῦν δὴ (with a past tense) in Plato and the dramatists *regularly* = 'just now,' while in most writers it = *nunc cum maxime* ('at this very moment'). Its force is sometimes brought out strongly by an antithesis to *νῦν*, e.g. Legg. 683 E *ἢ ν ῦ ν δὴ μὲν ὀ λ ί γ ο ν ἔ μ - π ρ ο σ θ ε ν τούτοις περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις οὕτω ταῦτ' ἐτίθεμεν, ν ῦ ν δ ὲ ἐπιλελήσμεθα*, and a line quoted from the comic poet Magnes *ν ῦ ν δ ὴ μὲν ὤμνυς μὴ γεγονέναι, ν ῦ ν δ ὲ φῄς.*

ἀποκρίνεσθαι is imperfect, corresponding to the direct *τοιοῦτον νῦν δὴ ἀπεκρινόμην*. Cf. inf. 341 B *ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες.*

τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν—'but the strictly accurate

(way of speaking) is this' (*ἐκεῖνο*=*illud*, of what follows). The infinitive clause following is exegetic of *ἐκεῖνο* (v. 329 D).

CHAPTER XV.

341 A. ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντα—Cf. Gorg. 483 A and v. sup. 338 D. **σε** belongs to **ἐρέσθαι.** 'Nay, do you think it was maliciously and with knavery that I put you the question in the way I did?'

341 B. οὔτε μὴ λαθὼν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο—Lit. 'nor could you, when you failed to remain undetected, force me by sheer argument.'

The tense of **λαθὼν** is important; it differs from *λανθάνων* by assuming that the attempt has first been made. 'I should detect you if you tried trickery; also, when you were detected (and had to come into the open), you could not overpower me by strict argument.'

For the form of sentence cf. Apol. 32 A *οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν ἀπολοίμην.* The word **βιάσασθαι** is in keeping with the eristic attitude of the sophist. Socrates would rather say *πεῖσαι.* At the same time, the antithesis of *λανθάνειν* and *βιάζεσθαι* was not rare (cf. Xen. Mem. IV. 4. 21).

τοιοῦτον—'such a misunderstanding.'

τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.—'The ruler in the loose sense, or the ruler in the strict signification, of whom you just now spoke.'

The phrase **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν** is restrictive or qualifying, and is so used in two connexions (1) when the speaker owns that he is not aiming at strict exactness in the particular language he chooses, but qualifies it with 'to speak approximately' or 'not to be too particular.' This is the sense here (cf. 340 D *τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως*), Legg. 639 D, &c.: (2) when he qualifies a *word*, which may be too strong or comprehensive, by adding 'I might almost say' (*prope dixerim*). Cf. Apol. 17 A *καίτοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι* (where *οὐδὲν* is too strong). So *πᾶσα, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* in Gorg. 450 B, Aesch. Pers. 714 *διαπεπόρθηται τὰ Περσῶν πράγμαθ', ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος.* Phaedr. 258 E *τίνος ἕνεκα κἄν τις, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ζῴη;* These two uses of 'so to speak' are closely related, and in e.g. Legg. 656 E *οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστόν, ἀλλ' ὄντως* they practically coincide.

[A sense given in some lexicons, but which the phrase never has, is that of 'as the saying goes.']

ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες—If we read **ὃν** it of course refers to **τὸν ἄρχοντα** (viz. 340 E), not to **λόγῳ**. Cf. inf. 343 E *λέγω γὰρ ὅνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν*. But the reading **ὃ** of MSS is quite satisfactory 'as you were just now saying': lit. '(to take the expression) which you just now used.' Thrasymachus had said *κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον* (340 E).

οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι—'I ask no quarter (or concession) from you.' The genitive may be explained (1) *ad sensum*, as if *παρίεμαι = αἰτοῦμαι παρά*; (2) on the same principle as *τοῦτό σου θαυμάζω* and its like, i.e. 'I try to win over nothing (in you =) on your part.'

The latter is on all accounts the better. Cf. Apol. 17 C *τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι*. This, which is the only one quoted, is no instance of *παρίεσθαι* with genitive of person directly dependent upon it. We cannot therefore render 'in no way (adv.) do I beg off your opposition.' In that sense the verb would take an accus. of the person (as with *παραιτεῖσθαι*). Cf. Legg. 742 B *παρέμενος τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀποδημείτω*. The same accus. is understood in Soph. O. C. 1666 *οὐκ ἂν παρείμην* (sc. *τούτους*) *οἷσι μὴ δοκῶ φρονεῖν*.

341 C. οὐ μὴ οἷός τ' ἦς—v. Goodwin M. and T. § 295.

ξυρεῖν...λέοντα—a proverb more quoted in late Greek than in the classical period. Cf. Lucian Cynic. 14 *οὐκ ἂν ὑπέμειναν οὐδὲ εἷς αὐτῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν λεόντων τις ξυρώμενος*.

νῦν—not = *νῦν δή*, but 'in the present case' (cf. *nunc vero* and *νῦν δὲ* with past tenses).

οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα—The translation of these words depends upon the tone and inflection with which they are spoken: (1) with **καὶ ταῦτα** run practically into one word (i.e. with *καὶ* lightly and rapidly pronounced) the sense is 'moreover' or 'too,' i.e. 'and proved a failure, too'; (2) with more stress on both **καὶ** and **ταῦτα** it = 'being a failure at that also (as well as at other attempts).'

The sense could in any case hardly be the same as with the order *καὶ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ὤν*, since there is no point in saying 'and that too though you are a man of no account,' even if we allow that Thrasymachus is capable of such extreme rudeness. *καὶ ταῦτα*, when it = *praesertim cum*, regularly precedes its participle, though it is possible to quote from Diodorus Comicus *τὴν ἐσομένην καὶ ταῦτα μέτοχον τοῦ βίου* and still better Aristid. pro Quat. p. 504 *Περικλέους δὲ οὐκ ἐφείσω τεθνηκότος καὶ ταῦτα*.
Editors who are alive to this fact (Stallbaum, Jowett and Campbell, &c.) give the explanation (2) above, i.e. rendering *καὶ* as = *quoque* and *ταῦτα* as an accus. respect, 'being a nobody in regard to this also.' They do not appear to have thought of the other, (1), which is here

offered as most easy and natural. *καὶ ταῦτα* is an afterthought, insisting on the preceding statement: grammatically it is a separate clause as in Charmid. 154 E *πάνυ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ ταῦτα* ('he is a thorough gentleman, too'). Here, literally, 'being a failure,—being that also,' and there 'he is a thorough gentleman, that also (sc. he is).' So I should explain Lucian Alex. 13 *διάζωμα περὶ τὸ αἰδοῖον ἔχων κατάχρυσον καὶ τοῦτο* (where commentators are at a loss).

341 D. οὐκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τούτων ἔστιν τι ξυμφέρον;—'I suppose in the case of each of these there is something which is his interest?'

οὐ καὶ ἡ τέχνη...ἐκπορίζειν; 'and is it not also the case that the art (in each instance) is essentially directed to this, viz. the discovery and provision of what is for the (said) interest of each?'

These questions are sufficiently obscure to deserve more comment than they usually receive. What is meant by **ἑκάστῳ**? It is difficult to believe that it can refer to the practitioner of the art, since Socrates is bent on shewing that an art is *not* directed to the interest of the practitioner, but to that of the 'subjects' on whom it is exercised. On the other hand, to take *ἑκάστῳ τούτων* and *ἑκάστῳ* as referring to the 'subjects' upon whom the art is practised, seems to put a rather unnatural strain upon the language. Yet this is apparently the only rendering which is in keeping with (E inf.) *τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ κ.τ.λ.*, and (342 B) *οὐδὲ προσήκει τέχνῃ ἄλλῳ τὸ ξυμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν.* We shall then be obliged to consider that *ἑκάστῳ τούτων* is made to refer to the 'subjects' the more easily because *τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν* has just preceded and so drawn attention to the 'subjects' as opposed to the practitioners. Either, therefore, Plato has expressed himself awkwardly, or something which imparted more precision has been lost from the MSS.

[We may suggest *οὐκοῦν <εἴδει> ἑκάστῳ τούτων*='in each department of the operations named is involved a certain interest somewhere, (which is to be provided for).' For *εἴδει* cf. inf. 389 B *ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει* ('in the department of medicine'). *ἐν εἴδει τινός* subsequently became common. Cf. *τιθέναι τι ἕν τινος μέρει.* Cf. also Aristot. Pol. III. 15. 2 *τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας* ('belongs to the department of...'), Rhet. II. 22 § 1 *περὶ δ' ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκατέρου τούτων ἐστίν* ('belong to different departments'). *ἑκάστῳ <τῶν εἰδῶν> τούτων* is of course equally possible, 'each of the sets of circumstances specified introduces a certain *ξυμφέρον*.' With *ἑκάστῳ* of the following sentence *εἴδει* is then again understood.]

ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἑκάστῃ κ.τ.λ.—There being some form of *ξυμφέρον*

involved in each set of relations (viz. of physician to the sick, navigator to sailors), Socrates proceeds to shew that there is no *ξυμφέρον* of the art itself and its practitioner to be sought, but only a *ξυμφέρον* of the 'subjects' of its exercise.
The **καὶ** either (1) emphasizes *ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν*, 'Well, but then, as regards each art (itself), has it any other interest (i.e. *qua* that art and nothing else) than that it should be as perfect as possible?'; or (2), belonging to the whole question, = 'going a step further.'

341 E. **νῦν**—'In actual experience.'
πόνηρον—*πονηρός*, like *μοχθηρός*, is used of both the physically and the morally unsound and defective. Cf. Tim. 86 D *πονήρα ἕξις σώματος*. Thuc. VIII. 97 *πονήρων τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων*.

[The old grammarians laid it down that in Attic the accent was oxytone only in the moral sense. It seems safest to follow their rule. Cf. (though with reservations) English 'húman' and 'humáne.']

τοιούτῳ εἶναι—'to remain in that state.'

342 A. **ἢ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἔσθ' ὅ τι προσδεῖταί τινος ἀρετῆς**—'or does any other art in any way stand in need of some further excellence?' **ἔσθ' ὅ τι** = *τι*, except that it is brought into greater prominence. Cf. inf. 346 D. So *ἔστιν ὅτε* = *ἐνίοτε*, *ἔστιν ὅπως* = *πως*. Cf. Protag. 331 D *τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὀπῇ προσέοικε*. **ἀρετῆς** = excellence enabling it to perform its special function (*ἔργον*), v. on 335 B.
ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὶ κ.τ.λ.—"For example eyes stand in need (of the *ἀρετὴ*) of seeing, and ears (of the *ἀρετὴ*) of hearing, and therefore there is need in connexion with them (**ἐπ' αὐτοῖς** = 'in charge of them,' or, 'engaged upon them') of some art to consider and provide what is *ξυμφέρον* to these ends (viz. seeing and hearing) [such a 'providing' art is that of the oculist or aurist]. Is it also the case that in art itself there is a certain defectiveness, and that —[inasmuch as it therefore stands in need of a completing *ἀρετὴ* to enable it to perform its function]—each art requires the help of another art to provide it with what is *ξυμφέρον* [to that end, viz. the obtaining of the *ἀρετὴ* in question], and so ad infinitum?"

Socrates does not conceive of the interdependence of arts and sciences. 'The art of healing' is complete in itself; it implies the fullest and most ideal command of healing, and what further can it require to enable it to perform its function? So far as it is the art of healing it can proceed at once to heal. Cf. inf. B *οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ πάρεστιν κ.τ.λ.*

σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριζούσης. ἐκποριούσης (a form liable to corruption) is given in two 'edited' MSS, but is perhaps unnecessary. In 604 A *μαχεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν* should, however, almost certainly be corrected *ἀντιτενεῖν*.

σκέψεται...σκοπουμένη—v. sup. 339 B.

342 B. ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτῆς πονηρίαν—'to remedy its own defectiveness.'

σκοπεῖν—*ὥστε* (or *εἰς τὸ*) *σκοπεῖν*. Cf. Crito 52 B *οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι* (i.e. *ὥστε εἰδέναι αὐτά*), Eur. Med. 1399 *φιλίου χρῄζω στόματος παίδων ὁ τάλας προσπτύξασθαι* (quoted by Stallbaum).

αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀκέραιος κ.τ.λ.: 'but in itself it is without flaw or blemish while it possesses its true nature—that is to say, so long as each art, bearing its strict meaning, is *nothing but* the art it is.' **ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖ κ.τ.λ.** is explanatory of **ὀρθὴ οὖσα**. It is to be noted (1) that the Greek is not *ἀκριβὴς καὶ ὅλη*, (2) that we have *ἧπερ* and not *ὅπερ*.

It is therefore no literal rendering to translate, 'while in all strictness and entirety it is what it is.' Grammatically *ἀκριβὴς* = *ἀκριβὴς οὖσα*, and its meaning is that which attaches to *τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ* sup. 341 B. So inf. D *ὁ ἀκριβὴς ἰατρὸς* = *ὁ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἰατρός*. By **ὅλη**, which belongs to the predicate with *ᾖ* (i.e. *ἕωσπερ ἂν ἑκάστη ἀκριβὴς (οὖσα) ᾖ ὅλη ἧπερ ἐστί*), is meant 'nothing but' the art which it calls itself (i.e. *ἰατρική*, for instance, without involving *χρηματιστική* &c.). This use of *ὅλος* or *πᾶς* is frequent enough, e.g. *ὅλον ἁμάρτημα* ('nothing but a mistake'), *πλάσμα ὅλον* ('a cheat and nothing else').

The balance of the whole passage is thus **οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία... πάρεστι** corresponding to **αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβὴς οὖσα καὶ ἀκέραιος**, and **οὐδὲ προσήκει ἄλλῳ τὸ ξυμφέρον κ.τ.λ.** corresponding to **ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖ ἀκριβὴς ὅλη ἧπερ ἐστί**: and the meaning in brief is, 'art has no defects and no flaw; and, in so far as it is simply what it professes to be, it only seeks the advantage of its subject. [It is only when it becomes confused with money-making &c. that it either (*a*) requires a supplementary art, or (*b*) aims at some other interest than that of the subject.]'

342 C. ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν κ.τ.λ. In these words Socrates brings the remarks upon *τέχνη* round to their application. For the reasoning and its fallacy see Introd. § 31 *a*.

342 E. τῷ ἀρχομένῳ—neuter; hence *ἐκεῖνο* below.

δημιουργῇ—v. sup. 340 E.

CHAPTER XVI.

343 A. ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος—'the account (to be given) of justice.' Cf. Phaedr. 245 E *ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον.* The sense is often indistinguishable from that of *ὅρος* 'definition.' See Legg. 895 E.

[**τί δέ**;—Stallbaum's *τί δαί*; is not in the MSS.

Both expressions were in use in conversation, and, in the later entire confusion of pronunciation of **ε** and **αι**, one was often substituted for the other in the copies. Sometimes the corruption can be detected from the metre, as in the MSS of Aristophanes (e.g. Ach. 912, where however it is *δαὶ* which has replaced *δὲ*). *τί δέ*; was more widely recognised in literature than *τί δαί*; and there can be no reason whatever for altering it here.]

κορυζῶντα—'drivelling.' Literally *κόρυζα*=*pituita*, 'a running at the nose.' Hence it is used of idiocy or childish helplessness. Cf. Lucian Alex. 20 *κορύζης μεστοῖς τὴν ῥῖνα*, and *κορυζᾶς* (Menander). Hor. Sat. I. 4. 8, speaking of Lucilius, employs the contrary expression *emunctae naris.*

αὐτῇ—'ethic' dative: 'to her shame': lit. 'so far as she is concerned.' Cf. Lys. 208 D *ἐκείνη σε ἐᾷ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ ἵνα αὐτῇ μακάριος ᾖς.* Soph. Aj. 1128 *θεὸς γὰρ ἐκσῴζει με, τῷδε δ' οἴχομαι.*

οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις—not=*οὔτε...οὔτε*; but the first **οὐδὲ**=*ne...quidem* (with the verb or general sense), while the second=*neque*; cf. Apol. 26 D *οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι.* Lit. 'Inasmuch as you cannot so much as tell sheep or shepherd.' English prefers the form of expression 'sheep and shepherd' or 'sheep from shepherd,' but with the present 'disjunctive' form Jowett and Campbell compare 605 B *οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι.*

ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; Lit. 'because why, exactly?'

Both the English and Greek belong to the ungrammatical vivacities of conversation; but while the English is colloquial, the Greek is countenanced in literary use. The sentence begins **ὅτι δὴ** 'because, of course...' and then the speaker, finding himself unable to assign the reason readily, asks for it instead: 'because, of course...why, exactly?' The idiom *ἵνα τί*; is somewhat similar: 'in order that—what?'

With the present passage cf. 449 C *ὅτι, ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα*;

For **μάλιστα** cf. Crito (ad init.) *πηνίκα μάλιστα*; 'what o'clock, exactly?'

343 B. τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν...καὶ τὸ αὑτῶν—The shepherds &c. are in the first instance naturally thought of as slaves, since they were commonly such. **καὶ τὸ αὑτῶν** might either refer to the advantage which even slaves may get from success with their masters' flocks and herds, or (= *ἢ τὸ αὑτῶν*) to freemen who act as their own shepherds and herdsmen.

καὶ δὴ καὶ—'and so, of course, also....'

ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν—i.e. are really and truly lords and masters (and do not qualify that attitude by seeking any other object, e.g. social good or beneficent organisation &c.).

διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. It is natural (especially with *διατίθημι* following) to suggest *διακεῖσθαι*, with Faesi, Cobet, and others. Yet cf. inf. 414 E *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι* ('be minded'), and with *πρὸς* Legg. 628 D *ὡσαύτως πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν διανοεῖσθαι*, &c. 'To be minded' being thus an established sense of *διανοεῖσθαι*, there is nothing gained by altering to its synonym *διακεῖσθαι* 'to be disposed.'

ὠφελήσονται. For the middle form with passive sense, cf. inf. 361 E *μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται*, 426 C *τιμήσεται*. In 376 C *θρέψονται* is middle 'will grow up.'

[*ζημιώσομαι, ἀδικήσομαι, ἄξομαι, λέξομαι, ἀπατήσομαι, φυλάξομαι, στυγήσομαι, μισήσομαι, οἰκήσομαι, ἀξιώσομαι, ἐάσομαι, διδάξομαι* and others are similarly used.]

343 C. οὕτω πόρρω εἶ—'you are so far (out),' sc. *τοῦ ἀληθοῦς*, or *τοῦ ὀρθῶς γνῶναι*.

The expression *πόρρω εἶναι περὶ*, 'to be far off in the matter of,' is here treated as sufficiently explicit to dispense with the usual genitive, for which cf. Theaet. 151 C *πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι, ὅτι...*

περί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης κ.τ.λ. For the distinction of *τὸ δίκαιον* and *δικαιοσύνη* v. sup. 336 A. The 'hyperbatic' position of **τε** immediately after the preposition is the regular Greek. Cf. Prot. 316 D *τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον*. Thuc. VIII. 78 *ὑπό τε Ἀστυόχου καὶ Τισσαφέρνους* (for *ὑπὸ Ἀστυόχου τε καὶ* T.) and inf. 345 E *ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ*.

A omits **τε** after **ἀδίκου**, nor is it requisite. The sense is *περὶ τοῦ δικαίου—καὶ—δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου—καὶ—ἀδικίας*, 'concerning on the one hand justice and on the other injustice.' If, however, *τε* is right, we must suppose it to have been deliberately inserted in order to shew more definitely that the words *ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας* form a single notion opposed to the other single notion *τοῦ δικαίου καὶ*

δικαιοσύνης. For the one article before *δικαίου*, which runs on with its opposite *ἀδίκου*, cf. 332 D *τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς.*

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν—cf. Aristot. Eth. v. 1. 17 *καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μονὴ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν*, and ibid. 6. 6 *ἀλλότριόν εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην.* The phrase was evidently in vogue.

τοῦ πειθομένου κ.τ.λ.—there is a slight chiasmus (cf. 328 E). **πειθομένου** answers more particularly to **ἄρχοντος**, **ὑπηρετοῦντος** to **κρείττονος.**

οἱ δ' ἀρχόμενοι—as Jowett and Campbell point out, this admits of being taken either as (1) *οἱ δὲ* 'while they' (sc. the *εὐηθικοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι*) *ἀρχόμενοι* 'being ruled,' or (2) 'and the subjects': i.e. in the one case we have demonstrative pronoun and true participle, and in the other article and substantive.

The former rendering, however, is obviously less natural when *οἱ δὲ* stands immediately before a word which looks like its noun, than when it stands without such ambiguity before the verb, as in the instances quoted by them, viz. 380 B *οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι.* Prot. 315 A *οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηλημένοι.*

343 D. **ὦ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες.** Though we need not press the intellectual meaning of *εὐήθης* too far, this is a rude enough return for the *ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε* of Socrates (339 E).

ξυμβολαίοις...κοινωνήσῃ—v. sup. 333 A *ἐν τῇ διαλύσει κ.τ.λ.* 'at the settlement of the joint venture.' The modern 'dissolution of partnership' conveys a more specific technical notion.

ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν—*ξυμβολαίοις* should be repeated from *ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβολαίοις*, the distribution of taxes and receipts among the partners in the political *κοινωνία* being regarded as a 'joint engagement.'

Otherwise **τοῖς** may be taken more comprehensively—'in *matters* referring to the state.'

τινες εἰσφοραί. **εἰσφοραί** were not the regular taxes, but (after 428 B.C.) calls upon the citizens and metics to supply funds for various emergencies (hence **τινες**), especially wars.

Such contributions were levied by decree of the people, which fixed the amount required, and payments were in proportion to property, the Θῆτες alone being untaxed. Practically the *εἰσφορά* was an income-tax, since the taxable property was assessed at 12 times the net income. As the amount of that income was returned by the citizen himself, there were at least the same opportunities for evasion as with the modern income-tax. The *ἄδικος*, though possessed of as

much property (ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων) as the δίκαιος, might deceive the symmories or collectors.

ὅταν τε λήψεις. These would include (*a*) the ordinary payments e.g. the *μισθὸς δικαστικός, βουλευτικός, ἐκκλησιαστικός*, magistrates' fees, officers' fees (e.g. of *πρέσβεις* and *θεωροί*) and payments for government jobs and contracts (e.g. in buildings, religious processions &c.); (*b*) state doles e.g. the *θεωρικόν, σιτοδοσίαι*, gratuities to orphans &c.; (*c*) the handling of public money by paymasters, *στρατηγοί*, &c. The *ἄδικος* would thus receive more than he had earned, or secure more than his share of largess, or let public money stick to his fingers in passing.

343 E. **ὑπάρχει**—not simply = *ἔστι*, but implies a first condition to be reckoned with ('to start with'). That condition may be either an advantage or a disadvantage. Cf. Xen. Ages. 8. 1 *ὑπαρχούσης μὲν τιμῆς, παρούσης δὲ δυνάμεως*, inf. 366 C *ᾧ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ.*

τά γε οἰκεῖα. It is obviously more natural to take these words as the subject of **ἔχειν** (and not as accus. respect). The fact that the subject of **ὠφελεῖσθαι** changes to 'the just man' counts for nothing in the Greek. Cf. sup. 333 C, where the instances are much more abrupt.

ἀπέχθεσθαι or **ἀπεχθέσθαι**?—The latter appears to be the correct form for Plato.

The proparoxytone accent of MSS,—an accent which can only date from times when a later verb *ἀπέχθομαι* was actually in current use—manifestly proves nothing. The older verb was *ἀπεχθάνομαι*, of which various parts occur in the classical period. If *ἀπέχθομαι* had existed as well, we should have looked for corresponding parts from that present, and it is at least highly suspicious that the only part which claims to represent it is identical in form with the aorist of *ἀπεχθάνομαι*, viz. *ἀπεχθεσθαι*. The first appearance of *ἀπέχθεται* is in Theocritus (7. 45), but that writer can hardly be quoted to validate a form in Attic Greek (cf. his *ἰδησῶ*). Later, however, *ἀπέχθομαι* came into general use, and it is to that fact that the error in *ἀπέχθεσθαι* is due. [*ἀπέχθομαι*, the old reading in Eur. Hipp. 1260, has now been long corrected (from MSS) to *ἐπάχθομαι*.]

ὅνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον—sc. in the general sense of 343 B *οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν*. For the expression cf. 341 B. Here also some inferior MSS have **ὅπερ**.

μεγάλα—with **πλεονεκτεῖν** (otherwise *μέγα* would be required) 'the man who has the power to grasp on a large scale.'

344 A. ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἰδίᾳ αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον—αὐτῷ, from its position with **ἰδίᾳ**, is rather *ipsi* than *ei*. 'To his own personal advantage.'

τὸ before *δίκαιον* creates a certain difficulty, and it is probably for this reason that some MSS omit it. Retaining it, with the best MSS, we may render (1) 'How much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by *justice*,' i.e. *μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ξυμφέρει.* (Both constructions of *ξυμφέρει* are of course allowable. For the personal use cf. Hdt. IX. 37 *οὐ...οἱ συνήνεικε τὸ ἔχθος.*) (2) 'How much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by being just,' i.e. *μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.*

[That in this case it would have been usual to express *τὸ* either twice or not at all does not prove the unusual expression to be wrong. Critics are too apt to abridge the conversational liberties of language. For a variation of expression with and without article cf. 347 D *πᾶς ἂν τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἕλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν.*]

The former rendering is probably correct, though editors appear to have overlooked it.

τὴν τελεωτάτην—i.e. most ideal in both character and opportunity.

τοὺς...οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας—οὐκ rather than *μὴ* because it coalesces into one word with *ἐθέλοντας*, 'those who would *refuse*.' Cf. Gorg. 457 C *τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον (τῇ ῥητορικῇ)*, inf. 427 E *οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὕρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ ηὑρημένον;* ('the not-found'). Soph. Aj. 1131 *εἰ τοὺς θανόντας οὐκ ἐᾷς θάπτειν* (*=κωλύεις*). Similarly *τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας* (*=ἄφρονας*).

ἣ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν...ξυλλήβδην—'which, in its secret or forceful plundering of alien property, whether sacred or profane, public or private, proceeds not by littles but comprehensively.' There is no method and no object of depredation which the complete *ἄδικος* avoids. The smaller *ἄδικος* does a little here and there, sometimes **λάθρᾳ**, as in thieving and cheating, sometimes **βίᾳ**, as in kidnapping and open robbery: he sometimes despoils **ἱερὰ** (as *ἱερόσυλος*), sometimes **ὅσια** (as *τοιχωρύχος*), sometimes **ἴδια**, sometimes **δημόσια**. The *τελεωτάτη ἀδικία* proceeds **ξυλλήβδην** to do each and all of these without reserve. That **λάθρᾳ** is not unsuited to the actions of the ideal *ἄδικος* is shewn by 345 A *δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι.*

ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια—cf. Dem. Timoc. 702 (fin.) *τῶν ἱερῶν μὲν χρημάτων*

τοὺς θεούς, τῶν ὁσίων δὲ τὴν πόλιν ἀποστερεῖ. Things which can only be used for sacred and religious purposes are *ἱερά*; things which it is 'lawful' or 'consistent with piety' to use for profane purposes are *ὅσια*. Hence also *ὅσιος* = *βέβηλος* in reference to places.

344 B. ὧν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει—'Now in the case of each separate instance of these (aforesaid) crimes,' i.e. 'when each of these is taken in detail and alone.'

ἀνδραποδισταί—'kidnappers,' 'man-stealers.' The crime was common in Greece, where slavery made it profitable. With the present passage cf. 575 B *οἷα κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἱεροσυλοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται.* Gorg. 508 E, Xen. Mem. I. 2. 62.

ἀποστερηταί—'cheats,' differing from *κλέπται*, inasmuch as it implies 'keeping back what is due' (the opposite of *ἀποδιδόναι*) rather than the positive act of stealing. One who fraudulently retained a *παρακαταθήκη* would come under this description.

τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων—The genitive follows **κατὰ μέρη**: 'those who are wrong-doers in regard to separate items of such knaveries.' **τοιούτων**: viz. either (1) those referred to above (A) in *τἀλλότρια...δημόσια*, or (2) = 'those implied in the said names respectively': 'the *corresponding* knaveries.' [There is nothing to decide the question.]

πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ.—a brachylogy, or a zeugma, for *πρὸς τῷ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ.*

ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσηται—ἀνδραποδισάμενος takes up the preceding *ἀνδραποδισταί* and conveys primarily the notion of 'seizing the person,' to which **δουλώσηται** adds the sense 'and turns them into his slaves.' [For the original distinction of *ἀνδράποδον* and *δοῦλος* v. L. and S.]

εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται. For the plural after a clause with *ἐπειδάν τις, ὅταν τις, εἴ τις, ὅστις* &c. by a common construction *ad sensum* see Madvig Gk Syntax § 99 D. Cf. Xen. Cyr. VII. 4. 5 *ἢν παρὰ ταῦτα ἀδικεῖν τις ἐπιχειρῇ, τούτοις Κῦρός τε καὶ ἡμεῖς πολέμιοι ἐσόμεθα*; and for the reverse order, inf. 426 C *αἱ πόλεις προαγορεύουσι τοῖς πολίταις τὴν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀποθανουμένους ὃς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ.* See also Protag. 319 D, Gorg. 478 C. Here the singular is resumed in *αὐτὸν...ἠδικηκότα.* Inf. 347 A *ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ* (sc. *τις*) follows the plural *τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν.*

[Whatever distinction may once have existed between **εὐδαίμων** and

μακάριος, it is impossible to shew that any was consistently maintained, and in the frequent combination *εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος* (cf. 354 A) the effect is simply comprehensive or cumulative, as in the English 'sin and wickedness' and as in so many of Cicero's pairs of epithets. Cf. Theognis 1013 *ὦ μάκαρ εὐδαίμων τε καὶ ὄλβιος*, Phaedr. 250 B. In Arist. Eth. I. 10. 14 *εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων* (happy by *ἕξις*), *οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε* (happy in external circumstances), *ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ* merely shews that a difference could be extracted between the words when pressed.]

344 C. φοβούμενοι—belongs to the first member of the clause only by a slight zeugma: 'not because they dislike (e.g. *ὀκνοῦντες*) doing injustice, but because they fear to suffer it.' The antithesis of *τὸ ποιεῖν* and *τὸ πάσχειν* is, however, better brought out by putting both under the government of one word, which, after all, is but slightly strained.

ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη—i.e. *εἰ ἱκανῶς γίγνεται*, 'if it comes off adequately.' Cf. *εὖ, καλῶς, κακῶς γίγνεσθαί τινι.* **γίγνεσθαι** often has the sense of 'amounting,' 'accruing.' Cf. inf. 346 C. That sense may be present here, i.e. 'if there is a sufficient amount of it.'

τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν—'whereas to oneself injustice is profitable.' The common rendering, 'injustice is that which is of advantage to oneself,' is neither so apt, nor is it grammatical, in view of the absence of *τὸ* before *ἑαυτῷ*.

CHAPTER XVII.

344 D. ἡμῶν καταντλήσας—the genitive **ἡμῶν** depends directly upon the participle, while **κατὰ τῶν ὤτων** is added for further definition. Cf. 536 B *φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν.*

For **καταντλεῖν** of a deluge of words, cf. Lys. 204 D, Ar. Vesp. 483 *ἀλλ' ὅταν ξυνήγορος | ταὐτὰ ταῦτά σου καταντλῇ καὶ ξυνωμότας καλῇ.* Athen. v. 221 A *δοκεῖτέ μοι σφοδροῖς κατηντλῆσθαι λόγοις.* Similarly *καταχεῖν* (Legg. 800 D) and *ἐπαντλεῖν* (Eur. Frag. 891). The whole passage is imitated by Lucian Dem. Enc. 16.

ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον—'emptied his speech plump over us in a torrent.' The adjectives keep up the metaphor of *καταντλεῖν*. Cf. the familiar *πολὺς ῥεῖ*, Dem. de Cor. 272 *θρασυνομένῳ καὶ πολλῷ ῥέοντι* (of language), Hor. Sat. I. 7. 28 *salso multoque fluenti*. Their 'predicative' position is part of the idiom, i.e. as *ὁ λόγος πολὺς ῥεῖ* so *ὁ λόγος πολὺς καταντλεῖται.*

ὑπομεῖναί τε καὶ παρασχεῖν...λόγον—either (1) 'to stay and render an account,' or (2) taking *ὑπομεῖναι* also with *λόγον*, 'to submit to argument and render it' = 'to give and take argument' like *δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον*. Cf. Hipp. Mai. 298 D *ἀλλ' ὑπομείνωμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον*, Isoc. 171 C *ὅμως δὲ ἐπειδήπερ ὑπεμείνατε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους λόγους...καὶ τούτων ὑμᾶς ἀνασχέσθαι δέομαι*. Perhaps these instances rather favour the latter rendering, which seems to have been generally overlooked. With the former might be compared Prot. 329 B *περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν*.

οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον. The metaphor is most probably taken from hurling missiles. Cf. Prot. 342 E *ἐνέβαλε ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής*. Theaet. 165 D *ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος λόγοις ἐρόμενος...ἐμβαλὼν ἂν ἐς τὸ ἀκούειν...ἤλεγχεν ἄν*, ibid. 180 A, Phileb. 23 B &c. 'Having hurled into our midst.' There is a reference to the proverb *βαλὼν φεύγειν*. Cf. Symp. 189 B *βαλών γε..., ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, οἴει ἐκφεύξεσθαι*.

344 E. ἀλλ' οὐ βίου διαγωγήν, ᾗ ἂν διαγόμενος...ζῴη—'and not the leading of a life—(I mean) by what manner of conduct one would live the most profitable existence.' It is better to treat **ᾗ** not as = *ᾗ διαγωγῇ*, but as the adverb (= *qua ratione*).

ἀλλ' οὐ is regular for English 'and not' in such emphatic oppositions. Cf. 379 D, 492 A, 532 C (*ὥσπερ χρηματιστήν, ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα*), Lach. 185 A &c. *καὶ οὐ* is, however, no less permissible. Cf. inf. 350 A *δοκεῖ πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι...καὶ οὐ ταὐτά*.

διαγόμενος—much rarer than the active *διάγων*. With *διάγειν* it is possible to understand (1) *χρόνον* or *βίον*, (2) *ἑαυτόν*, 'to keep oneself (occupied).' But *διάγειν ἑαυτὸν* may be expressed by *διάγεσθαι*, while the meaning is practically identical with *διάγειν* (*βίον*).

ζωὴν—properly differs from **βίον** as the physical existence differs from the course of life and its activities. Here also a 'rational way of leading a life' (*βίου διαγωγή*) is answered by 'getting the most profit out of existence' (*ζωὴ λυσιτελεστάτη*).

ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι κ.τ.λ.—'pray, do I think otherwise?' or 'do you mean to say that I think otherwise?' To which Socrates replies 'You seem to, or else to care nothing about *us*.'

This rendering is so simple that it is hard to understand why **οὔτοι** has been suggested for **ἤτοι**, and why the mark of interrogation has not been universally accepted after **ἔχειν**.

ἔοικας—sc. *οἴεσθαι τοῦτο ἄλλως ἔχειν.*
ἤτοι—'or else.' Cf. inf. 400 C *τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς οὐχ ἧττον ψέγειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτούς, ἤτοι ξυναμφότερόν τι,* 433 A *τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη.*
[**γε** does not belong to *ἤτοι*, but to *ἡμῶν*.]

345 A. οὔτοι κακῶς σοι κείσεται...εὐεργετήσῃς—'any benefit you may confer upon so great a number of us will be no bad investment for you.' The sense of **κεῖσθαι**, as applied to money or other treasure stored or invested, may be gathered from e.g. Soph. O. C. 1518 *ἐγὼ διδάξω, τέκνον Αἰγέως, ἅ σοι | γήρως ἄλυπα τῇδε κείσεται πόλει,* Hdt. VI. 86 *εὖ ἐξεπισταμένῳ ὥς μοι κείμενα ἔσται παρὰ σοὶ σῷα.*

In connexion with **εὐεργετήσῃς** there is an allusion to the custom of the Persian kings, who recorded the names of their *εὐεργέται* for future recompense. Cf. Gorg. 506 C *καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγξῃς... μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψει,* Thuc. I. 129 *κείσεταί σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ εἰσαεὶ ἀνάγραπτος.*

τό γ' ἐμόν—either (1) 'I tell you my own feeling (or case), viz., that...,' cf. Sophist. 237 B *τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον, κ.τ.λ.*, or (2) *τό γ' ἐμόν* is purely adverbial: 'so far as I am concerned.' Cf. Prot. 338 C *ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει,* Hdt. I. 108 *ἀλλ' εἴ τοι φίλον τοῦτο οὕτω γίγνεσθαι, χρὴ δὴ τό γε ἐμὸν ὑπηρετέεσθαι ἐπιτηδέως* (though this also is capable of being rendered as if *τὸ ἐμὸν* were the subject to *ὑπηρετέεσθαι*).
ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος κ.τ.λ.—'let there be an unjust man, and let him...'
οὐ πείθει—sc. 'he' (the aforesaid successful *ἄδικος*), 'such a man.' This is more natural than to supply 'it,' 'such a case.'
ταῦτ'...πέπονθεν—[or **ταὔτ'** ?]—'is in this state of mind'; v. note on 329 A.

345 B. πείσω...ποιήσω;—since **ἐνθῶ** follows, these verbs are probably subjunctive.
ἐνθῶ—apparently a metaphor from putting food into another's mouth. Cf. Ar. Eq. 716 sqq. *κᾆθ' ὥσπερ αἱ τιτθαί γε σιτίζεις κακῶς· | μασώμενος γὰρ τῷ μὲν ὀλίγον ἐντίθῃς | αὐτὸς δ' ἐκείνου τριπλάσιον κατέσπακας.* So *ἔνθεσις* = 'mouthful.'
This form of 'teaching' is the last of which Socrates would approve.
πρῶτον μὲν—it is not necessary to look for a *δὲ*-clause to balance

the stereotyped πρῶτον μὲν, which here simply = 'above all things.' For the absence of the δὲ-clause cf. Aesch. Ag. 810, Supp. 410.

[Otherwise it would perhaps be permissible to take πρῶτον μὲν as = μάλιστα μὲν ('if possible'), and to suppose that the regular εἰ δὲ μή is here replaced by a clause with ἤ, i.e. 'if possible, abide by your assertions, or else...change your ground openly.']

345 C. **ὁριζόμενος κ.τ.λ.** Jowett and Campbell say 'having at first defined the physician as the true physician you did not think fit *afterwards* &c.' But **ὁριζόμενος** is not ὁρισάμενος, and must be synchronous with **ᾤου**. Rather render 'that, while providing at the outset for the genuine physician, you did not, consistently therewith (οὐκέτι), realise that you were bound subsequently to keep to the genuine shepherd'; i.e. 'while making the proviso in the one case, you did not see that you would have to make it in the other.'

οὐκέτι does not mean later in time, but following in logic: 'you did not carry on the principle.' Cf. Prot. 321 D τῷ δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν...οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν (i.e. he could not carry his boldness further and enter &c.).

πιαίνειν.

So A. A few inferior MSS have the gloss **παχύνειν**, while the common reading is **ποιμαίνειν**. πιαίνειν, being a rare word in prose, was likely to be glossed, and no less likely to be corrupted (in this particular context) to the similar looking ποιμαίνειν. On the other hand it is not so easy to believe that a genuine ποιμαίνειν could first be corrupted to the rarer πιαίνειν and then further glossed into παχύνειν.

Here, as in 343 B, the main business or 'art' of the herdsman is 'to fatten' his herds. The art of the ποιμήν, which might be expressed by ποιμαίνειν, is at least equally expressed by πιαίνειν τὰ πρόβατα. In keeping with πιαίνειν also we have immediately μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

ἑστιάσεσθαι. Davies and Vaughan inadvertently say 'to give an entertainment.' This, of course, requires the active.

πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν—sc. βλέποντα.

345 D. **τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ...ἐκποριεῖ**—see 342 B.

ἐκπεπόρισται—middle, otherwise the nominative βελτίστη could not stand.

ἕως γ' ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέῃ τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι—'that is to say, so long as it lacks nothing of being (what it calls itself, viz.) ποιμενική.'

οὕτω δὲ ᾤμην νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κ.τ.λ.—**εἶναι** is imperfect.

καὶ θεραπευόμενῳ—it is exactly in this addition that Socrates begs the question, implying that the subjects have to be brought into good condition. See note on 342 C. To him the king is *ποιμὴν λαῶν* (Il. II. 85) in the Homeric sense.

345 E. **ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ**—For the position of **τε** v. 343 C. An **ἰδιωτικὴ ἀρχή** is any form of control (e.g. of the *κυβερνήτης, ἰατρός, ἱππικός, ποιμήν*) which has no reference to the body politic. 'And it is the same whether the position of governing be political or non-political.'

CHAPTER XVIII.

τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς—i.e. *τὰς ἰδιωτικὰς* (sup. D), as opposed to *τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν* immediately above. Socrates means such forms of control as *ἰατρική* (=*ἀρχὴ σωμάτων*), *κυβερνητική* (=*ἀρχὴ ναυτῶν*) &c. Cf. 342 C *ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι.*

[The translation of Jowett and of D. and V., 'the common state offices,' cannot be got from the words.]

οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἑκών. **ἑκών** involves no tautology with **ἐθέλει**, which simply expresses consent, not desire. A man may 'consent' to hold office *ἄκων* (against his wishes).

ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην—the accus. abs. as in 426 C, Phaedo 109 D, Soph. O. T. 101 &c. It is combined with gen. abs. in 604 B *ὡς οὔτε δήλου ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ...οὔτε οὐδὲν προβαῖνον κ.τ.λ.*, and similarly in Xen. Mem. II. 2. 13, Thuc. VII. 25 (fin.). Attempts to draw any real distinction between the two cases in a clause with *ὡς* are futile.

αὐτοῖσιν. The 'longer' form, which in Attic literature mostly belongs to verse, is apparently chosen for emphasis (*ipsis*), though euphony may have had something to do with the matter.

The same explanation can be given of the other instances in the Republic collected by Jowett and Campbell, viz. *ξὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις* (564 C), *σμικροῖσι παθήμασι* (388 D) and *θεοῖσι μὲν* (389 B). In *μεγάλοισι τέλεσι* (560 E) rhythm seems to be the chief consideration. In the treatise on the Laws they are frequent. That such forms were conversational is shewn by their free use in Aristophanes. In inscriptions they are rare after 444 B.C., though before that date they occur almost as frequently as the shorter forms. Meisterhans § 47. 7.

346 A. **οὐχὶ...μέντοι**—v. on 339 B.

ἑτέραν—'different (from others)'='distinct.'

τὴν δύναμιν—'its faculty'; i.e. its special power towards a certain end. Cf. 532 A *ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις.*

From this fact of each τέχνη possessing a special δύναμις comes the later meaning of δύναμις as itself = 'art' or 'faculty' (of Medicine, Logic, &c.). Cf. Gorg. 447 C τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός;

μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου. Socrates being anxious to arrive at some 'actual result' (τι καὶ περαίνειν) asks Thrasymachus not to give 'some peculiar (unexpected or paradoxical) reply.' The question has obviously only one answer, which should be so readily admitted that he virtually says 'and pray do not baulk us by answering in some unnatural way.'

The rendering 'contrary to your opinion' corresponds rather to παρὰ τὴν γνώμην τὴν σήν, or would require παρὰ τὴν σεαυτοῦ δόξαν as in 350 E. Lach. 178 B λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν δόξαν. Nor has Socrates any reason to suppose that the sophist will be complacent. In Protag. 337 B πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων there is no ambiguity.

περαίνωμεν—a word of logic (v. lex.). Cf. συμπέρασμα, 'a conclusion.' Protag. 360 D αὐτὸς, ἔφη, πέρανον.

ἀλλὰ τούτῳ...ἑτέρα. For **ἀλλὰ** = 'nay' or 'well' v. 327 B.

μισθωτική—a word invented *ad hoc*: 'an art of securing pay.' See Introduction.

346 B. **ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ...ἢ ἐάνπερ κ.τ.λ.**—'or *do* you (**σὺ**, cf. 339 D) call the art of healing and the art of navigating the same? (Can it possibly be so?) or (is it not rather the case that), if you desire to draw strict distinctions according to the principle you laid down (viz. 340 D), the fact of a navigator becoming well through the benefit of a sea-voyage will none the more make you call it (viz. the art of the navigator) an art of healing?'

διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλεῖν—the best MSS give **διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν**, of which it is possible to take several views: viz. (1) (most probable) that the frequent recurrence of the phrase τὸ ξυμφέρον in the previous argument caused it to be inadvertently substituted here, (2) that ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ forms an adjectival qualification to the noun πλεῖν (= διὰ τὸ πλεῖν τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ), 'through the beneficial voyaging,' (3) that ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ is a phrase of the accus. absolute participle, i.e. the whole = διὰ τὸ πλεῖν, ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ, 'through his voyaging, it being beneficial to him,' (4) that διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ = 'through the fact of it benefiting him,' the participle being used as equivalent to the infinitive itself.

Of these (2) and (3) are exceedingly harsh, and will hardly be considered tenable in the absence of parallels. The last explanation

might perhaps be maintained by those who are satisfied to quote e.g. Thuc. v. 9 *τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν*, VI. 24 *τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ πλοῦ οὐκ ἐξηρέθησαν* (where, however, it is easy to render 'the part of them (the feeling in them) which desired the expedition'). Soph. O. C. 1220 *ὅταν τις ἐς πλέον πέσῃ τοῦ θέλοντος*, Trach. 196 *τὸ γὰρ ποθοῦν ἕκαστος ἐκμαθεῖν θέλων*. The Thucydidean usage, however, is by no means to be regarded as a substitution of participle for infinitive. His *τὸ δεδιός, τὸ θαρσοῦν, τὸ βουλόμενον, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν* are never the same thing as *τὸ δεδιέναι* &c. Usually they are accompanied by a genitive (e.g. *αὐτοῦ, τῆς γνώμης*) and are literally 'the fearing part (of him, his mind),' 'the desiring part (of him, his mind)' &c. In the strongest case I. 142 *ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι ἀξυνετώτεροι ἔσονται* it is an error to say that *ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετᾶν* could be substituted in exactly the same sense. Literally the words mean 'in the non-practising quality (part) of them.' The passages quoted from Sophocles are very dubious (v. Jebb's notes on each). A careful examination of each instance will shew that there is none analogous to the supposed use of *τὸ ξυμφέρον* here.

The second **καλεῖς** is probably future, which would be the regular tense in apodosis to *ἐὰν ὑγιὴς γίγνηται*.

αὐτὴν, sc. *τὴν κυβερνητικήν*, to be supplied from the context in general.

καλεῖς μᾶλλον—οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον has been separated from its verb by the conditional clause, and it is forgotten that *μᾶλλον* has been already expressed.

346 C. **οὐκοῦν τήν γε ὠφελίαν κ.τ.λ.**—'we accordingly granted (viz. sup. A) this much, that the benefit of each art is peculiar to itself.'

κοινῇ τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.—'through their common use of some one and the same thing in addition (to their own art) they derive benefit from the said thing.' **ἀπ' ἐκείνου**, sc. *τοῦ αὐτοῦ τινὸς* (which is *μισθωτική*).

γίγνεσθαι—the regular word of 'accruing.' Cf. Xen. An. v. 3. 4 *τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων γενόμενον ἀργύριον*, Cyr. I. 1. 2 *καρποὶ οἱ ἐξ ἀγελῶν γιγνόμενοι*, Aesch. S. c. T. 20 *ὅπως γένοισθε πρὸς χρέος τόδε* (which should be rendered 'accrue to meet this debt'). The subject of *γίγνεσθαι* is *τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργούς*: 'the benefit received by the craftsmen in the shape of wages which they earn accrues to them from &c.'

346 D. **αὐτῇ ἑπομένη**—'naturally associated with it.' Cf. Xen. Cyr. I. 2. 7 *τῇ ἀχαριστίᾳ ἡ ἀναισχυντία ἕπεται*.

ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς κ.τ.λ.—To make the position sound we must include in *μισθὸς* all such rewards and considerations as honour, position, self-approbation, &c. Τιμή, indeed, is specifically named later (347 B), and cf. *τοὺς δύο μισθούς* (347 A).

346 E. **οἶμαι ἔγωγε**—sc. *αὐτὸν ὠφελεῖν τότε.*
οὐδὲ ἀρχή. For the fallacy involved in the addition of these words v. sup. 342 C (note).
In **ἄρτι ἔλεγον** Socrates is referring to the arts, the *ἰδιωτικαὶ ἀρχαί* of 345 E. The application to *πολιτικὴ ἀρχὴ* is to follow.
ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν κ.τ.λ.—The regular negative is *οὐδένα*, but Plato not uncommonly uses *μὴ* with verbs *sentiendi et declarandi*, e.g. *ἡγοῦμαι, φημί, ὁμολογῶ.* Cf. Phaedr. 242 B *οἶμαι...μηδένα πλείους ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι*, Euthyphr. 6 B *ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι.* Protag. 319 B *ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν* (i.e. *οὐ-διδακτὸν*) *εἶναι μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστόν.* Theaet. 155 A *φήσομεν...μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέσθαι.* So in other writers, e.g. Xen. Mem. I. 2. 39 *φαίην ἂν μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παίδευσιν παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσκοντος.* Soph. Ph. 1058 *οἶμαι σοῦ κάκιον οὐδὲν ἂν | τούτων κρατύνειν μηδ' ἐπιθύνειν χερί.* Soph. O. T. 1455 (after *οἶδα*), &c.

It would seem that the *μὴ* which is regular with *ἀρνοῦμαι, ὄμνυμι, πέποιθα* &c. could hardly be kept from appearing in conversation after any other verbs of thinking or asserting, and already in classical Attic there are signs of the confusion which had become hopeless in the time of Lucian. The greater number of instances perhaps occur with *φημί*, but in any case the line between verbs with *μὴ* and verbs of cognate meaning with *οὐ* was too fine to be maintained consistently.

τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα—'and takes in hand the troubles of others as their corrector.'

Some critics might regard **ἀνορθοῦντα** as a gloss to explain *μεταχειρίζεσθαι.* It is redundant, since *μεταχειρίζεσθαι* itself = 'treat as healer.' Cf. 408 C *ἰατροὶ...τοιοῦτοι ὅσοι πλείστους μὲν ὑγιεινοὺς πλείστους δὲ νοσώδεις μετεχειρίσαντο.* But Plato is often even more redundant.

The word **κακὰ** is strictly suitable only to such arts as *ἰατρική*, while for *οἰκοδομική* or *κυβερνητική* some cognate word, e.g. *πράγματα*, must be supplied. As applied to the *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή*, *κακὰ* is appropriate enough, since Socrates is thinking of the *ἄρχων qua ἄρχων*, as an organiser, remedying the evils of a social system.

347 A. κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων—i.e. so long as he prescribes only what the principles of his art demand, with no eye to anything extraneous, e.g. money-making.

δεῖν—like the infinitives just above, is in the oratio obliqua after *ἔλεγον*. That grammar is, however, probably confused with a false notion that *δεῖν* is dependent on **ἔοικε**.

Such a confusion is very common. Cf. Sophist. 263 D *παντάπασιν ὡς ἔοικεν ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις...γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής*. Phileb. 20 D *τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν.* Soph. Trach. 1238 *ἀνὴρ ὅδ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ νεμεῖν ἐμοὶ | φθίνοντι μοῖραν*, Hdt. I. 65, IV. 5 *ὡς δὲ Σκύθαι λέγουσι, νεώτατον ἁπάντων ἐθνέων εἶναι τὸ σφέτερον*, Aesch. Pers. 188 *τούτω στάσιν τιν', ὡς ἐγὼ 'δόκουν ὁρᾶν, | τεύχειν ἐν ἀλλήλαισι.*

ἀρχῇ. For the singular after a plural, v. 344 B (ad fin.).

CHAPTER XIX.

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς...τὴν δὲ ζημίαν—'for two sorts of payment I can recognise (viz. honour and money, inf. B), but the (payment which is a) penalty...I do not understand.'

The article **τοὺς** does not imply that the two sorts have been named, but is regular when a certain number is picked out and distinguished from the rest or opposed to some other number. Cf. Thuc. VIII. 15 *τῶν ἐν τῷ Πειραιῷ ἐφορμουσῶν τὰς μὲν ὀκτὼ ἤδη πέμπειν... ἄλλας δὲ...ὕστερον βοηθεῖν.* I. 116 *ταῖς μὲν ἑκκαίδεκα τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο.*

'*Two* sorts I recognise...the third I do not understand.'

ξυνῆκα—for aorist cf. *ἔμαθον* 339 A, note.

347 B. ξυνιεῖς.

The question whether this or **ξυνίῃς** should be read is one never likely to be settled. (*ξυνίεις* would be imperfect, and is out of the question.) The best MSS here give *ξυνιεῖς*, as in Soph. 238 E, 243 B. Similarly in Ar. Lys. 895 and Eq. 717 the best MS (Rav.) has *διατιθεῖς* and *ἐντιθεῖς* respectively. For other arguments establishing the 'thematic' form (**ἱέω*) in the present see Rutherford New Phrynichus Art. CCXX, where it is remarked that 'the contracted second person singular, being unknown to late Greeks, was altered when possible into the participle, otherwise was converted into the imperfect or late *ἵῃς*.' In the imperfect there is little doubt of the superiority of *ἵεις*, *ἵει*. The imperative is *ἵει* only. [Inscriptions lend little help.]

τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι—τε καὶ does not imply that the two qualities go together: rather = 'as the case may be.'

Cf. 332 D. For the sentiment cf. Arist. Eth. IV. 4. 3 *τὸν γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον*, and ibid. IV. 1. 41 *πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσι.*

οὔτε ... ἐθέλουσιν ... οὔτε ... βούλονται. The distinction between *ἐθέλειν* and *βούλεσθαι* is kept up here, as elsewhere in classical Attic prose. Cf. Gorg. 522 E *εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι*, Dem. Ol. II. 20 *ἂν οἵ τε θεοὶ θέλωσι* ('consent') *καὶ ὑμεῖς βούλησθε* ('desire'), De Fals. Leg. 348 *οὔτ' ἀκούειν ἠθέλετε* ('you refused to hear') *οὔτε πιστεύειν ἠβούλεσθε* ('you wanted to disbelieve'). So in the present passage 'they are unwilling to rule' is followed by 'they are desirous not to be called hirelings.' In Protag. 309 B *ἄτοπον μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν* the thought is 'I am willing to confess.' Cf. Alc. I. 135 D.

αὐτοὶ...λαμβάνοντες—i.e. instead of waiting for it to be given.

347 C. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν—either (1) 'compulsion must be brought to bear upon them and a (threat of) penalty, if they *are to be* willing to rule,' like *τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν* sup. A, or (2) 'compulsion must be laid upon them and punishment, if they are slow in consenting (hesitate to consent) to rule.' In the former sense *μέλλω* may be joined with present, future, or (less commonly, but certainly) with aorist; in the latter sense the future is inadmissible.

The change to *ἐθέλειν* for *ἐθελήσειν* of sup. A might therefore have a purpose, and the words *ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν κ.τ.λ.* correspond to *ζημίαν ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ* of that context. Nevertheless the variation of the meaning of *μέλλειν* in two almost identical expressions so near to each other is perhaps improbable. That the change in tense need have no effect on the meaning is clear from Protag. 334 D *εἴπερ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι* followed by *εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι* in precisely the same sense. Cf. Alc. II. 146 E *βιώσεσθαι...πλεῖν.*

ὅθεν κινδυνεύει...αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι. The sentence is a remark by the way, parenthetical to the argument. 'And that is probably the reason why the voluntary undertaking of office, instead of waiting for compulsion, has come to be regarded as unseemly.' **αἰσχρὸν** must not be translated by too strong a term. It is *turpe* ('ugly'), as the opposite of *καλόν*.

Socrates may make the assumption more or less playfully, and it may be true of the attitude of certain superior minds, but we can hardly believe that the average Athenian actually looked upon office-seeking in the light of an unseemly proceeding. Moreover we should naturally expect *ὅθεν* **καὶ** *κινδυνεύει* or *ὅθεν* **γε** *κινδυνεύει.*

We may perhaps suggest an alternative rendering which materially affects the meaning, viz. 'whence it is probable that voluntarily undertaking office, instead of waiting for compulsion, *is an unseemly custom*.' For **νενομίσθαι** in that sense cf. Ar. Nub. 962 *ὅτ' ἐγὼ τὰ δίκαια λέγων ἤνθουν καὶ σωφροσύνη 'νενόμιστο* ('was in vogue'): ibid. 1185 *καὶ μὴν νενόμισταί γ'*. The adjective *αἰσχρὸν* is then predicative; cf. Hdt. I. 173 *ἓν δὲ τόδε ἴδιον νενομίκασι*, which would become in the passive *ἓν δὲ τόδε ἴδιον νενόμισται*. The same ambiguity exists in the same phrase *αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται* Gorg. 520 E.

τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη—μεγίστη is an attraction for *μέγιστον*, cf. *ἡ πολλὴ τῆς γῆς, τοῦ σίτου τὸν ἥμισυν* (Xen. Cyr. IV. 5. 1), *τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς* (Thuc. VII. 3). In Aesch. Ag. 1300 *ὁ δ' ὕστατός γε τοῦ χρόνου πρεσβεύεται* should be explained in the same way. 'Of the penalty of which I spoke (*τῆς*) a very serious form (or 'portion') consists in being ruled by an inferior.'

ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ ἄρχειν—αὐτὸς refers to an indefinite *τινα* implied with *ἄρχεσθαι*; 'if a man refuses to bear office himself.' Cf. 359 A *ἐὰν ἀδικῶν* (sc. *τις*) *μὴ διδῷ δίκην*, Apol. 29 B *ἡ* (*μανία*) *τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν* (*τις*), Gorg. 456 D *τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθε πυκτεύειν*, Crito 49 C, and elsewhere very commonly in Plato.

καὶ τότε—i.e. and when they *do* so take office.

ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν—cf. *accedunt ad rem publicam*.

οὐκ ἔχοντες...ἐπιτρέψαι—'because they cannot leave the matter to....'

The addition of **τὴν ἀρχὴν** in some inferior MSS is due to ignorance of the (sufficiently common) 'absolute' use of *ἐπιτρέπειν* = 'trust (things) to.' Cf. Gorg. 512 E *ἀλλ' ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξί*, Hdt. III. 81 *Μεγάβυζος δὲ ὀλιγαρχίῃ ἐκέλευε ἐπιτράπειν*.

347 D. **πᾶς ὁ γιγνώσκων**—'every person of discernment.'

τοῦτο μὲν...resumed by **ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν** in the next sentence, and answered by **πολὺ δὲ...μεῖζον**. Socrates has had enough of this point for the present, and turns to what Thrasymachus has said of the *εὐδαιμονία* of the *ἄδικος* and the troubles of the *δίκαιος* (sup. 343 D—344 C).

347 E. **φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω**—viz. 344 C *ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης*.

ποτέρως...αἱρεῖ καὶ πότερον ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι;

The MSS all give **ποτέρως** in the first position, in the second the best shew **πότερον ὡς**, and a few inferior copies **πότερον** only. Ast's

transposition *πότερον...ποτέρως* seems hardly sound-principled criticism. Of the reading of the best MSS in the second position we may take at least three views: (1) that **πότερον** is the correct reading, while *πότερον ὡς* is due to an emendation (*ποτέρως*), made in the belief that *ποτέρως* should naturally stand in both clauses: (2) that **ποτέρως** is the correct reading, but that the accent was misread and the copyist took the word as **ποτερ' ὡς** i.e. *πότερον ὡς* (v. Cobet, Var. Lect. p. xxvii.): (3) that **πότερον ὡς** is the original, **ὡς** belonging to *ἀληθεστέρως*. As, however, *ὡς*, though frequent with positive (*ὡς ἀληθῶς*) and superlative (*ὡς ἀληθέστατα*), is not found with comparative, the last view is less probable.

πότερον and *ποτέρως* being equally possible, we may decide for the former on the ground of euphony.

ἔγωγε—sc. *αἱροῦμαι*.

348 A. **βούλει οὖν κ.τ.λ.**—**ὡς** follows **πείθωμεν**, not **ἐξευρεῖν** (an order which would suggest deliberate contentiousness). 'Shall we persuade him—if we can discover some satisfactory way—that he is wrong?'

ἐξευρεῖν, like Latin *invenire*, obtains later a technical meaning of discovering arguments. Here we should grammatically supply *ὅπως πείσομεν*.

ἀντικατατείναντες—cf. inf. 358 D *διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν*, 367 B *ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω*, Arist. H. A. IX. 44. 4 *ὁ λέων κατατείνας τρέχει*.

In each case it should be noticed that the tense is aorist, the notion being that of a position taken up from the start; here, literally, 'having drawn the rope tight' (as in a tug-of-war). The literal sense is soon lost sight of (as in *contendere*), so that *κατατείνας* is practically equivalent to an adverb 'with all one's might.'

For other parts of the verb, as applied to vehement speech, cf. Eur. Hec. 130 *σπουδαὶ δὲ λόγων κατατεινομένων*, Xen. An. II. 5. 30 &c.

ἂν...λέγωμεν λόγον παρὰ λόγον—cf. Hipp. Min. 369 C *εἰ δὲ βούλει, σὺ αὖ ἀντιπαράβαλε λόγον παρὰ λόγον*.

ὅσα αὖ ἀγαθὰ κ.τ.λ. **αὖ** 'on the contrary,' i.e. as opposed to *ὅσα ἀγαθὰ διῆλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου (βίῳ)* just above.

καὶ αὖθις οὗτος—sc. *λόγον λέγῃ*.

ἐν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν—'in each of the two cases' (or 'conditions'), sc. *ἐν τῷ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄδικον*.

348 B. **δικαστῶν τινῶν**—'a kind of jury.'

αὐτοί τε δικασταὶ κ.τ.λ. The **τε** is trajected, as more often after prepositions or the article.

ῥήτορες—not in the technical sense, which does not belong to the courts but only to the assembly. A well-known *ῥήτωρ* like Demosthenes might often act as *ξυνήγορος*, but he is not called *ῥήτωρ* in virtue of the latter function. The word here has its earlier general meaning (cf. *orator* and *orare causam*), i.e. *ῥήτωρ* is simply the 'speaker' and stands as the agent in the scheme *ἀγορεύω, ἐρῶ, εἶπον, εἴρηκα, ἐρρήθη, ῥῆσις, ῥήτωρ.*

ὁποτέρως οὖν σοι...ἀρέσκει. (1) an elliptical form of expression, putting a question in a milder tone. '(Will you be good enough to choose) in which way you would like to proceed?' Cf. Lys. 212 C *ὁπότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλος ἐστίν;* Euthyd. 271 A *ὁπότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων;* In fact the use of the 'indirect' interrogative amounts to an 'if you please.' We might supply e.g. *βουλοίμην ἂν εἰδέναι*, or for the grammar simply *αἱροῦ*. In the familiar form of repeated questions e.g. A. *τίς ἐστιν;* B. *ὅστις;* the grammar is *(ἐρωτᾷς με) ὅστις (ἐστίν);*

(2) It is possible (and perhaps better) to explain the present instance otherwise than as a question, viz. 'whichever way you like!' i.e. 'I am ready to adopt,' or 'let it be' whichever &c., cf. inf. 353 C *ἥτις αὐτων ἡ ἀρετή.*

οὕτως—i.e. 'in the way you suggest.'

CHAPTER XX.

τὴν τελέαν—'omnes numeros habentem,' 'ideal.' Cf. 344 A.

348 C. **ἀρετὴν...κακίαν**—see Introduction § 37 *a*.

εἰκός γε—sarcastically: 'very likely indeed!'

ὦ ἥδιστε—see note on 337 D.

348 D. **γενναίαν εὐήθειαν**—'magnificent simpleness.' No compliment is intended by **γενναίαν**, which simply = 'egregious' ('sublime' Jowett).

The sense *generosus* passes by metaphor into that of 'fine' or 'prime' in various applications, complimentary or ironical. Cf. inf. 372 B *μάζας γενναίας.* Legg. 844 E *τὴν γενναίαν νῦν λεγομένην σταφυλὴν ἢ τὰ γενναῖα σῦκα ἐπονομαζόμενα*, inf. 544 C *ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς* ('that magnificent thing, despotism').

εὐήθεια—cf. 400 E *οὐχ ἣν ἄνοιαν οὖσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν.* The change of implication in *εὐήθεια* is illustrated by a remark of Thucydides III. 83 *τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη*, and by Xen. An. II. 6. 22 *τὸ δ' ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐνόμιζε τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἠλιθίῳ εἶναι.*

κακοήθειαν—Socrates pretends to take **εὐήθεια** literally, although he is well aware of Thrasymachus' meaning. The temptation to score a point in passing is too great. "Then if justice is 'good nature,' injustice is 'ill-nature'?"

At the same time the point is a real one. That *εὐήθεια* could ever come to be treated contemptuously implies a tendency to treat *κακοήθεια* with respect. Thrasymachus may give the *κακοήθεια* another name, but Socrates interposes a caustic reminder of the unvarnished truth.

φρόνιμοι...ἀγαθοί. 'Do the unjust seem to you to be men of wisdom and excellence?' See Introduction.
ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. So Thuc. IV. 60 *τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι.* The dative, however, is more common, e.g. Phileb. 58 A *πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῇ δοῦλα...ποιοῖτο.* Sometimes MSS differ, as in Hdt. I. 201. With the accusative the sense of *bringing* under is uppermost, with the dative the sense of the subjection itself, *ὑπό τινι* having become a fixed phrase accompanying any verb.
ἀποτέμνοντας—cf. inf. 575 B *βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι.* The *βαλλάντιον* (*marsupium*) was a leather pouch hanging from the girdle. Thieves cut this pouch away (**ἀπο-**). Sometimes, however, the money was carried in the girdle itself; hence *zona* = 'pouch.' Mayor on Juv. XIV. 297. In that case the girdle itself would be cut. Plaut. Trin. IV. 2. 20 *sector zonarius.* Cf. Gorg. 508 E.

348 E. τοῦτο μέντοι κ.τ.λ.—'I quite understand *that*,' viz. that you are referring to the *ἄδικοι* in the grand style and not to the petty practitioners.
ἐθαύμασα. For aorist v. *ἔμαθον* 339 A and note. Lach. 186 D *ὅτι δὲ διαφέρεσθον ἀλλήλοιν ἐθαύμασα.* **εἰ** is not interrogative, but, as often after *θαυμάζω, αἰσχύνομαι* &c., approaches the meaning *ὅτι.* 'I am surprised *at the thought of* your putting...'
στερεώτερον—'a more stubborn position (to take up).' Otherwise 'this is a stronger position (to attack).' Either sense is involved in the notion of 'firmer consistency.'
ὅ τί τις εἴπῃ. The deliberative subjunctive *direct* of the third person is comparatively rare, and mostly occurs in cases with *τις*, where *τις* is only another way of saying *ἐγώ*, as in Phileb. 15 D *πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξηται τῆς μάχης;* v. Goodwin M. and T. § 289. The deliberative *indirect* is less restricted. Goodwin M. and T. § 677. Cf. Protag. 348 D *περιιὼν ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξηται.* Phaedo 115 D *καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ.*

κακίαν...ἢ αἰσχρὸν—answered immediately with chiasmus by **καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν**, in such a way as to shew that *κακία* particularly implies weakness. For the chiasmus cf. 328 E and inf. 350 C.

349 A. ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν—'which we were attributing to justice,' viz. in the general sense of 345 A, 347 E, 348 A. There is no express catalogue of praises ascribed in those passages.

τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν—a military metaphor, 'to come out to attack the position.' That this is the sense (*τῷ λόγῳ* not being instrumental) is seen from e.g. Prot. 345 D *οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ᾄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι*. Cf. 361 D. Also immediately below the same sense is expressed by **τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχειν**.

349 B. δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.—'Do you think the just man would be ready (**ἐθέλειν**, not so strong as *βούλεσθαι*) to have an advantage over the just man?' 'By no means, for (in that case) he would not have been the charming and simple person he is.' 'Well, (would he be ready to have an advantage over) the just action?' 'No, not even over the just one.' For the argument and the senses of **πλέον ἔχειν** see Introduction.

ἀστεῖος = *lepidus*. Cf. Phaedr. 242 E *ἔτι τε ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτοῖν πάνυ ἀστεία*, Lys. 204 C *ἀστεῖόν γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ἐρυθριᾷς*, Ar. Nub. 1064 *ἀστεῖόν γε κέρδος* ('a pretty piece of luck'). The meaning goes through the stages (1) 'town-bred,' (2) 'polite and charming,' (3) 'charming' (ironically).

ἀξιοίη—v. note on *εὐδοκιμοίη* 330 A. In meaning the word corresponds to *ἐθέλειν* (sup.), and is accordingly opposed to *βούλεσθαι* (inf. C init.).

πλεονεκτεῖν—differs from *πλέον ἔχειν* as the habit or disposition of striving differs from the result. Whereas the *δίκαιος* does not think it right to have an advantage (*πλέον ἔχειν*) over the just man, he does think it right to claim (or seek) advantage (*πλεονεκτεῖν*) over the unjust man. The unjust man seeks advantage (*πλεονεκτεῖ*) in all cases.

ἀξιοίη—it is conceivable that the MSS reading *ἀξιοῖ* might here be indicative (as inf. C init.), but, in the light of the preceding sentence and *ἡγοῖτ' ἂν* in this, it is almost certainly optative.

349 C. εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν...τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου—sc. *ἀξιοῖ*. The expression is a brachylogy. Stallbaum compares Gorg. 500 E *ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη...ἡ δ' ἰατρική* (sc. *δοκεῖ*), Theaet. 186 D *ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ* (sc. *ἔνι*). Cf. inf. D and 350 B.
μὴ ἀξιοῖ...μηδὲ βούλεται—'neither thinks it right (=*ἐθέλει* sup. B) ...nor wishes it.'

CHAPTER XXI.

λέγωμεν—so best MSS. It may be either interrogative, 'shall we put it thus?' or hortative, 'let us put it thus.'

Inferior MSS have **λέγομεν**, which, again, may be either a question or a statement of the position.

349 D. εὖ—sc. *εἴρηκας*.
πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει...ὁ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ.—either (1) 'of course a man who is of *that* character (viz. *φρόνιμος καὶ ἀγαθός*) must also be like people of that character, whereas the other must be unlike them'; or (2) 'of course a man of *such and such* a character must also be like people of *the said* character &c.' Editors generally choose the latter, but the addition of **ὢν** makes in favour of the former.
ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐοικέναι. **ὁ δέ**, 'the other man,' is frequently thus written as if *ὁ μὲν* had preceded. For a peculiar instance see Theaet. 181 D *δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν.*

This (the reading of the best MSS) is both more idiomatic and more euphonious than the explicit **ὁ δὲ μή, μὴ ἐοικέναι** of some inferior copies (i.e. *ὁ δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτος ὤν, μὴ ἐοικέναι*), which probably arose from an interpretation.

τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος κ.τ.λ. **ἄρα** does not introduce a logical deduction (which would be egregiously inaccurate), but Socrates catches at Thrasymachus' word **τοιοῦτος**. 'Then (we are to understand that) each of the two is of the same description as those whom he resembles' [i.e. *τοιοῦτος...(οἷοι ἐκεῖνοι) οἷσπερ ἔοικεν.* Cf. Phaedo 92 B *οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις*].
This formal admission, in which lies a fallacy, is required as a premise to the following argument (inf. 350 C). See Introd. § 40 *a*, *g* (iii).
ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει;—'Nay (why), what must be the case?' Cf. 332 C

ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; 348 C *ἀλλὰ τί μήν;* In such places *τί* becomes practically equivalent to *τί ἄλλο*, but it would be a mistake to suppose that *ἄλλο* is omitted. The thought is 'Nay, but what is it (if it is not this)?' In full Xen. Oec. 9 *τί δέ, εἰ μὴ...;* (*quid nisi...*).

349 E. **φρόνιμον**—i.e. relatively to *μουσική*.
τί δὲ ἰατρικόν; sc. *λέγεις*.
ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει κ.τ.λ.—which is a *μουσικὴ πρᾶξις*; v. note on 349 B sup. The one article, inasmuch as **καὶ** practically = 'or' ('as the case may be'). Cf. 332 D. 'The act which consists in tightening or relaxing.'

350 A. **ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει**—sc. which he prescribes. This sense is determined by the article, 'in the food or drink (belonging to the special case).'
ὁστισοῦν—comes as a sort of emphasizing afterthought, **τις** having already been expressed. 'If any expect—no matter who...'
πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.—'would be ready to adopt the course of either doing or saying more than another scientific man would do or say, instead of the same as his like.'

> **αἱρεῖσθαι** has something of the sense common with *προαιρεῖσθαι* and *αἵρεσις*, viz. of adopting a policy or taking a line.

ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη—the assent becomes grudging as the consequences begin to appear.
ὁμοίως μὲν...ὁμοίως δὲ... Cf. Protag. 319 D *ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεύς*, Soph. O. T. 4 *πόλις δ' ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει | ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων.* Latin similarly doubles *pariter*.

350 B. **σοφός**—i.e. in respect of his particular *ἐπιστήμη*.
ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; The usual Socratic position in any case, since *ἀρετή* comes of knowledge. Here, however, we have simply a laxity for the full expression of sup. 349 E *οὐκοῦν καὶ ἅπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν;*

350 C. **τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ**—a good instance of the Platonic chiasmus is afforded by the reversed order **τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ**: cf. 328 E.
ἀναπέφανται. Cf. sup. 334 A. The word is used of that which turns up unexpectedly at the end of an argument. Cf. 487 B *ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι.*

CHAPTER XXII.

ὁ δὴ Θρασύμαχος κ.τ.λ.—'Thrasymachus, you must know, ..' The well-supported reading **δὲ** is flat.

ὡμολόγησε μὲν κ.τ.λ. The position of **μὲν** shews that it was not intended to answer to *ἐπειδὴ δὲ*..., but to a thought which is actually expressed somewhat irregularly in *οὐχ ὡς...ἀλλὰ ἑλκόμενος*... The sentence began as if it would run *ὡμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, χαλεπῶς δὲ καὶ ἑλκόμενος*: 'he did acknowledge it all, but with reluctance.'

οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥᾳδίως λέγω—lit. 'not in the way in which I am now easily telling,' i.e. 'not in the easy way in which I am describing it.' The sense is practically *οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω*.

350 D. **ἅτε καί.** **καὶ** belongs to **ἅτε** (cf. *ὡς καί, οἷος καί, ὅτε καί* &c.). 'Which was quite natural, seeing it was summer.' To join it with what follows 'since it was summer to boot (i.e. over and above his struggles)' is to lose some of the irony.

τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ...Both **καὶ** and **ἐγώ** have their point. 'On that occasion I (*moi qui vous parle*) actually saw.' 'I saw with my own eyes, I did indeed...'

The punctuation of some MSS (including Par. A) **ἅτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος τότε**... must have been made in forgetfulness of the fact that the dialogue had only taken place the day before (vide init.). Also *τότε* is strongly opposed to *πρότερον δὲ οὔπω*.

ἐρυθριῶντα. Dionysodorus (Euthyd. 297 A) and Hippocrates (Protag. 312 A) are similarly seen to blush.

κείσθω—for *τεθείσθω*. See on *ἔκειντο* 328 C. 'Let it have been laid down,' = 'let it be taken as settled.'

ἔφαμεν—sc. 344 C and 348 E. Socrates with mock politeness identifies himself with the position of Thrasymachus (cf. 337 C *ἐάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν κ.τ.λ.*).

350 E. **δημηγορεῖν**—'declaim': i.e. substitute rhetoric for dialectics. The word is used of *ad captandum* speeches, in which, by means of length and special pleading, the orator contrives to mislead the hearer.

Cf. Prot. 329 A (with allusion to the practice of the sophists) *ἐάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηταί τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δολιχὸν κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου.* Gorg. 482 C *ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς*

λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν. καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς, Theaet. 162 D *νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει.* Cf. Grote, Plato I. p. 241.

ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις. Cf. *γραῶν ὕθλος* (Theaet. 176 B), 'old wives' tales,' Gorg. 527 A *τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ γραός*, Protag. 324 D *οὐκέτι μῦθόν σοι λέγω ἀλλὰ λόγον.*

κατανεύσομαι. In the compounds of *νεύω* the future is middle in classical Greek, active in late writers. In the simple verb the classical future is *νεύσω.*

ὥστε σοι ἀρέσκειν κ.τ.λ. 'Just to please you.' The sense is 'I will nod or shake my head.' (S.) 'Do not do so against your real opinion.' (Th.) 'Very well; just to please you (I will nod honestly as I think). Pray what more can you desire (than such a nod, since you forbid me to speak)?'

εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις—'if you are going to (mean to) do that.' Cf. Ar. Av. 759 *αἶρε πλῆκτρον, εἰ μαχεῖ* ('if you mean to fight').

The more common expression would be *εἴπερ τοῦτο μέλλεις ποιεῖν.* See Goodwin M. and T. § 71. Apol. 34 D *τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω;* ('am going to do').

351 A. ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν κ.τ.λ. For ὂν attracted from *οὖσα* to the gender of the predicate, v. sup. 333 E, 336 A.

οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι κ.τ.λ.—some inferior copies have **οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν**... from an objection to the asyndeton. *οὐδείς*, however, is intended to be emphatic (cf. *τότε* sup. 350 D), '*No one* could fail to see it.'

οὕτως ἁπλῶς—'in this absolute way,' viz. by assuming the fact rather than proving it by logical process. The sense (like the order) probably differs from that of *ἁπλῶς οὕτως* sup. 331 C.

πόλιν φαίης ἂν...δουλωσαμένην. φαίης ἂν='would you *admit.*' There is no tautology in this account of the various steps of oppression. A city is unjust; it attempts unjust enslavement of others; it has succeeded; it keeps many (when once enslaved) in servitude.

κατα- implies complete success (cf. *καταπολεμεῖν*, *debellare*).

351 B. ἡ ἀρίστη—explained by **καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος**: 'the best, that is to say, the one which is most completely unjust.'

ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος—not 'that this was your position'=*οὗτος ἦν ὁ σὸς λόγος*, but, 'that this position was one you took up.' Cf. Protag. 331 A *σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστί;*

ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ—sc. *τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔχειν.*

εἰ μὲν ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία, is the reading of the best MSS. The authority for **ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἔστιν ἡ δ. σ.**

is much inferior. With **ἔχει** there is plainly an anacoluthon of a kind very unlikely in so short a sentence, and it is possible that **ἔστιν** is an emendation to remedy the grammar. On the other hand it is equally possible to argue that both *ἔχει* and *ἔστιν* are adscripts, and that *εἰ μέν, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία* (sc. *ἐστίν*) is sufficient in itself. With the next words *εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον* we should then understand 'but if (things are) as...'

[*ἔχει* cannot well have arisen from *ἔστιν*, and the latter reading may therefore be put aside, unless we are willing to suppose that Plato wrote *ἔχει, <καί ἐστιν> ἡ....*]
If *ἔχει* is not a gloss we may make grammar by inserting <*εἰ*> after it, with Baiter &c. (a reading which is cacophonous enough), or by inserting <*καὶ*>, or by omitting either *σοφία* or the whole phrase *ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία* as a note which has crept into the text.]

CHAPTER XXIII.

351 C. εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν—'Thank you': 'it is very good of you!' Cf. Symp. 174 E *καλῶς γε, ἔφη, ποιῶν σύ.* The finite verb is to be understood from the preceding context; here *εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν* (*χαρίζει μοι*). Cf. Ar. Pax 285 (after *ἀπώλεσαν αὐτόν*) *εὖ γ' εὖ γε ποιήσαντες.*

In D inf. *ἀλλ' εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν* the words to be supplied are to be extracted from the general sense of *Ἔστω,...ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι.* Strictly speaking the phrase there has no grammar, but the sense is clear, viz. *εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν* (*οὐκ ἐθέλεις μοι διαφέρεσθαι*). So Prot. 352 C D *καὶ ἅμα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων. Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων.* The full expression occurs in e.g. Dem. Phil. IV. 141 *ἡ τύχη καλῶς ποιοῦσα* (thanks to Fortune who) *πολλὰ πεποίηκε τὰ κοινά*, and Ar. Pax 271 *εὖ γ', ὦ πότνια δέσποιν' Ἀθηναία, ποιῶν | ἀπόλωλ' ἐκεῖνος κἀν δέοντι τῇ πόλει.*

In Plato **γε** is an essential part of the expression when it is used in replies (Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 7).

ἔθνος—'class' (cf. *γένος*). If the word is depreciatory it is only so from the context. Cf. 420 B *ὅπως ἕν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος διαφερόντως ἔσται εὔδαιμον* (i.e. of the various classes of a *πόλις*), Gorg. 455 B *περὶ ἰατρῶν...ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους*, Tim. 19 D *τὸ μιμητικὸν ἔθνος.* In Latin *natio* is depreciatory, as in Phaedr. II. 5 *est ardelionum quaedam Romae natio.* Cf. Cic. pro Mur. § 69 *natio candidatorum.*

351 D. ἔργον ἀδικίας. Not in the meaning of its 'special function' (as in 335 D), a sense of *ἔργον* explained inf. 352 E (init.). Here it is merely *a* function, or a result.

That injustice necessarily results in implanting hatred (*ἐμποιεῖν* is used of a disease sup. 333 E &c.) is simply an observation from experience, assumed as an axiom. It is, of course, assuming too much.

οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις κ.τ.λ. The first **καὶ** belongs to the sentence: 'will it not also be the case that...?' For the rest, there is no point in the usual rendering 'whether among freemen or slaves.' This, moreover, would normally be *ἔν τε ἐλευθέροις καὶ δούλοις* (cf. 343 C, 345 D fin.). Rather we should render 'in the case of (the relation between) freemen and slaves,' 'in a society where there are both freemen and slaves.' Cf. 364 B *περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς*, 'of the relation of the gods with virtue.' The allusion is to 351 B, where the unjust state enslaves others. In a society composed of these two elements, where *ἀδικία* is present, *μῖσος* and *στάσεις* will occur between the parties.
We thus obtain the three steps (1) **ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις**, i.e. between two parts of a society; (2) **ἐν δυοῖν**, i.e. between two persons; (3) **ἐν ἑνί**, i.e. between two parts of a man.

351 E. ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις—'not only to the just (to whom they are assumed to be necessarily hostile), but also to one another.'

ἐὰν...ἐν ἑνὶ ἐγγένηται. The notion of the individual at feud with himself is further dealt with inf. 444 A, where *στάσις* and *ἐπανάστασις μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς* are expressions employed. There, however, the position has been led up to, whereas here the strange expression 'if injustice occurs in an individual' is sprung abruptly upon Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus assumes however that it has some satisfactory meaning, and therefore assents to the question, whereupon Socrates proceeds to explain what the meaning is and what conclusion results from it.

μῶν μὴ ἀπολεῖ κ.τ.λ. 'It will not lose its proper faculty, will it?' The origin of **μῶν** (*μὴ οὖν*) was forgotten, and since *μῶν* introduces questions expecting a negative answer, and *μὴ* also is employed in such questions, it comes about that *μῶν* and *μὴ* are sometimes combined. Cf. 505 C, Phaedo 84 C *ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λελέχθαι;*

[It is an error to suppose that in the combination *μῶν οὐ* the expectation of a negative answer no longer attaches to *μῶν*. Thus

in Sophist. 234 A *μῶν οὐ παιδίαν νομιστέον; πάντως που*, Aesch. Supp. 417 *μῶν οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖν φροντίδος σωτηρίου*; the combination = *num non-putas*, i.e. 'it is not the case (is it?) that we are not to consider (that it does *not* seem)...?']

ἢ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕξει;—sc. *αὐτήν*. This must be another half of the question, with punctuation as in the text: ἢ cannot be brought into the clause following *μῶν μή*.

τοιάνδε...τὴν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ.—'well, the said faculty (which it is to retain in the individual case) is evidently something of this sort.'

οἵαν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται κ.τ.λ. If **ποιεῖν** (the easier but less supported reading) is correct, the construction is *οἵαν...πρῶτον μὲν ποιεῖν αὐτὸ* (sc. *ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται*) *ἀδύνατον πράττειν μεθ' αὑτοῦ, ἔτι δὲ* (*ποιεῖν αὐτὸ*) *ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ κ.τ.λ.* 'Such as, in the first place, to make it unable to act in concert with itself, and, furthermore, to cause it to be an enemy to itself.'

Some MSS, however, (including Par. A) have **ποιεῖ**, which is certainly more euphonious immediately before *πράττειν*. If this is the genuine reading, we may either (1) suppose an anacoluthon, *ποιεῖ* being written as if *ὥστε* and not *οἵαν* had preceded, or (2) eject **οἵαν** and allow **ᾧ ἂν** to begin a new sentence explanatory of *τοιάνδε*. The latter course appears preferable. The sentence which results is neater, and the appearance of *οἵαν* is easily accounted for. With *τοιάνδε* fresh in his mind the copyist came upon ΩΙΑΝ (*ᾧ ἂν*), which he might naturally misread as ΟΙΑΝ. It would soon be detected that *ᾧ ἂν* was necessary to the sentence. When however *ᾧ ἂν* was reinserted from the archetype, *οἵαν* was left unexcised.

γένει—'set of men,' 'class.' Cf. *ἔθνος* sup. 351 C.

352 A. **ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ**—'to itself (i.e. inwardly), and to everything that opposes it, and (consequently, or necessarily) to the just.' Emphasis is laid upon the hostility to 'the just' both here and sup. 351 E (*ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις*) because of the point which Socrates proposes to make immediately, viz. that hostility to the just means hostility to the gods.

καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ δή—i.e. to come to the application of the preceding statement. If the 'faculty' of *ἀδικία* is what has been stated, then 'in the case of the individual also of course....'

ὄντων [ἔστωσαν]—an answer made sullenly in view of the consequence.

[The proper Attic form of the 3rd plur. imperative is **ὄντων**, and Plato probably so wrote it. Later such forms were regularly

adapted to the shape then current, and it is often simply an accidental confusion with the genitive of the participle which has preserved an imperative *-όντων* in MSS where *-έτωσαν* would otherwise have been substituted. Metrical evidence is against the longer forms, except in Eur. Iph. Taur. 1480 (*ἴτωσαν*), and Ion 1131 (*ἔστωσαν*), where, however, the editors have something to say. Inscriptions do not shew *-ωσαν* in either active or passive until 300 B.C. (v. Meisterhans Gram. Att. Ins. § 61. 9), though the imperative in *-ων* is previously met with 111 times, among which *ὄντων* itself occurs in B.C. 446 and 424, while an instance of *ἔστωσαν* is not met with till the 2nd century B.C. The Grammarians (Moeris, p. 13, Etym. Mag. 6. 56) lay down the rule *ἀγόντων Ἀττικῶς, ἀγέτωσαν Ἑλληνικῶς*. In Euthyph. 9 D MSS give *πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγείσθωσαν θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων*, but the second hand in B alters to *ἡγείσθων*. In *μισούντων* all agree. See some apt remarks by Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 327 sq.]

352 B. θεοῖς...ἐχθρός. Apart from the force of the two words regarded separately, there is a reference to their familiar sense, when *θεοῖς—ἐχθρός* is treated as a compound (whence the noun *θεοισεχθρία*). *θεοῖς ἐχθρός* in that use involves a contempt which is the very opposite of the admiration which Thrasymachus claims for the *ἄδικος*. The same notion is brought home here.

εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου: the partitive genitive (as with *ἐσθίειν, πίνειν τινός*), no doubt assisted by the sense of 'taking one's fill' (*ἐμπίπλασθαι* &c.).

For the comparison of discourse to a feast, cf. Lys. 211 C *τί ὑμεῖς αὐτὼ μόνω ἑστιᾶσθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον τῶν λόγων*; Soph. 251 B *τοῖς νέοις...θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν*, Gorg. 522 A, inf. 571 D, and frequently in Plato. Inf. 354 A *ταῦτα δή σοι...εἱστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδίοις*. With the gen. as here Phaedr. 227 B *ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἱστία*;

ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι. Thrasymachus sulkily pretends to believe that the audience is prejudiced.

ἀποπλήρωσον—combining the meaning of 'satisfying the inquirer' with that of 'making the banquet complete.' The object, being **τὰ λοιπὰ** *κ.τ.λ.*, shews that grammatically the latter sense predominates; but for the former cf. Charm. 169 C *κἀμὲ τάχ' ἂν ἀποπληρώσαις ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγεις περὶ σωφροσύνης ὃ ἔστιν*, Polit. 286 A *τὴν τοῦ πυνθανομένου ψυχὴν ἀποπληρῶσαι*, Prot. 329 C *ὃ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον*.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ.... The sentence is unfinished, and the opening words are resumed in **ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει** (inf. D). From **οὐ γὰρ ἂν**... we enter upon a parenthetical note, which lasts down

to ...**πράττειν ἀδύνατοι**, and itself contains other parentheses. The outline is 'for that the just prove to be wiser and better and more capable of action, while the unjust are quite unable to act in concert (...), this I perceive to be so, and not as you stated at first.'

ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὓς φαμεν...τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν. This clause (still following **ὅτι**) is slightly anacoluthic. Lit. 'but in point of fact even persons of whom we say that, though unjust, they have at any time done anything vigorously in concert, we do not use the expression with entire truth': i.e. 'but when we say of people who are unjust that they have at any time...we do not use the expression with entire truth.' Grammatically *τοῦτο λέγομεν* should have been e.g. *οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθῶς λέγομεν τοῦτο πρᾶξαι*, i.e. 'when persons of whom we say...we are wrong in declaring to do so.' **οὓς**, however, is unconsciously treated as if it were *εἴ τινας*.

352 C. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν κ.τ.λ. Literally, 'but it is manifest that there was in them a kind of justice—one which prevented them from wronging at one and the same time both one another and also those whom they were attacking—through which they accomplished what they did, *and that* consequently they set out in pursuit of their unjust ends with only a half-developed corruption by injustice, inasmuch as those who are wholly depraved and completely unjust are no less completely incapable of action.' Thus the clause **ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει...ἀδικεῖν** is an explanation in passing, while **δι' ἣν ἔπραξαν** *κ.τ.λ.* carries on the main sense of the larger clause. The clause **ὥρμησαν δὲ**... is coordinate with **ἐνῆν τις** *κ.τ.λ.* after **δῆλον ὅτι.**

μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε—'at any rate not both one another and also....' Cf. inf. 388 B *πολὺ δ' ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον δεησόμεθα μήτοι θεούς γε ποιεῖν ὀδυρομένους...εἰ δ' οὖν θεούς, μήτοι τόν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν κ.τ.λ.*

ἀδικίᾳ ἡμιμόχθηροι—'only half-depraved by injustice,' opposed immediately by *παμπόνηροι*. Cf. Arist. Eth. N. VII. 10. 3 *καὶ ἑκὼν μέν, πονηρὸς δ' οὔ. ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρον.* The sense 'only' is obtained by emphasis upon **ἡμι-**. Cf. 333 E.

352 D. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. **οὖν** resumes after the digression; **μὲν** is answered by *εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν.*

εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν κ.τ.λ. Thrasymachus has strongly taken the ground that the ideally unjust man is made *εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος* (344 A—C). In 347 E and 348 A the difference of view as

to which *βίος* is *λυσιτελέστερος* is brought forward as demanding detailed examination. In 348 E Socrates finds that Thrasymachus takes up an uncompromising attitude in calling injustice *καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν*. He is compelled to refute this position, by proving that injustice is not *καλόν* (being neither *σοφόν* nor *ἀγαθόν*), and that it is not *ἰσχυρόν* (being incapable of single-minded action). He now turns back to the question as a whole—which life is the more profitable, in the sense of producing *εὐδαιμονία*? Socrates' own summary of the course of the argument is given in 354 B.

τὸ ὕστερον—'as our second question.' The first question having been as to whether justice is 'the interest of the stronger.' See 347 D (fin.) E (init.).

φαίνονται—sc. *ἄμεινον ζῶντες* (rather than *ζῆν*, since the meaning is 'they are shewn').

οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος κ.τ.λ. For the thought cf. 344 E.

352 E. **ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν;**—[For the form **ἀκούσαις** v. sup. 338 D *κακουργήσαις*.] The loss of **ἂν** before **ἄλλῳ** would be easy, just as it has been lost from Par. A and other MSS immediately below in ...*μαχαίρᾳ* <**ἂν**> *ἀμπέλου*....

To say that *ἂν* is 'readily' understood from the preceding question is to ignore the repetition of *ἄλλῳ*. Thus in *ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἢ ὠσίν*; we might have understood *ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ* as common to both questions and capable of being so understood with a series of them. With *ἄλλῳ* expressed, however, and in its position after *ἀκούσαις*, the case is different. Nevertheless an emphasis upon *ἀκούσαις*, recalling the fact that *ἴδοις* had preceded, might suggest that *ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν* must be repeated, i.e. 'Could you see with anything but eyes? No. Well, *hear* with anything but *ears*?' Whether or not this is possible, is one of those questions about which scholars will differ. Goodwin (M. and T. § 226) accepts the MSS reading here, and it is wiser to retain it. A case like 360 C *οὕτω δὲ δρῶν, οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοίη ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἴοιεν ἀμφότεροι* is, however, obviously much simpler. Cf. 398 A for one equally natural.

A potential optative without **ἂν** at all is of course quite out of the question in Attic prose.

οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἄν...φαῖμεν εἶναι. So Stallbaum for **φαμὲν** of MSS. **ἂν** cannot belong to **εἶναι**, nor can it be joined with a present indicative: Goodwin M. and T. § 195. The one instance quoted, viz. Legg. 712 E *ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω νῦν ἐξαίφνης* **ἂν** *ἐρωτηθεὶς ὄντως, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω...εἰπεῖν* shews an anacoluthon easily intelligible in a rather long sentence, but not so conceivable here.

CHAPTER XXIV.

353 A. **νῦν δή**—'well now...,' 'now at last' (*nunc demum*) [not, of course, as in 340 E, where the tense is past].

πυνθανόμενος εἰ οὐ κ.τ.λ.—**οὐ** is naturally kept when *εἰ* is simply interrogative. The present instance is the indirect form of the direct *οὐ τοῦτο ἑκάστου ἐστὶν ἔργον;* see Liddell and Scott, Lex. *οὐ* A 7 *a*, *b*.

> *οὐ* is particularly common in the second member of such indirect questions. Cf. inf. 354 C *σχολῇ εἴσομαι εἴτε* (=*πότερον*) *ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει, εἴτε* (=*ἢ*) *καὶ οὔ*. Soph. Aj. 6 *ὅπως ἴδῃς εἴτ' ἔνδον εἴτ' οὐκ ἔνδον* (where see Jebb's quotation from Antipho de caed. Her. p. 131. 14). A collation of examples, however, warrants the belief that (to use Prof. Jebb's imaginary sentence while differing from his explanation) in the second member of such questions as *σκοπεῖν εἰ πρέπει ἢ οὔ* (*μή*) or *σκοπεῖν εἴτε πρέπει εἴτε οὔ* (*μή*) the choice is determined mainly by emphasis. The emphatic negative is *οὔ*. Thus the difference would be expressed by 'See if it is becoming or *not* (*οὔ*),' 'see if it is *becoming* or not' (*μή*). This distinction seems conversationally more practicable than the somewhat recondite discrimination between abstract conception and actual fact. Thus in Prot. 313 A *πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέψω, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὔ* ('whether it is right to do so or *not*')...followed by (B) *οὐδὲ συμβουλὴν ποιεῖ εἴτε χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μή* ('whether you *ought* to do so or not'). Note in corroboration of this view that *χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν* is substituted for *ἐπιτρεπτέον*.

ὃ ἂν ᾖ μόνον τι κ.τ.λ.—**τι** is subject.

κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων. This very common Greek idiom, the result of a confusion, is often supposed to have been deliberately imitated by Milton in his 'the fairest of her daughters, Eve.' The same confusion, however, is to be met with frequently in English writers, e.g. Sterne, Sentimental Journey (Calais) 'of all others... the unfortunate of our own country surely have the first rights,' and is daily heard.

353 B. **ἀρετή.** For the special meaning v. sup. 335 B.

ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτά—'have recourse to the same illustrations.'

ὤτων ἦν κ.τ.λ.—i.e. 'did we not say that there was...?' (352 E). For the imperf. cf. Crito 47 D *διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο...ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ ἐγίγνετο* ('as we said') *τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο.*

ἔχε δή—So Gorg. 460 A &c. 'Stay now!' *Tiens donc.* **δή** again implies that we have reached the vital point.

ὄμματα—a word used by Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, but not treated as current Attic by Aristophanes or the orators.

ἀπεργάσαιντο—The plural is given in all the best MSS. Cf. 503 D, *τὰ ἤθη...ποιεῖ ταὐτὸν...ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπλανται.* There, as here and in other places, the insertion of a *ν* is palaeographically easy to explain, but there are sufficient reasons for believing that even in prose the rule of attaching a singular verb to a neuter plural subject frequently broke down with its own weight.

The verb was apt to depend rather upon the thought than upon the actual word employed. In 503 D the real subject of *ἐμπίπλανται* is the possessors of the *ἤθη* in question. In 365 B *τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα... φασιν* the subject is treated as if it were 'men in general.' Lach. 180 E *τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε...διαλεγόμενοι.* See Jelf § 385, where the present case is explained as one in which *ὀφθαλμοί* (the word previously used) is in the writer's mind as the subject. How easily this might occur is shewn by such substitution as in Lach. 190 A *εἰ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι ὄψις παραγενομένη ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ ἐκείνους οἷς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἷοί τέ ἐσμεν ποιεῖν αὐτὴν παραγίγνεσθαι ὄμμασιν.*

The plural with neuter subject is found in epic and is especially frequent in Empedocles, occurs in Pindar and occasionally in Thucydides and Herodotus, often in Xenophon (though sometimes with discrepancy in the MSS, probably due to editorial attempts to preserve the rule), and here and there in other writers. Jelf (loc. cit.) supplies examples, e.g. Xen. An. I. 2. 23 *ἐνταῦθα ἦσαν τὰ Συεννέσιος βασίλεια.* Thuc. IV. 88 *τὰ τέλη...αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν.* There is no truth in Porson's *a priori* canon, which limited the plural to cases with an animate subject; nor is it possible in most cases to regard the subject as a collective plural which is itself pluralized.

353 C. ἥτις...αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή—('I mean the special excellence in each case) no matter what the excellence may be': it is not our present concern to define these special *ἀρεταί*, but only to recognise that they are essential. The construction is *ἥτις* (= *ἥτις ποτέ*, *ἥτις δή* or *ἥτις δήποτε*) *αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή*, (*ταύτην λέγω*). For the use of **ἥτις** cf. Ar. Ran. 38 *τίς τὴν θύραν ἐπάταξεν; ὡς κενταυρικῶς | ἐνήλαθ' ὅστις* (i.e. *ὅστις δήποτε ἦν*). Crito 50 A *εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως* (= *ὅπως δή*) *δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο.* More fully Euthyph. 11 B *εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ὅ τι δὴ πάσχει.*

τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ...κακίᾳ δὲ...Both order and sense shew that the words **τῇ οἰκείᾳ** must not be repeated with **κακίᾳ**. Each thing has its own particular *ἀρετή*; there is no reference to its own particular *κακία*, but only to *κακία* in general. 'Thanks to its special excellence...but thanks to defectiveness...'

στερόμενα—The form *στέρομαι* (cf. *οἴχομαι*, *ἥκω*) frequently possesses the sense of a perfect. Cf. Thuc. VIII. 1 § 2.

τίθεμεν—with more vivacity than the deliberative subjunctive: 'Do we put...?' cf. Thuc. VI. 77 *μένομεν ἕως ἂν ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις ληφθῶμεν;* and frequently.

353 D. **αὐτὰ**—redundant (or resumptive) after **τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι** *κ.τ.λ.* Cf. inf. 398 A *ἄνδρα δὴ δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μιμεῖσθαι πάντα χρήματα, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν πόλιν...προσκυνοῖμεν ἂν αὐτόν.* Eur. Bacch. 201 *πατρίους παραδοχὰς ἅς θ' ὁμήλικας χρόνῳ | κεκτήμεθ', οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος* &c.
ἀποδοῖμεν—'assign' (as belonging to its department), cf. Legg. 765 B *εἰς τοὺς κριτὰς ἀποδιδοὺς τὴν κρίσιν.* See Cope on Arist. Rhet. I. 7. 7 for the uses of *ἀποδιδόναι.*
ἐκείνης—for *ἐκείνου*, by an attraction (to the gender of *ψυχή*). There is a confusion of expression between (1) *ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ...καὶ...φαῖμεν...ἐκείνου εἶναι;* and (2) *οὐκουν* (or *ἄλλο τί οὖν ἢ*) *ψυχῇ...καὶ φαῖμεν ἴδια...ἐκείνης εἶναι;*
τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; That *τὸ ζῆν* is *ψυχῆς ἔργον* is in one sense a truism, since the presence or absence of *ψυχή* means the presence or absence of life, *ψυχή* in fact often = 'life.' **τὸ ζῆν**, however, has another meaning, 'the conduct of life,' i.e. the life which consists in the exercise of the faculties (*κατ' ἐνέργειαν*). Arist. Eth. N. I. 7. 14 defines the 'function of a man' as *ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου*, and says that it is the function of the *σπουδαῖος* to carry on this life *εὖ καὶ καλῶς*. 'Virtue' in the soul (the special *ἀρετή*) enables life to be lived thus *εὖ καὶ καλῶς.*

353 E. **εὖ βιώσεται**—But, as has been pointed out in the last note, it by no means follows that because the soul *performs* well (*εὖ πράττει*) it also *fares* well (*εὖ πράττει* in the other sense).

354 A. **μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων**—v. sup. 344 B.
ὄντων—[*ἔστωσαν*], v. sup. 352 A.
εἱστιάσθω—cf. 352 B. **σοι** is the usual dat. of agent with perf. pass. Lit. 'let this have been the feasting done by you....'
ὑπὸ σοῦ γε—sc. *ταῦτά μοι εἱστίαται.*

354 B. **τοῦ ἀεὶ παραφερομένου**—'the dish which happened to be (from time to time) brought on.' *παραφέρειν*, like *παρατιθέναι* = *apponere*, of dishes. Cf. Hdt. I. 119 *παρέφερον, τοῖσι προσέκειτο, τὴν κεφαλὴν τοῦ παιδός.* The word is specially applicable, since it is also used of bringing forward arguments, cf. [Eur.] Iph. Aul. 981 *λόγους παραφέρειν.*

ἀπογεύονται = *delibant*: 'take a mere (ἀπο-) taste of.' Cf. Theaet. 157 C *παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.*
οὕτω—redundant, since *καὶ* sufficiently answers to **ὥσπερ**. Cf. 327 C.
ἐμπεσόντος...ὕστερον. As a matter of fact the discussion *εἴτε κακία ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.* itself arose out of the assertion that injustice was *λυσιτελέστερον.* The final disproof of the assertion does indeed come after the said discussion, but it is incorrect to say that the subject *ὕστερον ἐμπίπτει.* See 352 D (note on *εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον κ.τ.λ.*).
οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ κ.τ.λ.—Goodwin M. and T. § 811.

354 C. **ὁπότε...μὴ οἶδα**—**μὴ** because **ὁπότε** is not = *quoniam*, but refers to indefinite cases: 'in cases where I do not...' (= *εἴ ποτε...μὴ...*).
εἴτε καὶ οὔ—v. sup. 353 A.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

357 A. **λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι**—not *τοῦ λόγου* 'the argument,' but 'that I had done with discussion.'
τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. For **τὸ δ'** ('but, as a fact'; lit. 'but on the other hand') v. sup. 340 D *τὸ δέ, οἶμαι, ἕκαστος... οὐδέποτε ἁμαρτάνει* (note).

For **ἦν** and **ἄρα** as familiar parts of the expression cf. 443 C *τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα,...εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης*, Tim. 51 C *τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος*; Soph. Trach. 1171 *κἀδόκουν πράξειν καλῶς· | τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρ' οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν θανεῖν ἐμέ.* The two words may be separated, e.g. Symp. 198 D *τὸ δὲ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν.*

προοίμιον—'a prelude (merely).' For the absence of *μόνον* v. note on 333 E *πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον.* So here the effect is gained by a stress upon *προοίμιον.*
Γλαύκων. For Glaucon and his character see Introduction § 3 *c*.
ἀεί τε...καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε.... For **καὶ δὴ καὶ...** see 328 B.
ἀνδρειότατος—cf. 368 A. For the use of *ἀνδρεῖος* in reference to moral bravery or pluck in argument cf. Meno 81 D *ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν.*

τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο. It is very improbable that this order should mean the same as *οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο τὴν τοῦ Θρ. ἀπόρρησιν*. The genitive belongs to the verb: i.e. 'he would not accept from Thrasymachus his retirement.' Cf. 329 E *οἶμαί σου...οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι*.

ἀπόρρησιν = 'giving up' (the argument). The use of *ἀπαγορεύειν* = *ἀποκάμνειν* is frequent. Cf. Phaedo 85 C *μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις*. Thrasymachus abandoned the argument in 354 A (*ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἱστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδίοις*).

357 B. τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. There is nothing philosophically recondite about Glaucon's division of *ἀγαθά* into (1) harmless pleasures with no future results, (2) things pleasant in themselves and in their results, (3) things unpleasant in themselves but beneficial in their results. The classification is sufficiently exact for the character. It would be over-refinement to press the point that even *ἡδοναὶ ἀβλαβεῖς* may leave good consequences.

[Aristotle (Eth. Nic. I. 6. 9) has *δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα* (i.e. goods desired *in and for themselves*, and a secondary class which are *means* to these). Ibid. 7. 5 he says that the chief good is *εὐδαιμονία· ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηδενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν*: i.e. what Glaucon calls *χαίρειν* (= *ἡδονήν*) and *φρονεῖν* (= *νοῦν*) are put by Aristotle in the same class, viz. the second class of Glaucon.]

καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται κ.τ.λ. This, the reading of the best MSS, is sound and idiomatic. Greek habitually substitutes the personal or demonstrative for the relative in the second clause of sentences similar to the present. It is too much to say that *καὶ δι' ἃς μηδέν...* is not allowable, but that form of expression would certainly be the exception rather than the rule. Cf. inf. 505 E *ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει*, 395 D *ὧν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι*, Euthyd. 301 E *ἆρ' οὖν ταῦτα ἡγεῖ σὰ εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ἄρξῃς καὶ ἐξῇ σοι αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ;* Soph. Aj. 457, and see Jelf § 833. 2.

The negative **μηδὲν** (rather than *οὐδὲν*) shews that, despite the

change to the demonstrative, the force of the indefinite relative **ὅσαι** pervades the clause. The *sense* is *καὶ δι' ὅσας μηδὲν....*
ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα. The words **ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα** might possibly be suspected by a certain school of critics. They are redundant and, of course, a little illogical: 'they have no future result other than enjoyment while one has them.' But neither of these objections amounts to much when we are dealing with a conversational style. The Greek use of *ἄλλος* is particularly idiomatic (*χόρτος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δένδρα* &c.). [An attempt to render **χαίρειν ἔχοντα** by '*keep on* rejoicing' contradicts the bearing of the whole sentence.]

357 C. **οἷον αὖ**: 'for example, again,' i.e. to give instances in this case as in the other.
εἶδος—'species.' From the general meaning of 'sort,' *εἶδος* in Plato may = 'genus' or 'species' according to context. Cf. Theaet. 148 D *ὥσπερ ταύτας* (sc. *τὰς δυνάμεις*) *πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες.*
ἰάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός—'medical practice and other ways of making money' (or 'moneymaking in general').

There is no need, with Stallbaum, to call in the rendering '*and also* money-making.' That idiom of *ἄλλος* is, of course, familiar enough, e.g. Eur. Med. 297, Euthyd. 273 A *ὅ τ' Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος* (the Sophists) *καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα πολλοί*, Gorg. 473 C *τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων* ('and foreigners *as well*'), Phaedr. 232 E &c.; but it is clear from what follows that Glaucon has in mind a benefit arising from the disagreeable exertion of *ἰάτρευσις*, and that benefit is the making of money.

ταῦτα...ἐπίπονα φαῖμεν ἄν.—This construction of *φημί* (without *εἶναι*) = *καλῶ* is not very common. Yet cf. inf. 360 C *καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις*, Gorg. 481 C *πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα;* Hom. Il. VIII. 153 *εἴπερ γάρ σ' Ἕκτωρ γε κακὸν καὶ ἀνάλκιδα φήσει.*

357 D. **ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν...καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον**: 'yes, there is this sort also besides the other two' (not *τοῦτο τὸ τρίτον*).
γὰρ οὖν in confirming = 'yes, indeed,' cf. Theaet. 170 A *φησὶ γὰρ οὖν* 'yes, he *does* say so.' In Parm. 148 C *γὰρ οὖν δὴ* is more emphatic still. **οὖν** in such connexions has its usual force, 'no matter (what the consequences may be),' 'anyhow.'
ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι...ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ. (1) With this punctuation there is a slight irregularity of expression, it being necessary to supply *αὐτὴν θετέαν εἶναι* from *τίθης*. (2) We may, however, treat

οἶμαι as parenthetical and expressive of a slight diffidence in deciding, i.e. *ἐγὼ μὲν, οἶμαι, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ (τίθημι αὐτήν)*. For **μὲν** without a *δὲ*-clause, carrying on the same diffidence of tone, see note on 334 C *εἰκὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ.* 'I, for my part...'

358 A. οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.—'Well, you must know, it does not...' or 'Now it does not...'

The absence of any qualifying or predicative word with **δοκεῖ** calls for remark. 'It does not seem *so*' would naturally be *οὐ δοκεῖ τοιοῦτον*, or *οὕτω*; or we should look for *οὐ τούτου δοκεῖ* (sc. *τοῦ εἴδους*) or its equivalent.
It is therefore probable that *δοκεῖ* has the same value as in e.g. *ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ*, viz. 'people in general do not approve,' 'they say No': *non placet*. In that case we may either (1) construe the whole sentence *οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ (δοκεῖ) τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους (τιθέναι αὐτήν)*, where the same words are supplied as with *ἐγὼ μὲν* sup.; or (2) repeat *δοκεῖ* with the *personal* subject (*δικαιοσύνη*) and understand *εἶναι* with *ἐπιπόνου εἴδους*. (For laxity of *δοκεῖ* cf. 334 B.) The former seems much preferable.
The class-genitive **ἐπιπόνου εἴδους** is good in either case. Cf. 367 C *ὡμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην* and 424 C *καὶ ἐμὲ θὲς τῶν πεπεισμένων*. Eur. Bacch. 1317 *τῶν φιλτάτων ἔμοιγ' ἀριθμήσει τέκνων.*

μισθῶν θ' ἕνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον. We must join **διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον**, 'to be practised because of appearances (and not for its own sake), with an eye to rewards in money and reputation.' **δόξα** as noun corresponds to the frequent sense of *δοκεῖν* 'to be thought.' See 361 B—D and 362 A for the part played by 'having the name' of being just.

[Another, but very unlikely, rendering would consist in joining **εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν**, 'high estimation by reason of repute.' The tautology is flagrant, and, though *διὰ δόξαν* is possible (cf. Gorg. 514 D *ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου*;), *διὰ δόξης* would be expected. Apart from these objections (which are, however, sufficient, especially when the better construction is clear), the combination would be grammatical enough. Cf. 378 D *δεσμοὶ ὑπὸ υἱέος*, Phaedo 99 B *δίνη ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*, Xen. Hell. VI. 1. 6 *περὶ ταφὰς κόσμῳ*, Thuc. I. 18 1 *τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος*.]

εὐδοκιμήσεων—'acquisitions of a good name,' in various manifestations and instances.

CHAPTER II.

[**ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται**]—omitted in Par. A and some other MSS. Whether the omission is due to homoeoteleuton with **ψέγεται**, or whether the words have been interpolated to complete the antithesis (cf. D inf.), can hardly be decided.

ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής—'but I am apparently a stupid person.' Stallbaum compares Phileb. 23 D *εἰμὶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις* ('a ridiculous creature'). Prot. 340 D *κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικε...καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός* ('a ridiculous sort of doctor).'

358 B. **ἄκουσον—ἐάν σοι ταὐτὰ δοκῇ**—i.e. *ἄκουσον* (*καὶ σκέψαι*) *ἐὰν κ.τ.λ.*; 'listen *and see* if you will come to the same opinion (as mine).' Cf. 434 A *ἰδὲ δὴ ἐὰν σοί, ὅπερ ἐμοί, ξυνδοκῇ*, Xen. Mem. IV. 4. 12 *σκέψαι ἐὰν τόδε σοι μᾶλλον ἀρέσκῃ*, Cyr. II. 4. 16 *ἄκουε τοίνυν...ἄν τί σοι δόξω λέγειν*, Hom. Il. XX. 172 *γλαυκιόων δ' ἰθὺς φέρεται μένει, ἤν τινα πέφνῃ.*

> The notion with **ἐάν** (or Homeric *αἴ κε*) is that of trial or inquiry, in order to discover whether a result *will turn out* such and such, while with *εἰ* the notion is of examining whether a thing *is* so (e.g. Xen. Anab. VII. 3. 37 *σκέψαι εἰ ὁ Ἑλλήνων νόμος κάλλιον ἔχει*). Thus *ἄκουσον εἴ σοι τόδε δοκεῖ*='listen and see whether this is your opinion,' but *ἄκουσον ἐάν σοι τόδε δοκῇ*='listen and see whether you will come to this opinion.'
>
> [A rendering 'whether you will remain of the same opinion *as now*' would require e.g. *ἔτι δοκῇ*.]

ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι—i.e. your talk acted on him like a spell. The effect of an *ἐπῳδή* on a serpent was to render it powerless, or even make it burst (Verg. Ecl. VIII. 72).

αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ—with **ἔχει δύναμιν**, not with **ἐνόν**. 'What faculty it possesses in itself by itself, when it exists in the *soul*.' **ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ** should be read with stress.

ἐὰν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ: here, of course, quite different from *ἐάν σοι ταὐτὰ δοκῇ* above. It is simply the protasis of the ordinary shape with an apodosis in the future. 'Well, then, I will act as follows, if you have no objection.'

358 C. **(πάντες) αὐτὸ...**—referring to **δικαιοσύνην**. See note on 336 E. In construction it belongs to **ἐπιτηδεύουσιν**, not to the participle, as the order shews.

αὐτὸ δρῶσι—'do it' (the said thing)='do so': *le font*. Cf. inf.

359 B *αὐτὸ ποιεῖν* (referring to *ἀδικεῖν*). Thuc. I. 69 *οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος ἀλλ' ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι, περιορῶν δέ, ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ*.

πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα. The force of **ἄρα** is 'after all' ('when you come to look at it') = 'as a matter of fact.' Cf. 375 D *οὐκ ἐνοήσαμεν ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα τοιαῦται φύσεις οἵας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ᾠήθημεν*, 438 A *μήτοι τις ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβήσῃ, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ· πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσι*. The sense thus = 'for (whatever may be urged against injustice on moral grounds) it is, after all,....'

ὡς λέγουσιν. The verb is emphatic: 'so it is *said*; for *I* am not of that opinion.'

διατεθρυλημένος...ἀκούων κ.τ.λ.—'dinned...with hearing....'

A comma at **ὦτα** is misleading as to the construction. For one participle 'subordinate to, or explanatory of, another' (Jelf § 706. 2), cf. e.g. Apol. 31 A *τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι...κρούσαντες ἄν με πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε*, Hom. Od. v. 374 *κάππεσε χεῖρε πετάσσας νηχέμεναι μεμαώς*.

358 D. **κατατείνας.** See note on 348 A (*ἀντικατατείναντες*).

εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἃ λέγω—sc. *ἐστί*. Cf. 370 E *ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία* (sc. *ᾖ*), Thuc. I. 9 *εἴ τῳ ἱκανὸς τεκμηριῶσαι* (sc. *ἐστί*).

The omission would appear less harsh if an adjective e.g. *εἰ ἡδέα ἃ λέγω* had been written. **σοι βουλομένῳ**, however, is treated as such a predicate, being a frequent combination in the same sense. Cf. Phaed. 78 B *ὅθεν ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν*, Hipp. Min. 363 B *εἰ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν Ἱππίᾳ*, Hdt. IX. 46 *ἡδομένοισι ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι γεγόνασι*, Antiph. (*περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ*) 766 *ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἡδομένοις ᾖ, βουλήσομαι ἀπολογήσασθαι*, and, in Latin, Tac. Agr. 18 *quibus bellum volentibus erat*. Sall. Iug. 100 *uti militibus exaequatus cum imperatore labos volentibus esset*. So *ἀσμένῳ, ἐλπομένῳ*.

358 E. **περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, *τί τῷ ὄντι* καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.** The reading of the last clause is doubtful, but fortunately the meaning is quite clear. The position to be stated is given above (C init.) as *δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι*, and inf. 359 A the corresponding phrase is *γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης*.

The best supported reading (Par. A &c.) is **τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη** i.e. *τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν (ὂν) δικαιοσύνη γέγονε* (with trajection of *τε* for *τί τε ὂν καὶ ὅθεν*) 'being what and whence, justice has come into existence.' This is rather awkwardly obtained, and destroys the formal agreement of the expression with C (init.)

and 359 A. The two questions are there equally prominent: 'what it *is*; whence it comes.' Here the *γένεσις* is specially emphasized. No one can say that such a variation of phrasing is impossible, but, taken with the awkward construction, it appears unlike Plato's style.

Two related inferior MSS have **τί οἴονται καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε**, which may be set aside. The reading is obviously akin to another, **τί οἷόν τε καὶ** *κ.τ.λ.* of Ven. Π. A little supported, but obvious (and almost certainly 'edited') reading is simply **οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε**, and **τί οἷόν τε** *κ.τ.λ.* *may* be a confusion of this and the **τί ὄν τε** *κ.τ.λ.* of Par. A.

We are thus, as actual texts stand, reduced to choosing between **τί ὄν** and **οἷόν**, or else determining a new reading from which all the texts may have been derived. We can, however, hardly start with the easy *οἷον* and suppose the unlikely *τί ὄν* to have been derived from it, and even with *οἷον* we cannot naturally supply *ἐστί* and preserve the formal agreement above-mentioned.

[The construction of a new reading is hazardous, but I have ventured **τί τῷ ὄντι** (sc. *ἐστὶ*) **καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε**, 'what it is essentially (cf. *οὐσία* 359 A) and whence it has arisen.' We should then look for the cause of the diversity in an old corruption of ΤΙΤΩΙΟΝΤΙ, which became ΤΙΟΙΟΝΤΕ or ΤΙΟΙΟΝΤΑΙ or ΤΙΟΝΤΕ. The substitution of *τε* for *-τι* (thanks to the following *καὶ*) would throw the rest into confusion. *οἷόν τε* is simply a scholar's easiest correction.]

πεφυκέναι—emphatic: 'is *naturally*,' in its *φύσις* or *οὐσία*.

ὥστε δοκεῖ. It is true that all the period is introduced by **φασί**, but Glaucon for the moment identifies himself with those who so argue and takes their words into his own mouth. It is quite in the conversational manner that he should speak as if the construction were *ὥστε, ὥς φασι, δοκεῖ* instead of what it actually is. With the new sentence he reverts to the dependent construction, i.e. *ἄρξασθαί* (*φασι*).

It is surprising that anyone with an ear and a feeling for style should write (with Ast)...**αἱρεῖν δοκεῖν λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι**...

ἀδικῶσι—sc. *οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, 'people.' Cf. Thuc. VII. 6J *νομίσας, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσι, πάντα ἔργῳ ἔτι σφίσιν ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι.* This subject then runs on to **ἄρξασθαι** following.

359 A. **αἱρεῖν**—with the sense of 'catching' (in hunting &c.). Hence the opposition to **ἐκφεύγειν**. Cf. Tim. 64 B *ταύτῃ γὰρ δὴ μεταδιωκτέον πάντα, ὅσα ἐπινοοῦμεν ἑλεῖν.*

For the doctrine (common with the Sophists) cf. 344 C *οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὀνειδίζουσιν οἱ*

ὀνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν, and Gorg. 483 B, &c. It is natural also to compare the Hobbesian 'contract' or 'covenant' of Justice (**ξυνθέσθαι** inf.). 'The forms taken by somewhat analogous doctrines in Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Rousseau are stated and criticised in T. H. Green's Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, Works, II. 335' (B. Bosanquet 'Companion to Plato's Republic').

ξυνθήκας αὑτῶν [or **αὐτῶν**?]—(1) with **αὑτῶν**—'covenants belonging to themselves,' i.e. 'among themselves.'

It matters little whether we call the genitive possessive, or subjective ('made by themselves'), or objective (= *πρὸς αὑτούς*). These notions are indivisible in the Greek, 'appertaining to themselves.' Jowett and Campbell quote (as objective) Thuc. I. 140 *τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα*, but though the decree was, no doubt, *πρὸς Μεγαρέας*, the actual grammar is nothing more than 'pertaining to the Megarians.'

(2) with **αὐτῶν**. This admits of two renderings (*a*) with **τίθεσθαι** passive—'and hence laws and covenants belonging to them began to be established' = 'began to be established among them.' This is less natural in itself, and is rendered altogether improbable by the necessity of changing the subject again at **ὀνομάσαι**: (*b*) with a neuter sense in *αὐτῶν*, i.e. 'they established laws and covenants concerning them,' viz. injuring and being injured (*τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι*), or, rather, matters connected therewith. So we might say 'they legislated *about it*.' [This rendering, though apparently overlooked, has much in its favour.]

τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα. The verbal sense is retained in the noun. There is no need to assume a mixture of *τὸ...ἐπιταχθὲν* with *τὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα*. See note on 358 A *εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν* and the instances there quoted, and add from Stallbaum 390 C *Ἄρεός τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμόν*, Xen. Cyr. III. 3. 2 *ἥδεσθαι τῇ ὑπὸ πάντων τιμῇ*, inf. 366 A *ἀζήμιοι ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα*.

ταύτην—for *τοῦτο*, by the usual attraction.

γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν. 'The origin and essence.' The one noun answers to *ὅθεν γεγονέναι*, the other to *οἷον εἶναι* of 358 C init. **οὐσία** = *ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν* (Phaedo 65 D). It is similarly opposed to *γένεσις* in Theaet. 185 C, Soph. 232 C, &c.

ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην—sc. *τις*. See note on 347 C *ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ ἄρχειν*.

ἀγαπᾶσθαι—'is put up with,' 'acquiesced in,' a common sense of *ἀγαπᾶν*, as of *στέργειν*. Cf. 471 B, 496 E, &c.

359 B. ἀρρωστίᾳ—causal dat. (=*δι' ἀρρωστίαν*). Cf. Gorg. 486 A *εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ*, Apol. 26 E *δοκεῖ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι*, inf. 366 C *θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν.* Madvig Gk Synt. § 41.

αὐτὸ ποιεῖν—viz. *ἀδικεῖν.* See *αὐτὸ δρῶσι*, 358 C.

ξυνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ.—'lay down as a compact the (said) principle of neither wronging nor being wronged.' The article refers to previous mention, sup. A (init.).

φύσις—as opposed to the doctrines of convention (*νόμος*). Cf. the antithesis *φύσις πέφυκεν...νόμῳ*, inf. C, Gorg. 482 E *εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δέ κ.τ.λ.*

CHAPTER III.

αὐτὸ—referring to *δικαιοσύνην*: cf. 358 C.

359 C. δόντες ἐξουσίαν...ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν. The clause is in explanatory apposition to the expression **τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν**, and is under, or carries on, precisely the same regimen.

This construction, which is not rare after *τόδε*, *τοῦτο* and similar words, is well illustrated by Madvig Gk Syn. § 190. Cf. Phaedo 68 E *τί δέ; οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν, ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσίν;* Gorg. 501 E (*ἡ αὐλητική*) *οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον διώκειν;* Rep. 487 D *ὁρᾶν...τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ ἐπαινεῖς πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους.*

τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ. Plato's style is marked by conversational fulness of expression for clearness' sake. Here the words are by their position unmistakably an afterthought to explain **ἑκατέρῳ.**

ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν κ.τ.λ. **οὖν**='well...,' the implication being 'to cut a long story short.' Cf. the use of *οὖν* after a parenthesis or digression.

Similar, but less conscious, because more stereotyped, is the Herodotean use of *ὦν* in such an apodosis as II. 47 *ἤν τις ψαύσῃ παριὼν ὑός, αὐτοῖσι ἱματίοισι ἀπ' ὦν ἔβαψε ἑωυτόν.*

εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰόντα—(1) 'making for the same *goal*,' while in 360 C *ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἴοιεν*='aim at the same *object*.' But (2) Eur. Hec. 747 *εἴ τοί με βούλει τῶνδε μηδὲν εἰδέναι, | εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥκεις, καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐγὼ κλύειν* suggests rather the sense 'coming to the same

thing,' i.e. 'agreeing with,' 'meeting on common ground,' the opposite of *διαφέρειν*.

ὃ πᾶσα φύσις κ.τ.λ. ὃ, of course, has no reference to *ταὐτὸν* in the phrase *εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰόντα*. Nor is it strictly correct to say that its antecedent is **πλεονεξίαν**, although, so far as the neuter is concerned, there is no grammatical objection to that view: cf. Eur. Hel. 1687 *γνώμης, ὃ πολλαῖς ἐν γυναιξὶν οὐκ ἔνι*, Soph. O. T. 542 *τυραννίδα | θηρᾶν, ὃ πλήθει χρήμασίν θ' ἁλίσκεται*, and (with a transition step) Legg. 937 D *καὶ δίκη πῶς οὐ καλόν, ὃ πάντα ἡμέρωκε;* Lit. 'through covetousness, a thing which....' As a fact, however, ὃ refers laxly to the sense, e.g. a *πλέον ἔχειν* understood from *πλεονεξίαν*. It is not *πλεονεξία* ('greed,' 'graspingness') which every *φύσις διώκει*, but rather 'gain,' 'advantage'; not the desire, but the gratification of the desire. Lit. 'because of the (vice of) greed: *and this* (viz. the satisfaction of greed) is the natural pursuit of every creature (as such).'

τὴν with *πλεονεξίαν* does not look forward to the relative, but is the article familiar with abstracts. Jelf, § 448.

φύσις. From the sense 'nature,' and the variety of natures in different creatures, comes the concrete meaning 'creature as naturally constituted,' 'kind of creature,' or briefly 'creature.' Cf. Polit. 272 C *μετά τε θηρίων καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων ὁμιλοῦντες καὶ πυνθανόμενοι παρὰ πάσης φύσεως*, and inf. 588 C *τῶν τοιούτων τινά, οἷαι μυθολογοῦνται παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἥ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβέρου*. In Isoc. 64 B *τῶν συμφορῶν εἰς ἃς αἱ τοιαῦται φύσεις ἡμᾶς κατέστησαν* Morus explains 'homines hac indole praediti.' At the same time we should not miss the strong emphasis intended by the combination **φύσις...πέφυκεν** in opposition to **νόμῳ** (v. B sup.): 'every nature is—naturally, I say,—disposed....'

νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται. The reading **καὶ βίᾳ** of some MSS arose from forgetfulness that *βίᾳ* is simply the common adverb, while *νόμῳ* is instr. dat. Cf. 552 E *οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί* (J. and C.). 'But is by convention forcibly driven aside to (=prevented and forced to) respect the claims of equity.'

For the thwarting of natural propensities by *νόμος* cf. Prot. 337 D *ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται*, Arist. Eth. N. x. 9. 9 &c.

εἴη δ' ἂν...τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ...—(1) 'and the power which I mean would be *about like* (**μάλιστα** = *σχεδόν τι*, as often,) the following, viz. if...'; or (2), less well, 'and the power which I mean would exist *most effectually* in the following shape, viz. if....' The latter

would rather require e.g. *εἴη δ' ἂν μάλιστα...τοιάδε οὖσα.* For another, though cognate, meaning of **μάλιστα** v. 343 A.

τοιάδε is explained by the following *εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο κ.τ.λ.*

τῷ τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ. The best MSS give **τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ.** The ring, however, is regularly known as the ring of Gyges, and inf. 612 B Plato expressly calls it by that name (*ἐάν τ' ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον, ἐάν τε μή*).

Cicero De Offic. III. 9. 38, copying and to a certain extent translating this passage, has *hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone* &c.; and references to the ring of Gyges are frequent elsewhere (e.g. Lucian Nav. 42, Bis Acc. 21). The story of Gyges and his king Candaules is told (though with differences) in Hdt. I. 8 sqq., and Gyges, as founder of the dynasty of the Mermnadae, is himself a *πρόγονος* of that dynasty (B.C. 716—546 and ending with Croesus), but there would not be likely to exist any story of his own *πρόγονος*. Inf. 360 B the finder of the ring *τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέσχε*, and this makes him Gyges and no other.

A poorly supported reading, adopted by Stallbaum, is **Γύγῃ**, but this is quite ungrammatical for *τῷ Γύγῃ* <*τῷ*> *τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ*. Whether *Γύγῃ* is the mere adscript which originally caused all the error (*Γύγου* having arisen from it by adaptation to the following genitive), or is a correction of *Γύγου* by someone who saw that it was Gyges himself, or whether *Γύγου* and *Γύγῃ* were both adscripts by different persons (the one being wrong and the other right), cannot of course be determined.

It is best, however, to suppose that, in any case, the proper name is an adscript, and to render 'the ancestor of the Lydian' i.e. 'the Lydian king.' Cf. the familiar use of *ὁ Πέρσης, ὁ Μῆδος* &c. for 'the king of Persia, of Media.' *ὁ Λυδός* is then used either (1) generically: 'the Lydian' = 'the Lydian kings (in history),' or (2) *par excellence* of the most famous Lydian, viz. Croesus. There is nothing unnatural in the use by Glaucon of such an expression: 'the same sort of power which they say once came into the hands of that (famous) ancestor of the Lydian.'

In Hdt. I. 17 *ὁ Λυδός = ὁ Λυδῶν βασιλεύς.* So III. 7 *πέμψας παρὰ τὸν Ἀράβιον*, ibid. c. 9, VI. 49 *ὁ Πέρσης* &c.

359 D. παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι—viz. Candaules (Hdt. I. 8). **παρὰ** = 'in the household (or service, *familia*,) of....'

ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ μυθολογοῦσιν—many (though not the best) MSS have **ἃ μυθολογοῦσιν.** The reading of the text is obviously better. The construction is proceeding under the government of **φασί**, but at this point Glaucon wishes it to be understood that he does not commit himself to the truth of the narrative, in fact disbelieves it, but is simply repeating the old tale. Hence he

substitutes the depreciatory *μυθολογοῦσιν* for the neutral *φασί*. We should rather put it parenthetically '—so they romance—.' In *ἄλλα τε* **δὴ** the **δὴ** is ironical.

θυρίδας ἔχοντα—*cuius in lateribus fores essent* (Cic.).

ὡς φαίνεσθαι. It is debatable whether the qualifying 'apparently' belongs to the preceding **νεκρόν** or the following **μείζω** *κ.τ.λ.* Its position is not decisive for the former. Thus in Lucian Necyom. 10 *ὁ μὲν τὸ σκέλος, ὁ δὲ τὴν κεφαλήν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι συντετριμμένος, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ἔκ τινος πολέμου παρόντες*, and ibid. 17, the qualification refers to what comes after, and in Plato the phrase **ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι** regularly precedes rather than follows. On the other hand it may be argued that Gyges could easily see whether the body was of superhuman size, but not so readily whether it was a corpse, and on this ground it is probably best to join the phrase with *νεκρόν*. Cicero has simply *hominis mortui vidit corpus magnitudine inusitata.*

ὡς φαίνεσθαι. The infinitive is explainable in two ways: (1) as restrictive (Jelf § 864), cf. 414 A *ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρῆσθαι*, Phaedr. 230 B *ψυχροῦ ὕδατος, ὥς γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι*, Hdt. II. 125 *ὡς ἐμὲ εὖ μεμνῆσθαι*, and the frequent use of e.g. *ὡς δοκεῖν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς εἰκάσαι*: (2) as oratio obliqua for *ἐφαίνετο*, depending on the verb of saying (Jelf § 889 *b*). Cf. inf. 360 C *ἐπεὶ...ἀδικεῖν* (Par. A), 408 C *ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κεραυνωθῆναι αὐτόν*, 614 B *ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὗ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχήν, πορεύεσθαι*. In Xen. Cyr. V. 2. 4 *ἀπήγγελλον τῷ Κύρῳ ὅτι τοσαῦτα εἴη ἔνδον ἀγαθά, ὅσα ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων γενεάν, ὡς σφίσι δοκεῖν, μὴ ἂν ἐπιλιπεῖν τοὺς ἔνδον ὄντας* there is the same doubt as here.

τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον κ.τ.λ. is the reading of Par. A, while Ven. Ξ inserts **φέρειν** after *δακτύλιον*. The common reading is **τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδὲν** *κ.τ.λ.*

The total may be taken as evidence that corruption had occurred very early, and that both *φέρειν* and *ἔχειν* are attempts at emendation by inserting the most obvious words. There seems, however, to be no reason why *ἔχειν* should have fallen out after *μὲν* or *φέρειν* after *δακτύλιον*. Moreover *φορεῖν* would be the proper word in the latter case. If *ἔχειν* was lost, it was more likely to disappear between *χειρὶ* and *χρυσοῦν* in the group ΧΕΙΡΙΕΧΕΙΝΧ. What was actually written by Plato is probably undiscoverable. It is, for instance, possible that *περικεῖσθαι* ('to wear' or 'have about him') was lost before **περὶ**..., the text thus being *τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν* <*περικεῖσθαι*>, *περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ κ.τ.λ.*; but almost equal possibility attaches to so many other conceivable guesses that we

can do no better than retain the 'edited' text of Ven. Π &c. with ἔχειν. Cicero has (freely) *anulumque aureum in digito* (sc. *vidit*), *quem ut detraxit, ipse induit*.

[For the version of Davies and Vaughan 'from which he took nothing but...' the necessary Greek would be τούτου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον <περικείμενον>, περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. It would also be implied that he was naturally expected to take something.]

359 E. **δακτύλιον.** The magic ring is much in evidence in Oriental fable, and it should not be overlooked that the wonderful horse also plays its part in the 'Arabian Nights,' as in the Indian stories of the Pakshiraj.

συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κ.τ.λ. Lit. (1) 'now *a* meeting having taken place among the shepherds —one they were accustomed to hold in order to report from month to month...': or (2) '...having taken place, one which the shepherds were accustomed to hold in order to...'; i.e. **τοῖς ποιμέσιν** may be construed with either **γενομένου** or **εἰωθότος.** The latter makes the more rhythmic sentence. No doubt the dat. is to a certain degree construed ἀπὸ κοινοῦ.

[Editors before Jowett and Campbell seem to have overlooked the fact that **ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν** is to be taken closely with **εἰωθότος** (as above rendered), and not with **γενομένου.** It is not 'they met for the purpose of presenting their monthly report,' nor is it '*the* usual meeting occurred' (D. and V.). The latter would require τοῦ εἰωθότος, and it is extremely doubtful whether ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν **κατὰ μῆνα** could mean 'to make their report *for the month*.' The natural sense is 'to report month by month.']

τὴν σφενδόνην—properly the 'bezel' or 'collet,' the hoop holding the stone (σφραγίς). The stone is, as it were, in a sling. The transference of the word to the stone itself was easy. Cf. Eur. Hipp. 862 καὶ μὴν τύποι γε σφενδόνης χρυσηλάτου. Cicero translates by '*palam eius anuli*.'

εἰς τὸ εἴσω. One MS has **ἔσω,** and therefore it is worth observing that εἴσω was the prose (and comic) form, while ἔσω is poetical. The metre of comedy makes for this view, and it is supported by Meisterhans Gr. Att. Insc. § 83. 14.

360 A. **καὶ διαλέγεσθαι**—sc. αὐτούς. For the change of subject see 333 C.

τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι. The gen. as in 358 A τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους.

360 B. **ὡς δόξειεν**—the reading of all MSS. Whether it can

stand or not is one of those questions about which scholars are likely always to disagree.

That Glaucon is reporting the views of others can have nothing to do with the optative here, apart from the fact that if he were stating his own opinions directly, there could be no place for the aorist *ἔδοξεν*. He might say *ὡς δοκεῖ* and *ὡς δόξειεν ἄν*, or *ὡς δοκεῖν* (restrictive), but no amount of 'indirectness' could turn any of these into *ὡς δόξειεν*.

Views which may be advanced are; (1) that *ἄν* is to be understood from the previous *οὐδεὶς ἄν γένοιτο*, as it is understood with *ἀκούσαις* (352 E), *ἴοιεν* (inf. c), or in Aesch. Ag. 1049 *πείθοι' ἄν, εἰ πείθοι', ἀπειθοίης δ' ἴσως*. But in those and similar instances (e.g. Xen. Mem. II. 1. 18) the *ἄν* is omitted with a word which is in, and suggests, the same regimen with the word actually combined with *ἄν*: i.e. an *οὐδεὶς ἄν γένοιτο...οὐδὲ δόξειεν* might afford to dispense with the second *ἄν*; but in the case actually before us the verb *δόξειεν* is not co-ordinate in construction with the verb *γένοιτο*, but is in a parenthetic and qualifying phrase: (2) that the expression **ὡς δόξειεν** is grammatical in itself. For this view might be quoted Ar. Av. 180 ΕΠ. *πόλος; τίνα τρόπον;* ΠΕ. *ὥσπερ εἴποι τις τόπος·* Eur. Andr. 929 *πῶς οὖν τάδ', ὡς εἴποι τις, ἐξημάρτανες;* Editors are wont to condemn these examples, but it is curious that it should be the same colloquial phrase which occurs in each, 'as one might say.' *ὡς δόξειεν* may be equally colloquial, and both common expressions may date from a period when the optative was more freely used without *ἄν* (cf. *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι* and similar idioms). See Goodwin M. and T. §§ 241, 242. The translation 'as it might seem' appears quite feasible: (3) that the optative is irregularly 'assimilated' or attracted. Goodwin M. and T. §§ 558, 531. None of the instances there quoted are analogous to the present case.

[The second view appears sound enough to make emendation quite unnecessary. If there had been any need to correct the text, perhaps it would have been easiest to write *ὡς δόξαι* (restrictive infinitive), and to suppose that this was mistaken for the optative and re-shaped accordingly.]

ἀδαμάντινος—cf. 619 A *ἀδαμαντίνως δὴ δεῖ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα εἰς Ἅιδου ἰέναι.* The *ἄρρηκτοι πέδαι* of Prometheus are of adamant—the type of the unbendable and unbreakable.

ὃς—instead of *ὥστε*, after **οὕτως**. Cf. Hdt. IV. 52 *κρήνη πικρή, οὕτω δή τι ἐοῦσα πικρή, ἣ μεγάθεϊ σμικρὴ ἐοῦσα, κιρνᾷ τὸν Ὕπανιν*, IV. 28 (*οὕτω...ἔνθα*).

τολμήσειεν—'steel himself to.'

360 C. οὕστινας βούλοιτο—the repetition of the same phrase

might be considered objectionable if it were not intentional for emphasis.

ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος—sc. *τοῦ δίκαιον εἶναι*, understood from the context.

ἰδίᾳ—'to himself'; though it may be beneficial to the community (*κοινῇ*). Stallbaum quotes Eur. Heraclid. (init.) for the unjust man who is *πόλει τ' ἄχρηστος καὶ ξυναλλάσσειν βαρύς, | αὑτῷ δ' ἄριστος.*

ἐπεὶ...ἀδικεῖν. So A. The ordinary reading is the less idiomatic **ἐπεὶ...ἀδικεῖ.** See on *ὡς φαίνεσθαι* 359 D for the common use of the infinitive in a relative clause in oratio obliqua. Cf. Hdt. v. 84 &c.

360 D. ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων—i.e. its advocate. The sense 'about,' 'concerning,' is too flat.

With words of fighting **περί** introduces the object *at stake*, and hence often becomes indistinguishable from *ὑπέρ*. Cf. the Homeric *ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης*, Ar. Ran. 191 *εἰ μὴ νεναυμάχηκε τὴν περὶ τῶν κρεῶν*, and the expression *περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τρέχειν*. So with verbs of the sense *ἀπολογεῖσθαι*, where 'pleading about' often means 'pleading in behalf of.' Either sense is imparted here to *λέγων*, 'contending,' or 'pleading in defence.'

διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον—cf. Hor. Sat. I. 3. 111 *Iura inventa metu iniusti fateare necesse est.*

CHAPTER IV.

τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου πέρι ὧν λέγομεν—In 358 C Glaucon undertakes to speak after the popular style upon three points: (1) the nature and origin of justice, (2) the fact that it is practised under compulsion, (3) the superiority of the unjust life. The first two have been treated, and he here comes to the final question, the one which it is really vital to settle. Hence **αὐτὴν**, 'the actual (*practical*) choice.'

MSS (if rightly reported) read **περὶ**, editors **πέρι.** MS authority is, indeed, of little account in the matter of accents, but editors have been hasty in condemning **περὶ**. The construction may very well be 'the actual choice of life in the case of those concerning whom we speak,' i.e. *τὴν κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου* (*ἐκείνων*) *περὶ ὧν λέγομεν* (where *ἐκείνων* does not, of course, depend on *βίου*, but is subjective with *κρίσιν*). The omission of *ἐκείνων* may appear harsh, but cf. Soph. Aj. 1050 *δοκοῦντ' ἐμοί, δοκοῦντα δ' ὃς κραίνει στρατοῦ* (i.e. *ἐκείνῳ ὃς*...). Similarly Tennyson ('Sir Galahad'):

'How sweet are looks that ladies bend
On whom their favours fall!' (i.e. on those on whom...)

With πέρι the construction is neater, viz. τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν ὧν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ βίου 'the choice made in the matter of life by those of whom we speak.' Stallbaum quotes Phileb. 27 C κάλλιον ἂν ἴσως καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσαίμεθα πρώτου πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἠμφισβητήσαμεν, a place which he rightly says is 'simillimus.' The copyists of MSS were naturally led to connect the preposition with the genitive following.

The article in **τοῦ βίου** either (1) looks back to 358 C: 'now for the choice as to the life (of which I spoke),' or (2) = 'the life (which results in the two cases).'

360 E. ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον—sc. *ἄνδρα*, not *βίον*, as the following passage shews (...*εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα*). For **τε...καὶ...** in contrasts ('on the one side...on the other...') see note on 330 B *μέσος...τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός*.

τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἥδε·—This is Bekker's punctuation for the earlier **τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις ἥδε;** In Phaedo 73 C *λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε· ἐάν τις κ.τ.λ.* there is the same room for choice as here; but in Legg. 780 A *τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἴρηται; τοῦδε· ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* there is no doubt, and this, together with the Greek custom in conversation or oratory of answering one's own question, makes for the punctuation given in the text.

τιθῶμεν—'assume.' The sense 'make' (= *ποιῶμεν*) only attaches to *τιθέναι* in poetry or in Ionic.

οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοί = *οἱ δεινοὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν*. For the sense of *δημιουργός* see 340 E.

ἄκρος—cf. 'tip-top' = 'first-rate.' With gen. in Theaet. 152 E *οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας*: with *εἰς* inf. 499 C *ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν*. Cf. Hdt. v. 124 *Ἀρισταγόρης ὁ Μιλήσιος ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄκρος*.

τά τε ἀδύνατα...καὶ τὰ δυνατά—the order of nearly all MSS is answered, in the familiar Platonic chiasmus (v. 328 E), by *τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐᾷ*.

It must have been ignorance of this figure which caused a couple of inferior MSS (followed by Stallbaum) to reverse the order with *τά τε δυνατὰ...καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα*. Cf. 431 E *ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σοφία...ἡ μὲν σοφήν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρείαν τὴν πόλιν παρείχετο.* So Antiphon Tetr. I. 3. 642 *οἵ τε ἧσσον κινδυνεύοντες τῶν μᾶλλον ἐν φόβῳ ὄντων οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπεβούλευσαν αὐτῷ. τοὺς μὲν* (sc. the latter) *ὅ τε φόβος ἥ τε αἰκία ἱκανὴ ἦν παῦσαι τῆς προθυμίας, τοῖς δὲ* (sc. the former) *ὅ τε κίνδυνος ἥ τε αἰσχύνη κ.τ.λ.*

361 A. ἐσχάτη γάρ. Stallbaum quotes Cic. Off. I. 13. 41

Totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior est quam eorum qui tum, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt ut viri boni esse videantur.

τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ—i.e. subjectively: the man whose character and practices are ideally unjust. **τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν**—i.e. injustice with all external circumstances ideally in its favour (344 A). Cf. the expression *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ* of Arist. Eth. N. I. 7. 15.

καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον—sc. *οὐδέν*: 'and no deduction must be made.' Cf. the absolute use of the opposite *προσθεῖναι* in 335 A and 339 B.

361 B. **δυνατῷ**—following **δοτέον**, the words **καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον...δικαιοσύνην** being parenthetical to the construction.

ὅσα—contained accus.: 'in all cases where force is needed.'

διά τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας.—The words **ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην** form one notion, that of his personal qualities; while **φίλοι καὶ οὐσία** are his external advantages. Hence **διά τε...**) (...**καὶ διὰ**.... For the resources enumerated cf. Eur. Tro. 669 *ξυνέσει γένει πλούτῳ τε κἀνδρείᾳ μέγαν*.

θέντες—cf. *τιθῶμεν* 360 E.

κατ' Αἰσχύλον κ.τ.λ.—viz. S. c. T. 592 (of Amphiaraus)

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,
βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.

Hence **ἐθέλοντα**, for which strict prose would require *βουλόμενον*, since **οὐ** belongs to the stressed *δοκεῖν*—'not to *seem*, but to *be*.'

361 C. **ἄδηλον οὖν, εἴτε...εἴη**—see note on 332 A *ἀποδοτέον... ὁπότε τις...ἀπαιτοίη*. We cannot supply *ἂν εἴη*, at least with the assumption that those words were actually intended to be understood.

ποιητέος...διακείμενος—'he must be represented (considered) as situated,' not = *ποιητέος διακεῖσθαι* 'he must be caused to be situated.'

βεβασανισμένος—'tried as by the touchstone.' **εἰς** = 'in regard to.' Cf. Thuc. VIII. 88 *βουλόμενος αὐτὸν...ἐς τὴν...'Αθηναίων φιλίαν διαβάλλειν*.

τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι—'by his refusing to unbend under ill-repute.' The metaphor is of the softening of something rigid by moistening. Cf. Legg. 880 E *ἀτεράμονι χρωμένων τινὶ φύσει καὶ μηδὲν τεγχθέντων ὥστε μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἰέναι κάκην*, Aesch. P. V. 1008 *τέγγει γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ μαλθάσσει κέαρ* | *λιταῖς*, and the adjective *ἄτεγκτος*.

τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων. All MSS have **ὑπ' αὐτῆς**, which is, of course, defensible: 'brought on by means of it' (J. and C. quote Theaet. 200 E). But the confusion of *ἀπὸ* and *ὑπὸ* is among the commonest, and the phrase of 357 C and 358 A and B is most natural and likely.

ἀλλ' ἴτω κ.τ.λ.—'let him go his ways unalterable....'

> The best MSS give **ἤτω**, an occasional late form of *ἔστω*, and **ἔστω** is actually read by Theodoret and Eusebius as well as by one or two MSS of Plato. But *ἔστω* was very unlikely to be altered into *ἤτω*, and the *ἔστω* itself may with tolerable certainty be considered a correction of an earlier *ἤτω*, a false reading once common to all copies of Plato. The most natural emendation is Neukirch's **ἴτω**, since it exactly suits the sense, and *η* and *ι* were pronounced identically.

For the expression **ἴτω** cf. Soph. O. T. 1458 *ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἡμῶν μοῖρ', ὅποιπερ εἶσ', ἴτω.*

CHAPTER V.

361 D. ὡς ἐρρωμένως κ.τ.λ.—'How vigorously you trim and polish each of them for the competition, as if he were a statue!' **ἐκκαθαίρειν** is used of the removal of roughnesses and superfluous material and making the outlines distinct and vivid.

> References to the art of the statuary were naturally frequent at Athens, or, indeed, anywhere in Greece. Cf. 420 C, 540 C &c. Moreover Socrates was the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus. The tradition goes that he even executed works of sculpture himself (Diog. Laert. II. 19, Paus. IX. 35. 7).

ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ—either (1) as in 349 A lit. 'to go out to grapple with the discussion,' or (2) *λόγῳ* is instrumental.

361 E. καὶ δὴ κἂν—lit. 'and, of course, even if....'

ἀγροικοτέρως—'somewhat boorishly' or 'coarsely.' In Aristot. Eth. N. II. 7. 13 *ἀγροικία* (in the domain of *παιδιά*) is the vice by defect in that of which *βωμολοχία* is the vice by excess, and of which *τὸ μέσον* is *εὐτραπελία*, viz. in *τὸ ἡδύ*. In life in general, he says, the corresponding exhibitions of *τὸ ἡδύ* are (1) the excess, 'complaisance and flattery,' (2) the mean, 'friendliness,' (3) the defect, 'contentiousness and quarrelsomeness.' Similarly here the position to be taken up appears to Glaucon to be Philistine and wanting in fine feeling.

μαστιγώσεται κ.τ.λ. For the form of future passive see note on *ὠφελήσονται* 343 B. **δεδήσεται**, of course, is not for *δεθήσεται*, but

is the future of *δέδεμαι* 'am a prisoner.' 'He will be kept in prison.'

ἐκκαυθήσεται.—So the best MSS. Cf. Gorg. 473 C *ἐὰν ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται...καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται.* Hdt. VII. 18 *θερμοῖσι σιδηρίοισι ἐκκαίειν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.* Inf. 613 E *ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι ἀληθῆ λέγων· εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται* there is a distinct reference to the present place, and made in such terms that the very wording was evidently before the writer.

One or two MSS have **ἐκκοπήσεται**, and this is given also by Eusebius, Theodoret, and Clemens Alex. (Strom. IV. 7). A few have **ἐκκοφθήσεται**, for which the above mentioned *ἐκκοπήσεται* was in all probability substituted at a date when (as is well known) the 'first aorist' passive forms had largely became obsolete in favour of forms of the 'second aorist' (e.g. *ἀπαλλαγῆναι* rather than *ἀπαλλαχθῆναι*). We are thus confronted with an early divergence of reading **ἐκκαυθήσεται** and **ἐκκοφθήσεται**, the former having the better support. So far as the sense goes either is possible, both punishments being common. The more cruel practice is the more likely to be emphasized here. The pronunciation of **υ** became that of the English **f**, and may have assisted, if not caused, the corruption.

[No argument can be based upon the passage of Cicero quoted by Lactantius (Inst. v. 12), which is simply a paraphrase of the general sense. The words in Lactantius form a good summary: *Quaero, si duo sint, quorum alter optimus vir, aequissimus, summa iustitia, singulari fide, alter insignis scelere et audacia: et si in eo sit errore civitas ut bonum illum virum sceleratum facinorosum nefarium putet; contra autem, qui sit improbissimus, existimet esse summa probitate ac fide; proque hac opinione omnium civium bonus ille vir vexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique afferantur,* EFFODIANTUR *oculi, damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, egeat, postremo iure etiam optimo miserrimus esse videatur: contra autem ille improbus laudetur, colatur, ab omnibus diligatur, omnes ad eum honores, omnia imperia, omnes opes, omnes undique copiae conferantur, vir denique optimus omnium existimatione et dignissimus omni fortuna optima iudicetur; quis tandem erit tam demens qui dubitet utrum se esse malit?*]

362 A. ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται. So best MSS. Variants are **ἀνασκινδυλ-** and **ἀνασκινδαλ-**. The **κ** belongs to the later Greek. **σχινδ-* is the nasalized *σχιδ-*, and *σχινδάλαμος*, not *σκινδάλαμος*, is Attic.

From the noun it might seem that *-αλ-*, not *-υλ-*, should be read in the verb. But the formation is not from *σχινδ-άλαμος*, but from

σχινδ-υλος (cf. *κειρ-ύλος* &c). *σχινδύλησις* is quoted by Galen from Hippocrates.

The meaning is the same as in *ἀνασκολοπίζω*, 'impale,' and hence the gloss *ἀνασκολοπισθήσεται* in one MS. In Gorg. 473 C *ἀνασταυρωθῇ* is substituted.

ἐθέλειν—quoted. See on *ἐθέλοντα* 361 B.

τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου κ.τ.λ.—'and, as a matter of fact (or 'after all'), it is, it seems, much truer to apply the saying of Aeschylus to the unjust man.'

ἦν ἄρα might be taken literally 'it was (when Aeschylus was saying it) a sounder thing to say of the *unjust* man,' in which case *ἦν* (like *ἐχρῆν*, *ἔδει* &c.) stands where *ἦν ἂν* might have stood. But it is best to assume the usual idiom of *ἦν ἄρα* (Goodwin M. and T. 39) of a fact which had 'previously been denied, overlooked, or not understood.'

Whether **τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου** is subject to *ὀρθότερον ἦν λέγειν* (like *ἡ πόλις χαλεπὴ ἦν λαβεῖν*), or is the object in *ὀρθότερον ἦν λέγειν τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου*, can hardly be determined, but the former reads more naturally.

κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. It is a mistake to suppose that (*λέγειν*) **κατὰ** must always mean 'to the disadvantage of....' Cf. Phaedr. 260 B *συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου*, Dem. Phil. II. 6. 9 *μέγιστόν ἐστι καθ' ὑμῶν ἐγκώμιον*. In a neutral sense Soph. 253 B *καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνιῶν τοιαῦτα εὑρήσομεν ἕτερα*, Symp. 193 C *λέγω δ' οὖν ἔγωγε καθ' ἁπάντων καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν κ.τ.λ.*

ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον—v. 329 A. He practises his injustices because he is in earnest about them: he does not sham injustice. In being unjust he is not so for the sake of any good name it can bring him (**οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα**). The inversion is humorous: the unjust man makes no parade of his injustice, he is quite willing to be, and not seem, unjust,—to be honestly unjust, even though the world knows it not.

ἀληθείας='genuineness.'

362 B. **πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν...δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι.** The dative depends on **βλαστάνει**, with which *αὐτῷ* is to be supplied: i.e. **ἐξ ἧς βλαστάνει** (*αὐτῷ*) **τὰ κεδνὰ βουλεύματα**, viz. **πρῶτον μὲν** *κ.τ.λ.* The series of advantages (*ἄρχειν*, *γαμεῖν*, &c.) are explanatory of *βουλεύματα*, with the difference that the sense 'good counsels' passes into that of 'results of good counsels.' A poetical quotation

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brought into prose is treated with some liberty as to its precise meaning and its bearing on the construction.

γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται—'to marry a wife from whatever family he chooses.' The same expression occurs in 613 D. **ὁπόθεν** = ἐξ (ἀφ', παρ') ὧν. Cf. Eur. And. 974 *ὡς φίλων μὲν ἂν | γήμαιμ' ἀπ ἀνδρῶν, ἔκτοθεν δ' οὐ ῥᾳδίως*, Rhes. 168 *οὐκ ἐξ ἐμαυτοῦ μειζόνων γαμεῖν θέλω*, Aesch. Suppl. 227 *πῶς δ' ἂν γαμῶν ἄκουσαν ἄκοντος πάρα | ἁγνὸς γένοιτ' ἄν;* Plat. Polit. 310 C *κατὰ δύναμιν γαμοῦσί τε παρὰ τούτων καὶ τὰς ἐκδιδομένας παρ' αὐτῶν εἰς τούτους ἐκπέμπουσι πάλιν.* For **ὁπόθεν** of persons cf. Hor. Od. I. 12. 17 *unde* (= a quo) *nil maius generatur ipso.*

ἐκδιδόναι, sc. *τὰς θυγατέρας.* For the whole expression cf. Thuc. VIII. 21 *οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ' ἀγαγέσθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.*

ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν—cf. *ξυμβόλαια...κοινωνήματα* 333 A (note).

οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ. Though *ἐθέλειν* and *βούλεσθαι* are not synonyms (347 B) there must be many cases in which either might be used. 'Anyone he desires' and 'anyone he likes' may therefore be interchanged for the sake of variety. The same device is adopted in 613 D *ἄρχουσί τε ἂν βούλωνται τὰς ἀρχάς, γαμοῦσί τε ὁπόθεν ἂν βούλωνται, ἐκδιδόασί τε εἰς οὓς ἂν ἐθέλωσι.*

παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα—'all the time' (as in *παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον, βίον* &c.). Cf. 424 B *ὅπως ἂν...παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι.*

[Other possible renderings are (*a*) '*besides* all these advantages.' Cf. 337 D, Phaedo 74 A *παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι.* (In its ultimate analysis this is identical with the foregoing, the sense being 'withal'): (*b*) '*because* of all this.' See L. and S. *παρὰ* C I. 6.]

κερδαίνοντα—with **ὠφελεῖσθαι**, = *τῷ κερδαίνειν.* Cf. Thuc. II. 39 *ὃ μὴ κρυφθὲν ἄν τις τῶν πολεμίων ἰδὼν ὠφεληθείη* (i.e. *ὠφ. τῷ ἰδεῖν*). The accus. participle is equally allowable with the dative *δοκοῦντι* (sup.). The construction is *βλαστάνει αὐτῷ (τὸ) ὠφελεῖσθαι—κερδαίνοντα*, which is interchangeable with *βλ. αὐτῷ, κερδαίνοντι, ὠφελεῖσθαι.*

It is otherwise possible to explain it as dependent on **φήσουσι**, but the reversion to that construction begins better with the next sentence (introduced by **τοίνυν**).

εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ: 'and accordingly (i.e. in consequence of his resources) he is victorious in all his conflicts public and private,' i.e. in law-suits brought by or against him, whether as private *δίκαι* or public *γραφαί.*

εἰς ἀγῶνας ἰόντα echoes the technical phrase *εἰσιέναι δίκην.*

362 C. ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς: **καὶ** is corrective, 'nay.' **ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον κ.τ.λ.**: 'so that *also* (i.e. in addition to his being more favoured by men) he will naturally be more favoured by heaven.' Contrast the position with that arrived at by Socrates in 352 B.

θεοφιλέστερον...μᾶλλον. **μᾶλλον** (though in any case redundant) is perhaps not to be joined immediately with **θεοφιλέστερον**, but with **προσήκειν**: lit. 'it is *rather* to be expected, so far as probability goes, that he will be more favoured by heaven than the just man.' In Gorg. 487 B *αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος*='rather bashful, more than they ought to be.'

There is, however, no doubt that (as in Elizabethan English) double comparatives are frequent without any such excuse, cf. Phaedo 79 E *ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή*. In Attic prose such cases generally shew *μᾶλλον* separated by some interval from the comparative, as here, Xen. Cyr. III. 3. 51 *αἱρετώτερόν ἐστι μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν μαλλον ἢ φεύγοντας σῴζεσθαι*, and frequently elsewhere; but in Legg. 781 A *λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον* occurs, and in verse the juxtaposition is common, e.g. Aesch. S. c. T. 673 *τίς ἄλλος μᾶλλον ἐνδικώτερος*; Suppl. 279, &c.

For **προσήκειν**, of appropriateness to the circumstances, see 332 B.

CHAPTER VI.

362 D. ἀλλὰ τί μήν;—'pray, why not?' See note on 349 D *ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει;*

αὐτὸ...οὐκ εἴρηται κ.τ.λ.—The clause **ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι** is an explanatory amplification of **αὐτὸ** ('the very thing'), so that while the whole practically=*αὐτὸ τὸ μάλιστα δεόμενον ῥηθῆναι* in point of sense, the grammar is somewhat different.

It is not *αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι*, and Stallbaum is wrong in treating *αὐτὸ* as '*id* ipsum.' Rather *αὐτὸ οὐκ εἴρηται* is complete in itself: 'the very (or 'essential') thing has not been said.' The relative clause amounts to 'I mean, what it was most essential to say.' Cf. Charm. 166 B *ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἥκεις ἐρευνῶν, ὅτῳ διαφέρει*: 'You have got to the vital point, namely...,' which, again, is not grammatically the same as *ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.*

τὸ λεγόμενον.—For this absolute so-called accusative in apposition to the sentence see Jelf § 580. Cf. 422 E *τὸ τῶν παιζόντων*, Theaet. 183 E *Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, αἰδοῖός τε...δεινός τε*, Soph. O. C. 138 *φωνῇ γὰρ ὁρῶ, τὸ φατιζόμενον*. So *τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, τὸ κεφάλαιον, τὸ μέγιστον* &c.

ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη. The source of the proverb is uncertain. The scholiast compares Od. xvi. 97

> *ἦ τι κασιγνήτοις ἐπιμέμφεαι, οἷσί περ ἀνὴρ*
> *μαρναμένοισι πέποιθε, καὶ εἰ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρηται.*

The words in the text bear much the appearance of having formed the end of a hexameter verse, and Shilleto (on Dem. Fals. Leg. 415 *συγγνώμη ἀδελφῷ βοηθεῖν*) therefore suggests that *ἀδελφεός* should be read here. But, even if a familiar verse did contain that form, it by no means follows that Plato so quotes it. With **παρείη** cf. *παραστάτης, παραστῆναι, adesse.* For the optative of an exhortation (= *παρέστω*) v. Goodwin M. and T. § 725. Here, however, it might be simply a wish (*ibid.* § 722). The sense, of course, is 'a brother is a man's best comrade.'

ἀδύνατον—masc., not neuter.

362 E. **δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν κ.τ.λ.**—lit. 'for we must set forth (and examine) also the representations directly opposed to those of Glaucon, I mean the representations which praise justice, &c.' **οἵ** grammatically refers to **λόγους**, these being personified. There is no need to assume the harsh construction *οἵ* = *τούτων οἵ*, 'the representations of those who...' **ὧν** is probably masculine (= *τούτων, οὓς*...) but might very well be neuter (*τούτων, ἃ*).

[The representations made by those who praise justice and blame injustice now require examination. It will be found that the one is commended and the other discountenanced on the ground of expediency. Gods and men reward justice. But how is justice a good thing *in itself?*]

βούλεσθαι—sc. *λέγειν*. 'What he means': *ce qu'il veut dire.* Cf. Meno 71 E *εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον* (sc. *εἰπεῖν*).

πατέρες τε υἱέσιν κ.τ.λ. The full expression would be *πατέρες τε υἱέσι καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι τούτοις ὧν κήδονται*: 'and all who are in the position of guardians tell their respective charges...'

The flexion **υἱέσι** is alone correct for Plato. Meisterhans Gr. Att. Ins. § 56. 14 gives the rule that, while *υἱός* and *υἱόν* belong to old Attic, the rest of the declension was based on the original *υἱύς*. It was not till 350 B.C. that the forms *υἱοῦ, υἱῷ, υἱοί, υἱοῖς* &c. came into use by analogy with *υἱός, υἱόν.*

363 A. **οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες**: 'not praising the thing itself, justice.' Cf. 472 C *ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι*, Parm. 130 B *αὐτὸ ὁμοιότης, χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν.* More fully in Symp. 199 D *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἠρώτων, ἆρα ὁ πατήρ ἐστι πατήρ τινος;*

From this apposition it is but one step to the compounds of Aristotle αὐτοβούλησις, αὐτόιππος &c., as in Eth. N. I. 6. 5 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Such compounds, however, do not belong to Plato.

A fuller method of expression is the familiar αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστίν, and the fullest would have been δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν. More emphasis is gained by the use of the neuter than by the feminine of 612 C ἵνα αὐτὴ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν κριθείη.

γίγνηται...ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι κ.τ.λ. The singular **γίγνηται** is an instance of the *schema Pindaricum*, so named, it is said, because much used by Pindar (though in his extant odes and fragments there are very few examples forthcoming). Sometimes it is known as *Boeoticum*.

Of the extant Pindaric instances most are very dubious. Thus in Pyth. x. 71 κεῖται κεδναὶ πολίων κυβερνάσιες there is a variant κεῖνται, just as in Aesch. Pers. 49 στεῦται δ' ἱεροῦ Τμώλου πελάται there is almost as good authority for στεῦνται. In Pind. Ol. XI. (x.) 4 μελιγάρυες ὕμνοι ὑστέρων ἀρχὰ λόγων τέλλεται (not ἀρχαὶ) is the correct reading, and, as Professor Gildersleeve remarks, 'the example disappears.' Nevertheless the construction was not rare in Greek writers, just as it is not rare in lax English conversation to begin with 'there was...' and to follow with a plural subject later in the sentence.

The verb ordinarily precedes, and in Attic writers the construction is almost (though not entirely) confined to ἔστι, ἦν, γίγνεται. The singular verb is used while the writer has a single or collective notion in his mind, whereas that notion is afterwards analysed or expressed otherwise. Cf. inf. 463 A ἔστι μέν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος, Euthyd. 302 C ἔστι γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερά, Soph. Trach. 520 ἦν δ' ἀμφίπλεκτοι κλίμακες, Eur. Ion 1146 ἐνῆν δ' ὑφανταὶ γράμμασιν τοιαίδ' ὑφαί, Bacch. 1350 αἰαῖ δέδοκται, πρέσβυ, τλήμονες φυγαί, Ar. Vesp. 58 &c. The verb follows in Symp. 188 B πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἐρυσίβαι...γίγνεται, but there has been an interval between the words and περὶ ἄλληλα has intervened.

ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. So all the best MSS, while a few inferior copies give **τῷ ἀδίκῳ**. The latter is almost certainly a very natural conjecture of some reader who said 'But Glaucon did *not* attribute all these advantages to the just man, but to the unjust. The just man was to be persecuted and the unjust man to flourish mightily in a false reputation for justice.' This,

however, is to misconceive the meaning. **τῷ δικαίῳ** does not mean '*our* just man (in the case above imagined)' but, generically, 'the just man (when he is recognised as such).' Glaucon did enumerate a number of advantages which a just man will naturally obtain from his reputation for justice (see 361 c init.). It is only when the reputation is reversed that he is persecuted.

ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ κ.τ.λ.: 'and these persons make still more of the (respective) reputations.' It is incorrect to render 'carry the advantages of a good name still further.' This would require *τὰ τῆς δόξης*. Literally we have 'the question of the reputations (on either side, good or bad).'

τὰς παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις—not simply *τὰς παρὰ θεοῖς* (*apud deos*), but pregnantly, 'the way in which they are looked upon from heaven (and affected therefrom).' Cf. Phaedr. 232 A *τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*.

ἐμβάλλοντες—'throwing into the scale.'

τοῖς ὁσίοις—made emphatic by position.

ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρος. In the mind of the speaker the two poets are closely associated in their work and in the character of their theology and ethics. Hence the single article for the single notion. Cf. Phaedo 111 C *καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα* (='the heavenly bodies' *τὰ μετέωρα*), inf. 372 E *τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν*, Thuc. I. 36 *τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται*. Jelf § 459. 9 (*b*). **γενναῖος** has something of the sense of 'simple-minded,' 'good old.' Cf. 348 D *πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν*.

363 B. **ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ.**—sc. Hesiod Opp. 230, where the words are

> *τοῖσι φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βίον, οὔρεσι δὲ δρῦς*
> *ἄκρη μέν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελίσσας,*
> *εἰροπόκοι δ' ὄϊες μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι.*

In shifting from his indirect quotation of the second line to the direct of the third Plato throws in the word **φησίν**, which some MSS wrongly omit in order to preserve the simple line and its metre.

βαλάνους=acorns, chestnuts and probably *ἀκρόδρυα* in general, since *δρῦς* was the name for any of the larger trees. Cf. Theoc. XV. 112 *πὰρ δέ οἱ ὥρια κεῖται, ὅσα δρύες ἄκρα φέροντι*.

μελίσσας cf. Verg. Ecl. IV. 30 *et durae quercus sudabunt roscida mella*.

τούτων ἐχόμενα—cf. 329 A. The words **ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθά**, if they have any strict grammar, depend on **ποιεῖν**. It is not Greek, of course, to attach them to **φησίν**. There is little doubt, however, that among his quotations Plato has retained no very clear idea of grammatical regimen. Hence **ὁ μὲν** is not followed by **ὁ δὲ**..., but by *παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος* (sc. *ἀγαθά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι* or its equivalent).

'ὥστε τευ' γάρ φησιν κ.τ.λ.—Homer Od. XIX. 109 sqq. The genitive **τευ** depends on the preceding unquoted words

...ἦ γάρ σευ κλέος οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἵκανεν,
ὥστε τευ ἢ βασιλῆος κ.τ.λ.

363 C. τίκτῃ δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα: 'and his flocks bring forth young ones without fail.' The usual rendering is 'bring forth *strong* young ones,' but **ἔμπεδα** can hardly bear this meaning, and it is awkward to separate the adjective from **μῆλα**. Rather the sheep 'can be relied on.' Cf. Od. VIII. 30 *πομπὴν δ' ὀτρύνει καὶ λίσσεται ἔμπεδον εἶναι.*

Μουσαῖος—a legendary composer of oracles, gnomic sayings, directions for mystic purifications &c.

Like Orpheus, with whom he is so frequently associated (e.g. Aristoph. Ran. 1032, Plat. Ion 536 B, Prot. 316 D and inf. 364 E), he was supposed to have lived in, or come from, Thrace. His mother is generally given as Selene, while the name of his father varies, after the manner of legends and mythologies, between Orpheus, Eumolpus, Linus and others. All that can be said with any approach to certainty is that the early Greeks derived most of their 'Orphic,' i.e. religious and mystic, poetry *viâ* the Thraceward parts, and that the various names (whencesoever derived) connected with such poetry were apt to be forced, consciously or unconsciously, into some genealogical relation with each other. The names Orpheus, Musaeus, Eumolpus, Bakis &c. came to stand for collections of sayings and ordinances. An excellent summary of 'Orphism' is to be found in Prof. Murray's 'Ancient Greek Literature.' He there reckons among the 'cardinal tenets' a belief "in sin and the sacerdotal purging of sin; in the immortality and divinity of the soul; in eternal reward beyond the grave to the 'pure' and the 'impure'—of course, none but the initiated being ultimately quite pure."

In Plato's time the 'oracles' (*χρησμοί*) attributed to Musaeus were extant and registered (see Herod. VII. 6, IX. 43). His *τελεταί* and *καθαρμοί* are mentioned below (364 E).

The son alluded to is Eumolpus, the legendary founder of the

Eleusinian mysteries. According to Suidas (*s.v.* *Μουσαῖος*) the *ὑποθῆκαι* or 'precepts' of Musaeus were addressed to this son. Compositions attributed to Eumolpus himself were hymns and writings on the mysteries.

νεανικώτερα τἀγαθὰ......διδόασιν: i.e. 'they *represent the gods as giving* their favours to the just in a still more magnificent style.' So inf. D *εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν* (=*ποιοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κατορυττομένους*).

νεανικώτερα—'splendidiora, magnificentiora' Stallbaum. The word is not, however, one of unqualified praise, but contains a suggestion of excess, mostly in the direction of the 'showy' or 'dashing.' That which is characteristic of the *νεανίας* is something spirited, but lacking in sobriety and solidity. Cf. 503 C *νεανικοί καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τῇ διανοίᾳ*, 563 E, Alc. I. 104 A (Alcibiades thinks he is) *νεανικωτάτου γένους ἐν τῇ πόλει*, Aristot. Pol. IV. 11. 11 *ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς νεανικωτάτης...γίνεται τυραννίς*.

κατακλίναντες—the regular word. Cf. Hdt. I. 126 *τοὺς Πέρσας κατακλίνας ἐς λειμῶνα εὐώχεε*. So *κατακλίνομαι*=*accumbo* (*ad mensam*). Ar. Vesp. 1208 and passim.

For the joys of the blest Stallbaum refers to Od. XI. 602, Pind. Nem. I. 100 (69), Verg. Aen. VI. 637 &c. The conception is that of Walhalla, with such differences as correspond to the tastes and circumstances of the Greeks and Teutons respectively.

ἐστεφανωμένους—i.e. wearing garlands (of myrtle, roses, pansies &c.) like those in the Greek *συμπόσια*.

363 D. **ἤδη**—almost=*τὸ λοιπόν*, 'from this time forth.' Cf. Hdt. III. 5 *ἀπὸ ταύτης ἤδη Αἴγυπτος*, 'from this point onwards.' The two expressions are combined in e.g. Soph. Phil. 454 *τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη*.

οἱ δ'=*ἄλλοι δὲ*: as if, instead of *Μουσαῖος καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ*, we had had *οἱ μὲν*.... Cf. 451 E *πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεστέραις χρώμεθα, ταῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέραις*, 455 E *καὶ γυνὴ ἰατρική, ἡ δ' οὔ*, Hom. Il. XI. 536 *ἀφ' ἱππείων ὁπλέων ῥαθάμιγγες ἔβαλλον*, | *αἱ δ' ἀπ' ἐπισσώτρων*, &c. Inf. 364 A *τοὺς δὲ*... 'others.' Cf. sup. 349 D (*ὁ δὲ*).

μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθοὺς: not *μείζους*: 'draw out to still greater length (a list of) rewards from heaven.' The expression is brachylogic for e.g. *μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσι λόγους περὶ μισθῶν*.

With **ἀποτείνουσι**, of speech, cf. Gorg. 465 D *ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα*, Aesch. Ag. 916 *μακρὰν γὰρ ἐξέτεινας*.

γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι—referring to Hesiod Opp. 282 sqq.

> *ὃς δέ κε μαρτυρίῃσιν ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσας*
> *ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ,*
> *τοῦ δέ τ' ἀμαυροτέρη γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται,*
> *ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.*

ταῦτα ... ἐγκωμιάζουσιν δικαιοσύνην. The same construction as with *αἰτιᾶσθαι, ψέγειν, διαβάλλειν, ὀνειδίζειν, ἐπαινεῖν* &c. Jelf § 583. Carried further in Soph. Aj. 1107 *τὰ σέμν' ἔπη | κόλαζ' ἐκείνους.*

εἰς πηλόν τινα—cf. Phaedo 69 c *ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται.* Ar. Ran. 145 sqq. *εἶτα βόρβορον πολὺν | καὶ σκῶρ ἀείνων, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κειμένους | εἴ που ξένον τις ἠδίκησε πώποτε κ.τ.λ.* Diog. Laert. VI. 39. Lucian Alex. 25 *ἐρομένου γάρ τινος τί πράττει ἐν Ἅιδου ὁ Ἐπίκουρος; Μολυβδίνας, ἔφη, ἔχων πέδας ἐν βορβόρῳ κάθηται.* Properly *βόρβορος* is mud and *πηλός* is clay, but these senses are apt to become confused.

κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ...φέρειν. The case is still worse in Gorg. 493 B *τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου...οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν οἱ ἀμύητοι καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ.* The allusion is, of course, to the punishment of the Danaids. Cf. Hor. Od. III. 11. 25 *audiat Lyde scelus atque notas | virginum poenas et inane lymphae | dolium fundo pereuntis imo* &c.

363 E. **ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν**—sc. *λέγειν.* I.e. it is impossible for them to devise anything further than the punishments enumerated by Glaucon (361 E—362 A).

ἑκατέρων—'of the two classes respectively,' viz. the just and the unjust.

CHAPTER VII.

ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν—'in prose as well as verse.' **ἰδίᾳ** (= *ὑπ' ἰδιωτῶν*) is preferred to *ἰδιωτικῶς*, which would be too strong, inasmuch as it would imply a manner markedly devoid of skill.

ἰδιώτης is opposed to any *τεχνίτης* or *τέχνην ἔχων* (Soph. 221 C *πότερον ἰδιώτην ἤ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα;*) as the layman or non-expert to the professional. Thus it answers to *χειροτέχνης* (Thuc. VI. 72), *ἀθλητής* (Aristot. Eth. N. III. 8. 8), *ῥήτωρ* (Isoc. 43 A), *αὐλητής* (Plat. Prot. 327 C), *ἰατρός* (Theaet. 178 C), *πολιτικός* (Phaedr. 258 D) &c. Cf. Phaedr. 236 D *παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων* (where *ποιητής* is used in a wider sense).

For its opposition to ποιητής cf. Symp. 178 B *γονῆς γὰρ ἔρωτος οὔτε εἰσὶν οὔτε λέγονται ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ἰδιώτου οὔτε ποιητοῦ*, Phaedr. 258 D *ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητὴς ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης*. With the present passage particularly cf. inf. 366 E *οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν*.

364 A. ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος—'with one accord,' *uno ore*. Often joined with **πάντες**: cf. Legg. 634 E *μιᾷ δὲ φωνῇ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντας συμφωνεῖν*. Ar. Eq. 670 *οἱ δ' ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντες ἀνέκραγον*. So Aesch. Cho. 72 *πόροι τε πάντες ἐκ μιᾶς ὁδοῦ βαίνοντες* (where, as here, **ἐκ** is modal). The same modal preposition occurs in e.g. Aesch. Pers. 462 *τέλος δ' ἐφορμηθέντες ἐξ ἑνὸς ῥόθου*.

ὑμνοῦσιν—not = *ᾄδουσιν*, but including the *ἰδιῶται* as well as the *ποιηταί*: 'they repeat the same (old) tale.' See note on 329 B.

ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη—one notion. See note on 363 A *ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρος*.

χαλεπὸν μέντοι κ.τ.λ. On **μέντοι** for *δὲ* see 327 A. The substitution is all the more desirable here because of the **δὲ** in the next clause.

For the commonplace itself cf. Prot. 339 B, where the words of Simonides are quoted *ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν κ.τ.λ.* (where, however, *ἀγαθὸν* is used in the ordinary Greek sense, of which morality forms but a part). The shape in which it is most frequently cited is that of the passage (inf. C—D) from Hesiod.

ἀκολασία—the recognised antithesis of **σωφροσύνη** (Arist. Eth. N. III. 10. 1 &c.).

ἡδὺ μὲν κ.τ.λ. The adjectives are arranged, as so often in Plato, with chiasmus: *ἡδύ*)(*ἐπίπονον*: *εὐπετές*)(*χαλεπόν*. So immediately below

πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας

ἀσθενεῖς *πένητες*

and the verbs *εὐδαιμονίζειν*)(*ὑπερορᾶν*: *τιμᾶν*)(*ἀτιμάζειν*. See note on 328 E.

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος—'in general,' *ut plurimum*. Cf. Phaedr. 275 B *ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες*. More fully in Aristot. Gen. An. V. 6. 11 *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ παμφαγώτερα ποικιλώτερα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰπεῖν*. Inf. 389 D we have *ὡς πλήθει* in the same sense. More commonly *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*.

πονηροὺς πλουσίους κ.τ.λ.—'wicked men, *if* rich or possessed of other sources of power.' Though it would be easy to explain **ἄλλας** by the common idiom as='means of power *in general*,' it is more natural to regard *πλοῦτος* as itself a *δύναμις*, just as *ἀσθενής* often means, or connotes, *πένης*.

εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσιν—not *βούλονται*: 'they are quite ready to...,' 'they have no objection.' Cf. inf. 475 C *τὸν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι*. In Phaedo 117 C Socrates drinks the poison *μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως*. The word is one of reproach here as in Dem. 248. 11 *ὁ λέγων εὐχερῶς ὅ τι ἂν βουληθῇς*, and inf. 535 E *ῇ ἂν...εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνηται*. It implies the absence of a fine conscience or a proper self-respect.

τοὺς δὲ.... See note on *οἱ δ'* sup. 363 D. 'And others, who happen to be uninfluential and poor, they are prepared to dishonour and slight, *though* they acknowledge them to be better than the former.'

364 B. **τούτων δὲ πάντων**—sc. *τῶν λόγων*.

οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς—'the statements about Heaven and virtue,' i.e. about the way Heaven treats virtue. The position of **τε** distinguishes this sense from the inapposite 'concerning the gods and (concerning) virtue,' which would be expressed rather by *περί τε θεῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς* with the regular trajection (see note on 343 C). Here *θεῶν-τε-καὶ-ἀρετῆς* forms one notion, 'the relation between Heaven and virtue.'

θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται—'take the most wonderful shape.'

πολλοῖς...ἔνειμαν: 'have often ere now allotted.' The aorist with **πολλοῖς** as in the gnomic (or iterative) use with *πολλάκις, ἤδη* &c. Goodwin M. and T. § 156.

βίον κακὸν—life on the material side, in respect of livelihood and circumstances.

ἀγύρται—'mendicants' or 'vagabonds,' originally often priests, and very similar to mendicant friars.

The best known were the *μητραγύρται*, who collected (*ἀγείρω*) money ostensibly for the worship of Cybele. This term became one of great contempt (Aristot. Rhet. III. 2. 10) in consequence of the worthlessness of the men and women who practised such mendicancy, and who added low arts like those of the later gipsy fortune-teller, the quack, and the indulgence-vendor. In Soph. O. T. 387 the *μάντις* Teiresias is thus spoken of: *ὑφεὶς μάγον τοιόνδε μηχανορράφον, | δόλιον ἀγύρτην, ὅστις ἐν τοῖς κέρδεσιν | μόνον δέδορκε.* Similarly Aesch. Ag. 1273 (of Cassandra) *καλουμένη δὲ φοιτάς, ὡς*

ἀγύρτρια. In both these passages (as here) the *ἀγύρτης* has a sham religious character. Later, however, the word became more general, e.g. Pseudo-Eur. Rhes. 503 (of Ulysses) *ἤδη δ' ἀγύρτης πτωχικὴν ἔχων στολὴν | ἐσῆλθε πύργους*, and ibid. 715 *βίον δ' ἐπαιτῶν εἷρπ' ἀγύρτης τις λάτρις.*

ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες—a common expression for begging. Cf. 489 B, Phaedr. 233 E *καὶ ἐπὶ θύρας ἥξουσι* (sc. *οἱ προσαιτοῦντες*), Symp. 203 B *προσαιτήσουσα, οἷον δὴ εὐωχίας οὔσης, ἀφίκετο, καὶ ἦν περὶ τὰς θύρας*, Aesch. Ag. 1195 *ἢ ψευδόμαντίς εἰμι θυροκόπος φλέδων;* Ar. Nub. 467 *ὥστε γε σοῦ πολλοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖσι θύραις ἀεὶ καθῆσθαι.*

The same and kindred phrases are applied also to other needs and solicitations. Cf. 489 C *ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι.* Xen. Hell. I. 6. 7 *αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας φοιτήσεις* (=‘danglings about court’).

πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι κ.τ.λ. : ‘try to persuade them that they possess a power acquired from the gods by sacrifices and incantations, on the one hand to cure amid indulgences and feastings any crime which may have been committed by a man himself or his ancestors, and, on the other, if one is willing to incur a trifling expense for the purpose of damaging an enemy, (they undertake) to injure just or unjust with equal ease, working upon the gods by charms and spells to serve their purposes.’

It is hoped that this rendering, when once seen, will commend itself. Hitherto the passage appears to have been wrongly construed by editors. For instance **θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς** is usually taken with **ἀκεῖσθαι**, instead of with **πορίζομένη** (which obviously requires it), despite the clumsy order which results. Next **εἴτε** is generally made to answer to **ἢ** instead of to **ἐάν τε**. Again **ἐθέλῃ** is made to be synonymous with *βούληται* and **μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν** is taken with **βλάψειν**.

The true construction is *ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς πορίζομένη ἐκ θεῶν*, (viz. a power) *εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν, ἀκεῖσθαι* (*αὐτὸ*) *μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν, ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ἐθέλῃ* (*τις*) *πημῆναι*, (*φασὶ*) *βλάψειν κ.τ.λ.*

The only difficulty lies in the fact that nearly all MSS have **βλάψει**, while **βλάψειν** is given in only two inferior copies. If we like to suppose very considerable laxity of construction we can retain **βλάψει**, making it depend on **πείθουσιν ὡς**... and referring it to the subject of **ἐθέλῃ**. This is quite conceivable, but it involves an ugly anacoluthic termination to the sentence in the participle **πείθοντες**. On the other hand it is easy to supply *φασί* (from *πείθουσι*) with *βλάψειν*, or perhaps it is fairer to the Greek to say that the grammar is simply *πείθουσι...βλάψειν.* The claims of *βλάψειν*

would have been more favourably considered if this had been perceived, instead of attempting to make the future infinitive depend on *ἔστι δύναμις*. The loss of final ν is always easy, or a very early editor may have missed the construction and altered the text.

σφίσι—used for *ἑαυτοῖς* in dependent object-clauses (i.e. after *ὅτι*, *ὡς*) and final clauses (*ἵνα*, *ὅπως* &c.).

364 C. ἀδίκημά του...αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων: i.e. 'if a crime attaches to a man, committed by himself or his ancestors.' **του** is qualified by a sort of afterthought in partitive apposition: 'a crime belonging to a man, (that is to say, belonging to) himself or his ancestors.'

εἴτε...ἐάν τε...: *sive...sive*. **ἐάν τε** is used for the second *εἴτε* because in direct narration the quack would say *εἴ τι ἀδίκημα γέγονεν, ἀκεῖσθαι δύναμαι, ἐάν τε πημῆναι ἐθέλῃς, βλάψω*, according to the usual manner of conditional sentences.

[The ordinary rendering makes **εἴτε** answer to **ἢ**, and this is no doubt allowable in itself. Cf. Legg. 862 D, Eur. El. 896, and conversely *ἢ...εἴτε* in Eur. Alc. 114. But the sense can obviously be bettered.]

ἀκεῖσθαι—sc. *αὐτό*. For **ἀκεῖσθαι** in reference to the taint or disease of a sin cf. Hdt. I. 167 *οἱ δὲ Ἀγυλλαῖοι ἐς Δελφοὺς ἔπεμπον βουλόμενοι ἀκέσασθαι τὴν ἁμαρτάδα*. Antiphon Tetr. 3. 3. 7 *ἐπισκήπτομεν ὑμῖν τὸ μήνιμα τῶν ἀλιτηρίων ἀκεσαμένους πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν καθαρὰν τοῦ μιάσματος καταστῆσαι*. So in Soph. O. T. 98 a *μίασμα* is called *ἀνήκεστον*.

μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν—cf. inf. E. The sinner will be put to no discomfort. **ἑορτῶν** are *sacrificial* feasts.

ἐθέλῃ—sc. *τις*, supplied from **του**. For the omission cf. 347 C. **ἐθέλῃ** cannot mean *βούληται* in Plato, and its proper sense is retained by joining it to *μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν*. The *ἀγύρτης* would put it 'if you are willing to spend a trifle.'

ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶν καὶ καταδέσμοις. Cf. Legg. 933 D *ἐὰν δὲ καταδέσεσιν ἢ ἐπαγωγαῖς ἢ τισιν ἐπῳδαῖς κ.τ.λ.* The addition of **τισὶ** is contemptuous. **ἐπαγωγαὶ** are properly 'incantations' by which supernatural powers (particularly of *χθόνιοι*) are drawn to one's aid, while **κατάδεσμοι** (or *καταδέσεις*) are 'spells' (*defixiones*) which may simply have a negative effect. Cf. Aesch. Eum. 306 *ὕμνον δ' ἀκούσει τόνδε δέσμιον σέθεν*. In popular use, however, it is probable that 'incantations and spells' were not distinguished, the terms being combined for comprehensiveness.

τοὺς θεούς. The enormity of the notion causes the speaker to add promptly *ὥς φασι.*

οἱ μὲν...εὐπετείας διδόντες...οἱ δὲ...μαρτύρονται. The expected *οἱ δὲ...μαρτυρόμενοι* gives place to the finite verb, the construction having been broken by the quotation (cf. 363 B).

εὐπετείας διδόντες—'granting facilities'='representing facilities as being given.' Cf. 363 C *τἀγαθὰ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασιν.*

ὡς 'τὴν μὲν κακότητα κ.τ.λ.' ὡς does not belong to the quotation, but introduces it, 'to the effect that....' In Hesiod (Opp. 285) the lines are

> *τὴν μέν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι*
> *ῥηιδίως·* **ὀλίγη** *μὲν ὁδὸς, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·*
> *τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν*
> *ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν*
> *καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,*
> *ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα.*

It is curious that the MSS of Hesiod should give **ὀλίγη**, while Plato (here and in Legg. 718 E), Xenophon (Mem. II. 1. 20) and Plutarch (Mor. 77 D) agree in **λείη**. It is no unnatural conclusion that the current version in Greece was from early times *λείη*, while *ὀλίγη* was unrecognised. Yet it is not likely that one arose simply from the other. It may therefore be suggested that Hesiod wrote **λιτὴ** 'smooth.' For this the current Greek was *λείη*. In later times *λιτός* came to mean 'small,' and hence *ὀλίγη* in the MSS by a gloss.

The passage was a favourite in Greek and is often partially quoted by Lucian. Its resemblance to the 'strait gate' and 'narrow way' of the New Testament can hardly be missed.

364 D. τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς—see 358 A, note on *εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν.*

ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν—sc. Il. IX. 497 sqq.

> *στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,*
> *τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀρετὴ τιμή τε βίη τε·*
> *καὶ μὲν τοὺς θυέεσσι καὶ εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσιν κ.τ.λ.*

The second line is away from Plato's purpose, and is therefore omitted.

Par. A has **λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοί τε** and some other MSS also give both words, but with some variation in the particles. The MSS of Homer have *στρεπτοὶ*, not *λιστοί*. It is possible that *στρεπτοὶ* was capable of being misunderstood, and was therefore glossed by *λιστοί*, so that both words came to appear in the text. On the

other hand *λιστός* is *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον* and therefore not a very probable gloss (*ἄλλιστος* and *τρίλλιστος* are found), and it might be argued that *λιστοὶ* was actually written by Plato (and perhaps in the true Homer), whereas *στρεπτοὶ* was a correction by someone who had verified the reference in his copy of the Iliad.

364 E. βίβλων κ.τ.λ.—containing the rites of the Orpheotelestae. Cf. sup. 363 C, note on Musaeus. For **Orpheus** cf. Ar. Ran. 1032 *Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι, | Μουσαῖος δ' ἐξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς*, Eur. Alc. 967 *Θρῄσσαις ἐν σανίσιν, τὰς Ὀρφεία κατέγραψεν γῆρυς.* Orpheus was reputed to be the son of Calliope; hence **Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων.** The plural *Μουσῶν* and the use of *ἐγγόνων* ('descendants') rather than *ἐκγόνων* ('children') are intended to express a certain indifference as to the exact legendary relationship, 'descendants of Selene and Muses, as they allege...'

παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν—lit. 'pleasures of the nature of amusement (or play),' i.e. mirthful pleasures, or 'jollities.' For the whole phrase cf. Hdt. VIII. 99 *καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν ἐν θυσίῃσί τε καὶ εὐπαθίῃσι* and IX. 11 *Ὑακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε* (Stallbaum).

εἰσὶ μὲν κ.τ.λ.—**μὲν** is kept back thus far for the sake of the antithesis **ζῶσιν**)(**τελευτήσασιν.** The construction is 'persuading them that not only are there expiations and purifications from their sins by means of sacrifices and mirthful pleasures while men are still alive, but also *for their good when they are dead* there are (certain rites), the same, you know (*δή*), which they call mysteries...'

The meaning is not, of course, that after a man is dead *τελεταί* can be performed to act as a *καθαρμός* for his soul, but that if, while still alive, he is initiated in the purificatory *τελεταί*, his lot after death is assured. It is only the *ἀμύητος* and *ἀτέλεστος* who will lie *ἐν βορβόρῳ* (cf. 363 D). Phaedo 69 C *ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.* Isoc. Pan. § 28 *τὴν τελετὴν ἧς οἱ μετασχόντες περί τε τῆς βίου τελευτῆς καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος ἡδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν.* Antisthenes (ap. Diog. Laert. VI. 4) *μυούμενός ποτε τὰ Ὀρφικά, τοῦ ἱερέως εἰπόντος ὅτι οἱ ταῦτα μυούμενοι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν Ἅιδου μετίσχουσι, Τί οὖν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀποθνήσκεις;* Soph. Frag. 719 *ὡς τρισόλβιοι | κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη | μόλωσ' ἐς Ἅιδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ | ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.*

365 A. ἐκεῖ—in Hades. See note on 330 D.

μὴ θύσαντας κ.τ.λ.: after **πείθοντες...ὡς...**

CHAPTER VIII.

ταῦτα πάντα κ.τ.λ. (1) The subject of **ποιεῖν** is **ψυχὰς, ταῦτα πάντα** being dependent on **ἀκουούσας**: 'and when the souls of young people hear all these statements, what do we suppose they do?' or (2) the subject is **ταῦτα πάντα** and **ψυχὰς** is accus. *after* **ποιεῖν**: 'what do we suppose all these statements do to the souls of young people when they hear them?' The position of *ἀκουούσας* makes for the former. *ποιεῖν* is used of the conduct of the soul, which is personified. Cf. Ar. Nub. 319 *ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἀκούσασ' αὐτῶν τὸ φθέγμ' ἡ ψυχή μου πεπότηται*, Xen. Cyr. v. 1. 27 *ἡ γάρ μοι ψυχὴ οὐχ ὡς βουλεύσουσα παρεσκεύασται, ἀλλ' ὡς ποιήσουσα.* Hor. Sat. I. 2. 69 *diceret haec animus.*

[The whole passage may be rendered 'and when young people hear all these authoritative statements made concerning virtue and vice and the way in which gods and men are disposed to respect them, how do we think the minds of those of them act, who have good natural parts and are capable of flitting, as it were, from statement to statement and gathering therefrom what sort of character and what sort of walk in life one must adopt in order to live his life in the best possible way?']

τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα: i.e. statements of such a kind (referring to the *εἴδη λόγων* 363 E) and made with such an accumulation of authority (*ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν* 363 E). In construction the words go predicatively with **λεγόμενα** 'statements made in this shape and with all this warrant.'

ὡς...περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς: lit. 'namely, as to how gods and men are disposed in the matter of respect to be paid to them (respectively).' **τιμῆς** as in 359 C *ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν.* For the genitive (which is ultimately partitive) cf. 456 D *πῶς οὖν ἔχεις δόξης τοῦ τοιοῦδε πέρι;* 571 D *ὅταν ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ* and the common expressions *ὡς ποδῶν ἔχει, ὡς τάχους εἶχεν, εὖ ἥκειν βίου.* Hdt. v. 20 *καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντας ὑμέας ὁρέω μέθης.* Similarly Legg. 869 D *κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔστω τοῦ καθαρὸς εἶναι.*

τί οἰόμεθα...; So *τί φαμεν* often in place of *τί φῶμεν;* and e.g. *ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;* (373 D).

εὐφυεῖς. The word is used either absolutely or relatively (*εὐφυὴς πρός τι*). It is explained inf. 455 B *ἆρα οὕτως ἔλεγες, τὸν μὲν εὐφυῆ πρός τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφυῆ, ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν ῥᾳδίως τι μανθάνοι, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὑρετικὸς*

εἴη οὗ ἔμαθεν, ὁ δὲ πολλῆς μαθήσεως τυχὼν καὶ μελέτης μηδ' ἃ ἔμαθε σῴζοιτο; cf. Aristot. Eth. N. III. 5. 17.

ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι. The metaphor (from bees) is qualified by **ὥσπερ**, after the Greek manner.

[The appearance of **ἐφιπτάμενοι** in a correction of Par. A perhaps makes it desirable to state that the Attic prose forms are *πέτομαι, πτήσομαι, ἐπτόμην (πτέσθαι, πτόμενος)*. Tragedy uses also *ἔπτην (πτῆναι, πτάς), ἐπτάμην*. But *πέταμαι* and *ἵπταμαι* are unclassical. See Rutherford New Phryn. Art. ccxcviii.]

συλλογίσασθαι—with a play upon the notion *συλλέγειν*. The 'gathering' of a logical inference is the literal sense, but the notion of gathering honey is, of course, suggested by the metaphor.

πῇ πορευθεὶς: the **ποῖ** of some MSS is less good. The sense is *qua ratione* rather than *quorsum*: 'in what manner of walk.' Cf. Hdt. VIII. 67 *ἐκαραδόκεον τὸν πόλεμον κῇ ἀποβήσεται.*

πορευθεὶς is not simply interchangeable with *πορευόμενος*, but= 'having bent his steps.'

365 B. **λέγοι γὰρ ἄν**... sc. *τις*, from the *τις* preceding.

ἐκεῖνο τὸ... 'that well-known saying' (cf. *honestum illud Solonis*, Cic. Senec. § 50).

Though the passage does not occur in any extant ode, **ἐκεῖνο** is justified by the evident vogue of the quotation in antiquity. Thus it appears in Maximus Tyrius (circ. 150 B.C.) XVIII. 1, Cicero ad Att. XIII. 38 and 41, Dionysius Halic. de Compos. Verb. 21, and in a citation from Atticus Platonicus by Eusebius (Praep. Ev. XV. (5). 798 D).

The whole fragment (Fr. 232) is reconstructed by Bergk as

πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον
ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνει
ἐπιχθόνιον γένος ἀνδρῶν,
δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἰπεῖν.

πότερον δίκᾳ κ.τ.λ. 'Shall I mount to a loftier castle by means of justice or by means of crooked wiles?' **τεῖχος** is not a 'wall,' as may be seen from the following words, but=*arcem* or *castellum*. Cf. Hdt. III. 14 *παρέλαβε τὸ τεῖχος τὸ ἐν Μέμφι Καμβύσης*, and III. 91 *Λευκὸν Τεῖχος*. So *'Αβώνου τεῖχος* &c.

ὕψιον, not for *ὑψηλόν*, nor for 'more than usually high,' but a true comparative. The question is 'which offers the loftier stronghold?'

ἀναβαίνειν is therefore not to 'mount upon' but to 'go up into,' as to an acropolis. Cf. Hom. Il. I. 497 *ἠερίη δ' ἀνέβη μέγαν οὐρανόν.*

The expression is quoted directly from the poet, whereas Plato himself might more probably have written *ἀναβαίνειν ἐς*...

τὰ...λεγόμενα...φασιν.—For the plural verb used *κατὰ σύνεσιν* see note on 353 C.

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ: 'if *at the same time* I am thought *not* to be so.' *οὐ δοκῶ* is 'I seem not...' rather than 'I do not seem.' Cf. *οὐκ ἐθέλω, οὔ φημι* (=*ἀρνοῦμαι*), *οὐκ ἐῶ* (=*κωλύω*) &c. Similarly in English 'I don't think' 'I don't want to....' The sense therefore becomes the same as if the words had been *ἐὰν καὶ δόξαν ἔχω ἀδικίας*. Hence **ζημίας φανεράς** immediately, these being the consequences of a *positive* reputation for injustice (cf. 361 E, 362 A).

One or two MSS and many editors, through missing the sense of *καὶ* and of *μὴ δοκῶ*, have reversed the order to the weaker **ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ**.

θεσπέσιος—a word of poetical colour, used by Plato mostly with a suggestion of satirical exaggeration. In Euthyd. 289 E the *λογοποιοί* are *ὑπέρσοφοι* and their *τέχνη* is *θεσπεσία*. Inf. 558 A *θεσπεσία καὶ ἡδεῖα ἡ τοιαύτη διαγωγή* (sc. in a perfect democracy). The word does not belong to other Attic prose writers. It occurs, however, in Hdt. III. 113 *ἀπόζει δὲ τῆς χώρης τῆς Ἀραβίης θεσπέσιον ὡς ἡδύ*.

365 C. **οἱ σοφοί**—see 340 E. The 'sage' here is Simonides, from whom the words are quoted by the scholiast on Eur. Or. 782.

The MSS there give the corrupt *τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὰ μάλα θεῖα βιᾶται*, where ΤΑΜΑΛΑΘΕΙΑ stands for ΤΑΝΑΛΑΘΕΙΑΝ. The error shews that **ἀλάθειαν** and not **ἀλήθειαν** is the proper form, as in Par. A.

πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κ.τ.λ.: i.e. *περιγραπτέον περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς* (*ὡς* or *ὥστε εἶναι*) *πρόθυρα καὶ σχῆμα*. **καὶ** is corrective or explanatory (351 B): 'a front (façade) *or* show.'

The passage cannot be acquitted of an incongruous combination of images. 'For my outward appearance in front—(i.e. rendering *πρόθυρα καὶ σχῆμα* as a hendiadys)—I must sketch round myself a sham picture of virtue—[which will look very well if not too closely examined]—while behind I must trail the fox of Archilochus in all its guile and cunning.' However free the sense of *πρόθυρα* may have become, it never wholly lost its connexion with building or sank into the mere equivalent of *τὰ ἐπίπροσθεν μέρη*. Moreover the painting of a *σκιαγραφία* implies a wall. It is therefore impossible to make any clear mental picture out of the sentence as a whole. Whether we call the expression a mixed metaphor or a combination of incongruous metaphors is of little importance. 'In

front I shall be a whited sepulchre: behind will be the fox's tail' is a fair English equivalent. Unfortunately we know nothing of the original context in Archilochus.

σκιαγραφίαν. Properly *σκιαγραφία* is used of colourless outline in light and shade. It is without finish of detail and can only look passable at a distance. Like scene-painting, it becomes meaningless when approached too near. Cf. Parmen. 165 C *οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἓν πάντα φαινόμενα...προσελθόντι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα*, inf. 523 B *τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα.* Thence there attaches to the word a special implication of pretence or falsehood. Cf. inf. 583 B *οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ...οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις*, Aristot. Met. IV. 29. 2 *τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ...ὅσα πέφυκε φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἃ μή ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια*, Crit. 107 C *σκιαγραφίᾳ ἀσαφεῖ καὶ ἀπατηλῷ.*

περιγραπτέον—either (1) 'paint round me,' or (2) 'draw in outline.' The latter sense of *περιγράφειν*, as opposed to *ἀναγράφειν* ('fill in'), is seen in e.g. Aristot. Eth. N. I. 7. 17 *περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι*, and would relieve the pleonasm in **κύκλῳ περὶ...περιγραπτέον.**

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου κ.τ.λ. The same reference underlies Themistius Orat. XXII. 279 A *φύονται δέ τινες καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλώπεκες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνθρώπια σμικρά τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερα τὰς ἀλώπεκας ὄπισθεν ἐφελκόμενα.* There is obviously no connexion between this and the fragment of Archilochus *τῷ δ' ἆρ' ἀλώπηξ κερδαλῇ συνήντετο | πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον.*

ἀλώπεκα—It is an error to say, with Stallbaum, that this = *ἀλωπεκῆν* 'the fox's skin.' The adjectives would be inappropriate. Moreover the point is that the hinder part should be 'fox.'

κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην—sc. *οὖσαν.* Not *τὴν κερδαλέαν κ.τ.λ.* 'In all its guile.' Cf. Thuc. I. 49 *ἐνέπρησαν τὰς σκήνας ἐρήμους.* Soph. El. 1143 *τῆς ἐμῆς πάλαι τροφῆς ἀνωφελήτου.*

The words probably form part of the quotation. Cf. *κερδαλῇ* just cited. Aelian has *ἡ κερδαλέη* alone = *ἡ ἀλώπηξ*, and *κερδώ* is frequent. Pind. P. II. 78 *κερδοῖ δὲ τί μάλα τοῦτο κερδαλέον τελέθει;*

ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, κ.τ.λ. = *at enim*, *ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία.* So *ἀλλὰ δὴ* (inf. D). The words **φησί τις** are not necessary to the sense.

οὐδὲ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—'No, nor yet....' For **γάρ**, see note on 340 A. The notion is that of the familiar proverb *χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά* (497 E).

365 D. ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει: 'we must go in that direction (i.e. the direction above mentioned, the way of hypocrisy and *τὸ δοκεῖν*), as (='for so') the track of the arguments leads us (or 'if we are to follow the track of the arguments').' This is, of course, very different from *ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ᾗ*.... **τῶν λόγων** is not the same as *τοῦ λόγου* but 'all the data,' or 'arguments,' almost=*τῶν λεγομένων* of sup. A. **φέρει**: as in *ἡ ὁδὸς φέρει*, and the English 'this road *takes* you to....'

ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας—'cabals and clubs.' On these see Grote Hist. Greece cap. lxii. (Vol. VII. of 1869).

Such associations were bound by oaths like the one recorded in Arist. Pol. V. 9. 11 "*καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.*" For their purpose cf. Thuc. VIII. 54 *καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς* ('to control trials and offices'), *ἁπάσας ἐπελθὼν καὶ παρακελευσάμενος, ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον κ.τ.λ.*, ibid. c. 81. So Theaet. 173 D *σπουδαὶ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς*, Isoc. 56 D *καὶ τὰς ἑταιρείας συνῆγον, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίᾳ συμφερόντων* (which was the usual custom), *ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ πλήθους ὠφελίᾳ*. The members of a *ἑταιρεία* were called *ἑταῖροι*. Dem. Mid. 521, Lys. Erat. 412 *πέντε ἄνδρες ἔφοροι κατέστησαν ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἑταίρων*. The same kind of clubs existed in Rome under the name of *coitiones*, *factiones*, *sodalitates*, and in the Middle Ages we have *coniurationes amicitiae*.

πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι κ.τ.λ.: i.e. sophists, at whom Plato once more has a passing fling, as he does also at rhetoric, an art distasteful to him. Cf. Gorg. 453 A *λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική*, Phaedr. 271 A &c.

In the Gorgias *σοφιστική* and *ῥητορική* are the *κολακεῖαι* opposed to *νομοθετική* and *δικαιοσύνη*, two virtues which have their spheres in *δημηγορία* and *δίκη* respectively (cf. here *σοφίαν δημηγορικήν τε καὶ δικανικήν*).

With **πειθοῦς** cf. Quintil. Inst. Or. II. 15. 18, *Gorgias apud Platonem* (sc. Gorg. 453 A) *persuadendi se artificem in iudiciis et in aliis coetibus esse ait.* The third (epideictic) division of oratory is one with which we are not here concerned.

Though a proper function of the rhetorical teachers is *θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν* in a given subject (Aristot. Rhet. I. 2. 1), they went too far in undertaking (as did Corax, Aristot. Rhet. II. 24. 11) *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν*—a charge brought against Socrates himself by Aristophanes (Nub. 112 sqq. *νικᾶν λέγοντά φασι τἀδικώτερα*).

In **διδάσκαλοι** there is satire. The sophists *taught* for money. Socrates declared himself no teacher, but only a fellow-learner, or at best a *μαιευτής* of knowledge. **σοφίαν** is equally satirical. See Protag. 312 C for *σοφία* in this connexion.

ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν κ.τ.λ.—'with which resources...,' 'and thus equipped...,' i.e. by means of these clubs and this rhetorical wisdom.

There is chiasmus in the arrangement, the sense being *ἐκ τῶν ξυνωμοσίων βιασόμεθα* (sc. *ἃ ἂν βίας δέηται* 361 B), *ἐκ δὲ τῆς πειθοῦς πείσομεν.*

ὡς...μὴ διδόναι: 'so as to overreach and yet not be punished.' **ὡς** for *ὥστε* is rare in Attic prose, but is familiar in Xenophon and in the Ionic of Herodotus. It occurs once in Thucydides (VII. 34). Plato has it again Symp. 213 B *παραχωρῆσαι γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκεῖνον καθίζειν.* In Lucian it is common. See Goodwin M. and T. §§ 608 sq.

ἀλλὰ δὴ—v. sup. C, *ἀλλὰ γάρ.*

οὐκοῦν...<οὐδὲν> καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν. The reading of Par. A and most MSS is **οὐκοῦν...καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον κ.τ.λ.** But this could only mean 'we, on our side, must take care to be undetected.'

An alteration to **οὔκουν** is of no value, since *οὔκουν καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον* would be unnatural Greek for *οὔκουν οὐδ' ἡμῖν μελητέον.* It should mean 'it is not the case that we also should care,' whereas what is required is 'we also need *not* care.' The latter sense is given by the very poorly supported **οὐδ'** *ἡμῖν* which J. and C. adopt. But how came **καὶ** to be substituted for **οὐδὲ**? It is also given by the *καὶ ἡμῖν* **οὐ** *μελητέον* of one inferior MS. This, however, is manifestly a correction only. Again, there is slight support for *οὐκοῦν...τί καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν*; but, even though we may admit the question after *οὐκοῦν* ('well then'), it is evident that **καὶ** is impossible. 'If the gods do *not* care.. why should we *also* care?' is as bad in Greek as in English. A conjecture of Baiter is **ἀμελητέον**, which may be right, although, as J. and C. perceive, it rather suggests a duty of neglecting than an opportunity of not troubling.

The evidence of the MSS goes to prove an early corruption. The conjecture in the text is based (1) upon a comparison of the two readings **οὐδ'** and **καὶ**, (2) upon the belief that **οὐδὲν** was omitted in most MSS because of being misread in the hypothetical clause already containing **μηδὲν**.

The appropriateness of **καὶ** becomes obvious if we look simply at

the words *εἰ θεοῖς μηδὲν μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν οὐδὲν μελητέον* 'if the gods care nought, we *also* need care nought.'

365 E. **αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν**—'know or have heard of them.' The sense is, more fully, *αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὁποῖοί τινες εἰσί.*

[When it is said that *εἰδέναι τινὰ* is not Greek for *connaître quelqu'un*, the remark is true; but *εἰδέναι τινὰ* is perfectly good and ordinary Greek for *savoir ce qu'on est*, i.e. *εἰδέναι τινά, ὅστις* (*ὁποῖος* &c.) *ἐστί*. Thus in Eur. Med. 39 *ἐγῷδα τήνδε, δειμαίνω τέ νιν* and Ar. Ran. 836 *ἐγῷδα τοῦτον καὶ διέσκεμμαι πάλαι*, the meaning is 'I know what to expect of her, him.']

ἀκηκόαμεν *αὐτοὺς* is made possible by the intervening **ἴσμεν**. The combination would hardly occur alone.

τῶν λόγων=*τῶν λεγομένων*, 'tradition.'

τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν—e.g. Hesiod and Homer. Cf. Hdt. II. 53 *Ἡσίοδον καὶ Ὅμηρον...οὗτοι δέ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες* (on which see Baehr's Excursus, Herod. Vol. I.). Legg. 886 B.

εἰσὶν οἷοι...παράγεσθαι: i.e. *τοιοῦτοι οἷοι*, v. 334 D.

ἀγανῇσιν—so best MSS, though they have **ἀγαναῖσιν** in 364 D. Similarly at that place there are variants *εὐχωλῇς* and *ἀγανῇσι*. In all probability the true Homeric forms were written in some of the texts of Plato by persons who recalled the original passage. As no decision can be final on such a point, it is best to follow the authority of the better MSS.

παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι. The participle defines or specialises the wide **παράγεσθαι**, which might mean 'deceive' or 'mislead,' as well as 'pervert.' Cf. inf. 383 A *ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν*)(Legg. 885 B *εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγομένους*. The notion here is of being 'turned aside' from the exercise of strict justice by means of bribes.

ἀναπείθειν is frequently used of bribing: e.g. Ar. Pax 622 *κἀνέπειθον τῶν Λακώνων τοὺς μεγίστους χρήμασιν*. Cf. the saying of Hesiod *δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει* (which, however, is meant in a more pious sense).

εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον—'well, admitting (as we must of course) that we are to believe them.' **δ' οὖν** implies that the matter must be cut short.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων—'*out* of our ill-gotten gains,' 'out of the results of our injustices.' Cf. Xen. Hell. IV. 8. 9 *τρέφειν τὸ*

ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῶν νήσων ('from the resources of the islands'). Ar. Plut. 569 *πλουτήσαντες δ' ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν.*

366 A. ἀζήμιοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. Par. A omits **μὲν** (which is due to Muretus), but many of the better MSS read **μόνον.** The latter is probably derived from *μον`* (where the accent would represent the final syllable *ον*), a misreading of *μὲν.* On the other side Par. A might easily omit a second *μὲν* after the *μὲν* which introduces the sentence.

With the construction **ἀζήμιοι ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα** (=*οὐ ζημιωσόμεθα ὑπὸ θεῶν*) cf. Thuc. I. 130 *ὢν ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν* (=*μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν*), and sup. 364 D *τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς.*

ἄδικοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.: 'but, as unjust men, we shall not only make gains, but also get off scot-free, by bribing them with prayers when we transgress and commit sin.' The construction of the participles is *πείθοντες αὐτοὺς λισσόμενοι* (=*τῷ λίσσεσθαι*) *ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες* (=*ὁπόταν ὑπερβαίνωμεν κ.τ.λ.*).

An awkward congestion of participles will be found in Gorg. 494 C *λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν* (if the text is sound).

λισσόμενοι is, of course, poetical. The speaker is recalling the Homeric line of 364 E, *λισσόμενοι ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.*

ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. The rule is laid down (by Cobet and others) that with the active *ἀπαλλάττω* an adverb is required, but with the middle an adjective. No doubt custom did favour this distinction, but with the present instance to the contrary cf. Soph. 254 D *ἔστιν ἀθῷοις ἀπαλλάττειν.* So with participle Hdt. III. 69 *οὔ τοί μιν δεῖ χαίροντα ἀπαλλάσσειν.* Lucian Alex. 27 *ἀπήλλαξεν...κατακοπείς.* On the other hand Gorg. 457 D *καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἴσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται.*

ἀλλὰ γάρ—v. 365 C.

ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων—cf. 364 C *εἴ τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων.* The descendants are not punished directly for the crimes of their ancestors, but the *μύσος* or *μίασμα* attaching to an unexpiated crime leads to an *ἄτη* in the family, from which proceed sins and penalties from generation to generation. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1565 *τίς ἂν γονὰν ἀραῖον ἐκβάλοι δόμων; | κεκόλληται γένος πρὸς ἄτᾳ.*

ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος κ.τ.λ.: 'but he (sc. our young *εὐφυής*), following out his reasoning, will say...,' cf. *λέγοι γὰρ ἂν πρὸς αὐτόν* 365 B.

αὖ μέγα δύνανται—these words are accidentally omitted by Par. A and some other MSS (presumably because of the similar ending *τελεταί—δύνανται*).

The article **αἱ** *τελεταὶ* and **αὖ** refer to 364 E: 'here is where the effect of *our* mystic rites *once more* comes in.'

οἱ λύσιοι θεοί—especially those presiding over the *τελεταί*, e.g. Demeter and Dionysus. Cf. Soph. O. T. 921 *Λύκει' Ἄπολλον... ὅπως λύσιν τιν' ἡμὶν εὐαγῆ πόρῃς.*

366 B. **ὡς αἱ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι**—i.e. there are purifying gods—at least all the greatest communities, the centres of illumination, tell me so, and it is not for a humble individual to dispute their word. [There is a special reference to Athens and the Eleusinian mysteries.]

οἱ θεῶν παῖδες: e.g. Musaeus and Orpheus (364 E).

ποιηταὶ κ.τ.λ., 'having become poets and mouth-pieces of the gods,' cf. Ion 534 E *οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἑρμηνῆς εἰσι τῶν θεῶν κατεχόμενοι ἐξ ὅτου ἂν ἕκαστος κατέχηται.* So in Aesch. Eum. 19 *Διὸς προφήτης ἐστὶ Λοξίας πατρός.*

μηνύουσιν—more than *λέγουσι*. They are in the secret and disclose it to the outside world.

CHAPTER IX.

ἔτι—i.e. after all these arguments.

πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας—'in preference to an injustice of the amplest kind' (*τελεωτάτης* 361 A). Not strictly identical with *πρὸ τῆς μεγίστης*.

ἣν ἐὰν...κτησώμεθα. The expression *κτήσασθαι ἀδικίαν* could hardly occur alone, but the addition of the superlative makes the sense 'to secure the results, or profits, of ideal injustice.'

ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος. The participle adds something to **λόγος**: 'the statement *commonly made* by (=the traditional statement of) people in general and supported by the highest authorities.' The sense is, of course, very different from that of *ὁ πολλῶν καὶ ἄκρων*. The **τε καὶ** gives the meaning 'not only general, but including the highest authorities.' The article is not repeated because the *ἄκροι* are included with, not opposed to, the *πολλοί*. With **τῶν πολλῶν** cf. *ὡς αἱ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι* (c. viii. fin.). For **ἄκρων** cf. 360 E. The reference is to the poets and sages (*οἱ σοφοί* of 365 C and *οἱ θεῶν παῖδες* of sup. B

init.). The whole expression recalls 363 E *ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν.*

τίς μηχανή κ.τ.λ. The substantive verb is usually omitted in this expression. Cf. Phaedo 72 D *τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;*

366 C. **ᾧ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει**: 'the man who has the advantage of special resources in the way of...' For **ὑπάρχει**)(*ἐστί* v. 343 E. **δύναμις** is not 'ability' but = *παρασκευή* of 361 B.

ψυχῆς—so the best MSS. The variant **τύχης** is due to the similarity of *ψ* and *τ* (Cobet, Var. Lect., p. 6), and is too general.

The superiority in *τύχη* is sufficiently implied in the particulars enunciated. Moreover **δύναμις ψυχῆς** corresponds to *ἀνδρεία* of 361 B, just as **σώματος** answers to *ῥώμη*, **γένους** to *παρασκευὴ φίλων*, and **χρημάτων** to *οὐσίας*.

ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν—v. 344 E (note).

ὡς δή τοι—'since, as you must admit...,' *nam profecto*. Cf. Phaedr. 242 C *ὡς δή τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μαντικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή.* By itself **ὡς** would assert a fact too positively. **δή τοι** softens the assertion. Later **που** is added to emphasize the deferential tone.

ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι κ.τ.λ. Properly **μὲν** should follow **ἔχει**, but Plato writes as if the sentence were to proceed with e.g. *εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ δηλῶσαι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* The laxity is slight and frequent.

ἱκανῶς ἔγνωκεν: 'has made up his mind on satisfactory grounds.'

ἄριστον: not = *ἄμεινον* (sc. *ἀδικίας*), but 'that justice is (always) the best policy.'

θείᾳ φύσει—For the dat. of cause v. 359 B (*ἀρρωστίᾳ*). For the words cf. Aristot. Eth. N. x. 9. 6, *γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει.* In the present passage **ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν** corresponds to Aristotle's *διδαχῇ*. For virtue and *τὸ θεῖον* cf. inf. 492 E.

366 D. **ψέγει**—the subject *πᾶς τις* is to be supplied from **οὐδείς**. So in Latin *quisque* is often to be supplied after *nemo* (Hor. Sat. I. 1. 3). Stallbaum quotes Symp. 192 E *ταῦτα ἀκούσας οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐξαρνηθείη...ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς οἴοιτ' ἂν ἀκηκοέναι.*

αὐτὸ δρᾶν—v. 358 C.

ὡς δέ, δῆλον: cf. Dem. Timoc. 730 *τὴν διοίκησιν ἀναιρεῖ, τήν θ' ἱερὰν καὶ τὴν ὁσίαν· ὡς δέ, ἐγὼ φράσω.* In such brachylogies it

is equally possible to regard **ὡς** as (1) =*ὅπως* 'and how (it is so)...' or (2) =*ὅτι*, cf. the brachylogic *δηλονότι*, i.e. *ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει*.

εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν—sc. *τοῦ ἀδικεῖν*.

ὅθενπερ...ὁ λόγος...ὥρμησεν...εἰπεῖν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.—viz. 358 B and 362 E. The sentence may be construed in two ways: (1) *ὅθενπερ ἅπας ὁ λόγος ὥρμησε...εἰπεῖν* (*ὅτι*), *ὦ θαυμάσιε κ.τ.λ.*: "whence all this argument, both on Glaucon's part and mine, began to say 'my good sir'...," i.e. *ὁ λόγος* is personified: (2) *ὅθενπερ ἅπας ὁ λόγος ὥρμησε καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ...*(*ὥστε ἡμᾶς*) *εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.* 'whence all this argument started both on his part and mine against you, (whence, I mean, we started) to say....'

The latter is probably the nearer to Plato's mind, although there is little doubt that in reality the sentence is the result of some confusion between the simple *ἐκεῖνο, ὅθενπερ ὁ λόγος ὥρμησε.. πρὸς σέ, ὅτι...*'the fact (with which this argument began) that'... and the simple *ἐκεῖνο, ὅθενπερ ὡρμήσαμεν καὶ ὅδε καὶ ἐγὼ...εἰπεῖν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* Similar in expression is Hdt. VI. 86 *τοῦ δὲ εἵνεκα ὁ λόγος ὅδε ὡρμήθη λέγεσθαι ἐς ὑμέας εἰρήσεται* (J. and C.).

By omitting **εἰπεῖν** we make the construction clear, but the interpolation was improbable.

366 E. **ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων κ.τ.λ.**: 'down from all the earliest demigods whose utterances have been preserved.' **λόγοι λελειμμένοι** are not 'accounts of them handed down to us.' This would rather have been the singular *λόγος*, and it is away from the sense.

The words **μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων** should be joined with **ἀρξάμενοι**, not (as by Stallbaum) with *λελειμμένοι*: 'all of you, from the earliest heroes down to the present generation.' Cf. Legg. 771 C *μέχρι τῶν δώδεκα ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρξάμενος*.

By **ἡρώων** are meant the legendary personages to whom various moral sayings were attributed by poetry or tradition. From these we pass through the more historical sages *μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων*. Among the *ἥρωες* the speaker is probably thinking of Heracles, for whose 'choice' (as told by Prodicus) see Xen. Mem. II. 1. 21.

ἄλλως ἢ δόξας, sc. *ἐπαινῶν ἢ ψέγων*. Cf. 363 A *οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις*.

αὐτὸ δ' ἑκάτερον κ.τ.λ. It is no doubt just possible to make this accus. depend on **ἐπεξῆλθεν**, the words **τῷ λόγῳ** being instrumental. But *ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ* is so familiar an expression in Plato that we are scarcely justified in breaking it apart in this instance and attaching to it an unfamiliar usage. See 349 A (note). In reality

the accus. is *κατὰ σύνεσιν*. Plato wrote **αὐτὸ δ' ἑκάτερον** as if it were to be governed later by e.g. *οὐδεὶς ἱκανῶς ἐδήλωσεν ὅ τι ἐστί*. By the time he reaches **οὐδεὶς...λόγοις** he is no longer alive to the exact way in which the sentence began. Literally 'as for each in itself, regarded as existing with its essential quality in the soul of its possessor and unperceived by gods or men, no one, either in prose or verse, has satisfactorily grappled with the argument that....' Such anacolutha are particularly frequent in sentences which begin with the accusative and delay the verb. Cf. Legg. 819 D *ἐνοῦσάν τινα φύσει γελοίαν τε καὶ αἰσχρὰν ἄγνοιαν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις...ταύτης ἀπαλλάττουσι*.

τῇ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει—dat. of attendant circumstances. Cf. Thuc. VIII. 27 *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι...ἀτελεῖ τῇ νίκῃ...ἀνέστησαν*, and the familiar *ἡ ναῦς ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι*.

ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις—v. note on *ἰδίᾳ λεγόμενον* 363 E.

τὸ μὲν...δικαιοσύνη δὲ—clearness is gained by the substitution of the precise name instead of *τὸ δέ*. Cf. Charm. 161 A *εἴπερ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὄν, αἰδὼς δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ κακόν*.

367 A. ξύνοικος ᾖ. So A and other MSS. A variant is **ξυνοικοίη**. Either is allowable, but the subjunctive is more idiomatic and the adjective preferable.

The expression is somewhat poetical. Cf. Soph. O. C. 1133 *ᾧ τίς οὐκ ἔνι | κηλὶς κακῶν ξύνοικος*; El. 784 *ἥδε γὰρ μείζων βλάβη | ξύνοικος ἦν μοι*, Aj. 611 *θείᾳ μανίᾳ ξύναυλος*. Elsewhere in Plato, Symp. 203 D *ἐνδείᾳ ξύνοικος*, Phileb. 63 D *ἡδονὰς ξυνοίκους*.

ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας. Though *περί* may often be used for *ὑπέρ* (see note on 360 D), there is no clear instance of *ὑπέρ* in the simple sense of *περί*. Examples quoted from Aristotle and Demosthenes need closer examination.

In Hdt. II. 123 *τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὲρ ἑκάστων ἀκοῇ γράφω* the reading is doubtful, variants being *ὑπ'* (which is probably correct) and *περί*. In Hom. Il. VI. 524 *ὅθ' ὑπὲρ σέθεν αἴσχε' ἀκούω* the meaning is 'I am reproached for your sake.' In Apol. 39 E *ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος* = 'on behalf of what has occurred.'

The sense here is 'they would say this on behalf of their view of the relations of justice and injustice.' For this use of **τε καὶ** cf. 364 B *περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς* 'the relations of the gods to virtue.'

φορτικῶς, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ: 'in a vulgar manner,—at least so *I* think.'

The word **φορτικός** expresses 'vulgarity in person, manners or intellect...want of cultivation, especially philosophical cultivation... a coarse habit of mind which looks merely at the surface of things, with little or no faculty of observation or power of distinction, and contents itself with a mere vulgar knowledge shared by the rest of mankind' (Cope, Aristot. Rhet. II. 21. 15). In fact the meaning comes very near to 'Philistine.' Cf. Apol. 32 A *ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ* (i.e. not *χαρίεντα*). Inf. 581 D *τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικήν τινα ἡγεῖται*, Phaedr. 256 B *φορτικωτέρᾳ τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῳ*, Aristot. Eth. N. I. 5. 1 *οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι...οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες*, ibid. IV. 8. 3 connected with *βωμολόχοι*, and Pol. VIII. 7. 6 opposed to *πεπαιδευμένος*.

In the later Greek (of Lucian, for example) its meaning shifted somewhat, and it often = *ἐπαχθής*, of pedantic affectation.

367 B. **κατατείνας**—v. note on 348 A and cf. 358 D.

αὐτὴ δι' αὑτήν—with **ἐστί** rather than with **ποιοῦσα**.

διεκελεύσατο—'challenged you.'

οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν κ.τ.λ.: 'we shall say that you are not praising justice, but semblance, and that you do not blame the *being* unjust, but the seeming so.' Of course *εἶναι* cannot be supplied after **δίκαιον**.

367 C. **τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν κ.τ.λ.**—sup. 343 C.

ὡμολόγησας—viz. 358 A.

τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν—for the gen. cf. 358 A *δοκεῖ...τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους*.

τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων...πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον.... The speaker begins the clause as if he would end with *αὐτά τε αὑτῶν*, but, wishing to insist more upon the second point, he substitutes *πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.*

The addition of extra emphasis to the second member very frequently causes a slight deviation in expression. Cf. Pol. 270 D *ἄλλα τε παθήματα πολλά, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε*, inf. 394 C *ἔν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι*, Thuc. I. 25 *ἅμα δὲ καὶ* after *τε*, and in Symp. 186 E Plato writes *ἥ τε οὖν ἰατρικὴ...κυβερνᾶται, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυμναστική*.

καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή—No climax is intended in **δή**, which merely ends the enumeration. Cf. Meno 87 E *ὑγίεια καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή*. Its force is something like 'and here we will stop.'

367 D. **γόνιμα τῇ αὑτῶν φύσει**: 'effective (productive) in their own nature and not made so by reputation.' Hearing, seeing, &c. are productive of good in themselves; to possess

them is enough; their effectiveness does not depend upon whether we are thought to possess them or not.

That which is **γόνιμον** is that which has a *δύναμις* in itself. Thus *γόνιμα ᾠά* are opposed to *ὑπηνέμια* ('wind eggs'), as containing a *δύναμις* of producing chickens. Cf. Theaet. 151 E *γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον*. It is probable that Plato has this application of the word in mind.

From this sense we pass to that of 'genuine.' Cf. Theaet. 150 C *γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς*)(*εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος*, Ar. Ran. 96 *γόνιμος ποιητής*.

τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης: the construction as with *θαυμάζειν τί τινος*. In full *ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης αὐτὸ τοῦτο* ('simply that'), *ὃ ὀνίνησι τὸν ἔχοντα* (contained acc. as with *ὠφελεῖν*) *αὐτὴ δι' αὑτήν*. **οὖν** brings the matter to the point (cf. 359 C), as after a parenthesis. The sentence which begins with **ἐπειδὴ οὖν**... has grown to some length, and *οὖν* resumes the intention with which it began. Cf. Apol. 29 C *εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε...εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει—a brachylogic, not to say ungrammatical, attachment ('vel si mavis neglegentia' Stallbaum). The thought is *καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ψέγε ἀδικίας ὃ αὐτὴ δι' αὑτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα βλάπτει*.

ἀνασχοίμην—with gen. inf. 564 D *καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος*, 613 C &c.

A better supported reading (given also by Par. A in the margin) is **ἀποδεχοίμην**, but that should mean 'admit that they are right,' 'accept it from them' (cf. 329 E), whereas *ἀνέχομαι* possesses the required sense 'put up with,' 'tolerate.' In the text Par. A gives **ἀποσχοίμην**, which is plainly meaningless and is due to the frequent confusion of prepositions in compounds.

περὶ αὐτῶν—not with **δόξας**, but with the participles.

εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύοις of Par. A is perhaps slightly better than **κελεύεις**. 'I would not put up with it from *you*...unless you were to bid me,' and that, he thinks, is improbable.

367 E. αὐτὴ δι' αὑτήν—Par. A and others have **αὐτὴν δι' αὑτὴν** through (apparently) a false notion that the words should depend on **ἔχοντα**. This is obviously much less elegant, and the expression of B (sup.) is best here also.

CHAPTER X.

ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ ἠγάμην...ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε.... To **ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ** the second member of the sentence would naturally respond with *τότε δὲ...* or *τότε δὲ καὶ....* But in the answer to *ἀεὶ* (*πολλάκις* &c.) the place of *δὲ* is often taken by *ἀτὰρ*, which is somewhat stronger. Thus **ἀτὰρ τότε** would naturally answer to **ἀεὶ μὲν**. To this is added **καὶ**, which emphasizes *τότε* with something like the sense of 'particularly,' as in the familiar *ἄλλως τε καὶ...* and in the *καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον* of 328 B. **οὖν** is hardly translatable (cf. 359 C), but contains the notion of 'however' or 'at any rate' (i.e. 'I always did admire them, but, whatever may be said of that, I did *then* &c.').

Cf. Prot. 335 D *ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ*, Theaet. 172 C *καὶ πολλάκις μέν γε δή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν γελοῖοι φαίνονται*, Hipp. Mai. 282 C *πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ ἀφίκετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τελευταῖα κ.τ.λ.*

A very literal rendering of the particles would give 'I always indeed (**μὲν**) as a matter of fact (**δὴ**) admired them, but, however that be (**οὖν**), I was especially at that time (**καὶ τότε**) exceedingly delighted.'

φύσιν—'ability.' Cf. *εὐφυής* 365 A.

368 A. εἰς ὑμᾶς—'in regard to you': 'wrote verses *upon* you....' Cf. Phaedo 61 B *εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα*. Hdt. IV. 98 *γνώμη ἀποδεχθεῖσα εἰς τὴν γέφυραν*, I. 86, &c. The poet was probably Critias.

ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός: 'ye sons of an illustrious sire,' **ἐκείνου** being used like *illius* ('that famous'). Some translators take it to mean 'of the man there named,' i.e. of Ariston in the line quoted. Not only is this a clumsy anticipation, but in Phileb. 36 D Socrates calls Protarchus *ὦ παῖ 'κείνου τἀνδρός*, where the language shews that the expression was current, being probably a complimentary catch-phrase or stock quotation from some source now unknown.

περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην. The particular battle is unknown. War between Athens and Megara was very frequent. The article **τὴν** need not mean 'the great' or 'famous' battle, but simply 'the battle in which you were engaged' and to which the poet refers.

[Some MSS give **τὴν ἐν Μεγαροῖ μάχην**, wrongly combining ἐν with a true locative form. So in Gorg. 472 A MSS give ἐν Πυθοῖ, except for one which has ἐν Πυθίου. Where the locative-dative form was used ἐν might or might not appear. Cf. Menex. 245 A *αἰσχυνομένη τὰ τρόπαια τά τε Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι καὶ Πλαταιαῖς*. Though copyists certainly had a habit of inserting ἐν where it was not necessary, there is no doubt that the use of ἐν in such places was quite as good Greek as the single locative-dative. Cobet (Var. Lect. p. 201) is too dogmatic. Compare Ar. Frag. 363 *διὰ τοὺν Μαραθῶνι τροπαῖον* (where τὸ could not stand) with Eq. 781 *σὺ γάρ, ὃς Μήδοισι διεξιφίσω περὶ τῆς χώρας Μαραθῶνι*. A large array of instances of both usages is given by Blaydes on Ar. Eq. 1334 (crit. note).]

εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν—'seems apt.'

θεῖον πεπόνθατε: 'you have in you something divine.' The expression refers to their mental state (= *πάνυ θείως διάκεισθε*). Cf. 329 B *κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη* and note.

For **θεῖον** = *θεῖόν τι* cf. Gorg. 485 B *ὁμοιότατον πάσχω*, Xen. Mem. I. 2. 30 *ὅτι ὑϊκὸν αὐτῷ δοκοίη πάσχειν*. Plato Symp. 175 A *ἄτοπον λέγεις*, Meno 97 E, Aesch. Ag. 261, Soph. O. T. 516 sq. *εἰ...νῦν νομίζει πρός γ' ἐμοῦ πεπονθέναι | λόγοισιν εἴτ' ἔργοισιν εἰς βλάβην φέρον*.

ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ—sc. *ἀδικίας*. For the gender cf. 358 C.

δοκεῖτε δή κ.τ.λ. The sense is not as Ficinus renders it 'videmini *autem*,' but 'iam videmini.' **δή** = 'now, as a matter of fact....'

368 B. **τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου**—'your character *in general*.'

ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρήσωμαι: the precise dative can hardly be supplied. It is not *ὑμῖν*, nor *τῷ λόγῳ*, but rather the sense of *τῷ πράγματι*: 'what to do with (the matter).' The same absolute use appears in Protag. 321 C *λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅ τι χρήσαιτο*, Lys. 213 C *τί οὖν δὴ χρησώμεθα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ*, Gorg. 465 E.

[**χρήσωμαι** is the reading of Par. A, but many MSS have **χρήσομαι**. Both are good Greek (for the future cf. Soph. O. C. 1739 *ὅπως μολούμεθ' ἐς δόμους οὐκ ἔχω* &c., Thuc. III. 109 *ἀπορῶν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ πολιορκήσεται...ἢ καὶ ἀναχωρῶν διασωθήσεται*. The senses *non habeo quod faciam* and *nescio quid faciendum sit* are very near to each other, and as apt to be interchanged in the 'indirect deliberative' as the future and the subjunctive in direct questions e.g. *εἴπωμεν; ἢ σιγῶμεν; ἢ τί δράσομεν;* Hence *οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσωμαι* 'I do not know what I ought to do,' and *οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσομαι* 'I do not know what I shall do' (or 'I have nothing which I shall be able to do'). Cobet's dictum (Var. Lect. p. 105) that only the future is used when there is no negative with *ἔχω*, and only the subjunctive

when there is such negative, is true only in the first half, and is but one example of his excessive love of idiomatic rules without exceptions.]

οὔτε γὰρ...)(οὔτ' αὖ...(inf.)
σημεῖον δέ κ.τ.λ., i.e. *σημεῖον δὲ (τούτου) ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου (ταῦτα) ἃ λέγων πρὸς Θρασύμαχον ᾤμην ἀποφαίνειν κ.τ.λ.*
μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ᾖ—'lest it be actually wicked.' See 328 A *ἆρα...οὐδ' ἴστε κ.τ.λ.;*

368 C. **ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα**, i.e. *ἕως ἂν ἔτι ἐμπνέω.*
ἐμοὶ—not *μοι.* "Accordingly I said—just what *my own* opinion was—'the inquiry we are taking in hand is no light one'." **ὅτι** introduces the exact words (cf. 366 D), and **ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν** is to be treated as parenthetical.
τὸ ζήτημα—'the matter in quest,' while below **ζήτησιν**='the method of inquiry.' The distinction is one of *τέλος* and *μέθοδος.*
οὐ φαῦλον=*οὐ ῥᾴδιον.* Cf. 527 D *τὸ δ' ἐστὶν οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι,* Ar. Eq. 213 *φαυλότατον ἔργον* ('the easiest thing in the world'). Inf. 374 E &c.

368 D. **ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί**: either (1) **ἡμεῖς**=*ἐγώ,*

a use which occurs (*a*) freely in poetry, (*b*) in prose, when a *writer* is speaking of himself (the editorial 'we'), when a king so speaks (the royal 'we'), when a modest tone is assumed, and when a speaker is voicing the views of a profession &c.

or (2) **ἡμεῖς** is true plural, Socrates regarding the quest as one conducted, not by himself, but by the company. This is in keeping with **ἐπιχειροῦμεν** above and with the singular in **δοκεῖ μοι** immediately. 'Since you and I are not experts' (after the manner of the sophists) contains nothing offensive to the interlocutors. Cf. 337 A *ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν* (of the sophists), addressed to Thrasymachus. Moreover the same inclusion of his company is distinctly expressed in Theaet. 154 D *οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν κ.τ.λ.*
ἐπειδὴ οὖν...ἐν μείζονι. No difficulty would have been found in this passage if editors had punctuated at **μείζονι.** 'We must conduct the inquiry in the same way in which we should have done, if some one had bidden us read small letters a long way off ...and then (**ἔπειτα**=*ἔπειτα δὲ,* as often) someone had noticed that the same letters exist somewhere else in a larger form and on a larger ground.' Then follows, with an asyndeton common in

Plato, 'It would have seemed (in such a case) a godsend.' Indeed, with **οἶμαι**, there can hardly be said to be an asyndeton at all.

οἷάνπερ ἄν, sc. *ἐποιησάμεθα*. The ellipse is very common in *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, κἂν εἰ* &c. Cf. Gorg. 479 A *φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ παῖς*. With relative, as here, Eur. Med. 1153 *φίλους νομίζουσ', οὕσπερ ἂν πόσις σέθεν*.

ἔπειτα = *ἔπειτα δὲ* v. 336 B.

ἕρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη—cf. Phaedo 107 C *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ σώματος ἀπηλλάχθαι*. For **ἕρμαιον** ('windfall' or 'godsend,' attributed originally to Hermes) v. Cope on Aristot. Rhet. II. 24. 2 (*κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς*).

ἐκεῖνα—'the latter.' They are more remote in consideration, hence *ἐκεῖνα*, 'those others.'

368 E. **πλείων**—not *πλέων* (v. 330 A). 'On a larger scale,' used of quantity, while *μείζων* would express degree, and is therefore out of the question here. Though the state is *μείζων* than the individual, the justice in the case of the individual is as great as the justice in the case of the state. The state, however, contains a wider field for its exercise and a greater aggregate of its exhibition.

369 A. **οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα**—'when that is done, let us examine.' Cf. *οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν* 368 D.

τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα κ.τ.λ.: 'observing in the less the likeness of the greater,' i.e. 'finding the analogy which the less bears to the greater.'

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3. INDEX OF GENERAL MATTERS.

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